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Online reflective practices that are high-stakes – summatively assessed, or used as 
evidence for progression or membership in a professional body – are increasingly 
prevalent in higher education, especially in professional and vocational programmes. 
A combination of factors is influencing their emergence: an e-learning agenda that 
promises efficiency and ubiquity; a proliferation of employability, transferable skills 
and personal development planning policies; a culture of surveillance which prizes 
visibility and transparency; and teacher preference for what are seen as 
empowering pedagogies.  
This thesis analyses qualitative interview data to explore how students and teachers 
negotiate issues of audience, performance and authenticity in their high-stakes online 
reflective practices. Using mask metaphors, and taking a post-structuralist 
and specifically Foucauldian perspective, the work examines themes of performance, 
trace, disguise, protection, discipline and transformation. The central argument is that 
the effects of both compulsory reflection, and writing online, destabilise and 
ultimately challenge the humanist ideals on which reflective practices are based: 
those of a ‘true self’ which can be revealed, understood, recorded, improved or 
liberated through the process of writing about thoughts and experiences.  
Rather than revealing and developing the ‘true self’, reflecting online and for 
assessment produces fragmented, performing, cautious, strategic selves. As a result, 
it offers an opportunity to work critically with an awareness of audience, genres of 
writing and shifting subjectivity. This is rarely, if ever, explicitly the goal of such 
practices. Instead, online reflective practices are imported wholesale from their 
offline counterparts without acknowledgement of the difference that being online 
makes, and issues of power in high-stakes reflection are disguised or ignored. 
Discourses of authentic self-knowledge, personal and professional development, and 
transformative learning are not appropriate to the nature of high-stakes online 
reflection. The combination creates passivity, anxiety and calculation, it normalises 
surveillance, and it produces rituals of confession and compliance. More critical 
approaches to high-stakes online reflection, which take into account 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Online reflective writing that is summatively assessed, used as compulsory evidence 
for progression or membership in a professional body, or both, is increasingly 
prevalent in professional and vocational disciplines in higher education in the United 
Kingdom. Throughout this thesis I am calling this type of reflection ‘high-stakes’. 
High-stakes online reflection is also emerging in higher education more generally, 
through the development and proliferation of national policies for personal and 
professional development, and related matters such as graduate attributes, 
transferable skills, and employability. A combination of additional, less explicit 
factors makes the practice of requiring students to write reflectively online for 
assessment purposes attractive. These include: an increasing emphasis on producing 
flexible, self-regulating workers who take responsibility for constantly developing 
themselves; the belief that knowledge is no longer certain or fixed and that education 
must be about the student self rather than disciplinary knowledge; time pressures 
which make extensive observation of students in practice (on placements, for 
example) less viable for teachers; an e-learning agenda that promises efficiency and 
ubiquity; a culture of surveillance which prizes visibility and transparency; and 
teacher preference for what are seen as ‘empowering’ pedagogies.  
The main problem addressed by this research is that, despite the increasing 
implementation of digital and high-stakes reflective practices in higher education 
courses and programmes, there is a lack of theoretical or empirical work that 
examines the combined impact of digitality and assessment on reflection. As it 
stands, and as will be reflected in my review of the literature, there is a small but 
important body of literature that critically addresses power, assessment and reflection 
in educational settings, but this is not set in the context of the digital. There is some 
key literature that looks at online subjectivity in education, but not in the context of 
reflective practices. And there is a range of work that takes on issues of surveillance, 
privacy and disclosure in digital culture, including blogging culture, but not in the 
context of education or assessment. What we are left with is a large gap between 
what is happening in practice, where teachers and students are grappling with high-
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stakes reflective practices, and scholarly, well-theorised work that problematises it 
and puts it in context. This gap is being filled by small-scale, descriptive accounts of 
practice, which are flourishing as conference papers and articles in educational 
technology journals. These are radically inadequate to the task of understanding, let 
alone justifying or optimising, high-stakes online reflective practices. 
This thesis offers a theoretical framework for analysing high-stakes online reflection, 
and in doing so it aims to contribute to a richer and more critical approach to the 
practices that fall into this category. It looks at practice across a range of subjects, 
levels and modes. It focuses on how teachers and students negotiate the tensions that 
are produced when assessment, professional identity and an expectation of 
authenticity are brought together in an online context, as they are with high-stakes 
online reflection. My central argument is that the effects of both compulsory 
reflection, and writing online, destabilise and ultimately challenge the humanist 
ideals on which reflective practices are based: those of a ‘true self’ which can be 
revealed, understood, recorded, improved or liberated through the process of writing 
about thoughts and experiences. Rather than revealing and developing the ‘true self’, 
reflecting online and for assessment purposes produces fragmented, performing, 
cautious, strategic selves.  
Using the metaphor of the mask as a structuring principle, and taking a post-
structuralist and specifically Foucauldian perspective, this work examines and 
theorises issues of reflection and develops themes of performance, trace, disguise, 
protection, discipline and transformation. Along with these mask metaphors, which 
structure each chapter, there are some topics that run through the thesis as a whole: 
subjectivity, power and digitality. I argue that high-stakes online reflection offers an 
opportunity to work critically with these matters, and each chapter’s conclusion 
offers some ideas about how high-stakes online reflection could be approached 
differently, in line with a post-structuralist, posthumanist perspective on these broad 
topics. These concluding sections build towards the final chapter, which suggests 
further research that could be fruitfully undertaken in this area, and proposes some 
possible digital futures for reflection.  
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Background 
This project emerged from a development project about electronic portfolios (e-
portfolios), which I led in my role as a learning technologist in the School of 
Education at the University of Edinburgh in 2005-61. The literature on e-portfolios 
then, as now, largely took for granted that reflection was beneficial and focused 
mainly on how it could be supported. There was one paper, however, that proposed 
certain tensions – what the authors called “competing paradigms” – being disguised 
by e-portfolio practices (Barrett & Carney, 2005). They called these ‘positivist’ 
(product-driven, performative, externally assessed, based on externally defined 
outcomes) and ‘constructivist’ (process-driven, reflective, learner-constructed 
outcomes) portfolios. They argued that a model of a learner-centred and -owned 
process, which is intrinsically motivating and a stepping stone towards lifelong 
reflective practice, sat on one hand, while on the other were institutional and 
professional demands for accountability, evidence and the performance of 
professional or academic identities (ibid). 
In my own experience, students in Education were being asked to evidence their 
reflective processes for the purposes of assessment, and so the competing paradigms 
that Barrett and Carney proposed raised more questions than they offered answers. 
What happened when these so-called “positivist” and “constructivist” portfolios were 
one and the same? Preparing for a talk at an e-learning event in late 2005, I proposed 
the metaphor that has since come to structure my research. Noting the use of ‘mirror’ 
and ‘map’ as common metaphors for reflection, I offered ‘mask’ as a way of 
expressing the way in which the “constructivist” disguised the “positivist” in e-
portfolio practice. I argued that when what is being assessed or judged is the 
learner’s ability to be reflective, reflection itself is performative. With my curiosity 
sparked, and my soon-to-be supervisors supportive, I put forward this doctoral 
project as a way of exploring this hypothesis further. 
                                                
1 E-portfolio Research & Development in Education @ Edinburgh project: http://www.erdee.org.uk. 
Retrieved 6/8/2011. 
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The landscape of online reflection in UK higher 
education 
Two factors in particular are converging to produce an increase in online reflection 
in higher education in the UK. The first is the UK’s Quality Assurance Agency’s 
Progress Files initiative (QAA, 2000), which requires universities to provide 
structure and support for Personal Development Planning (PDP) for all students. This 
policy move has resulted in a flurry of interest in reflection, especially online 
reflection, and institutions are embedding PDP at a number of levels, including by 
assessing it as part of the formal curriculum. This policy is having a major impact on 
how reflection is perceived and integrated in higher education in the UK: “as 
enshrined in PDP… reflection is now expected to form part of every student’s 
analytical learning-to-learn armoury” (Clegg, 2004, p.292).  
The second factor is the transition, at all levels of the university, from paper-based to 
electronic practices. Moving practices and procedures online is seen as a natural and 
unproblematic progression towards efficiency and accountability (Goodfellow & 
Lea, 2007, p.30), and a sign of the university keeping up with the times. In 
professional subject areas, these paper-based practices include the tracking and self-
observation of students on placements through reflective journals, portfolios and 
logs. Reflection on practice has been part of the landscape of professional education 
for several decades (Schön, 1987) and is one of the key pedagogies in disciplines 
such as education, medicine and social work. There is, therefore, a firmly established 
precedent for assessing reflection, and both the reflection and the assessment is now 
moving online. At the present time the most common online environments for 
reflection are weblogs (blogs) and e-portfolios. Often these environments are 
provided at institutional level for PDP purposes and are adopted and adapted by 
programmes for their own use in assessing reflection. Some programmes opt to use 
their own bespoke or off-the-shelf environments, and occasionally they use tools or 
environments provided by professional bodies connected with their disciplines. 
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I have found it helpful to group online reflective practices in higher education into 
four main categories: informal, extra-curricular, low-stakes and high-stakes. Some 
students, tutors, lecturers and researchers engage in voluntary reflective writing, 
primarily weblogging (blogging), outside the formal structures of their institutions. 
These practices can be intimately connected with research, teaching and learning but 
are informal in nature. Extra-curricular activities, structures or processes are often 
now put in place in institutions to support transferable skills, PDP, and employability 
agendas. These are usually unrelated to formal coursework, and are often supported 
by careers staff, personal tutors or directors of study, or provided as optional and 
non-supported activities through an institutional e-portfolio or purpose-built PDP 
system. These activities are both dependent upon and intended to foster self-
motivated learners who value reflection and are prepared to invest time in writing 
about their own progress in an institutionally-provided or -sanctioned digital space 
(Clegg, 2004). 
Online reflection is sometimes included as part of a course or programme as a non-
assessed, non-compulsory, peer-assessed or minimally formatively assessed 
component. In some cases this low-stakes reflection is intended as a developmental 
stage towards a summatively assessed project. In other cases, it is supposed to be 
entirely student-led and (particularly in professional education) habitual as students 
strive to become members of professional communities which prize self-regulation 
and continuing professional development. In addition, discourses of ‘effective’ or 
‘deep’ learning often privilege the ability to reflect and self-regulate as the hallmark 
of a good student (Nota, Soresia, & Zimmerman, 2004). Teachers are sometimes 
wary of assessing reflective writing directly as it is assumed to be an inappropriate 
object of judgment or measure of quality (Hargreaves, 2004; Hinett, 2002). 
Competing discourses, which claim that to be a good student you have to reflect, but 
reflective writing belongs outside the academic gaze, may partly account for the 
many reports in the literature about confusion and modest participation from students  
in low-stakes reflection (Tosh, Light, Fleming, & Haywood, 2005).  
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I have defined high-stakes reflection as reflection which is summatively assessed or 
which serves a gatekeeping function in terms of entry, progression or continued 
membership in a profession or professional body (Ross, 2011). The specific rubrics 
or standards applied to these practices vary from discipline to discipline and course 
to course, as do the models of reflection they are based on, but they usually involve 
judgments of critical thought, the application of theory, evidence of growth and 
development, and the impact of institutional learning on individual practice. This 
category of reflection has been the focus of my research. 
There is no quantitative research that conclusively establishes the prevalence of high-
stakes online reflection in the UK. The work of the UK’s Centre for Recording 
Achievement over the past five years provides the best picture available. In a recent 
article, Strivens and Ward (2010) reported the results of a 2008 survey of universities 
with regard to their progress with PDP provision for students. In this survey, 59% of 
the 85 institutions that responded2 self-reported that PDP was “mostly” or “very 
well” established at undergraduate level, and more than 60% made the same claim 
for their postgraduate provision (Strivens & Ward, 2010, p.7). When asked about 
assessment:  
over two-thirds of respondents claimed that PDP activities were assessed in 
their institution. Over 80% of respondents said that PDP was embedded in 
credit-bearing modules in at least some curriculum areas, however, 70% 
said that PDP was also delivered outside the curriculum for some students, 
typically through personal tutors. (ibid) 
In a project funded to look at the use of e-portfolios for formative and summative 
assessment, the Centre for Recording Achievement produced case studies of 34 
programmes which, in 2008, were making use of such assessment (Strivens et al., 
2009). Twenty-eight of these programmes (82%) included a summative element. 
This study found, as I have, that while there is a range of subject areas incorporating 
online reflection into their practices, those that are assessing reflection are most 
                                                
2 133 institutions are recognised by Universities UK, the representative organisation for the UK’s 
universities, at time of writing: http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/AboutUs/Pages/About-Us.aspx , 
retrieved 13 August, 2011. 
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likely to be professional or vocational. This is likely to reflect the extensive prior 
experience of reflective practice, and the establishment of reflection as a legitimate 
form of academic discourse, in these disciplines. 
These numbers should be treated with caution, and not used to make too many 
assumptions about the sector as a whole, for several reasons. First, even in 
programmes that are reported as undertaking some form of summative assessment of 
PDP, the actual practices this encompasses can vary considerably: from a pass/fail 
log, to activities which are incorporated into essays but not assessed directly, to 
activities which are directly assessed within a portfolio. In addition, not all activities 
which are considered PDP would necessarily have a reflective element. Résumé or 
CV-building tools, for example, are a common feature of e-portfolio environments. 
Second, there are other types of online environment used for assessing reflection; 
principally blogs. Third, as Strivens et al note, there is under-representation of 
research-intensive institutions amongst respondents, and the assessment of online 
reflective practices in those institutions might be different in character and quantity 
to those in teaching-led universities. 
Nevertheless, what can be concluded from this data is that high-stakes online 
reflection is taking place in higher education in the UK, and that while it may still be 
a minority activity, it is not a peripheral one. Indeed, I predict that professional 
education is leading the way in practices that will become more mainstream in even 
traditional academic disciplines, as the employability and transferable skills agenda 
takes greater hold across university education and programmes are required to show 
how their students are being prepared for their working lives.  
The metaphor of the mask  
When worn, masks produce hybrids of the body and technology – Pollock (1995) 
calls them “body techniques” (p.581). They are artificial, in the sense that they are 
not materially of the body. However, their relationship to the face, and to identity, is 
profound. They can be formed to replicate the face (as in the case of death masks), to 
protect the face (as with armour or work masks) or to hide the identity of the wearer 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 8 
(as with disguises). I propose the metaphor of high-stakes online reflection as ‘mask’ 
as a useful way to think about matters of audience, authenticity and normativity, and 
I have identified six genres of mask: performance, trace, disguise, protection, 
discipline and transformation (Ross, 2011). This thesis is structured so that each of 
the chapters that present data from my research (Chapters 4–9) discusses and 
theorises one kind of mask.  
In this thesis, I am using these genres as follows. 
Genres of mask used in this thesis 
 3 
performance – masks worn to portray a character, for the benefit 
of an audience. Chapter 4 explores how students perform 
particular sorts of reflective identities, and their awareness of 
different sorts of audiences in doing so. 
 4 
trace – death masks, which are commemorations of a person who 
has died, and are more or less faithful representations, or traces, of 
that person, formed from an impression of their face post-mortem. 
Chapter 5 asks how we might see digital archives and databases, 
which store the reflective writing of students, as traces, and what 
this implies about subjectivity, authenticity and ownership. 
 5 
disguise – masks that are intended to hide a person’s identity. 
Chapter 6 applies the metaphor of the mask as disguise to 
reflective practices themselves, showing how ‘authenticity’ and 
‘development’ disguise practices of surveillance and confession, 
and the governmentality of reflection. 
                                                
3 Creative Commons licensed work by Giant Gingkgo, 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/giantginkgo/162974551/ 
4 L’Inconnue de la Seine, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Inconnue.jpg. Retrieved 6/8/11. 
5 Stock image by Brasil2, http://www.istockphoto.com 
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6 
protection – strong masks worn to protect the face and head while 
doing dangerous work. Reflection is normative in its use of 
templates and the presence of legitimate narratives, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 7. These can protect students from the 
vulnerability of confession, but at the cost of limiting and 
constraining other possibilities of expression. 
7 
discipline – masks with a normative dual purpose of restraining or 
injuring the wearer, and displaying the consequences of 
unacceptable behaviour to the wider community. The normativity 
of reflection in professional education produces professional 
identities through processes of repetition and training, with the aim 
of shaping the practice of would-be professionals. This is 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
8 
transformation – masks worn during rituals or ceremonies to 
enhance states of liminality and produce transformative effects on 
the wearer and the community. Reflection is intended to transform 
practice and selfhood through contemplation over time, but in 
Chapter 9 I explore how online reflection can produce shifts in 
subjectivity which relate to speed, risk and fragmentation. 
 
There have been three main fields of study that have focused on the mask: social 
anthropology, social psychology and theatre studies. Where I draw on existing 
analysis of masks in subsequent chapters, this comes mainly from theatre studies 
(Chapters 4 and 8), and from social anthropology (Chapter 9). Here I briefly outline 
the general perspectives taken by these three disciplines to show some of the many 
ways the mask has been thought about as cultural artefact, metaphor and apparatus. 
                                                
6 Stock image by KeithBinns, http://www.istockphoto.com 
7 © 2005 David Monniaux; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Branks_dsc05369.jpg. Retrieved 
6/8/2011. 
8 Stock image by stellalevi, http://www.istockphoto.com 
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From a social anthropological perspective, masks are deeply revealing of cultural 
values and understandings. They can deliberately produce new sorts of identities, 
through ritual or performance masks, or can, through discipline masks, enforce 
acceptable standards of behaviour and identity. Pollock (1995) argues that the 
relationship of the mask to its meaning is not arbitrary, but calls on the conventions 
through which identity is “displayed, revealed or hidden” in a given culture (p.582). 
Masks work, he maintains, by “operating upon the particular ways in which identity, 
or personhood, is expressed in any culture” (p.584). Similarly, Tonkin (1979) argues 
that a mask “takes meanings on itself and appears charged with Power because it is 
the focus of concentrated symbolism, whose associated meanings and emotions 
reverberate off one another” (p.246). It is therefore a site of cultural meaning-
making, and masked rituals and performances “can only be understood as a 
performance with complex interactions between Masks and non-maskers” (p.243). 
In social psychology – particularly in the field of symbolic interactionism – 
approaches to the notion of the mask have been largely metaphorical and have 
tended to focus on issues of identity and social performances. Symbolic 
interactionism emerged from the 18th century Scottish moralists and Adam Smith’s 
proposition that action “is (morally) regulated by [a] process of the functioning of the 
divided ‘looking-glass self’… and self-regulated action amounts to conduct” 
(McCall, 2006, p.3). In the 1920s, American sociologist Robert Park suggested that 
the role that individuals define for themselves and strive to live up to becomes a 
mask, and that this mask of the “self we would like to be” is in fact the “truer self” 
(Park in McCall, 2006, p.8). In the 1950s and 60s, both Anselm Strauss and Erving 
Goffman explored the notion of performance of self from a symbolic interactionist 
perspective. Strauss (1997)  argued that: 
everyone presents himself to the others and to himself, and sees himself in 
the mirrors of their judgements. The masks he then and thereafter presents 
to the world and its citizens are fashioned upon his anticipations of their 
judgements. The others present themselves too; they wear their own brands 
of mask and they get appraised in turn. (p.11) 
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Goffman’s (1969) work on identity performance in everyday life went further, 
suggesting that what we think of as unique humanity is a socialized self – a 
performed character (Branaman, 1997, p.xlix). The self is a doubled self, both “the 
mask that the individual wears in social situations, [and]… the human being behind 
the mask who decides which mask to wear” (p.xlvii). Both Strauss and Goffman 
explored how these performances are constructed and made to appear convincing.  
Theatre studies has investigated the nature of the relationship between actor, text and 
mask in masked performance. Literature in this area is concerned with the expressive 
possibilities of masks and the challenges of staging performances using them. Emigh 
(1996) is one key writer who discusses masks from a theatre studies perspective, and 
he argues that the mask fundamentally changes the nature of theatrical performance: 
I learned in stages that I couldn’t just take more or less appropriate masks, 
put them on actor’s faces, and have them speak lines from a selected text. I 
ended up having to rethink the whole process of acting. (p.248) 
He describes a time spent in Bali learning to perform with masks. He recounts this 
story about learning the intricate dance steps that would eventually be performed 
while wearing a mask: 
As I sometimes will do when concentrating, I had my face screwed up and 
tongue grotesquely stuck out. [My teacher] Kakul stopped and laughed and 
said … “your face – what are you doing with your face?” And I said, “Oh, 
that’s going to be covered by a mask anyway.” And Kakul suddenly 
looked very stern and said that, no, the mask was not a disguise. It hid 
nothing. (p.249) 
The complexity of the mask – in performance, in social contexts, and in cultural 
discourse – makes it a fruitful metaphor for complex reflective practices. While 
transformation, disguise and performance have been extensively explored in the 
literature described above, other less commonly analysed genres – discipline, trace 
and protection – are equally generative in the context of this research. These genres 
fit particularly well with a post-structuralist emphasis on discourse, which underpins 
this research. 
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Power, discourse and post-structuralism 
A post-structuralist, and specifically Foucauldian, perspective has been adopted here 
because it offers a framework for high-stakes online reflection that takes into account 
how complex discourses of reflection are produced and reproduced, and how they 
circulate at individual, ‘classroom’, institutional and societal level.  
A central premise of a post-structuralist position is that discourse shapes and bounds 
what can be said and thought. Foucault (1977b), whose theories of power, confession 
and governmentality are central to this thesis, defined discursive practices as being: 
characterized by the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a 
legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms 
for the elaboration of concepts and theories. Thus, each discursive practice 
implies a play of prescriptions that designate its exclusions and choices. 
(p.199) 
Delimitation, definition and fixing are all normative moves, which have the effect of 
settling (in some particular context) what counts, and what does not count, as truth. 
Context matters, because we are always in a historical moment with regards to our 
power-knowledge configurations:  
Power and knowledge are not external to one another. They operate in 
history in a mutually generative fashion. Neither can be explained in terms 
of the other, nor reduced to the other. (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p.114) 
It is therefore of both interest and relevance to explore the contexts of high-stakes 
online reflection in higher education, to try to understand how discursive practices in 
this setting are affecting what students and teachers do and how they can think about 
matters of reflection and subjectivity. What is particularly productive is to tease out 
where discourses might come into conflict with one another, as these are the spaces 
where new things can, and do, take place. Subsequent chapters undertake this work, 
with Chapters 2, 6 and 8 focusing in particular detail on Foucauldian theory and its 
use in understanding high-stakes online reflective practice. 
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Humanism 
A key argument in this thesis is that reflection is based on a humanist ideal of the 
autonomous, authentic self, and that this ideal is problematic and requires critique. 
Humanism is and always has been associated with a very broad spectrum of ideas, 
and as Davies (1997) puts it, “the meaning of ‘humanism’ is the semantic tangle, or 
grapple, that makes its meanings so difficult to grasp” (p.128). Similarly, Foucault 
(1984) rejects a reliance on the concept of humanism as explanatory or fixed, 
because “the humanistic thematic is in itself too supple too diverse too inconsistent 
to serve as an axis for reflection” (online).  
I must therefore say here what I mean by humanism. For my purposes, Belsey’s 
(1985) definition of liberal humanism is suitable: 
A commitment to man, whose essence is freedom. Liberal humanism 
proposes that the subject is the free, unconstrained author of meaning and 
action, the origin of history. (p.8) 
Usher and Edwards (1994) argue that education is fundamentally a humanist 
enterprise:   
The very rationale of the educational process and the role of the educator is 
founded on the humanist idea of a certain kind of subject who has the 
inherent potential to become self-motivated and self-directing, a rational 
subject capable of exercising individual agency. The task of education has 
therefore been understood as one of ‘bringing out’, of helping to realise 
this potential, so that subjects become fully autonomous and capable of 
exercising their individual and intentional agency. (pp.24-5) 
These notions of autonomy and agency, of essential human attributes and potential, 
and of rationality, underpin the understanding of humanism that is critiqued in this 
research. These are problematic notions, because, as postmodernist and post-
structuralist critique has argued, they mask the workings of power and discourse that 
construct and validate what is called ‘essential’ human nature. 
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Foucault (2002)  argues that the notion of “man” and his so-called essential nature is 
misguided and dangerous: 
Man had long since disappeared and would continue to disappear… our 
modern thought about man, our concern for him, our humanism, were all 
sleeping serenely over the threatening rumble of his non-existence. Ought 
we not to remind ourselves – we who believe ourselves bound to a finitude 
which belongs only to us, and which opens up the truth of the world to us 
by means of our cognition – ought we not to remind ourselves that we are 
bound to the back of a tiger? (p.351) 
For Foucault (1982), the important questions are about the shifting historical nature 
of our subjectivity and its construction (p.777). The purpose of critique is to “move 
beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers. Criticism indeed 
consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits” (Foucault, 1984, online). 
“Humanity” is a performance, a process of normativity or ordering through language: 
[Foucault] understands that this “order” conditions the possibility of his 
becoming, and that a regime of truth, in his words, constrains what will and 
will not constitute the truth of his self, the truth he offers about himself, the 
truth by which he might be known and become recognizably human, the 
account he might give of himself. (Butler, 2005, p.30) 
Biesta (1998) calls this the “radical historicity of our subjectivity” (p.10), and 
maintains that what Foucault has offered us is an understanding of subjectivity that 
frames “man” not as a fact but: 
a specific solution to a specific problem. Man, in short, is an answer and 
the question that needs to be solved is what kind of an answer he is. 
Foucault gives a clue, in that he presents modernity as a kind of escapism 
that simultaneously tries to acknowledge and deny the finitude of the 
subject. (p.9) 
As a result of the challenges to humanism put forward by Foucault, Biesta has 
claimed that a postmodernist orientation towards pedagogy is one that has to “do… 
without a deep truth of what it is to be human. It cannot take recourse to an original 
nature of the subject (not even its social or political nature)… In this sense, it is a 
pedagogy without humanism” (p.13) . This thesis explores, in part, what such a 
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pedagogy without humanism would look like for high-stakes online reflective 
practices in higher education. 
Outline of this thesis 
In Chapter 2, I review four strands of literature of particular relevance to this work: 
governmentality and Foucauldian understandings of power and confession; online 
subjectivity; reflective practices and writing in higher education; and online 
reflection. These four strands help to justify and locate the research I have done. 
Chapter 3 describes the methodology I have used in researching high-stakes online 
reflection in higher education and the post-structuralist theoretical perspectives 
underpinning my approach to research more broadly. 
Chapters 4–9 are structured around mask genres. They analyse the data generated as 
part of this project and propose new ways of theorising online and high-stakes 
reflective practices. Chapters 4 and 5 investigate the outward-facing aspects of high-
stakes online reflective practices: first in the performance of reflective identities with 
an awareness of audience, and second in the digital traces or archives these practices 
leave behind. To begin here is to upend, right from the start, the humanist figure of 
the “personal-confessional” self (Bleakley, 2000), in favour of an audience-sensitive, 
performing, strategic self, producing and then forgetting or renouncing digital 
fragments. In Chapter 4, I focus on the uneasy alignment of assessment, discourses 
of reflection, and awareness of audience that characterise the reflective practices in 
my research, and propose Bakhtin’s theory of addressivity as a means of 
understanding this uneasiness as a problem, not specifically with assessment, but 
with conceptions of reflection. Chapter 5 looks at how students and teachers 
describe, and in some cases deny, the digitality of their practices. Themes of control, 
privacy, disclosure and ownership emerge and are discussed and analysed. I offer 
online reflection as a generative space which can work with, not deny, its ‘webness’. 
These chapters build the contextual frame – the institutional practices of feedback 
and assessment in the case of performance, and the webness of online reflection in 
the case of the trace – that the concerns of subsequent chapters will sit within. 
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Chapter 6 returns to Foucault’s theories of confession, surveillance and 
governmentality first introduced in Chapter 2. It explores in detail the alignment of 
these theories with practices of online reflection and sets up the discussions of 
normativity and discipline that follow in Chapters 7 and 8. I argue that discourses of 
development and authenticity disguise the governmentality of reflection. The 
workings of power, surveillance and self regulation are explored and illustrated with 
data from my interviews, and I close by outlining some possible strategies for 
resistance to problematic discourses of surveillance and authenticity. 
In Chapter 7, I explore two aspects of normalisation: how students produce what 
Hargreaves (2004) has called “legitimate narratives of reflection”, and how the 
templates and interfaces of online reflective tools and environments work to 
construct a particular vision of reflection and standardise student output within the 
terms of that vision. I conduct a brief visual analysis of one highly-structured e-
portfolio environment, PebblePad, and argue that if we stop attempting to shield 
students from the experience of the blank page, and stop overstructuring their 
reflective environments, these can become spaces of activity rather than imitation. 
Students can negotiate personal styles and find creative ways to produce reflective 
accounts that are convincing without having to pretend at authenticity. 
Chapter 8 proposes that processes of normalisation actively produce new things, 
though the complexity of disciplinary discourses means these are not necessarily the 
things that are intended. This chapter positions professional education and practice as 
a space of supercomplexity and disorder, and argues that teachers in professional and 
vocational subject areas must acknowledge their own stake in reproducing practices 
of division, categorisation and regimentation through pedagogies of reflection, and 
must examine their practices from a political and discursive, not just an individual, 
perspective. They might then teach students to manage conflicting ways of knowing, 
while supporting uncertainty and openendedness. 
I move on, in Chapter 9, to propose a way of looking at online reflection as a space 
of shifting subjectivity, speed and digitality, and contrast this with the more typical 
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story of deep change over time that is usually told about reflection and 
transformation. The speed and looseness of digital flows presents an opportunity to 
look towards fragmentation, gatherings and a posthumanist sensibility, and offers 
‘fast’ openings through which to experiment with representing subject positions. A 
critical and conscious appreciation of what webness can offer helps us to reframe 
reflection for a digital context that has positive gains, not just losses. 
Finally, in the concluding chapter, I review the contribution that this research has 
made, suggest areas of future research that might be undertaken to build on the work 
I have presented in this thesis, and propose the ‘spectacle’ and the ‘placeholder’ as 
concepts to underpin fruitful digital futures for reflection. 
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Chapter 2: Power, subjectivity, digitality 
and reflection – reviewing key literature 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature in four key areas:  
governmentality, the online subject, reflective practices and writing in higher 
education, and online reflective writing in blogs and e-portfolios. Taken together, 
these four strands situate the research I have undertaken. The first two are primarily 
theoretical, while the latter two engage with the practice context in which this 
research is immersed.  
My research is interdisciplinary, not only in its exploration of high-stakes online 
reflective practices across a number of disciplinary contexts, but in its connections to 
cultural studies, educational theory, politics and philosophy. In selecting and 
discussing ideas in this chapter, I have not attempted to be exhaustive, but rather to 
provide the most helpful context I can for understanding the research I have 
undertaken, and the reasons why it is interesting, relevant and necessary. 
Each part of this chapter stands alone as an analysis of a specific body of literature 
relevant to this research. There is an overall argument, too, which is that there are 
important theoretical perspectives that have not, as yet, been applied to high-stakes 
online reflection. Discourses of reflection in education have been so overwhelmingly 
humanist that there has been little room for other possibilities. Perhaps relatedly, 
debates about online subjectivity have been all but ignored by the literature on online 
reflection. This chapter asks what questions about high-stakes online reflection are 
raised by theories of governmentality and online subjectivity, and examines how and 
where these questions might trouble the rhetoric of reflection so prevalent in 
educational theory. 
This research is heavily indebted to the work of Michel Foucault and to writers who 
have explicitly applied his thinking to education and reflection. Foucault’s theories 
of the nature of subjectivity, self, language and power have significantly informed 
my own thinking about the problems and possibilities of high-stakes online reflection 
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in higher education. In particular, his later work on the technologies of the self and 
on neo-liberal governmentality, since taken up and expanded on by others, have been 
crucial in the development of my research. In the next section, I review this work and 
its application to higher education. 
Power, governmentality, confession and pedagogy 
Foucault was a French social philosopher whose writing and lectures about the 
nature of power have been tremendously influential in many disciplines over the past 
30 years. His historical analyses of social systems demonstrated that there is nothing 
natural in the social world, but rather an ever evolving circulation of power, 
discourse and ideas that govern what can (and, importantly, cannot) be considered 
not only acceptable, but real. Reality, for Foucault, is a complex discursive construct, 
and governing reality takes place at the level of societies, institutions and individuals. 
His work has been taken up by a number of theorists to explain how educational 
institutions are implicated in the work of governing the self and society, and some of 
this work will be discussed in this section. 
For Foucault, power and discourse are intimately entwined. The ways in which 
knowledge is constructed and represented through language are the ways in which 
people can understand and represent themselves (Hall, 2001, p.72) and (as we will 
see in the next section on online subjectivity) the categories into which they can be 
sorted. The shifting boundaries of what can and cannot be thought, let alone said, are 
the primary sites of power in contemporary life. Though Foucault accepts the 
existence of material things, he claims there is no meaning without discourse (ibid, 
p.73). Furthermore, knowledge and power “operate in history in a mutually 
generative fashion. Neither can be explained in terms of the other, nor reduced to the 
other” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p.114). 
Power does not belong to an individual; it is a technology, not an attribute: “it does 
not matter who exercises power. Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate 
the machine” (Foucault, 1977a, p.202). In this sense, as Latour (1986) has argued, 
the person giving a command is less “powerful” than traditional sociological 
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understandings of social functioning would assume. Power has been understood in a 
negative, repressive and individual way primarily, Foucault (1998) argues, because 
“its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms” (p.86). If power 
is understood as a limit imposed by another or by a system, which can (perhaps) be 
resisted, then individuals can retain a sense of agency. If, on the other hand, power is 
produced and reproduced at the level of discourse, agency is far less clear-cut. 
Foucault does emphasise the possibility of resistance, claiming that, as Youdell 
(2006) puts it, “no discourse is guaranteed” because its meanings can shift and 
“subordinate discourses” can unsettle it (p.515). However, this is still an 
uncomfortable way to understand power, since it is haphazard and elusive rather than 
controlled and visible. 
Foucault (1982) claimed that the main focus of his work was not power for its own 
sake, but the “objectivizing of the subject” (p.777). At different times in history, 
different forms of power have been the primary focus of struggles and resistance: 
domination, exploitation and subjection. He argues that, in our time, subjection (the 
making of individuals into subjects) is in the foreground (pp.781-2). To understand 
the workings of subjection, Foucault (1988) paid particular attention to what he 
called governmentality, which he describes as “contact between the technologies of 
domination of others and those of the self” (p.19). This is both an individualizing and 
totalizing form of power (Foucault, 1982, p.782), employing a “diffuse set of 
strategies and tactics” mobilised by policies and laws of institutions and the state to 
“produce and reproduce subjects, their practices and beliefs, in relation to specific 
policy aims” (J. Butler, 2006, p.52). It has pastoral power as its primary technique 
(Foucault, 1982, p.782). Foucault means pastoral quite literally, tracing its origins in 
the Christian church, which he credits with the invention of a social function (the 
pastor’s) that concerns itself with the individual mind, soul and “innermost secrets”, 
and is “linked with a production of truth – the truth of the individual himself” 
(p.783). Institutions from the state to the family have been mobilized to produce and 
deploy pastoral power. 
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The domination of the self works at the level of self-policing, and Foucault claimed 
in a series of lectures late in his life that a political regime of neo-liberal 
governmentality has been built upon core principles of tracking and using “human 
capital”, panoptic (self) surveillance and confession (Lemke, 2001). I move on to 
discuss this idea, and some work that has emerged from it, in the next section. 
Human capital, technologies of the self and neo-liberal governmentality 
According to Rabinow and Rose (2006), Foucault’s rationale for thinking about 
governmentality in general was to understand how collective conduct could be 
influenced in the service of objectives not explicitly tied to the state (p.200). 
Foucault traces a shift in writing about governing power from the earliest written 
works, which advised kings and rulers about how to keep and exercise power, to the 
16th–18th centuries, where governing took on a broader set of connotations, referring 
to governing of the self, of souls in the religious sense, of children through 
pedagogy, and of the state through sovereign power (Foucault, 1991, p.87). He calls 
this the ‘art of government’ and analyses writings about Machiavelli’s The Prince 
over several hundred years to understand how their authors “attempted to articulate a 
kind of rationality which was intrinsic to the art of government”, while detaching this 
from the figure of the prince himself (p.89). This changing articulation “locates the 
self as a politically constituted subject” (Peters & Burbules, 2004, p.65). Peters and 
Burbules (ibid) go on to argue that governmentality is a necessary concept because 
“the limited conception of power as an institutional and prohibitory phenomenon 
cannot adequately explain the range of power relations that permeate the body, 
sexuality, family, kinship and discourse” (p.66). 
Lemke (2001) provides a useful analysis of Foucault’s claims that 20th century “neo-
liberal” political perspectives (German and American) have resulted in an 
understanding of the worker or wage labourer as entrepreneurial in their 
responsibility for themselves and their development (p.199). By framing social 
matters in essentially economic terms, neo-liberal theory posits subjects who are 
intrinsically rational and amenable to participating in cost-benefit analyses of their 
choices. Rational subjects will accept a conceptual connection between “economic 
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prosperity and personal well-being” (p.202). The neo-liberal subject has his or her 
citizenship “manifested through the free exercise of personal choice among a variety 
of marketed options” (Rose, 1999, p.230). ‘Free’ is often meant ironically by critics 
of this form of governance; freedom is described as an exercise upon the self (Peters 
& Burbules, 2004, p.67), and a “resource for, and not merely a hindrance to, 
government” (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996, p.8). 
Neo-liberalism is dominant not only in the functioning of many governments, but 
also, as we will see, in rationales underpinning the marketisation of higher education, 
so it is necessary to be clear about what this form of governmentality implies about 
the construction of self and power. However, there are a number of theories, not all 
compatible, which fall under the heading of ‘neo-liberal governmentality’. Barnett et 
al (2008), for example, describe a prevalent but uneasy convergence between “neo-
Marxian theories of neoliberal governance” and “Foucauldian theories of 
governmentality” (p.624), claiming that this convergence mistakenly attributes too 
much “strategic intentionality” (p.629) to the effects of government, thus moving 
away from Foucault’s more nuanced understanding of power as circulating, 
discursive and prone to misfire. They call for the study of “emergent rationalities” of 
government in all its forms, shifting away from the “wholly strategic conception of 
action and interaction” they attribute to neo-Marxist proponents of neo-liberal 
governmentality (p.632). 
Rabinow and Rose (2006) critique some current understandings of the related 
concept of “biopower” in the same terms. Biopower is another Foucauldian term, 
which Rabinow and Rose (ibid) define as a “plane of actuality” characterised by: a) 
truth discourses and associated authorities focused on the “‘vital’ character of living 
human beings”; b) ways of intervening in the lives of populations “in the name of 
life and health”; and c) ways of getting individuals to work on themselves “by means 
of practices of the self” (p.197). They argue that the neo-Marxist work of Hardt and 
Negri, for example, empties the concept of biopower of its “critical force”, by 
positing a simplistic “opposition of a mysterious global Empire to an even more 
phantom ‘multitude’” (Rabinow & Rose, 2006, p.199). 
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A general principle of emergent rationalities interests me more than strategic 
intentionality, though it is not always easy to tease these apart in the literature which 
draws on governmentality. It may be that any theory of governmentality or biopower 
is apt to be understood in a strategic sense when applied to situations of practice, 
perhaps partly as a result of power masking its own mechanisms. However, 
governmentality in its ‘emergent’ form can shed light on some of what is happening 
in higher education and how this impacts even on practices which are not supposed 
to be ‘governed’, such as reflection. Levidow (2002) notes the features of neoliberal 
strategies in higher education: 
• all constituencies are treated through business relationships;  
• educational efficiency, accountability and quality are redefined in 
accountancy terms;  
• courses are recast as instructional commodities;  
• student-teacher relations are mediated by the consumption and production of 
things, e.g. software products, performance criteria, etc. (p.229) 
In addition, neoliberal and marketised discourses are used to construct everything 
from the professional development of academics, to the personal development of 
students, to the rise of the ‘student-consumer’: all of which are influenced by, and 
influencing, the adoption of technology and the rise of e-learning in the university 
(Clegg, Hudson, & Steel, 2003). Clegg, Hudson and Steel, in their 2003 close 
reading of a policy speech given by the then UK minister for education David 
Blunkett, energetically refute totalising discourses of globalisation and Information 
Communication Technology (ICT) which, they argue, create rather than describe the 
conditions of learning as ‘big business’. They claim it is still possible for academics 
to create critical spaces of contestation, even within a policy context in which the 
neo-liberal paradigm “systematically denies” such dissent (p.51). 
However, the policy agenda outlined above is, in governmentality terms, being 
transformed and deployed at multiple levels: state, institutional and personal. The 
academic integrity being called on to create these critical spaces is not innocent; it 
has been and is being externally and internally managed, and constructed around 
terms of a debate which have already been laid down. 
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The personal and professional development agenda in higher education, for example, 
constitutes individuals as particular sorts of ‘subjects-in-process’, for whom no 
amount of development is ever enough: “all professional workers need to be 
developed. Moreover, there should be no end to this process – the true professional 
knows that learning is for life” (McWilliam, 2002, p.289). Development, reflection, 
conscientiousness and professionalism are grouped together, providing “scripts for 
turning ourselves into better (more professional) academics” (p.290). The pressure to 
be constantly developing shapes individuals to meet the market’s demand for 
flexible, self-regulating workers who will accept employers’ demands for “explicit 
confessional critical reflection“ (Fenwick, 2001, p.82) and even internalise these in 
forms of voluntary self-surveillance and confession. Such an agenda affects both 
teachers and students, and the result is that a process of “audit and regulation 
displac[es] provision” (Edwards, 2002, p.359). Surveillance and confession in online 
reflection will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
This neo-liberal vision of higher education frames students as consumer-investors, 
“making private choices within a game-structure controlled by government” 
(Marginson, 1997, p.64), and teachers as service providers. Such a model of higher 
education is of a game whose rules are ultimately those of the market. Immersed in 
values of commodification, profit, choice and progress, neo-liberal higher education 
is able to absorb and accelerate even the idea of “reflection” – apparently outside 
such concerns, so obviously focused on the self, not the system – to fit 
developmental and externalised values. Davies (2003) argues of teachers in such 
systems that: “no one can experience themselves as ‘good enough’ when the basis of 
assessment is externalised, constantly escalating, subject to change, and often at odds 
with the professional knowledge on which previous good practice was based” (p.95).  
If, as Deacon and Parker (1995) argue, “resistance is never opposed to power, rather, 
power produces multiple points of resistance against itself, and inadvertently 
generates opposition” (p.118), then the contestation called for by Clegg, Hudson and 
Steel (2003) is part of the circulation of power and the constitution and reconstitution 
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of the field of higher education. There are always such spaces, and they do not float 
independent of the whole – they are an integral part of every paradigm. 
Surveillance, confession and pedagogy  
It is always possible to be corrected… To become again what we never 
were is, I think, one of the most fundamental elements… of this practice of 
the self. (Foucault, 2005, p. 95)  
Formal education thrives on forms of pastoral power, surveillance, technologies of 
the self, and confession. Foucault has written extensively about the techniques of self 
discipline fostered by the panopticon, a model of surveillance which encourages the 
subject to believe they may be watched at any time, and therefore to modify their 
own behaviour to fit the norms of the context in which the panopticon is deployed. 
This normalising panoptic gaze need rarely, if ever, be ‘real’: its possibility is 
enough to ensure the desired behaviour in those who are subject to it. At all levels of 
formal education and development, from computer labs of primary schools (Bayne, 
Ross, & Williamson, 2008) to the continuing professional development requirements 
of practicing professionals, the panopticon is at work, and Chapter 6 demonstrates 
some of its workings in high-stakes online reflection.  
Like the panopticon, pastoral power is neither purely an interior nor purely an 
exterior form of control. Unlike the panopticon, it is not necessarily seen or 
experienced as negative, and Foucault (1993) stressed in his later work that he felt 
his earlier theory insisted too much on “techniques of domination” and not enough 
on the complex relations of power that consist of “subtle integration of coercion-
technologies and self-technologies” (p.204).  
Tell (2007) calls Foucauldian confession a discourse of identity, not of apology (p.1). 
According to Fejes (2008), the confessional “other” is “a person to whom one could 
speak and from whom one could receive guidance” (p.18). Foucault (1993) says that 
confession can assume an explanatory role because the other’s greater wisdom or 
seniority “permits him to distinguish between truth and illusion in the soul of the 
person he directs” (p.219).  
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The soul is not a pre-existing condition, however: communication, and specifically 
the “rigorous interpretation” that precedes confession (Tell, 2007, p.1) constructs the 
self it purports to disclose: “it is the confession, the verbal act of confession, which 
comes last and which makes appear, in a certain sense, by its own mechanics, the 
truth, the reality of what has happened” (Foucault, 1993, p.219). 
Foucault (1993) concluded that in his time the dominant technology of self was 
“oriented toward the permanent verbalization and discovery of the most 
imperceptible movements of our self” (p.222). As pedagogy moves increasingly 
towards personalised models of learning, the individual student’s self is increasingly 
seen as a legitimate area of development and disclosure. The persistent rhetoric of 
change, growth, development and progress envelops both students and teachers in 
higher education. This is not, as it may at first appear, in contrast with the neo-liberal 
governmentality discussed above, because “support for narratives focused on the 
learner become more possible, plausible and more likely, marginalising issues of 
pedagogy and power. In the process, the power in the pedagogic relationship is 
reconfigured on the basis that this is simply a manifestation of what it means to be a 
good teacher” (Edwards & Nicoll, 2006, p.127). Proper teaching, and proper 
learning, is that which exposes, individualises and obligates students to confess. 
Confession is a technology “used by the individual to effect changes on him/herself” 
(Fejes, 2008, p.18), and as Usher and Edwards (1994) have argued, confessional 
practices inscribe people as needing constant interventions of self-assessment and 
measurement “against norms apparently of [their] own making” (p.51).  
In the context of reflective practice, as we will see in the third part of this chapter, 
these norms include the principle of consistency and progress over time, and online 
reflective practices can create tension here. Bayne (2005) found that students 
experience the online self as a threat to the ‘real’ self, and feel themselves to be 
invited towards a dangerous fluidity: “without the safety net of our commitment to a 
truthful, unitary identity, we might fall permanently into another (untrue) version of 
ourselves. Identity formation online becomes a performance here, with the risk of the 
role taking control of the player” (pp.32-3). Students may therefore strongly resist a 
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loss of control they see implicit in the possibility of fragmentation online, and may 
commit with extra intensity to ‘authenticating’ the self they perform in reflection 
online.  
This authentication may readily take the form of efforts to ‘prove’ their sincerity 
through what Foucault describes as the ‘obligation to confess’ – a possibility that 
reflective practice makes available and possibly actively encourages (Gilbert, 2001). 
Students may be both ‘penitent’ and ‘listener’, in the terms of the confessional 
described by Hewitt (1991, p.227), when they try to gain a secure footing online 
through confessional reflection. Through confession, they strive to be “authenticated 
by the discourse of truth [they are] obliged to pronounce concerning [themselves]” 
(Foucault, 1981, p.58). Ironically, the structure of the confessional offered (or at least 
pretended at) a mask of anonymity which high-stakes online reflective practices do 
not allow. Students are disciplined from within and without in online reflection by 
urgent demands for authentication. This idea will be taken up in the online 
subjectivity part of this chapter. 
In a lecture in 1980, Foucault (1993) ended hopefully by reflecting on our ability to 
change the technologies of self which have made self-knowledge and interpretation 
seem so important: 
Do we need, really, this hermeneutics of the self? Maybe the problem of 
the self is not to discover …the positive foundation of the self. Maybe our 
problem is now to discover that the self is nothing else than the historical 
correlation of the technology built in our history. Maybe the problem is to 
change those technologies. (pp.222-3)  
In the 30 years since this lecture, technologies of self in higher education at least 
have become both more hermeneutic and more technological. In the next section of 
this chapter, on online subjectivity, I will discuss surveillance, the database and what 
Poster calls the “superpanopticon” in some detail.  
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Whatʼs the matter with Foucault? A note of caution 
Lather (1991) asks us not to be taken in by grand narratives (p.137), and in some 
quarters Foucault’s work has been taken up as one such grand narrative, and 
Foucault himself positioned as one of the “master[s] of truth and justice” (ibid) he 
spoke against. Foucault’s work on subjectivity and power works best, perhaps, when 
it is used to trouble and disrupt overarching frameworks or models, not as a 
framework itself. This is arguably why many theories of governmentality are so 
problematic – they have tried to reify a “Foucauldian” model of the workings of 
power, and reification is exactly what Foucault claims is impossible with power. 
Power is unpredictable and circulating, the energising force of society: it is not “done 
to”, but “doing”. Latour (1986) suggests that if power and society are treated as 
“outside or beneath” construction (my borrowing of Butler’s (1993, p.28) phrase), 
then social scientists have made explanatory what needs to be explained. He goes on 
to claim that “the only way to understand how power is locally exerted is… to take 
into account everything that has been put to one side – that is, essentially, 
techniques” (p. 277). By exploring the techniques, strategies and interpretations of 
high-stakes online reflection, I am looking in this research for a way to understand 
what power is doing, and how it circulates within and beyond the grasp of the people 
and practices I am focusing on. 
The online subject: embodiment, archives and 
fragments  
Working from a post-foundational perspective on self and subjectivity (which I will 
define further in Chapter 3), perhaps the greatest challenge in thinking about online 
subjectivity is this: are online subjects individuals, texts, or hybrid posthuman 
entities enmeshed in networks or “cognispheres” (Hayles, 2006)? These are 
questions that have not been asked of online reflection, and so one contribution that 
this research makes is to raise and discuss the nature of the online reflective self. 
This part of the literature review sets out the arguments for and against each of these 
three views, drawing out the important points to be made about each in relation to 
online reflective practices. 
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Online subjectivity as individual: embodiment and authentication 
The romance of leaving the meat behind, in a consensual hallucination of 
consciousness-as-data, is, it seems, only ever that. (Bell, 2001, p.176) 
Not long after the emergence of the cyberpunk movement in the early 1980s, with its 
utopian and dystopian visions of cyberculture and virtual reality, came the 
problematisation of what scholars, and particularly feminist scholars, saw as an 
attempted demotion or erasure of the body. As Balsamo (1996) puts it: “the 
phenomenological experience of cyberspace depends upon and in fact requires the 
willful repression of the physical body” (p.123). She goes on to ask: “how is the 
disembodied technological gaze marked by the signs or logic of gender and race?” 
(p.126), and argues that while the body may not always be represented in cyberspace 
or virtual worlds, it continues materially to exist in the interface and the experience 
of the user in fundamental ways (ibid). This continual framing and reframing of 
cyberspace as a space where bodies continue to exist, and where electronically 
mediated bodies are constrained by the same social inequalities as they are offline 
(albeit sometimes inequalities are experienced differently), has been important not 
only in cyberculture studies (Bell, 2002; Gies, 2008; Muri, 2003; Nakamura, 2008) 
but also in education (Blake, 2002; Land, 2004) and research ethics (Bassett & 
O’Riordan, 2002).  
Hayles (1999) argues that the posthuman subject as it is commonly understood 
mirrors the liberal humanist subject in its resolute separation of mind from body: in 
this case the belief that the mind can travel in virtual spaces unencumbered by the 
body. Land (2004) terms this the “incorporeal fallacy” (p.532), and maintains that, 
rather than being disembodied online, being online transforms what it means to be 
embodied (p.536). We may reconsider the boundaries and nature of individuality and 
selfhood in the online context, but we are not free to abandon them, because our 
bodies remain, and remain crucial in our understandings of our socially constructed 
subjectivity. This connects to an extent with the argument I will make in Chapter 3: 
the post-structuralist subject, online or off, does not choose from an infinite number 
of possible selves which identity to perform, but is positioned in particular ways by 
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discursive structures. Within these structures, only certain kinds of self construction 
are meaningful or coherent. 
The focus here on meaning is a focus on the social. As Bassett and O’Riordan (2002) 
have argued, the construction of cyberspace as space in which human subjects 
interact implies certain socially situated ways of approaching online subjectivity. 
Rather than being creatures of complete freedom, anonymity and multiplicity of 
identity (Turkle, 1997), online subjects are caught in webs of relationships, and the 
need (or at least the obligation, as we will see Poster argue shortly) to sustain a 
consistent social self (Ruch, 2009). The embodied individual is at the heart of this 
understanding of online subjectivity, and the tracking and authentication of that body 
is one of the key structural principles of the internet today, as its use is increasingly 
embedded in educational, commercial and civic practices and institutions (Ball, 
Lyon, Wood, Norris, & Raab, 2006).  
The online sites and spaces most likely to be used in higher education are those 
where online identities are meant to map fairly closely onto offline ‘student’ or 
‘teacher’ identities and bodies (in virtual learning environments, for example). Much 
as reflection is supposed to authentically mirror a stable, autonomous self (as I will 
argue in the third part of this chapter that it is), so the ‘walled gardens’ of 
institutional learning spaces online are supposed to provide the authentication 
necessary for both learner and teacher to feel sure that others (and they) are who they 
are meant to be. Logging in, in other words, forces us into certain subject positions 
(Land & Bayne, 2002, online). This becomes highly relevant in terms of online 
reflective practices, as we will see in Chapter 6 in particular. In the wider internet 
and the network of blogs (known as the “blogosphere”) in particular, the freedom to 
experiment with self-disclosure goes hand in hand with the freedom to experiment 
with identity, or at least with anonymity. To tie the expectation (sometimes the 
obligation) of disclosure and confession to an authenticated, known self, as teachers 
do in relation to online reflection, is to enter quite different territory from that of the 
(perhaps increasingly uncommon) anonymous blogger. The seemingly anarchic 
spaces of multiplicity Turkle celebrated fifteen years ago have given way to social 
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networks such as Facebook, to prominent cases of anonymous bloggers being 
‘outed’, and to the institutional e-portfolio and virtual learning environment (VLE).  
Identity theft (Poster, 2006) and e-safety in schools (Hope, 2005) are two examples 
of ‘moral panics’ whose solution is seen to be in stringent forms of authentication, 
where online selves are more and more tightly bound to unique bodies (including 
fingerprints and iris-scans) offscreen. It is exactly this insistence on authentication, 
however, that throws into question the agency of the online subject. As Lodders 
(2008) writes in his review of Poster’s 2006 book Information Please, identity is 
only available for “theft” if it is unhooked from the “corporeal nature of the subject” 
(p.279). It is here, therefore, that discourses around online subjectivity take a turn 
towards the textual, through theories of surveillance, the database and the archive. 
Online subjectivity as textual: surveillance and the database 
A politics that circumscribes freedom around the skin of the individual, 
labeling everything inside private and untouchable, badly misconceives the 
present-day situation of digitized, electronic communications. Since our 
bodies are hooked into the networks, the databases, the information 
highways, they no longer provide refuge from observation or a bastion 
around which one can draw a line of resistance. (Poster, 1996, p.291) 
Mark Poster (2001) claims that the concept of identity, with its focus on 
consciousness situated in a body, is useful for exploring political resistance, but that 
a model of “language/media assemblages” is necessary for thinking about the 
mutable nature of online subjectivity (p.8). He distinguishes between the 
phenomenological subject and the online subject, and calls the online domain a “new 
speech situation” (2006, p.156) requiring new understandings of identities which are 
partial and paradoxical, in that they appear to be unitary, at least temporarily (p.157). 
This is a model of online subjectivity as primarily textual, mirroring the replicable, 
divisible nature of text, and it stands as one kind of example of the post-structuralist 
fragmentation of the self. 
Davies (1997) claims that the post-structuralist subject “is constantly in process; it 
only exists as process; it is revised and (re)presented through images, metaphors, 
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storylines and other features of language, such as pronoun grammar; it is spoken and 
respoken, each speaking existing in a palimpsest with the others” (p.275). Taking up 
the metaphor of the palimpsest, though, raises the question: is there an essential self 
(the ‘paper’ foundation of the layered palimpsest) which can be revealed or 
identified? Or should we ask, with Butler (1993): “what kinds of constructions are 
foreclosed through the figuring of this site as outside or beneath construction itself?” 
(p.28). We might think of these closed off constructions as ‘traces’, in the Derridean 
sense: the (n)ever-present origin (Derrida, 1997, p.61), that which is absent and 
always already unspeakable when we pretend – for the sake of being able to speak at 
all – that concepts like ‘self’ are clear.  
The unitary, self-aware, individual subject already brought into question by post-
structuralist theory is further destabilized by digital representations, which are like 
liquid: always in motion (editable, non-material), but often leaving permanent traces 
(archives). In the previous section, I drew attention to the increasing stability of 
authenticated online spaces and the appearance of continuity of identity they provide 
within their own boundaries and domains. However, the internet is not a single site 
or space, and each subject will have multiple instances of identity across a variety of 
spaces. Furthermore, instability has been shown to be particularly pronounced within 
certain kinds of environments on the internet, in what Turkle (1997) describes as a 
“practice of identity as multiplicity in online life” (p.260). These unauthenticated, 
perhaps inauthentic, spaces are also of interest to Poster (2006), who describes the 
“ease of disappearance” within them (p.153).  
Beyond even that, though, the archived internet, built on databases, constitutes a 
form of compulsory memory over which we may have little control: “we do not 
produce our databased selves, the databased selves produce us” (Simon, 2005, p.16). 
Poster (1996) argues that databases are a particularly unstable form of interpellation, 
or ‘hailing’ (p.279). In its construction of subjectivity, the database “refutes the 
hegemonic principle of the subject as centred, rational and autonomous” (p.286). 
Each databased self is a textual self which can be replicated, divided, remixed and 
radically recontextualised: “digital archives allow situational context to collapse with 
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ease. …search engines can collapse any data at any period of time” (boyd, 2001, 
p.33). Poster (1996) puts it starkly: “the database is perfectly transferable in space, 
indefinitely preservable in time; it may last forever everywhere” (p.284). The 
instability of human memory has been argued to be a vital part of our sense of self 
(Mayer-Schönberger, 2009, p.21), and the combination of fragmentation and 
persistence of the database suggests a radically altered subjectivity.  
In its perpetuity, the textual online subject is not a duplicate of the individual, 
embodied subject. As Graham and Wood point out, the digitally constituted 
subject(s), or ‘dividuals’, as Deleuze (1992) calls them, may have a social life quite 
different from the trace or ‘original’ they represent: “these ‘dividuals’ … are 
increasingly more important for social identity than bodily selves” (Graham & 
Wood, 2003, p.231). They can be perfectly visible forever and everywhere; they 
have no secrets, no autonomy, no right to privacy. Through the participation of 
consumers or citizens in creating these doubles, they have a status between object 
and subject, and they can be bought, sold and owned. Databases are what Poster 
(1996) calls “superpanopticons”, and their prisoners are the disciplined, fragmented 
textual subjects we create each time we fill in a form or sign up for a web service 
online (Bayne, 2010, p.9)9.  
There are two main implications of this argument for education and online reflective 
practices in particular. One is that, in educational contexts, as Land and Bayne (2002, 
online) have argued in relation to virtual learning environments, “archival fixity and 
retrievability” binds students to the words and actions of their online past. It does so 
without promising to preserve a coherent self, but also without the possibility of 
deliberate intervention or modification on the part of the student who is 
‘represented’. These are representations which are out-of-control; in other words, not 
representations at all, but versions.  
                                                
9 Bayne argues that these are in fact embodied absences rather than disembodied presences, at least in 
the case of the icons and images we choose to represent us as visual doubles in various corners of the 
web. 
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The other implication is for the important notion of authenticity, which underpins a 
good deal of reflective practice (see the next part of this chapter, about reflection in 
higher education). If the digital reflective self generated by online practices is 
immediately something other than what the student may have intended, questions 
about authenticity take on an urgent new dimension, and we must consider what 
exactly we are compelling, and assessing. 
Poster, in his most recent book, appears to have moved away somewhat from the 
implications of a textual online subjectivity. In Information Please, he claims that an 
ethics of the virtual requires something other than an attempt to answer the question 
“how can identity in cyberspace conform to identity in real life?” (2006, pp.155-6). 
Rather than consider in ethical terms the language/media assemblages his earlier 
work suggested, however, he focuses here on an individual ethical obligation to 
maintain connections and identities (p.153). Acts are moral only when they are freely 
chosen, and the choice to remain connected is at the heart of Poster’s ethics of the 
virtual. In framing virtual ethics this way – as a return to the choosing, autonomous 
selfhood he problematised in his earlier work on the database and authenticated, 
surveilled and textual selves – he backs away from the moral implications of the 
textual digital subject.  
Lyon (2001) offers a possible way forward in thinking through the ethics of textual 
subjects – he calls for an ethically motivated and democratically transparent 
consideration of the categories into which textual, databased selves are sorted and 
judged. For Lyon, the weight of consequence of this sorting in terms of “life chances 
and choices” (p.174) for offline selves cannot be undone, but nor should it be 
disregarded: “because all the justifications of the ‘panoptic sort’ tend to be utilitarian 
ones, to do with increasing efficiency, or broadening consumer choice, or reducing 
costs, the need for an ethical approach to counteract it becomes all the more 
strikingly apparent” (p.177). The database is, in his view, the ultimate technique of 
normalisation (p.175), and the notion of privacy is inadequate to address it. Lyon’s 
conclusion, however, returns us to the realm of the embodied individual: the answer 
to the abstraction of surveillance and digital personae is to insist on the conception of 
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persons as “embodied – complete with faces” (p.178), and personhood is at the heart 
of the ethics of surveillance. This, as we have already seen Poster (1996) argue, is to 
“badly misconceive the present-day situation of digitized, electronic 
communications” (p.291). Is there, then, a fundamental problem with the application 
of ‘ethics’ to digital, textual subjects? If so, what implications follow from this? 
Perhaps partly with these ethical quagmires in mind, Hayles (2006) warns against too 
fragmented and textual a construction of the posthuman, noting that the subject 
“construed as an informational pattern that happens to be instantiated in a biological 
substrate” is “nefarious” (p.160), and calling instead for a “relational and distributed” 
(p.161) understanding of the posthuman subject – what could perhaps be termed 
relational posthumanism. Poster (2006) describes a construct he names the 
‘humachine’10 (p.36), which he does not specify in detail, but which has echoes of 
what Hayles calls the “cognisphere”, to which I turn next. 
Online subjectivity as hybrids and networks: the cognisphere and 
Actor Network Theory 
In their paper on the ethics of internet research, Bassett and O’Riordan (2002) argue 
that the common conception of the web as spatial contributes to a mistaken 
conflation of body and data, and a consequent confusion about whether internet 
research should take a ‘human subjects’ or documentary analysis approach. For 
them, what is needed is “a hybrid model of relational ethics that incorporates text, 
space and bodies” (p.245). Hayles points the way to such a model in her conception 
of the “cognisphere”. 
Hayles (2006) says that the individual person (or cyborg) is not sufficiently 
networked a concept to be an “appropriate unit of analysis” (p.160). However, she 
retains a strong focus on cognition and agency, claiming that this is “embodied 
                                                
10 The term ‘humachine’ appears to have been coined by Luke, and is described as “machinic 
ensembles of power, space, production, energy, reproduction, matter, organization, and information 
with their own intelligence and agency that coconstitute the operational settings and sustainable life 
worlds of cyborg life-forms” (Luke, 1997, p.1370). 
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throughout human flesh and extended into the social and technological environment” 
(p.161, emphasis mine). For Hayles, systems and embodied humans are linked in a 
network of “globally interconnected cognitive systems”: what she calls (following 
Whalen) the cognisphere (ibid).  
As a model of networked and relational subjectivity, the cognisphere acknowledges 
its relation to the human body primarily through the discourse of cognitive science, 
which offers explanations for “the physical and psychological bases for human 
constructions of reality” (Hayles, 2006, p.163). However, presenting the body as 
essentially fuel for the mind does not seem to address concerns relating to the social 
consequences of being or having a body that is interpretable, trackable and 
implicated in the ways in which we are known and constructed as subjects. In other 
words, the cognisphere embraces the networked nature of online subjectivity at the 
expense of engaging deeply with either the situated body or the fragmented code. It 
also seems to risk falling into the same “Cartesian” trap that Hayles herself (1999) 
critiques in relation to posthuman theory, which is that it privileges cognition over 
embodiment: “to the extent that the posthuman constructs embodiment as the 
instantiation of thought/information, it continues the liberal tradition rather than 
disrupts it” (p.5). This is, in Suchman’s (2007) words, a deadening rather than an 
enlivening approach that comes from: “an investment in obscuring the performative 
foundations of persons and things” (p.256). 
An alternative angle from which to approach the idea of hybrid online subjectivity is 
through the lens of Actor-Network Theory (ANT). Law (2004) describes ANT as an 
analytic approach that “treats entities and materialities as enacted and relational 
effects” rather than as natural categories (p.157). Such an approach allows us to 
move away from the text/body dichotomy, to consider agency and subjectivity as a 
shifting set of relations. Hand and Sandywell (2002) write that “‘online’ 
subjectivity… emerges through an open constellation of human agency, keyboard, 
monitor, fibre-optics, microprocessor, electronic text, network infrastructure, 
intelligent recipients and so on” (p.209). They offer the metaphor of “technopoiesis”: 
“world-making characteristics of technologies-in-practice” (p.213). ANT posits that 
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networks and flows circulate through practices, and actions and desires emerge 
through the “translations that are negotiated through …movements, talk, materials, 
emotions and discourses” (Fenwick & Edwards, 2010, p.21). This is a different 
construction of subjectivity from that of the cognisphere; it proposes that, rather than 
human minds being part of a network (digital or otherwise), the network is what 
constitutes subjectivity. As with the cognisphere, the subject/object distinction is 
problematised, but in a way which does not easily map to a neo-Cartesian privileging 
of ‘information’ above all else. In fact, the ANT model aligns closely with a 
Foucauldian perspective on subjectivity as constantly in process and being produced 
by discourse.  
Models of subjectivity that address hybridity, as the cognisphere and ANT do, 
provide another piece of the puzzle of what it means to be online. What becomes 
evident when talking about subjectivity in this way is that almost nowhere in the e-
learning literature does it rear its head. Educators, educational developers and 
learning technologists long for digital enhancement, but they shy away from 
transformation. Disruptive voices, such as Bayne’s (2010), are beginning to emerge  
and, as she suggests, the teaching practices or “generative digital pedagogies” (p.11) 
which follow from them will look, and be, quite different. The riskiness of taking up 
these generative pedagogies, and of engaging openly with hybridity and the 
instability of ‘selfhood’ both on- and offline, is that the project of education is part of 
a “grand narrative of progress” (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p.172) whose object is the 
autonomous, developing individual. Questioning the nature of the ‘subject’ 
problematises the whole humanist enterprise, and we are left to rethink what 
education might mean (Edwards, 2010). Of course that rethinking has long been 
going on in certain domains, in largely theoretical terms, but learning online, if we 
let it, brings teachers and students face-to-face with the destabilising force of digital 
subjectivity.  
Summing up the online subject? 
There are political reasons for wanting to preserve a place for the body and the 
individual online: because it is a domain where “writing and reading otherness” 
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(Nakamura, 2000, p.712) takes on a heightened significance, and otherness, with its 
possibilities and problems, is a crucial part of the fabric of online life. There are also 
political reasons for wanting to draw attention to the superpanopticon that duplicates 
and manipulates its digital subjects, creating, maintaining and profiting from 
uncanny textual simulacra (Baudrillard, 1994a; Bayne, 2010). In a sense the former 
connects us with the past, and with a tradition of scholarship and activism which 
takes as its unit of analysis the socially situated individual. In this tradition, travelling 
into online territory does not fundamentally alter the rules of the game (quite the 
opposite, in fact). The latter, textual account asks us to think ourselves anew and 
look at radically altered forms not just of representation but of subjectivity itself.  
Poster says that agency was a model developed for modern societies, but that 
postmodern society requires another model. He asks: “what kind of agency does that 
require? What kind of subject-positions are most conducive to building a 
postmodern, global society?” (Murray, 2003, p.3). The question is still open, but it is 
apparent that we require a way of thinking at the same time about networks of 
relations, embodied selves and fragmented assemblages of language and code. The 
cognisphere appeals because it seems to promise to attend to these strands by 
combining them into a larger whole, but not in a rich enough way to allow us to 
abandon the debate. An ANT approach offers a generative way of thinking that 
would seem to be equal to the task of theorising the uncertain, unstable, fuzzy 
ontological boundaries of subjectivity online.  
Education is a set of practices with unstable boundaries: “No matter how much 
education is pursued as a centred project… something always escapes. The attempt 
to make education into a controlled and controlling project is never total, that which 
eludes the totalising grasp always makes education ultimately uncontrollable” (Usher 
& Edwards, 1994, p.141). Similarly, when we turn to look at one aspect of online 
subjectivity, another slips away. What is important in the not-knowing, though, is to 
remain open to what does not fit or make sense yet. In particular, I have paid 
attention to how subjectivity is framed in the accounts of my project participants, and 
how this affects their framing of online reflection. My goal is to understand the sense 
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people make of their practices, and so understanding the sense they make of 
themselves in the online context is therefore an important part of this project.  
Reflective practices and writing in higher education  
This penultimate part of this chapter has two main aims. The first is to show how the 
key concerns and issues relating to reflection and reflective writing in higher 
education point to reflection as being above all concerned with individual experience 
and progress. This is the ground on which reflective writing is justified as a 
meaningful measure or process of learning, even when it is compulsory, audience-
focused or otherwise high-stakes. A pervasive humanist narrative of a true self which 
can be revealed, understood, recorded, improved or liberated through the process of 
writing about thoughts and experiences is by and large taken for granted in literature 
that presumes autonomous selfhood, rationality and progress as the natural goals of 
deep or authentic learning. As Usher and Edwards (1994) have argued about student-
centred learning more generally, reflective practices are “ultimately circumscribed by 
[their] humanist presuppositions” (p.114). 
The second aim is to draw attention to the literature which problematises the mostly 
unspoken assumptions that underpin reflective practice and offers alternative 
theoretical perspectives. This small body of writing has not been widely cited, and 
has not been recognised at all in the literature on online reflection (which is 
discussed in the final part of this chapter). Partly this may be due to its oppositional 
stance and the inability of more mainstream theories, with their emphasis on 
supporting and promoting reflection, to take account of it. Partly, though, it would 
seem to suffer from a lack of coherence and momentum. A number of papers have 
described similar theoretical perspectives and identified similar problems without 
making reference to one other – sometimes because these papers are emerging in 
different disciplinary contexts (nursing and teaching are especially prevalent) and are 
not making connections with similar literature in other fields. So I aim to pull this 
literature together and provide other researchers with a starting point for their 
explorations of alternatives to humanist models of reflection in higher education. 
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I have not focused in detail on the significant number of books and articles offering 
models or practical strategies for supporting reflection, except where this also adds 
new theoretical perspectives or important insights (Moon, 1999a). This aspect of the 
literature, and the accounts of practice that make up the bulk of published material on 
reflection (and online reflection, as we will see), rely on the same underpinning 
assumptions. I have paid particular attention to the issue of assessment and how this 
does, or does not, problematise assumptions about reflection. I have left a discussion 
of the literature on online reflective practices for the following section of this 
chapter. 
Reflection, individual experience, and progress 
There is general agreement in the literature on reflection and learning that 
‘reflection’ itself is a contested and sometimes confusing term. For Boud (2006), one 
key problem with reflection in higher education is that teachers come to it with a 
range of ideas of what it means. He identifies three key conceptions at work: 
technical/instrumental, interpretive/constructivist and critical (p.3). Fendler (2003) 
makes a related argument, taking a historical perspective and identifying an “array of 
meanings” informing reflective practices in teacher education: Cartesian rationality; 
Dewey’s notion of self discipline; Schön’s flexible “reflection-in-action” and 
feminist claims of empowerment and agency through self-knowledge. She concludes 
that “reflective teaching has become a catchall term for competing programs… It is 
no wonder then that current research and practices relating to reflection tend to 
embody mixed messages and confusing agendas” (p.20).  
In contrast, Rogers (2001) analysed seven theories of reflection (including Dewey; 
Schön; and Boud, Keogh and Walker) and found some commonality in terms of 
definitions: he maintains that there is broad agreement that reflection is a cognitive 
activity or process which requires the individual’s active engagement to examine his 
or her own emotional or cognitive responses to situations or experiences. The overall 
purpose of reflection is to improve the individual’s effectiveness (p.41). Moon 
(1999b)  identifies slightly different theoretical sources of reflective practices 
(primarily Dewey and Habermas, with important contributions from Schön and 
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Kolb), but also sees reflection as essentially an unproblematic concept. She 
maintains that alternative perspectives are merely “frameworks of meaning” imposed 
on the “simple mental process” that is reflection (p.93): a purposeful consideration of 
complex or open ended problems or ideas, or what she calls an “input-process-
outcome model” (p.98). She is concerned with defining reflection as simply and 
broadly as possible so that it may more effectively be taught and empirically 
researched, and to counter the tendency for untested theories to be solidified into 
unquestioningly accepted tenets of reflection. For Moon, important questions remain 
about the relationship of emotion and reflection, for example (p.95), but her simple 
definition is sufficient, she believes, to allow teaching, practice and research to 
productively go forward.  
There is a danger in what both Rogers and Moon are attempting that a definition of 
reflection, once simplified, becomes so broad that it is no longer helpful in thinking 
about the sorts of issues that more specific perspectives bring to the fore. However, 
while I think Moon in particular oversimplifies the matter, giving less importance to 
those diverse “frameworks of meaning” than they should have, I share her belief that 
there is common territory for the various conceptions of reflection. The foundation of 
reflection, which is often relied upon without being explicitly recognised, is a certain 
kind of assumption about the self doing the reflecting: it is individual, autonomous, 
consistent, but most of all amenable to development and progression through effort 
and direction. In other words, reflection relies on a humanist self (Fenwick, 2000, 
p.248). For this reason, as we will see, it richly rewards a post-structuralist analysis 
which views reflection as a discursive shaping of subjectivity. For the same reason, 
however, such analysis is not really welcome, and the vast majority of published 
work on reflection – despite its apparent proliferation of meanings – shares a 
common and unquestioned ontological foundation. The following accounts draw out 
some of what this humanist foundation entails, through the lenses of linearity, 
authenticity and empowerment. 
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Purpose, direction and reflection 
John Dewey is often identified as the fore-father of reflective practices in higher 
education today: according to Moon (1999b), his theories of thinking and education 
in the 1933 book How We Think have been highly influential in subsequent theories 
and models which justify making reflection part of higher education curricula in 
many disciplines. Dewey (1933) considers reflective thinking to be quite different 
from other kinds of mental processes, which he identifies as stream-of-
consciousness, invention and belief. Reflective thinking relies on logic, evidence, 
discipline and purposefulness. Through reflection, a state of doubt resolves into a 
settled truth or course of action (p.12). Both the doubt and the resolution are integral 
to reflective thinking. English (2007) refers to this doubt or uncertainty as the 
“negativity of experience”, by which she means the productively unexpected, or “the 
space between old and new experiences” (p.136). Or, as Dewey (1933)  puts it, “the 
old, the near, the accustomed, is not that to which but that with which we attend” 
(p.290). Importantly, doubt must be genuine and experienced by the individual: 
“general appeals to a child (or to a grown-up) to think, irrespective of the existence 
in his own experience of some difficulty that troubles him… [are] futile” (p.15), and 
teachers should “know” their students in order to understand what will energise them 
to think reflectively (p.36). Reflective thinking requires open-mindedness and 
curiosity, whole-heartedness and a sense of responsibility, all of which must be 
nurtured. To teach reflective thought is to empower students to act, give them the 
means of control over their circumstances, and to enrich the experience of life. 
Dewey says little about assessment here, but he criticises the imposition of “external 
standards”, arguing that these are applicable only to knowledge of subject matter, not 
to the training of the mind which he advocates (p.65). Reflective thinking is 
“thinking as an art”, and art requires discipline, which is not, in Dewey’s view, in 
conflict with freedom (pp.85-7). 
Boud, Keogh and Walker (1985) and Moon (1999a, 1999b) make less clear-cut 
arguments about the purposefulness of reflection. Both indicate that reflection is in 
some sense a natural and inevitable function, and ‘ubiquitous’ in its relationship with 
learning (Moon, 1999a, p.24) but maintain also that, as Boud et al put it, “the 
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adoption of a reflective approach [to learning] is a choice that we can make or not as 
we wish” (1985, p.24). Both draw on the twin concepts of deep and surface learning 
(Boud et al., 1985, p.24; Moon, 1999a, p.26), and associate reflection with deep and 
even ‘transformative’ levels of learning, arguing that reflection is not present, or at 
least not purposefully used, at lower or surface levels of learning (Moon, 1999b, 
p.149). I conclude from this that both Boud et al and Moon basically concur with 
Dewey that reflection is set apart (at least in part) by its purposefulness. 
One notable feature of the most commonly used models of reflection is their 
linearity. With individual experience as their starting point, the models posit ideal 
stages of progress through which a learner should pass on their way to the end point, 
which is either an understanding of how a situation could have been approached 
better, or another experience, in which case the cycle starts again. Even where the 
process is visually represented as circular (Gibbs, 1988), it is uni-directional: the 
ideal form of reflective thought according to these models takes experience as the 
raw material from which value and insight is derived:  
Representation of the Gibbs cycle of reflection11 
 
                                                
11 Source: http://www.brookes.ac.uk/services/upgrade/a-z/reflective_gibbs.html . Retrieved 26/7/2011. 
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The linearity of these models suggests a logical mind which can process experiences 
in ways that it chooses, for its own (or others’) purposes.  
Experience, emotion and embodiment 
In general, discourses of reflection make an assumption about the nature of 
experience which locates it as personal and private. Boud et al (1985) define 
reflection as “working with experience” (p.19). In separating experience from 
reflection, they situate the latter in the realm of the individual mind, and equate 
deliberate learning with the capture and analysis of experience. Unlike Dewey 
(1933), they make claims for the role of emotion in this process, but primarily in the 
sense that negative and positive emotional associations with topics and environments 
will affect the mind’s ability to work with an experience. Negative emotions, in 
particular, can block the efficacy of learning, and part of the reflective process is to 
remove these “obstructing feelings”, which are “impediments to a thorough 
examination of the experience” (p.26). They also maintain a role for emotion in the 
“triggering incidents” which spark reflection (p.46). These are understandings of 
reflection as rational detachment, in which a stripping away of extraneous thought or 
emotion enables an individual to learn from the experiences they have had. This 
position is similar to that of Brockbank and McGill (1998), who discuss critical 
reflection as a process of detachment (p.58).  
Other authors propose a greater role for emotion in reflection, while preserving an 
emphasis on individual experience. Ghaye (2007), in an editorial for the journal 
Reflective Practice, asks a series of provocative questions about the ethics of 
reflective practice, many of which revolve around an understanding of what he 
describes as the personal, private, particular views of students (pp.157-8). He asks 
teachers and researchers to take account of the emotions that are described and 
produced by reflective practices, and to pay attention to principles of fidelity, 
gratitude, nonmaleficence, beneficence and autonomy in their dealings with students 
around reflection. Other authors situate emotion even more centrally in reflection. 
Bleakley (1999), for example, insists that “reflection needs body, passion, sensitivity 
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to context, and, above all, begs for style… it is not a cold, detached and disembodied 
rationalising” (p. 319).  
Pollard (2008), responding to Ghaye, problematises this focus on experience as 
private and personal, which leads to confessional modes of writing. She proposes an 
alternative, which is to view experience as a “conversation between the self and that 
which is not yet known” (p.402). She describes experience as starting “with an 
encounter with strangeness” (ibid). This strangeness can come in the form of any 
“event which forcibly interrupts stable truths and forces changes to habits” (p.403), 
including, she seems to suggest, the figure of the teacher as “strange intruder” 
(p.406). 
Even where emotion, instinct and artistry are called into play as important aspects of 
the reflective process, ultimately what is usually valued is the rational mind, which 
“is considered to be the most natural, innate characteristic of ‘man’” (Usher & 
Edwards, 1994, p.136), and which can make sense of that emotion. Michelson (1996) 
discusses this at length, arguing that both liberal humanist and emancipatory 
traditions of adult learning see experience “as insufficient in its own terms; both 
schools assume, and, to a certain degree, construct, specific algorithms for how 
reflection transforms experience into something beyond itself” (p.439). She focuses 
on the gendered nature of both “experience” and “reason”, noting that “experience, 
like the female, is the ‘author’less body waiting to be acted upon by the mind, which 
alone can bestow order and meaning” (p.443), and calls for recognition of ways of 
knowing that flow from emotion, the body, intuition and personal history (p.445).  
Pollard’s and Michelson’s papers are useful and engaging critiques of assumptions 
about experience and reason, but they leave largely untouched other humanist ideals, 
those to do with authenticity and the knowable self, and the role of reflection in 
‘revealing’ (through emotion, through encounters with strangeness, or through 
reason) the truth of the self. 
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Authenticity, knowing and being known through reflection 
The linked themes of self-knowledge and being knowable are central to several 
important accounts of reflection. Johns (2004) and Bolton (2005) write primarily 
about the use of reflection in professional practice and clinical supervision. Their 
writing therefore pays relatively little attention to the special contexts of reflection in 
higher education, particularly issues of assessment. Nevertheless, their recent work is 
relevant to the study at hand because they articulate with great clarity the sense in 
which reflection constitutes and reveals a knowable self. In addition, both writers are 
frequently cited in literature focusing on reflection in professional education 
contexts. 
Johns’ (2004) work on reflection is primarily aimed at helping health professionals to 
be emotionally available and stable in work situations which can be harrowing and 
extreme. For him, self-knowledge is at the heart of this stability: “if you consider that 
‘who I am’ is the major therapeutic tool I use in my practice, then clearly I need to 
know myself well in order to use myself in the best therapeutic way” (p.37). 
Evidently there is for Johns a very fine line between self-knowledge and self-
management. This management should involve receiving help from a trusted other in 
exploring our ‘defended depths” (ibid). Unlike Moon and others, as we will see, 
Johns makes relatively little distinction between writing reflectively and sharing 
stories verbally in a real-time encounter with another person: they are equivalent 
forms of emotional expression (p.39). Johns argues that self-disclosure has proven 
benefits in terms of both mental and physical health. Telling stories about ourselves, 
in other words, is good for us. Reflection can, furthermore, be a route towards 
uncovering the “truth” of situations which we have distorted through flawed patterns 
of thinking (p.76).  
Bolton (2005) is inclined to view reflection not so explicitly as a tool for self-
management, but rather one for profound self-exposure and examination: “a closely 
observed event… written about, reflected upon, discussed critically, and re-explored 
through further writings stands metonymically for the whole of that professional’s 
practice” (p.31). Individual change and development over time can be “kept pace 
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with” by a reflective practice that focuses on a “practitioner’s relationship with her- 
or himself” (p.22). 
Boud (2001) claims that reflection on practice allows for a re-evaluation of 
experience to determine which thoughts and feelings resulting from it are authentic 
(p.14). Like ‘reflection’ itself, authenticity in learning generally is a complex and 
contested concept (Kreber, Klampfleitner, McCune, Bayne, & Knottenbelt, 2007). 
Most authors writing about reflection appear to define authenticity in the 
Heideggerian sense of ‘ownness’ or ‘mineness’ – an unmediated orientation to the 
self (Carman, 2009). In this sense, authenticity is a key feature of the self-knowledge 
that Bolton and Johns advocate. Fendler (2003) associates the call for authenticity 
with a feminist approach in which “reflection is constructed as a way of getting in 
touch with one’s authentic inner self in order to think in ways that have not been 
influenced by the same theoretical tools that built the master’s house” (pp.19-20), 
and problematises this from a Foucauldian perspective, which I will discuss later. 
The notion that reflection has the power to see through assumptions and falsehoods 
is one taken up strongly by proponents of critical reflection. 
Educators and researchers in the critical tradition argue that only reflection whose 
purpose is to “expose or unsettle dominant assumptions with the expressed purpose 
of challenging and changing dominant power relations” (Fook & Askeland, 2006, 
p.47) can be called critical reflection. Mezirow (1997), one of the key proponents of 
critical reflection, extols the virtues of critical reflection for transforming frames of 
reference, which involves exploring not only the assumptions of others, but also self-
assumptions (p.7). This form of reflective practice takes its name from critical 
theory, and describes an ideology rather than a method. Not all authors use the term 
in this way, however. Barnett (1997) writes about ‘critical self-reflection’ as an 
emancipatory but essentially apolitical independence of thought and action. He 
argues that higher education does a poor job of fostering this critical self-reflection, 
instead focusing on superficial and instrumental forms of reflection which orient the 
student’s self towards external agendas (p.100), rather than challenging and 
destabilising it in the service of a deeper and more personal understanding and 
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action. Barnett’s vision is less prescriptive than the critical theorists’, but also less 
attuned to the contexts in which individuals can act. However, both of these forms of 
critical reflection require a subject who is willing and able to challenge convention 
and their own comfortable truths, and, as I have already discussed, to evidence 
progress and change: “to classify a piece of writing as showing critical reflection, 
there should be evidence of a change in perspective over a fundamental belief” 
(Kember, McKay, Sinclair, & Wong, 2008, p.375). 
Having briefly explored some of the underpinning assumptions about reflection, I 
now move on to discuss what is specific about reflective writing, and further, how it 
is justified as a valid mode of assessment in higher education. 
Reflective writing and assessment 
Schön’s theory of reflective practice has been extremely influential in professional 
disciplines in higher education. His focus is on improving practice, and his 
instrument for doing so is the decision-making of practitioners. Schön (1991) argues 
that professionals work in conditions of uncertainty, and must hone the ability to 
“reflect-in-action”: to draw flexibly on past experience while taking account of new 
factors and conditions, all while in the midst or flow of a situation. He maintains that 
in supporting reflective practice, educators must be competent professionals 
themselves who can articulate their own processes in ways that are transparent for 
students (Schön, 1987). Van Manen (1995) is doubtful about the extent to which 
reflection-in-action can be articulated, let alone taught, as it is so embodied, tacit and 
instinctual. Ixer (1999) maintains that only if ‘action’ is slowed down dramatically, 
or stopped entirely, can what happens within it be considered reflection, and he 
therefore questions the premise of reflection-in-action.  
In any case, it is “reflection-on-action” – Schön’s contrasting form of reflection – 
that formal reflective writing aims to foster. Reflection-on-action involves time, 
dialogue and in-depth exploration after an event, and it sets the practitioner up for 
improved reflection-in-action the next time a novel situation emerges. This 
reflection-on-action is thought to be amenable to being captured in written form. 
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Moon (1999a) argues that reflective writing has metacognitive benefits (p. 27): 
writing expresses understanding and captures ideas for later consideration (p.31). 
Creme (2005) contrasts reflective learning journal writing with traditional academic 
essay writing and concludes that “whereas the subject matter of an essay normally 
comprises ideas and information ‘out there’, learning journals also encompass the 
student–writer: they are about ‘you-plus-course material’” (p.288). What is personal 
becomes, through the process of reflective writing, fused with other materials of 
learning in ways which allow for independence and creative exploration (p.289). 
Time is also positively associated with successful and meaningful reflection (Clegg 
& Bufton, 2008), and writing is seen as slowing thinking down (Moon, 1999a, p.31) 
in beneficial ways, creating “intellectual space for learners” (p.79). The question of 
time will be more fully explored in Chapter 9. 
One challenging aspect of reflective writing as it is discussed in some key texts is the 
extent to which writing creates, rather than represents, experience. Moon (1999a), in 
her book about learning journals, argues that informal or expressive writing is a 
direct means of learning and sense-making (pp.29-30). Richardson’s (1994) work on 
writing as a method of inquiry emerges as important in reflective practices, and both 
Moon and Bolton cite her. The key argument here is that writing does more than 
capture thoughts, it is constitutive of reality (Bolton, 2005, p.46). Reflective writing, 
then, can be seen as structuring experience in powerful ways. I will return to 
consider the extent to which this complicates other arguments about the role of 
reflection in capturing or processing experience in Chapters 6 and 8. 
On a practical level, a written record is a form of evidence of reflection (Hatton & 
Smith, 1995; Ho & Richards, 1993) which thinking alone does not produce, and this 
evidence can be stored, worked with and evaluated. At the same time, writing is 
thought to open reflection up to what Boud (2001) calls the “inhibiting gaze of 
others” (p.15). Boud claims that the possibility (let alone the reality) of audience can 
be constraining, particularly when the audience may wield the power of assessment. 
Conversely, Brockbank and McGill (1998) highlight the importance of “intentional 
reflective dialogue” in the reflective process, arguing that it supports a necessary 
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process of detached observation and change of parts of the self (pp.57-61). They do 
not appear to distinguish between dialogue amongst students and dialogue between a 
student and tutor, nor between written or spoken dialogue. However, the notion that 
reflection requires another or others to be maximally effective would seem to support 
the use of reflective writing, with its implicit or explicit audience. 
There is relatively little in the theoretical literature to support the assessment of 
reflection. Creme (2005) makes one strong argument in its favour: doing so attests to 
the value that teachers may wish to give more personal and process-orientated forms 
of knowledge construction. Assessment motivates students by recognising the effort 
that they put in to producing these texts (p.289). Bolton (2005) seems to suggest that, 
given enough clarity in assessment criteria, reflection can successfully be assessed 
(p.133). This position is also taken by English (2001), who describes clear guidelines 
as the basis for ethical assessment of reflection (p.31).  
Other authors are more concerned about validity than ethics in the assessment of 
reflection. Positions vary considerably on this point, with authors such as Ixer (1999) 
returning to the notion that the concept of reflection lacks clarity, and that “we do not 
know enough about reflection or how its intricate and complex cognitive processes 
can enhance learning to be able to assess it fairly” (p.520). Dyment and O’Connell 
(2011), in a recent paper analysing the reported quality of reflection in 11 studies in 
higher education, highlight the extreme variation in methods of assessing reflection 
and in the reported quality of reflection itself, and recommend that the “academic 
community” consider adopting a standard approach to assessment of reflection for 
both research and teaching purposes (p.92). Tummons (2011) maintains that there 
can be no such detached “clarity” in reflection, and that validity must necessarily 
involve local, partial social and literacy practices which are “fuzzy and complex”, 
and assessment criteria need (somehow) to take account of this (p.481). Brockbank 
and McGill (1998) argue that problems of bias and reliability in assessing reflection 
can be solved by ‘triangulation’ – where students’ reflective reports are 
supplemented by peer and tutor reports or dialogues (pp.100-4).  
Chapter 2: Reviewing key literature 
 52 
Still others are not convinced that reflection can or should be assessed at all. Creme 
(2005) problematises the assessment of reflection on the grounds that it kills off the 
very qualities that reflection is intended to foster (p.291). She suggests that reflective 
writing is valuable only to the extent that it frees the writer up to experiment with 
self-construction, and that these experiments deserve an interested, empathetic and 
most importantly non-judgemental reader (p.294). Reflective writing may therefore 
be usefully engaged with in higher education through formative feedback, but not 
through summative (or even formative) assessment. Boud and Walker (1998) argue 
that the combination of asking students to be vulnerable and assessing them within 
the same task undermines reflection and promotes self-censorship. They claim that 
“students expect to write for assessment what they know, not reveal what they don’t 
know” (p.194). In a later article, Boud (2001) rejects outright the notion that 
reflective journals should be directly assessed, warning of the “powerful influence” 
assessment has “on what is produced and the extent to which writers can engage in 
critical reflection” (p.17), a view he echoes in 2006, when he calls the marking of 
raw reflective journals “inappropriate” (2006, p.3).  
Creme (2005) and Boud (2006) argue that formal assignments based on reflective 
writing can be summatively assessed to good effect, striking an acceptable balance 
between valuing the process and concept of reflection while separating it somewhat 
from academic judgement. Brockbank and McGill (1998), too, recommend creating 
some deliberate distance between the process-driven and private reflective writing 
which forms the basis of these reports, and the selective public portfolios which are 
to be assessed (pp.100-4). This compromise is seen to be less than ideal, however, as 
Creme (2005) points out that it implies that reflection is not valuable for its own sake 
(p.291). 
If there is little enthusiasm in the literature for assessing reflection, why, in practice, 
is it being assessed? In addition to Creme’s argument about giving credit for what is 
valued, practical issues of time and motivation would seem to be paramount: there is 
a perception amongst practitioners that they cannot afford the time for, and students 
will not voluntarily participate in, activities which do not ‘count’ (Tosh et al., 2005). 
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The answer may also lie in part in the increasing popularity of e-portfolios, which 
have their own history and traditions, as a means of capturing reflection, and I will 
explore this further in the final part of this chapter which addresses online reflection. 
Challenging humanist assumptions in reflection 
The humanist assumptions justifying reflective practices in higher education have 
been identified and critiqued on a number of theoretical and pedagogical grounds in 
recent years, and a small number of authors have proposed post-structuralist, and 
specifically Foucauldian, ways of looking differently at reflection. These different 
perspectives take into account the non-transparency of language, the governmentality 
of surveillance and confession, and the instrumentalism of discourses of 
development. The literature discussed in this section is a key resource in the 
construction of my own theoretical perspectives on reflection, and will be drawn on 
again in subsequent chapters.  
Fendler’s (2003) analysis of the various meanings of reflection ultimately ties 
reflective practices to Foucauldian neo-liberal governmentality, where governing 
power is de-centred and located within individuals, who become responsible for their 
own surveillance (Lemke, 2001). Closely aligned with neo-liberal governmentality is 
the equation of reflection with the confessional. Gilbert’s (2001) critique of clinical 
supervision in nursing, and the subsequent response offered by Clouder and Sellars 
(2004), are valuable for the clarity with which they set out the arguments around 
confession and surveillance in reflective practice. Gilbert maintains that it is 
disingenuous to speak of autonomous, pure, critical selves emerging from practices 
which demand confession and discipline experience. Clouder and Sellars respond by 
suggesting that surveillance is ubiquitous for practitioners in almost all facets of their 
work, and that more, rather than fewer, forms of surveillance which make themselves 
visible and contestable, are beneficial: “surveillance becomes more ethical if it is 
made explicit rather than implicit by developing reflective practice, for instance, 
through clinical supervision” (p.262). This ignores, however, the constitutive nature 
of surveillance, which was discussed in the first part of this chapter. This is an aspect 
of what Smyth (1992) refers to as the “politics of reflection”.  
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The politics of reflection is also the politics of individualism, which “dismantles 
questions of politics, of discipline, of institutional interaction and of the workings of 
social categories by reducing them to questions of ‘thinking’” (Erlandson, 2005, 
p.669). In her work on personal development planning (PDP) and progress files in 
higher education, Clegg (2004) criticises the instrumentalism and individualism of 
reflection as it has come to be understood: “we are being exhorted to persuade our 
students that it is their own individual capacities that will be decisive in their future 
career success and that these can be enhanced though reflection” (p.295). Discourses 
of reflection depend to a great extent on notions of individualism and emancipatory 
liberal humanism (Bleakley, 1999). Despite the fact that these notions have been 
deeply problematised in the “poststructuralist turn” in the social sciences in 
particular (Davies & Davies, 2007), Clegg (2004) argues that teachers in higher 
education are invited to accept them as “obvious and transparent” (p.293) when it 
comes to PDP and reflection. 
Furthermore, contrary to an emancipatory rhetoric of reflection, high-stakes 
reflection is always inscribed with ‘correct’ answers. Hargreaves (2004) argues that 
compulsory reflective practices are essentially narrative in character, and that: “in 
producing narratives for assessment students are being asked to produce a story, 
and… in nursing (and possibly other professional settings) only three ‘stories’ are 
legitimate” (p.199). She identifies these as ‘valedictory’, ‘condemnatory’ and 
‘redemptive’ narratives (p.200). In constructing a narrative for the purposes of 
assessment the successful student understands which kinds of stories are legitimate, 
and shapes his or her words accordingly. Macfarlane and Gourlay (2009) invoke a 
“‘hidden curriculum’ of emotional performativity” in reflective writing (p.455) 
which requires students to humbly admit to their weaknesses, demonstrate that they 
have changed, and refrain from questioning current theoretically fashionable 
positions. For these reasons, Fendler (2003) categorizes reflective journal writing as 
a site of “surveillance and an exercise of pastoral power” (p.22). The normativity of 
reflection is discussed in Chapter 7. 
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The deliberate strategies called for by reflection are just part of the picture, though. 
In their analysis of the rhetorical strategies of professional development, Edwards 
and Nicoll (2006) argue that models, theories and so-called common-sense 
understandings of reflection often ignore the “intertextual and interdiscursive 
practices that make it possible” (p.123). Like me, Edwards and Nicoll object to the 
notion of reflection as a mirror, instead proposing to view it as a “language game” 
that privileges the idea of language as transparent (ibid). As I will argue, language is 
far from transparent, working to construct the selves it purports to disclose through 
reflection. Devas (2004), looking in detail at a student learning questionnaire, 
identifies within its questions and structure a clear inscription of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
answers (p.36). She argues that the student respondents to the survey must speak a 
truth “circumscribed… by the power of the authority to which they are confessing” 
(p.39), and that they are “summoned into being” as a certain discursively constructed 
form of ‘student’ (p.41). The implications of this way of thinking about reflection – 
as producing the history and the reality they represent – are, as Taylor (2003) argues, 
rarely acknowledged (p.249). To do so would be to undermine the foundations of 
reflective practice and call into question the justification for compelling and 
assessing reflection. 
If these critiques are seldom addressed in the literature on reflection and higher 
education, they are even less frequently drawn on in work that specifically considers 
online reflection. In the final part of this chapter, I review the literature on online 
reflective writing, e-portfolios and blogs, indicating where my research contributes to 
understandings of high-stakes online reflective practices in higher education. 
Online reflective writing in weblogs and e-portfolios 
At the time of writing, online reflective writing in higher education tends to be 
supported through the use of blogs or e-portfolios. Blogs are reverse-chronologically 
organised, primarily textual, web-based spaces for writing, while e-portfolios are 
often characterised by their multiple features and purposes. The core feature of an e-
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portfolio is the ability to collect, organise and share ‘evidence’ of some kind: of 
learning, personal development, professional and academic competence, or all three.  
Most e-portfolios are highly structured, database- and template-driven. Where 
present in an e-portfolio, reflective writing is typically either attached as metadata to 
artefacts; treated as an artefact itself, to be mixed and matched with other evidence 
(Strivens, 2007, p.13); or the ‘glue’ or narrative holding the portfolio together. 
Different contexts of use produce very different sorts of orientations to reflection; 
and indeed, not all uses of e-portfolios aim to be reflective. Perhaps as a result, 
reflection is, in the context of much educational literature on e-portfolios, seen as one 
of a multitude of options to be selected (or not) when using these technologies. In 
other words: reflection moves from being a complex site of attention and practice in 
its own right, as we saw in the previous part of this chapter, to being a technological 
feature or affordance. 
A blog can either stand alone or be part of e-portfolios or VLEs. Its purpose is most 
commonly understood as reflective: because of its chronological way of displaying 
data, a blog is ideally suited for the linear, developmental model so prevalent in 
educational reflective practices. 
The literature on reflection in e-portfolios makes different sorts of claims from that 
on educational blogging, and I will discuss the two separately. It is worth saying, 
however, that the vast majority of educational literature on both blogs and e-
portfolios is written from the point of view of learning technologists or teachers, and 
is descriptive of particular tools or of particular examples of practice; what Hounsell 
et al (2007) call “accounts of practice”. In addition, it mostly uncritically accepts 
these tools and practices as beneficial above and beyond offline practices, in terms of 
efficiency, accessibility, relevance, the enhancement of technical skills, and in terms 
of the ease of finding an audience and fostering community and dialogue. Where 
drawbacks are identified, these are usually attributed to lack of motivation, 
understanding or technical proficiency on the part of students or teachers, lack of 
institutional understanding or support, concerns about privacy and safety in the 
Chapter 2: Reviewing key literature 
 57 
online environment, or sometimes a lack of time or resource to properly implement 
these otherwise promising technologies.  
Furthermore, though reflection is very often cited as a key benefit of blogs and e-
portfolios, literature which focuses on online reflection is relatively rare. For most 
authors, any questions about the nature or purpose of reflection appear to have been 
answered in advance, and there is no need to do more than vaguely invoke 
‘reflection’ to do the work of justifying the use of blogs and e-portfolios, without 
engaging with the debates around reflection, audience, or authenticity raised in the 
previous section, let alone how these debates might change as a result of moving 
reflection online. 
There is also very little in the way of literature which engages with the online 
subject. Online reflective accounts are assumed to have a straightforward 
relationship with the offline selves of students, and few authors writing about online 
reflection ask what it means to create digital-textual selves or what impact reflecting 
online has on the subjectivity of students and teachers. 
A key purpose of this section is therefore to set the small body of work which does 
critically engage with online reflection and the online subject, and to which I will 
return throughout this thesis, in the wider context of an overwhelming lack of 
criticality, lack of concern about the nature of reflective practices in education, and 
apparent lack of curiosity about what difference being online makes.  
Where digital difference is acknowledged in online reflective practices, it is seen to 
be technological rather than conceptual, and beneficial rather than problematic (P. 
Butler, 2006, p.12). The following table outlines the features usually positively 
associated with online reflection, as compared with paper-based methods: 
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Discourses of online and paper-based reflection 
Online (the new) Paper-based (the old) 





multi-modal  textual 
audience focused  solitary 
spontaneous  deliberate 
 
The other key purpose of this section is to describe and explore the treatment of 
matters of assessment in relation to online reflection, and to argue that much of the 
apprehension or outright disapproval of assessing reflection expressed in the 
theoretical literature discussed in the last section evaporates when it comes to 
reflective writing online. I believe there are two reasons for this. The first is that 
assessability is held up as the ultimate goal of e-portfolio use in higher education, 
and insofar as reflection is part of e-portfolios, it is considered fair game. Secondly, 
the communicative, dialogic possibilities of online writing in general, and cultural 
understandings of blogging in particular, have prompted a shift from viewing 
reflection as personal and private to audience-focused and public.  
E-portfolios: evidence, representation and assessment 
E-portfolios, like paper-based portfolios before them, are widely believed to support 
‘authentic assessment’ (Cambridge, 2010, p.88; Kimball, 2005, p.435) and 
‘constructive alignment’ (Clark & Adamson, 2009). The perceived combination of 
personalisation, reflection, evidence, and supervision or tracking makes an online 
portfolio appear extremely well-suited to assessment in a variety of subjects and 
disciplines, especially those with significant practice elements (Strivens, 2007, p.5). 
There are also a number of professions and professional bodies which make 
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membership or progression contingent on evidence of reflective practice, and here e-
portfolios are seen to be a convenient method of collecting and storing this evidence. 
This combination of traits and uses can lead to the charge of what Barrett and Carney 
(2005) call the “conflicting purposes” of e-portfolios: accountability (evidence-
based, constructed around externally defined objectives), learning (process-
orientated, reflective) and marketing (presenting a ‘best face’ to the world). They 
write that “these models are based upon paradigms that are often at odds, 
philosophically, with each other” (p.1), but this is more than a philosophical dilemma 
for students. Attempts to combine, for instance, reflection with high-stakes 
assessment in a single portfolio can, as we saw Boud et al (1985) argue, affect the 
way that students will reflect about their mistakes, concerns or weaknesses.  
The imperatives of assessment are normalised in e-portfolio literature to such an 
extent, however, that Barrett and Carney (2005) go on to argue that while an e-
portfolio should ideally not be used for summative assessments, and should instead 
support process, “deep learning” and reflection through formative assessment, 
institutional demands for data for accreditation must be met. This notion is taken up 
by other authors as well: so, for example, there is a claim that “one should only ask 
for student reflections if the portfolio system can guarantee their authenticity” 
(Meeus, Questier, & Derks, 2006, p.136), a clear indication that assessment is the 
overriding purpose of reflection.  
Barrett and Carney (2005) propose a “balanced” assessment system with clear 
delineations between the different sorts of data being collected and presented. An 
archive of evidence is the centre point of a system which separates the learner’s 
portfolio from the institution’s assessment structures. They believe that technology 
can be made to support such a balanced system and that great learning advantages 
will follow from getting it right.  
Cambridge (2010) argues that what he calls “deliberative assessment” (p.73) 
supports authenticity and integration in students’ e-portfolio work and is therefore a 
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legitimate and valuable assessment practice. He suggests that both “standardized” 
and “subjectivist” methods of e-portfolio assessment are problematic because they 
preclude processes of “deliberative democracy” (p.69). Standardised methods mask 
the deliberations that take place in setting standards and producing normative 
orientations to those standards (p.71). Subjectivist methods privatise and make 
exclusive the judgements of quality that are held to be possible only within 
extremely local, specific contexts, by individual teachers as experts (p.73). He 
argues, though, that “deliberative assessment” can turn assessment criteria (which he 
calls “competencies”) into “boundary objects” which “make it possible for 
individuals and groups with different experiences and priorities to collaborate in 
shared enterprises while acknowledging those differences” (p.74). The humanist 
ideals of reason, authenticity and integration that underpin Cambridge’s conception 
of the educational process allow him to argue that the process and products (the 
competencies) of deliberative assessment is validated by the student experience: “to 
the extent that students are successful in expressing their experiences and beliefs in 
an authentic way within the shared framework of the competencies, they demonstrate 
that the college has been successful” (p.76). 
Ayala (2006), on the other hand, argues that e-portfolios are rarely adopted 
institutionally for the benefit of student learning, but rather are prized for their 
administrative convenience. This further complicates the “accountability” paradigm 
in light of administrative priorities and demands. Placier, Fitzgerald and Hall (2001) 
give a striking example of a teacher education programme’s e-portfolio being 
“transformed from the individualistic, developmental, constructivist vision …to a 
policy tool designed to address external program and state requirements” (p.7), and 
discuss in detail the negative impact of this orientation on students. For these 
authors, technology does not have the power to mask these demands enough to allow 
the ‘freedom’ of authentic reflection.  
The term ‘reflective e-portfolio’ is often used not only to refer to the presence of 
written reflections, but also to a general quality of openness, unpolishedness, an 
honest assessment of weaknesses (Stefani, Mason, & Pegler, 2007, p.73). It is, in the 
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discourse of e-portfolios, the opposite of a showcase or marketing portfolio. This 
construction of reflection as honest, spontaneous and confessional, in contrast to the 
strategic, selective and knowing ‘showcase’, accounts for the panic over conflicting 
paradigms. As Orland-Barak (2005) argues of paper-based portfolios, though, the 
larger context of practice (in her case, a centralised education system which defined 
the nature of the portfolios in use in local institutions for teacher training) means that 
different purposes do not necessarily produce different results: a ‘process’ and a 
‘product’ portfolio created in the same context look, she argues, strikingly similar in 
terms of their content and level or lack of criticality. 
When a lack of critical reflection is raised as a problem with e-portfolios or 
assessment of e-portfolios, the solution offered by authors is often ‘more reflection’ 
or better integration (Klenowski & Lunt, 2008, p.215). It is rare for authors to 
question the fit between reflection, assessment and e-portfolios. Perhaps this reflects 
the prevalence of ‘accounts of practice’ and the investment that many authors have in 
their own practices. Authors also have a tendency to conflate benefits of the e-
portfolio with the effects of assessment. So, for example, Duque et al (2006) claim 
that the accessibility and continuity of the e-portfolio encourages reflection over 
time, and count their project a success, while glossing over the fact that students 
would only receive marks for items with a ‘reflective’ element.  
Constraints imposed by e-portfolios can be explained by structures and technologies 
as well as purposes and audiences. Templates, which are designed to help students 
structure their portfolios, can result both in tick-box or form-filling mentalities 
(Placier et al., 2001) and in portfolios which are basically duplicates of one another 
(Baldwin, 2006). Kimball (2005) agrees, arguing that template driven e-portfolios 
run the risk of:  
stereotyping students, forcing them to make their work and their identity fit 
into a preconceived visual rhetoric of a certain kind of student… 
Overstandardizing the form, appearance, and structure of the portfolio 
reduces the possibility for real reflection and learning. (p.453) 
The notion of the template will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
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Calling for a critical examination of the uses to which e-portfolios are being put, 
Kimball (2005) identifies some theoretical principles underpinning portfolio 
pedagogy: reflection, connection, process and activation, and asks whether e-
portfolios can and do support these. He expresses concern that “in the excitement of 
creating new database portfolio systems that make drastic changes to the scope and 
permeability of portfolios, we may have left some of these theoretical principles 
behind” (p.437), and goes on to say that “database portfolio systems may simply 
accelerate the growing institutional appetite for data” (p.438), and move away from 
reflection as the heart of the portfolio. 
An institutional focus is at odds with the arguments often put forward about the 
importance of conscious engagement with e-portfolios as personal narratives. Some 
authors argue that the ideal e-portfolio uses artefacts and evidence to tell a story of 
learning, practice, identity or development (McAlpine, 2005). Reflection and stories 
are closely linked, but not necessarily identical: “composing a digital story is much 
more than simple digital reflection. It involves a conscious process of choice and 
intention to represent” (Tendero, 2006, p.178). Dubinsky (2003) says that this 
process helps students “recognize that their work can actually be represented as 
scholarship, and as such, as part of their field’s intellectual property” (p.2). Barrett 
(2004, 2006) is one of the key proponents of the connection of e-portfolios with 
digital storytelling, and she claims that “if we are to help learners create portfolios 
that truly support assessment for learning …we need to look at strategies that help 
the learner tell a story of their own learning[,] strategies that foster learner self-
motivation” (2004, online). 
Dubinsky (2003) also claims that his students will be “writing themselves” for an 
audience, and will be forced to be reflective in considering “what they decide to 
share and why, considering how these choices create a personality, complete with 
documented skills and talents” (p.8). The digital portfolio “asks students to write for 
the screen as well as for the page; to create relationships between and among linked 
material, as between and among experiences; to update it as a habit of mind; and to 
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represent learning in part by exploring the connections the digital environment 
invites” (Yancey, 2004, p.754).  
An emphasis on deliberation, choice and autonomy reflects the nature of the 
literature on online reflection. As in the previous section on reflection, subjectivity is 
mostly treated as unproblematic in relation to online reflection. The humanist self is 
not at all problematised by the current literature the way one might expect given the 
issues of fragmentation, embodiment, networks and the database that emerge from 
theoretical engagement with online subjectivity. One notable exception is Yancey 
(2004), who argues that the student represented in an electronic portfolio is different 
from that in a paper based portfolio (p.742), and that the possibilities for 
hypertextual, multi-modal, multiple and non-linear presentation of material in an e-
portfolio are coupled with the doubly-authored (student and system) nature of many 
e-portfolios to create new forms of student selves. This leads again to the question of 
whether reflection in an online space captures or produces the experience and 
knowledge which is to be assessed, and this question will be addressed extensively in 
this thesis, particularly in Chapters 7 and 8. McAlpine goes some way towards 
connecting e-portfolio practices with the issues relating to “database subjectivity” 
(Jarrett, 2004) that were discussed in the second part of this chapter. She notes that 
“the power over temporal structuring [in the e-portfolio] is undermined by database 
structure, which affords equal value given to all entries” (McAlpine, 2005, p.383), a 
matter which will be discussed more in Chapter 5. However, where I argue that this 
calls for a new orientation towards subjectivity in reflection, McAlpine maintains 
that the e-portfolio ultimately offers “control of narrative” (p.384) by the learner, and 
therefore represents a strengthening of learner autonomy.  
Blogs: audience, privacy and dialogue 
Unlike e-portfolios, whose development emerged from a tradition of educational 
portfolio building, blogs have been imported from internet culture, often because of 
their popularity and the belief that students will respond to them. Duffy and Bruns 
(2006) argue that the popularity of blogging indicates “a growing impetus towards 
personal expression and reflection, and also the sharing of personal ‘spaces’ – it is 
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now possible to harness these developments in an educational context” (p.34). This 
“harnessing” has included explicitly comparing blogs with learning journals, as 
Duffy and Bruns and also Hain and Back (2008) do. The mapping of blogs onto 
learning journals can be awkward, though, when it comes to issues of audience and 
assessment. As we saw in relation to the discussion of e-portfolios above, there is a 
tendency in the literature on educational blogging to attribute benefits to blogging 
while neglecting to consider the motivation provided by assessment or other forms of 
compulsion (Sim & Hew, 2010, p.7). 
Where e-portfolios are often extremely fine-grained in terms of access permissions, 
and where their default settings are normally private and closed, blogs have typically 
been accepted as at least semi-public environments, and many teachers value them 
for exactly this reason: they provoke an awareness of audience and voice (Walker, 
2005), and communities of learners can inspire and encourage one another 
(Ladyshewsky & Gardner, 2008).  
Furthermore, the entrance of blogging into educational settings has been 
accompanied by a decoupling of the notions of ‘personal’ and ‘private’. In part this 
may be a technical issue: unlike e-portfolio content, blog entries are usually not 
subject to a process of ‘selection’ or the concept of ‘presentation’ – the blog is diary-
like, and the ‘publish’ button adds a blog post to the diary – there is normally no 
suggestion that the writer will then return to filter, select or recombine blog posts for 
presentational purposes (except when blogs are part of e-portfolios), though 
recombination does occur, Jarrett (2004) argues, as an inevitable part of the blogging 
process. 
Additionally, the willingness of millions of bloggers to disclose their most personal 
thoughts (Nardi, Schiano, & Gumbrecht, 2004) has apparently convinced educators 
that blogs are the magic ingredient for transforming resistance to (or perhaps passive 
compliance with) reflection into engaged, self-motivated reflective practice. No 
longer is it seen to be the case that what is personal, intimate or difficult for an 
individual student is necessary to keep secret or private. It would seem that teachers 
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have concluded (perhaps spurred on by media reports, as Barnes (2006) argues) that 
their younger students will not object to sharing their reflections in a blogging 
context, since it is often argued that young people have no interest in online privacy 
(Lenhart, 2005). Indeed, if anything, they will have to be held back and taught about 
the dangers of putting too much information (or the wrong kind) online (Wishart, 
2004).  
More recent work on youth social media practices has revealed that, as boyd has 
pointed out, privacy remains important to everyone, including young people. 
However, its meaning is different in mediated spaces, where it denotes the ability to 
“limit access through social conventions” (boyd, 2008, p.131), and where tactics 
such as “security through obscurity” replace structural boundaries (p.133). This will 
be discussed more in Chapter 5. The emphasis on community and audience therefore 
poses problems in relation to the notion that learning journals are meant to be safe 
spaces in which students can honestly and critically explore their experiences. The 
openness and confessional quality of many blogs is supported by bloggers’ ability to 
limit their exposure (to an extent, and not always successfully – as the journalist 
Emily Gould (2008) discovered when her personal and professional blogging 
practices became blurred and she gained unwanted attention and criticism). 
Furthermore, bloggers in the public domain often play with identity, anonymity and 
blur the lines between fiction and ‘fact’ (Holbrook, 2006). Student bloggers almost 
never have the option to openly experiment with identity in this way, and the limits 
being set are usually not within their control. So, where the presence of a reading 
public, even one whose members are all known to the author, might stimulate 
participation, it does not necessarily provoke reflection: educational blogs (especially 
those which are high-stakes in any way) can suffer from the same problems as high-
stakes reflection in other contexts: primarily, a lack of critical reflection (Yang, 
2009). 
The notion of dialogue is also a complicated one in educational blog settings. 
Comments and participation from peers and tutors is mooted as one of the key 
benefits of blogging for learning. Williams and Jacobs (2004, online) argue that 
Chapter 2: Reviewing key literature 
 66 
blogs tap into informal peer learning and develop students’ ability to formulate and 
stand by opinions: “writing a blog …forces a student to confront their own opinions 
and contemplate how their views might be interpreted and reflected upon by others”. 
However, the development of a culture of constructive feedback and commenting is 
not trivial, and when this does not emerge, there can be adverse effects on the 
learning, enjoyment and reflective practice of student bloggers (Kerawalla, Minocha, 
Kirkup, & Conole, 2008; Sim & Hew, 2010).  
Furthermore, pervasive discourses of teaching efficiency and time-saving associated 
with e-learning in general (Clegg et al., 2003) are probably especially unhelpful 
when it comes to blogging. While ‘feedback’ is often used as a catchall term and 
does not always distinguish between peer and teacher contributions, it is clear from 
some of the most positive reports on educational blogging that the establishment and 
maintenance of a teacher presence in student blogs is key (Hughes & Purnell, 2008; 
Quinn, Duff, & Johnston, 2007), and while it is not explicitly discussed in these 
papers, we will see from a number of my teacher interviews that this feedback and 
engagement is extremely time-consuming. Blogging is therefore not a quick fix for 
promoting reflection, and getting it wrong can result in especially unsatisfactory 
experiences for students and teachers, again as we will see. 
In support of more theory 
In this section I have touched on some themes and issues from the literature on 
online reflection which are certainly ripe for further exploration: the construction of 
reflection as a technical affordance rather than a complex and contested area of 
study; the wide acceptance of assessment as an unproblematic feature of online 
reflection, and the attribution of ‘success’ to online reflective practices that elides the 
role of compulsion; the problematic discourse of conflicting paradigms; the ways in 
which templates can constitute students’ subject positions; the meanings of privacy 
and the decoupling of notions of ‘personal’ and ‘private’; and the importance of 
dialogue and feedback. 
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Many of these issues will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters, and the 
more critical literature (from Clegg, Yancey, Kimball, and Hughes and Purnell, for 
example) will be drawn on again. However, the majority of published literature on 
online reflection is descriptive and, perhaps as a result, seriously undertheorised. 
Unfortunately this is not uncommon in the field of e-learning, though as the field 
matures it is becoming more critical and rigorous. This work aims to contribute to 
the move towards greater theorisation and criticality of this area of study.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced some key theoretical positions and matters of concern 
that will be taken up in the rest of this thesis. I have established the Foucauldian 
underpinnings of this work, and shown how the literature on online subjectivity 
could inform much-needed new perspectives on online reflection. In addition, I have 
identified some gaps in the literature, particularly around problematising humanist 
reflective practices and theorising online reflection, and indicated how this research 
contributes to advancing knowledge in these areas. 
The next chapter describes the research I conducted, discussing its methodology, 
epistemological and theoretical frameworks, and the practicalities of how I went 
about investigating high-stakes online reflection in higher education. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
This has been a qualitative study involving students and teachers in higher education 
programmes in the UK. Its methodology consisted of interviewing students and 
teachers to find out how they were negotiating practices that discursively position 
them in multiple ways. I conducted a series of semi-structured interviews, which 
were designed to tease out ambivalent, uncertain places where student and teacher 
interpretations and descriptions of their experiences and practices exposed 
ambiguities. 
The ultimate goal of the research was to problematise a simplistic application of 
humanist ideals of reflection to complex practices, and to propose how high-stakes 
online reflection could be theorised differently. The goal in my interviews was 
therefore to get a picture of the complexity of these practices and the ways that 
students and teachers took up, rejected and reframed the various discourses of online 
reflection available to them.  
This chapter unfolds (albeit unevenly) from the pragmatic to the theoretical. The first 
few sections explain how the data I write about in the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis was generated and analysed, and what methodological choices informed its 
production. My aim here is to allow readers to understand the practicalities of the 
research project, and to persuade them that I approached the task with an eye to 
producing data satisfactory in quality and quantity for empirical social science 
research at doctoral level. I will explain how the research questions being 
investigated informed my choices of method and analysis, how I planned my 
research, and what did and did not go according to that plan. I describe my 
consideration of the ethical issues involved in this project and aspects of the process 
of analysis of the data. 
The final section of this chapter has a different aim: to show that, even with the most 
careful planning, there is no method that uncovers truth. Rather, method generates its 
truths. This section sets out a rationale for considering this research to belong to a 
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post-structuralist paradigm, examining how I have approached issues of the nature of 
experience, reflexivity, validity and subjectivity from a post-structuralist perspective, 
and what implications this has for how the research that follows should be read.  
Finding and selecting participants 
In this research I worked with ‘constellations’ of students and teachers, with each 
‘constellation’ consisting of one or more teachers and two or more students from a 
single academic programme. Interviewing both students and teachers from the 
programmes involved provided a context of practice in which to situate the data that 
was generated. In the end I had six such constellations, plus another three teachers 
from two additional disciplines who had insights into assessing online reflection but 
where full involvement of the programme was not possible (in one case because the 
high-stakes elements of reflection had been abandoned, in another because the timing 
meant there were no students available to be part of the study). 
I approached lecturers and programme leaders in the first instance, and requested 
their participation and permission to contact their students. Although I recognised 
that this potentially put me at a disadvantage in terms of being seen by students as 
allied with their tutors (see ethical issues, below), lecturers were clearly the 
gatekeepers to the programme-level context that was important for analysing the 
reflective practices being studied here.  
I conducted 31 interviews in total, between May 2008 and June 2009. Most lasted 
between 45 and 60 minutes, and all were digitally recorded and later transcribed for 
analysis. In addition, 15 students shared course-related reflective artefacts with me, 
and 5 teachers shared programme- or course-related documents (handbooks, 
assignment guidelines, assessment rubrics, etc), all of which were intended to form 
part of a documentary analysis, but which in the end I did not make use of in this 
thesis, for reasons that will be recounted later. 
Potential participants were approached through a number of channels: through a 
general request on two relevant email lists of which I was already a member; through 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 71 
several key informants knowledgeable about e-portfolios who sent my request to 
their own contacts; and through my contacts from an e-portfolio project I had worked 
on in 2005/06 (referred to in the background section of Chapter 1). The wording of 
my request varied slightly, but was generally along these lines: 
I am looking to make contact with Higher Education lecturers in the UK 
whose students are currently using online environments to do reflective 
writing which is either summatively assessed or used as evidence for 
progression or membership in a profession or professional body. These 
might be blog or e-portfolio environments, for example. 
I would like to involve lecturers and small groups of students across five or 
six courses or programmes as research participants in my qualitative study 
of online reflective practices and performances. 
I would be really grateful if you could get in touch with me if you or 
someone you know might be a relevant contact, or forward my details on to 
anyone who might be interested in talking to me. If you would like more 
information about my project, please also let me know! 
Rather than starting with a definition of online reflection and then seeking 
participants who agreed with that definition, I left the term “online reflection” to 
stand alone in my initial approaches, and allowed potential participants to define 
themselves as assessing reflection on their programmes or courses. I thought this 
would usefully expose some of the contrasts in understandings of reflection, which it 
has. 
A number of people responded on their own behalf or with suggested leads to follow 
up on. I corresponded with everyone who contacted me, and contacted quite a few 
others directly, and I learned quite a bit about the landscape of practice in this area in 
the UK, even from those who did not fit my criteria. In retrospect it could have been 
useful to have undertaken a more formal mapping exercise by sending out a short 
survey to generate some data on the prevalence, nature and spread of these practices 
(some work like this has been done by Strivens et al., 2009). At any rate, I can say 
that at the time of these initial contacts – Spring 2008 – I corresponded with more 
than 65 people with an interest, or some experience, in the area of assessing online 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 72 
reflection and that, while assessing reflection appeared to be a minority activity in 
terms of blog and e-portfolio use in higher education, there was widespread 
awareness of the practice and a number of programmes and courses known to be 
engaged in it.  
Through this correspondence, I narrowed the respondents down to people who were 
currently engaged in high-stakes online reflection in a higher education context, and 
were not in their first year of doing so. I wanted participants to have been through at 
least one cycle of assessing reflection, so that they would have views about the 
whole process, and also to ensure I was involving people who were continuing to 
assess online reflection because either they had to, or at some level they felt it had 
worked. I invited those who fitted these criteria to participate in my project, and 
explained that participation would involve: 
• being interviewed by me; 
• sharing relevant documentation about their high-stakes reflective practice; 
• helping me get access to students on their programme, who would be invited 
to participate in interviews and asked to share their reflective artefacts. 
I was keen to have participants from a spread of disciplines, including professional, 
vocational and more traditionally ‘academic’ subject areas, and to get a mix of 
undergraduate, postgraduate, campus-based, blended and distance programmes. In 
the end, it is notable that all the disciplines from which the constellations were drawn 
– indeed, the disciplines of nearly all the potential participants who made contact 
with me – are professional or vocational. This reflects the state of the field at the 
moment in higher education in the UK (Strivens et al., 2009), as described in more 
detail in Chapter 1. This may continue to be the case in future, or these could be seen 
as ‘vanguard’ courses and programmes which point the way for others. In other 
respects the mix of programmes did represent a range of type, mode and discipline. 
There was a weighting towards Education, with three of the six constellations 
coming from that discipline, which I attribute mostly to my own greater familiarity 
with and number of contacts in that area.  
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In terms of demographics, four of the universities involved in my study were based 
in England, and the other four in Scotland. The gender mix of my participants was 
weighted towards women: I spoke with 14 female and 6 male students, and 9 female 
and 3 male teachers. I have not attempted to discuss or problematise the discourse of 
so-called ‘gender differences’ in terms of reflection, but this is an area that could be 
fruitful to explore in future research. The cultural backgrounds of participants was 
mainly English or Scottish, but I also spoke with students from Germany, Italy, 
Australia, Canada, and the Ukraine. I did not explore class or race issues in my 
study, and did not ask questions to elicit this information.  
Summary of data 
Programmes with full involvement 








Met cohort for a session on ‘metaphor’ 
– obtained visual data. 







Student interviews face-to-face, 
lecturer by phone. 




















Mix of face-to-face and phone 
interviews. 
Programmes with partial involvement (lecturers only) 
Discipline Programme type Interviewees 
Pharmacy Undergraduate, on 
campus 
1 lecturer, in person 
Law Postgraduate, on 
campus 
2 lecturers (interviewed together), in person 
Total number of interviews: 31 (20 students, 12 lecturers – 2 interviewed together) 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 74 
Interview mode 
Although not explicitly my intention at the outset, for practical reasons the majority 
of the interviews (22 of 31) were conducted over the phone or, on two occasions, 
using Voice-over-IP software (Skype), while only nine were face-to-face. Usually 
this was due to the time constraints of participants, or their geographical location. 
For members of distance programmes this was particularly an issue; two of my 
interviewees were outside the UK, while others were scattered throughout the 
country. On one occasion I was ill when I was due to travel to conduct interviews on 
a campus, and rescheduled the interviews to be conducted via telephone. As a result 
of having done most of my interviewing in this way for this research, and having a 
fair amount of experience on other projects of face-to-face interviewing, I have 
gained some insight into the strengths and weaknesses of voice-only qualitative 
interviewing. 
On a purely practical level, telephone interviewing is usually very convenient for 
participants, taking up only the time of the interview itself, and being able to take 
place wherever is most suitable for them. Mostly interviewees were at home when I 
spoke with them. I was able to be more flexible in terms of times and dates of 
interviews because I was not travelling and therefore not on a tight schedule. 
Participants were in their own spaces, and not dealing face-to-face with a stranger, 
and most appeared to be quite comfortable with the medium. On the negative side, 
establishing rapport and conveying interest and engagement as an interviewer is 
more difficult without visual cues such as nodding and eye contact. This appeared to 
cause uneasiness for some people: one interviewee spent the first few minutes of the 
interview asking me questions about where I was, and describing his own view, and 
one was concerned that she was boring me when she took my listening silence for 
lack of interest. However, as Novick points out (2008, p.395), establishing rapport is 
a challenge for interviewers in any mode. There are skills involved in putting 
interviewees at ease which may differ slightly between modes, but my main 
strategies in all cases were: 
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• to communicate in a friendly way by email before the interview; 
• to signal my interest in the interviewee’s views and my appreciation for their 
participation; 
• to spend a few minutes at the start of each interview describing the nature of 
the interview, how long it would take, and that although I had questions 
written down it was fine to go off track into other areas of interest; 
• to start with a few ‘easy’ questions to put interviewees at ease. 
My experience of conducting interviews face-to-face has been that they have often 
had an energy and an edge – a sense of being high-stakes – while voice-only 
interviews often felt more relaxed. However, in terms of the amount and quality of 
the data generated, I found the results of each mode to be comparable, whether the 
interview was face-to-face, by phone, or over Skype. There are very few studies 
comparing the effectiveness of telephone and face-to-face qualitative interviewing, 
although there is a fair amount of possibly unfounded bias against the practice, with 
loss of nonverbal, contextual and verbal data (through shorter or less reflective 
responses) being cited as reasons why face-to-face interviewing is better than voice-
only (Novick, 2008, p.395). My own experiences reflect those of Sturges and 
Hanrahan (2004), who found that offering the option of telephone interviews to their 
potential participants improved access, allowed for more flexibility, and did not 
adversely impact on the quality of the data generated. 
Being in front of a computer, using Skype rather than a telephone, raised some 
slightly different issues. At the end of one early interview using Skype (voice-only 
rather than video chat), Lynne and I discussed our experience of using that medium:  
Jen: how did you find [Skype] by the way? Is it strange? I mean I find it, I 
do find it a little strange, um, even weirder than the phone for some 
reason. 
Lynne (student, PG): It’s because, it’s because you’ve got your hands free 
I think [laugh] 
Jen: maybe that’s it, and also because I’m looking at my computer screen 
and, you know, it’s just kind of, it is, it does feel quite different from other 
ways of of conducting interviews. 
Lynne: yeah. Actually for the, for the first couple of minutes I had my eyes 
closed so I could concentrate on what on what you were saying rather than 
being distracted, cause I thought it was going to be more distracting than, 
um than using the phone when you’re kind of a bit more focused, but um no 
it’s quite a good way to do it, actually, yeah. 
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However, during a number of phone interviews, participants mentioned having their 
computers on, looking at or for examples of their reflections or other material during 
the interview, so the presence of networked computers in my interviews was not 
limited to the two done via Skype. In addition, sometimes I used the Skype-to-phone 
feature to make telephone calls to participants, so I was sitting with my laptop while 
they were on the phone.  
In general, I agree with Kazmer and Zie (2008), who attribute the success of 
interaction modes in interviews to the comfort of both interviewer and interviewee 
with in-depth discussion in that mode: 
When participants and interviewer are comfortable in the interaction mode 
– online, via telephone or face to face – they have an easier time using their 
social skills to build the rapport needed to achieve the research goals of the 
interview. When rapport is established and both people are comfortable in 
the medium, they in turn find it easier to share affective data during the 
interview. (p.274) 
Interview format and style 
I developed a semi-structured interview format for all of the interviews in this 
research. My goal in conducting this research was to understand how students and 
teachers negotiated and made sense of the online reflective practices they were 
engaged in, and a semi-structured interview allowed for both a focus on the issues of 
importance to me, and a flexibility in following the interests and impressions of 
interviewees. I was also able to adapt my questions to the particular context of each 
programme, discipline, and use of technology, which was very helpful in getting a 
more detailed picture of the interplay of these three factors. My interviews were 
often more structured than Wengraf (2001), for example, might consider as being 
purely semi-structured; for him, semi-structured interviews are those where 
improvised questions make up at least half of the interview (p.5), and generally that 
was not the case in my interviews. However, I adopted what I see as the key features 
of the semi-structured approach: allowing both the researcher and the interviewee to 
shape the structure and direction of the interview; improvising questions, prompts 
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and probes as appropriate; and being prepared to reorder questions to take account of 
the interview’s momentum.  
In front of me during each interview was a schedule of questions and prompts, 
tailored for students or teachers and for the different contexts of the programmes, 
which I drew from flexibly throughout the interview (see sample schedules in 
Appendix A). I had a clear idea of the topics I wanted to cover, but was also happy to 
have new ideas and questions emerge during the interviews. I generally referred to 
the existence of this schedule at the start of the interview, and explained to each 
interviewee that I had a list of questions but that it was not necessary to get through 
all of them, and if we went off on a tangent that was also fine. The interviews were 
fairly conversational and informal in style, and each one took its own particular path. 
I asked for clarification and asked new questions depending on what was being said.  
As Wengraf (2001) notes, semi-structured interviews must be especially well 
designed to work: “they are semi-structured, but they must be fully planned and 
prepared” (p.5). He also notes that they require the interviewer to think on her feet 
and successfully improvise. These two are not mutually exclusive: I have found that 
the better prepared I am in terms of being immersed in the research context at the 
time of the interview, the better the interviews, and the improvisation, have gone.  
Wengraf also describes semi-structured interviews as requiring more discipline than 
structured ones. It is particularly difficult to avoid being leading in a semi-structured 
interview. For me, the main tendency I had to guard against in my improvised 
questions was to ask a question immediately followed by giving possible answers 
(for example: “why do you think that was? Was it because of A or B?”). I think that I 
did this with good intentions, to try to clarify a question that I was afraid had been 
confusing, but it was a bad habit which I think I made progress with eradicating in 
my research practice. 
Finally, semi-structured interviewing, while being aimed at “exploring the subjective 
world of the interviewee”, is not uncritical (p.28), and there is a balance to be struck 
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between demonstrating an understanding and acceptance of what interviewees say, 
and being challenging. I tended in my interviews towards friendliness and 
understanding, but when I became aware during transcription of early interviews that 
I was sometimes agreeing with the interviewee automatically, without testing my 
understanding of what was being said, I tried to be more challenging in subsequent 
interviews, asking questions about contradictions or points that were not clear to me.  
Metaphor 
One of the key aspects of my interviews involved asking interviewees to create 
metaphors for their online reflective spaces. When meeting face-to-face, I offered 
interviewees the option to draw their metaphor; over the phone I asked them to 
describe it. This strategy has its roots in visual methods (Rose, 2007), as my 
intention was to open alternative ways of knowing and understanding the topic 
through the use of imagery. The drawings or descriptions of metaphors, along with 
the conversation around them, emerged as one of the most vibrant and interesting 
parts of some of my interviews, giving me new perspectives on difficult issues like 
ownership, performance and the relationship between students and teachers.  
Metaphors offers a creative and visual way of thinking about a subject, but they are 
also, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have argued, “pervasive in everyday life, not just 
in language but in thought and action… the way we think, what we experience, and 
what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor” (p.3). I take metaphor very 
seriously, therefore, and have considered not only the metaphors I explicitly elicited, 
but also those which emerged in the interviews and in the reflective artefacts and 
documentation, as being important in understanding how students and teachers 
interpret online reflective practices. 
In addition to asking for metaphors at the end of each interview, I also had the 
opportunity in one case to visit a cohort who were going to be participating in my 
research, and to discuss metaphor with them as a way of representing their own and 
others’ interpretations of situations. Each member of this group was given a 
worksheet and asked to draw and/or write a metaphor for their e-portfolio. The 
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variety of responses was interesting and inspiring, and some of the visual accounts 
that were produced in this session appear in the chapters that follow. 
The use of these visual metaphors raises an issue about the status of the visual in a 
mostly textual account. I propose that these images are first and foremost metaphors, 
and should be understood as part of the research context in that way. However, 
images are often taken as more ‘true’ or revealing than text (Rose, 2007, pp.2-3), and 
therefore not subject to the same critical analysis. Vision is itself a metaphor for 
knowing, but this metaphoric relation has been forgotten in our visual culture: 
Human optics are assumed to accurately reflect externality … Visual 
symbolism, the primary form of symbolism within the culture, is 
dispossessed of its iconographic, or metaphoric, role and routinely 
understood as ‘correspondence’. (Jenks, 1995, p14) 
Baudrillard (1993) describes “a brute fascination [in images] unencumbered by 
aesthetic, moral, social or political judgements” (p.194). Ocularcentrism, as Julier 
(2006) puts it: “renders the viewer almost inanimate in relation to the viewed. …This 
rigid process of looking is underpinned and promoted by the habit of disembodying 
images from their primary contexts of encounter” (p.66). To break down such 
rigidity, where I have used these images I have attempted to look at, rather than 
through, them by citing parts of conversation around them, describing the specific 
contexts of their production, and offering my own interpretations as provisional and 
open to further scrutiny.  
A path that strayed: accessing and collecting 
documents 
In addition to the interview data, where I asked participants to articulate their 
understandings of issues around online reflection, I wanted to collect and analyse 
reflective artefacts themselves, and the programme-related documentation which 
informed the generation of these artefacts. My goal in doing so was to see to what 
extent I could observe in these documents the nature of students’ and teachers’ 
approaches to high-stakes reflection, and how reflection was discursively constructed 
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between teachers and students through their written communications. As pre-existing 
secondary sources (Wellington, 2000, p.109), and situated towards the private and 
restricted end of the continuum (p. 111), these documents seemed likely to provide 
valuable additional perspectives on the issues of importance to me.  
Although I collected a number of these artefacts, I did not fully analyse them, and 
have not (with one exception, the examples of assessment criteria in Chapter 4) made 
use of them in this thesis. Primarily this is because I was unable to resolve some 
complications that emerged during the data generation phase of the research. Asking 
for and receiving programme documents from lecturers, such as copies of the 
instructions for reflective assignments, was relatively straightforward, though not all 
shared this material with me. However, accessing student-generated reflective 
artefacts proved to be more complicated on technical, interpersonal and ethical levels 
than I had anticipated, and the collection and storage of the artefacts was less than 
ideal, given that it involved substantial loss of their digital, multimodal and 
hyperlinked nature.  
On a technical level, most programmes’ e-portfolio and blog environments had 
sophisticated permission settings and required special action on the part of students 
to share objects with external viewers. Not all students knew how to give me 
permission to see their reflective artefacts, and while I was able to talk some through 
systems with which I was already familiar, for others the access proved too 
complicated and they gave up. In this sense their participation in interviews was less 
problematic for them than the time and effort involved in figuring out how to give 
me access to their reflections. The access I did get was often of uncertain duration, 
which meant I had to act immediately to capture and store versions of the artefacts 
locally.  
The archiving of the reflective artefacts was problematic because the original e-
portfolio or blog interfaces were a complex mix of templates, text, images and 
hyperlinks, which did not translate well to being saved as offline HTML or PDF 
files. There was a tension for me between awareness that I would want to analyse the 
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text using Nvivo qualitative data analysis software, which is limited in its ability to 
import multimodal files, the need to act quickly to capture the data that had been 
shared with me, and the awareness that their digitality was an important aspect of the 
artefacts. In the end I was unhappy with the limitations of the archives I was able to 
produce. 
In interpersonal terms, some students were anxious about sharing their reflections 
with a stranger – again, possibly more so than they were to take part in an interview. 
Two students opted to share assignments with a reflective component rather than 
their e-portfolios or blogs, despite the latter also being the focus of assessment on 
their courses. For my part, I was concerned about how I could ethically and usefully 
cite these documents without running the risk of compromising the anonymity of 
student interviewees. I will say more about this in the following section. 
Partly as a result of these complications, and partly because of the large amount of 
interview data I wanted to use, I decided to leave this documentary data for future 
research. I believe that there is much to be gained from a discourse analytic approach 
to reflective artefacts, and a future project which was designed in such a way as to 
address the issues I encountered here would be of interest and value in further 
theorising high-stakes online reflective practices. 
Ethical issues and permissions 
As I was conducting research in the higher education sector, where formal ethical 
approval for research is the norm, I requested that my ethics application be reviewed 
by my School’s ethics committee (rather than signed off by my supervisors, as was 
more common at the time for doctoral projects in my university). Being able to 
provide a formal approval letter to programme leaders smoothed the way to 
participation in a few cases. In addition, several of the programmes in my study had 
their own institutional ethical approval mechanisms which meant I needed to provide 
copies of my ethics documentation and interview schedules in advance of getting 
permission for programmes to participate. One programme required me to complete 
an extensive ethical approval application for their own ethics committee. Another 
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requested a report of the key points arising from the interviews as a condition of 
access. 
In all cases, every participant in my study filled in a consent form, either in hard 
copy or online, giving permission for me to interview them, to record and transcribe 
the interview, and to use the data generated in anonymised form in my research and 
future publications. Each participant was made aware of the nature and context of my 
research, and that their consent to participate was strictly voluntary and could be 
withdrawn at any time. The consent forms for lecturers and students are provided in 
Appendix B. 
The ethical issues of primary concern to me in this project related to student 
participants, and were around choice and consent, and privacy and anonymity. The 
most practical way to get access to student participants was through their lecturers 
(Seidman, 2006, pp.43-5; Wanat, 2008). For this reason it was likely that I was seen 
by students as associated with their lecturers, and some students may have felt it was 
beneficial to them to be seen to participate in my project. In one case that I knew of, 
the teacher selected and put me in touch with the students who would speak with me. 
Other teachers announced the research to their classes and allowed them to contact 
me (or vice versa). In both cases, there is a general issue of the extent to which 
certain kinds of students (less critical? more engaged?) are likely to participate in 
research studies like mine, and what the effect on the data generated might therefore 
be. 
I was clear in my communications with students that participation was strictly 
voluntary, and that I was approaching them as a student myself. As with all 
researcher-participant relationships, however, power is a tricky and shifting dynamic:  
Subjective positions create multiple relations of power. A researcher is not 
necessarily powerful, and other identities, such as gender and nationality, 
should be attended to. …This is not to say that researchers should not 
consider themselves powerful and act in ways that aim to produce more 
egalitarian relationships, but that this aim should not reduce our theorising 
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of a more complex power dynamic. (Riley, Schouten, & Cahill, 2003, 
p.12) 
A second issue which affected the student participants in my research was one of 
privacy and anonymity. While all participants were assured that any data I used from 
interviews with them would be anonymised, it was also the case that in sharing their 
reflective artefacts with me they opened themselves up to being recognised by their 
lecturers in any published data from my research. Using the same pseudonym in 
order to be able to make connections between the interviews and reflections would 
have meant that student interview data was perhaps somewhat less anonymous than 
students might assume. This was part of the difficulty I had in approaching the 
analysis and use of this artefact data, and part of why I decided not to pursue it in this 
thesis.  
A third issue related to my critical take on reflective practices, and how to ensure that 
this did not lead me into a position of criticising individual teachers, who were 
consistently generous with their time, and open with me about their experiences with 
high-stakes online reflection. I respect the commitment that the teachers I met had to 
the best interests of their students and their professions. My goal in conducting these 
interviews was to understand how students and teachers negotiated what I saw as 
difficult issues relating to power, authenticity and performativity in high-stakes 
online reflection, not to criticise the work of teachers, and this is the stance that I 
have taken throughout this research. Grappling with this tension was one of the most 
rewarding parts of this project, as it made me feel a responsibility for proposing new 
and alternative practices in the place of the ones I am criticising, and forced me to 
move from a position of detached criticality to a position of creative criticality.  
Transcription 
A key, and still undertheorised and neglected aspect of using interviews as a method 
of data generation is that they must usually be transcribed into textual form before 
being analysed and drawn on in written academic prose. Transcription represents a 
key moment of choice and the exercise of power in the research process and, as has 
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been argued, it is not given nearly enough attention in the qualitative research 
literature (Lapadat, 2000), or in researchers’ accounts of their work. Many qualitative 
researchers appear to believe (or at least proceed as if they believe) that transcription 
is relatively unproblematic, in the sense that either meaning is totally separate from 
form and therefore transcription choices are merely a matter of preference (or 
budget), or that meaning is intrinsically bound to form but that an accurate 
transformation can be produced. 
I started out in this research project wanting each of my transcripts to be as faithful a 
representation of the interview as possible. For me this meant attempting to 
transcribe everything that was said, including repetition, stumbles and the rest, 
despite the messiness and troublesomeness of producing and then citing or working 
with these transcripts. For one thing, I thought, how would I decide what to leave out 
if I were to deliberately selectively transcribe? I told myself that I knew this was still 
my interpretation, and that I would be highly selective when I came to writing up my 
research, and I told myself I was acknowledging that. But I really wanted my data to 
sound authentic, and I had not deeply examined what I meant by that.  
Things got messier still when time pressures meant that I needed to send some of my 
recordings away to be transcribed externally. I worked with a local transcriber and 
provided her with a style sheet, example transcription of my own, and a list of key 
words and phrases that would be likely to come up in each interview. I asked her to 
“transcribe as close to verbatim as possible – including ‘ums’ etc, laughter, and 
pauses”. On receiving each completed transcript, I listened to the interview recording 
while working through the transcript to catch anything that was mis-transcribed or 
missed by the transcriber. However, to my mind the transcripts I produced from 
scratch are distinct from even the final versions of the other transcriber’s work, the 
versions that I checked and amended. This is not to say that mine are better in any 
objective sense, but rather that they reflect my conscious and unconscious beliefs 
about language, meaning, conversation and representation, while hers reflect hers. 
Not attending to transcription choices, does not mean that no choice is being made: 
“researchers make choices about transcription that enact the theories that they hold. 
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If these theories and their relationships to research processes are left implicit, it is 
difficult to examine them or to interpret the findings that follow from them” (Lapadat 
& Lindsay, 1999, p.66). 
As I have argued elsewhere (Ross, 2010), the field of translation studies and its 
engagement with visibility, power, authenticity and fidelity has a lot to offer to 
qualitative researchers working critically with transcription theory and practice. My 
understanding of transcription has been greatly influenced by translation studies, 
particularly Venuti’s concepts of domestication and foreignisation. Domestication 
implies assimilation to dominant ‘home’ values of the target culture, while 
foreignisation is a deliberate othering or making strange of the translated text to 
highlight its source in another place or time. Venuti (1998) attends to the political 
and ideological implications of translation and links these strategies explicitly to 
concerns of power, subordination and cultural marginalisation. He argues that 
translation is “fundamentally ethnocentric”, and that “the very function of translating 
is assimilation, the inscription of a foreign text with domestic intelligibilities and 
interests” (p.11). Later he draws on Berman (1992), who writes of the problems of 
ethnocentrism and the desirability of preserving “foreignness”: “A bad translation I 
call the translation which, generally under the guise of transmissibility, carries out a 
systematic negation of the strangeness of the foreign work” (p.5).  
Bucholtz (2000), in her work on the politics of transcription, identifies many 
important ways in which transcription can demonstrate attitudes towards race, 
otherness and power, for example. To this I would add that considering the politics 
of transcription in terms of foreignisation and domestication invites a look at 
academic discourse in the social sciences and the privileged status of what is 
generally thought of as “academic” prose over alternative forms of knowing and 
expression. As Bayne (2006a) argues, the scholarly written text “is still the primary 
marker of academic legitimacy. The linear, logically-developing scholarly text, with 
its hierarchical structure and build toward conclusion, is still the primary expression 
of the academic mind” (p.1). If we consider academic writing as the dominant mode 
of discourse in the social sciences, then it becomes possible to explore transcription 
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as an act of either domestication to or foreignisation from that discursive centre. The 
question: “can a translator maintain a critical distance from domestic norms without 
dooming a translation to be dismissed as unreadable?” (Venuti, 1998, p.84) becomes 
highly relevant to transcription, and indeed helps us to understand some of the 
discomfort and resistance to more verbatim forms of transcription in academic 
writing and publishing, which tend to coalesce around objections to the ‘distracting’ 
nature of such transcription, and to the question of whether certain forms of 
transcription disadvantage or deprivilege participants by making their words sound 
less academic than the prose that surrounds them.  
If we attempt to include foreignised transcripts in our analyses and publications, 
there will inevitably be a strangeness to the texts we produce. The question is, do we 
do more harm or more good in making our translations and transcriptions visible in 
this way? As Venuti (1998) asks, “to what extent does such an ethics [of difference] 
risk unintelligibility, by decentering domestic ideologies, and cultural marginality, by 
destabilizing the workings of domestic institutions?” (p.84). Foreignisation can 
render strange and essentially ‘other’ not only the text but also the source culture, 
thereby inviting a domestic audience to observe at a distance, and to marginalise a 
foreign culture as hopelessly different and unreachable. There is, in short, a danger 
that ‘foreignised’ transcribed material in research publications makes data 
inaccessible, which is far from the goal of most researchers.  
Bucholtz (2000) distinguishes between naturalised and denaturalised transcriptions, 
and, following Ochs, calls for proponents of each style of transcription to “unsettle” 
and experiment with the other to see what difference it makes, and what they can 
learn (pp.1461-2). However, sometimes the component parts of the process of 
translation – the text, or the translator – reveal themselves as being beyond the reach 
of deliberate experimentation or choice. The effects of the translator and transcriber 
emerge not only from their conscious strategies, but also from the unconscious 
assumptions (and errors) they make. Sometimes in translation these assumptions are 
brought starkly to light by the passage of time or alternative translations; in 
qualitative research transcription this will rarely if ever be the case. In large part this 
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is due to the almost ubiquitous commitment to anonymity that researchers make to 
their interviewees, which make audio or video recordings off-limits to anyone 
outside the research team. In an important sense, therefore, the transcript, not the 
recording, becomes the original in a way a translation may not appear to.  
Baker (2006) identifies as a key discourse of translation the depiction of translators 
as “honest and detached brokers who operate largely in the ‘spaces between’ cultures 
... who can transcend any cultural or political affiliation, at least while they’re 
engaged in the highly romanticised task of translating” (p.11). She problematises this 
discourse, arguing that “no one, translators included, can stand outside or between 
narratives” (p.12). This echoes the arguments of many qualitative researchers; 
Oliver, Serovich and Mason (2005), for example, explain that “a transcriber hears the 
interview through his/her own cultural-linguistic filters” (p.1282). The aim in 
drawing attention to such ‘meta-narratives’ and their impact should not be to “lament 
variability” (Bucholtz, 2002, p.785), but to ask (as Bucholtz does) what it might 
imply.  
Sometimes the nature of the text itself makes the translator more visible. Some 
theorists have argued, in fact, that there will always be inadvertent gain associated 
with translation, because words always have meanings and associations which differ 
between languages. Lecercle (1990) calls this gain “the remainder”, and Venuti notes 
that it “violates ... the ‘virtual reality’ created in the translation ... because the 
variables it contains can introduce a competing truth or break the realist illusion” 
(1998, p.22).  
Writing around translation and transcription has freed me up to live with the 
contradictions in my practice, and I have a new goal: to use my transcription practice 
to trouble and challenge the dominant discourse of academic writing in ways that 
leave more room for different modes and voices. I want the remainders, the 
foreignness and the accidents to be front and centre, because I believe that there is 
value in mess and uncertainty (Law, 2004), and in problematising our reliance on 
certain forms of academic writing as “stable materialisations of the workings of the 
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reasoning mind” (Bayne, 2006a, p.1), to the exclusion of all others. Extracts from my 
data therefore include pauses, laughter and repetitions, and I now offer these as 
generative disturbances rather than an unproblematic reach towards authenticity. 
Thematic analysis 
There are two main approaches to analysing qualitative interview data. One is to treat 
each interview as a unit of analysis. Many narrative and case study methods take this 
approach. The other is to look for commonalities – themes – across the interview 
data and analyse data thematically. Grounded theory and thematic analysis are two 
methods that approach interview data in this way. 
There are problems with both approaches. Treating an interview as a special kind of 
unit of analysis might be seen to privilege individual ‘voice’, autonomy and 
subjectivity as if these things were somehow beyond contestation. Looking for and 
pulling out excerpts from interviews on thematic lines implies that the interview 
context itself is unimportant, and that ‘experience’ can be abstracted from its 
production and equated with ‘experience’ from other contexts (Silverman, 2006, 
p.146).  
In my case, I am interested less in the specificity of individual experience than in 
language and accounts that appeared across a number of interviews, and so I 
conducted a thematic analysis. I understand this as a method assemblage – Law’s 
(2004) term for the ways in which we enact “presence, manifest absence, and 
absence as Otherness” (p.84) in our knowledge-making and research practices. For 
Law, method assemblages “necessarily craft complexities and simplifications”. 
Rather than identifying ‘signals’ amongst ‘noise’, we create both the signal and the 
silence (p.110). Our methods allow us to avoid being “dazzled” by complexity, by 
foregrounding some things by “very selectively attending to, amplifying, and so 
manifesting, possible patterns” (ibid). Law describes interviews in an ethnographic 
study he conducted as containing “limitless possible patterns of similarity and 
difference” (ibid), and the process of analysis as necessary reduction, not discovery. 
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My approach to thematic analysis was similar to that described by King and 
Horrocks (2010), who define themes as: 
recurrent and distinctive features of participants’ accounts, characterising 
particular perceptions and/or experiences, which the researcher sees as 
relevant to the research question. (p.150) 
Like Law, they stress that the researcher’s vision informs how themes are identified 
and developed. Themes are not “like a fossil in a rock” (ibid, p.149) waiting to be 
discovered. The successive stages of thematic analysis are, in a sense, the process of 
fossilising the themes that have been named. For this reason, thematic analysis is 
open to the same sort of scrutiny, and to questions about validity, as other analytic 
strategies. This is not a problem, rather it is an opportunity to ask those questions and 
to consider again and again, as Crotty (1998) puts it, what store we want others to set 
by our findings (p.41). King and Horrocks (2010) suggest that the key measure of 
validity for thematic coding is its ‘auditibility’, proposing that researchers should be 
prepared to show the trail of their successive coding activities so they can 
demonstrate how themes developed over time (p.152). While I question the emphasis 
on validity, for reasons I will explain soon, in Appendix C I offer three snapshots of 
the coding framework I developed, at three different points in the process, and show 
how an early proposed structure for this thesis was both informed by and informed 
the coding process. These snapshots are by no means exhaustive, and I did not 
capture every step of the process, but they should give a sense of how the coding 
developed alongside the theoretical work I was doing at the same time. 
King and Horrocks (ibid) also set out three stages of the process of thematic analysis: 
descriptive coding, interpretive coding, and the generation of overarching themes 
(p.153). I did not experience the first two stages as discrete, so I am describing them 
together.  
Initial coding stages – descriptive and interpretive 
The first stage of my analysis of interview transcripts began with close reading and 
an initial coding of the data. I chose NVivo as my coding environment primarily 
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because I had used it on other projects and was familiar with the interface and with 
the sorts of organisational help it can give in analysing transcripts along thematic 
lines. Using NVivo I highlighted and coded parts of the interviews that seemed to 
have something to offer in terms of the matters of interest informing my research, 
and also excerpts that were surprising, puzzling or thought-provoking, even if the 
connections with my research questions were not clear.  
I began a close reading of each transcript with a ‘blank page’, creating unstructured 
‘free nodes’ as I read, based on the specificities of each interview. Some of these 
were quite descriptive, named with a few key words from the content of the excerpt 
being coded. Others were more interpretive, trying to describe what the excerpt was 
‘about’. So, for example, in one interview a discussion of what a student planned to 
do with their e-portfolio after graduation might be coded under a free node called 
“motivation”, while another might be called “continuing professional development”, 
depending on the focus of that discussion. 
King and Horrocks (ibid) suggest deliberately reusing nodes where new data fits 
well, but I chose to create brand new nodes for each interview (even though 
sometimes these were similar or identical in name to earlier ones). This method of 
coding was more time consuming than reusing nodes, but it sits well with the semi-
structured interview format in that it gave space in my initial readings for different, 
and perhaps idiosyncratic, ways of framing ideas to emerge as I read each transcript. 
After free-node coding each interview, I transferred the nodes into tree nodes, under 
broad headings of ‘teachers’ and ‘students’. This first stage of coding happened over 
a period of many months, as I typically coded interview transcripts immediately after 
transcribing them (or, in later stages, as soon as I got them from the transcriber).  
Once all the interviews had been coded in this way, I turned my attention to 
successive stages of combining nodes. Where nodes were identical or very similar in 
name to previously created free nodes, I merged these together. Where they seemed 
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to be addressing a broader overarching point, I created a new node and either merged 
them into it, or added them as nodes one level down in the hierarchy.  
Generating overarching themes 
Throughout the process of this doctoral work, the notion of the mask has loomed 
large. By Spring 2007, the mask genres were starting to emerge in my early writing, 
spurred on by work I was doing on a separate project looking at digital museum 
collections. My first year board paper, submitted in February 2008, described the full 
set of six masks, with what is now ‘discipline’ then being called ‘punishment’. So, 
by the time my first interviews took place in May 2008, the masks were already an 
important aspect of my thinking about this research, and I mentioned in my board 
paper that I hoped to use the masks as a structuring element of the research. To test 
how this structure might work, I sorted the existing tree nodes into these six 
headings: performance, trace, disguise, protection, transformation and discipline. The 
process of doing so developed and refined my thinking about the categories, and 
resulted in the production of a proposed structure, with a chapter for each mask. 
As can be seen from comparing the proposed structure in Appendix C with the 
descriptions of the chapters I provided in Chapter 1, I generated more data than I 
have used in this thesis. Some themes, such as blogging and literacies, have been 
addressed in published papers (see Appendix D). Others, such as disciplinary ways 
of writing reflectively, are areas which future research, including documentary 
analysis, might fruitfully address.  
A post-structuralist paradigm 
In this research I have taken a post-foundational, specifically post-structuralist, 
theoretical stance. Such a stance has profound implications for the research process, 
and these are not necessarily apparent from a choice of methods or the planning of a 
research project. Instead, they inform matters of validity, reflexivity and subjectivity 
that underpin the vital question for any researcher: “what store are we asking people 
to set by our research findings?” (Crotty, 1998, p.41). 
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Texts, in the broadest sense, are the focus of enquiry for post-structuralist 
researchers. Usher and Edwards (1994) describe post-structuralism in research as: 
a way of analysing and asking questions by anyone in any field about 
anything ‘textual’ both in the narrow conventional sense of written texts 
and in the much broader sense of any discourses, practices, institutions – in 
other words, any structure generally which is productive of signification. 
(p.18) 
As we saw in the last chapter, the relationship between power and discourse is 
mutually constitutive, and focusing on one inevitably entails thinking about the 
other. Research methods such as interviewing and transcribing produce texts through 
relations of power that are both intriguing and, especially if unrecognised, 
problematic. Furthermore, the discourses that govern the processes of research 
themselves shape and produce particular sorts of outcomes, knowledge and 
researcher subjectivities. In early parts of this chapter I have been subject to such 
discourses as I attempted to explain myself as a rigorous, careful, consistent 
researcher who made plans which sometimes went awry, but never to the detriment 
of the researched, and never undermining the project of research itself. This 
explanation should have come, as Scheurich (1997) informs his audience at the start 
of his book about research in the postmodern, with a ‘caveat emptor’: “all that 
follows is never that which it is constructed to appear” (p.1). Researcher subjectivity, 
like all subject positions, is provisional and discursively constructed: 
Contrary to the misunderstanding that ‘post-structuralism suggests there is 
no such thing as truth or reality’, what is suggested by post-structuralist 
theory is that ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ do exist – because/as we invoke them. 
…our acting, choosing selves exist in so far as we refer to them and 
socially legitimate them. What post-structuralism maintains is that they 
exist in our discursive practices, not prior to them. (Jones, 1997, p.268) 
How, then, might the project of research, singular, be understood? In educational and 
social science research, there is what Lather (2006) calls a “paradigm proliferation”: 
a spectrum of sometimes conflicting methods, theoretical perspectives and 
epistemologies that the new researcher is confronted with and must select from. 
Nevertheless, the positivist and empiricist legacies of the scientific method from 
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which social sciences take their name – what Law (2004) names “their basic 
intuitions” (p.16) – are difficult to shake while still doing something that is generally 
recognisable as ‘research’: they are “widespread in Euro-American common-sense 
thinking about science and social science” (ibid). 
Bayne (2004a), in explaining her own post-structuralist perspective, sets out four 
assumptions that underpin positivist research paradigms. These are the possibility of: 
knowable reality, unbiased inquiry, the transparency of language and the autonomous 
subjectivity of the researcher. She goes on to make a helpful distinction between 
post-positivist and constructivist research paradigms, which question the first two of 
these assumptions (p.22), and post-structuralist paradigms, which question all four. 
In describing how my research should be read as post-structuralist, the remainder of 
this chapter offers some observations about my own approach to questioning these 
assumptions. 
First, and most important, is the nature of language and its relationship to reality and 
the self. Davies and Davies (2007) undermine a whole raft of positivist assumptions 
by claiming that:  
the researcher could never be finding out about a preexisting subject who 
exists independently of the interview or other account making processes. 
Nor could the subject reflexively examine and tell the researcher about a 
subject (themselves) who exists elsewhere as an accomplished project who 
is not, in the very act of telling, both progressing and limiting the unfolding 
of the self in interaction with the researcher. (p.1143)  
Knowledge, subjectivity and language are intimately entwined – not unidirectional, 
but symbiotic. Much of what follows applies equally to my research perspectives and 
to my understanding of some of the key issues in reflection and reflective practices.  
The post-structuralist subject does not choose from an infinite number of possible 
selves which identity to perform, and “lives are narratable as coherent in terms of the 
categories language makes available” (Belsey, 2002, p.51). These categories of 
coherence map on to embodied situations: gender, race, class, sexuality and 
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(dis)ability. They also map on to available social discourses and contexts, out of 
which the subject may construct meaningful identities.  
In research terms, a post-structuralist epistemology undermines goals of ‘knowing’ 
experience. For one thing, as Belsey (1994) argues, experience “does not exist in the 
raw, in its natural state, outside the order of language and culture… its presence… is 
an illusion” (p.10). The constitutiveness of language has implications for the role of 
the researcher, who should be wary of claiming to represent ‘the truth’ of individual 
experiences, because: “‘there is no clear window into the inner life of a person, for 
any window is always filtered through the glaze of language, signs and the process of 
signification’ (Denzin 1989:14) ... The researcher’s struggle, then, is not primarily 
with method” (Clough, 2002, p.85).  
If reality, and even human experience, is not ‘knowable’ through observation or 
through language, then enquiry is always already an interpretation. The questions we 
ask, the interests that drive us towards those questions, are already saturated with 
meanings that we cannot divest them of. Practices of reflexivity acknowledge this, 
and suggest that there is something we can do: we can bring our previously ‘hidden’ 
interpretations to the surface, we can situate ourselves as researchers in our research. 
This description of reflexivity sets a great deal of store by the possibility of self-
knowledge, and therefore by an assumption about the autonomous subjectivity of the 
researcher. Indeed, reflexivity is closely aligned with reflection in this respect – it 
relies on a stable, knowing subject who can say what “is” and “is not” in relation to 
herself, if not the world.  
Reflexivity does something else in relation to knowledge, though – it situates and 
contextualises it. It explicitly moves knowledge from a state of universality and 
closure, to one of multiplicity and uncertainty. In a 2006 paper about reflexivity, 
documentation and augmented reality, Avram discusses an art installation called 
Under Scan, which the artist, Rafael Lozano-Hemmer, describes as “a piece about 
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relating to representation”12. The installation involves recorded video ‘portraits’ of 
people being projected into the shadows of visitors to the installation, and appearing 
to relate to the visitors by making eye contact, waving and responding through 
movement. For Avram (2006), even as the visitors’ shadows are “annulled by the 
video projections”, this “brings another illusion – that of the representation (video 
image)” (p.4). The extent to which the representation appears to be alive, to have will 
and responsiveness, is the extent to which the visitor is taken in by the illusion.  
Image from Under Scan installation13 
  
The figure within the shadow in Under Scan has been a powerful metaphor for me 
for what it is that researchers do: we are the shadow-casters, and everything outside 
our own shadows is invisible to us. In other words: our research necessarily fits into 
the shape of our shadows. This is both troubling, because there is always so much we 
will not be able to see, and exciting: as we move, our shadows will create new spaces 
for new knowledge to fit into.  
What does this mean for the nature of interview research? Is there anything ‘real’ in 
an interview transcript? Was there anything real in the interview to start with? 
Scheurich (1997) writes critically of what he calls “modernist” approaches to 
interview data: 
                                                
12 http://www.tate.org.uk/intermediaart/underscan.htm, retrieved 21/6/2010. 
13 From East Midlands Development Agency press release, 21/2/2006 
http://www.emda.org.uk/news/newsreturn.asp?fileno=2963, retrieved 21/6/2010. 
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The modernist representation is not sheer fabrication, but all of the juice of 
the lived experience has been squeezed out, all the ‘intractable 
uncertainties’ and the unstable ambiguities have been erased. (p.63) 
It is possible to be too precious about the purity of our data, to lose awareness that it 
is a representation, not the ‘real thing’ and, in doing so, produce interpretations that 
are lifeless because they are so faithful to a certainty which is, above all, constructed. 
Even researchers who accept the premise that there is no such thing as unbiased 
enquiry can be subject to the allure of purity. For example, Lather (1991) has argued 
that “some amount of dialogic encounter [with participants after their initial 
involvement] is required if we are to invoke the reflexivity needed to protect research 
from the researcher’s own enthusiasms” (p.64). However, as Scheurich (1997) 
claims: “techniques like… joint construction… will not lead to a more correct 
interpretation because… an indeterminate ambiguity, ‘a wild profusion’, lies at the 
heart of the interview interaction” (p.73). 
What is the way forward, then? Watson (2006) offers a lovely metaphor that echoes 
Scheurich’s complaint about the “juice of lived experience”. Writing of qualitative 
research transcripts, she says that the transcript “needs to be reconstituted through 
analysis and bears much the same relationship to the original data as a prune, when 
rehydrated, does to a plum. But prunes are not necessarily inferior to plums; rather, 
they do ‘being fruit’ in different ways” (p.374). Research data, in turn, does ‘being 
fruit’ differently than the situation from which the data emerges. It is not that one is 
‘true’ and the others not, but that they belong to different moments. For me, 
rehydrating the transcript means accepting it as a literary text, and working with it as 
a creation full of imagery, narrative and contestable meaning. All texts have 
contexts, so this is not an attempt to force these transcripts into a form of 
placelessness or universality. Rather, it is to let them out of the trap of authenticity. 
This is the approach I have taken in writing this thesis. 
Our responsibility to our participants is not to tell the truth about their experiences – 
no such truth exists, or can exist. By the time an academic paper is written, multiple 
layers of interpretation, representation, reduction and rehydration have been formed. 
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Writing itself is one such layer – it is a method of inquiry that produces meaning and 
reality (Richardson, 1994, p.518). Instead, our duty is to generate data ethically by 
being direct with participants about our objectives; keeping our promises about how 
we protect and use what we generate; and most importantly, refraining from claiming 
that our interpretation ‘captures’ their experience. Anything else is: 
overlaying indeterminacy with the determinacies of our meaning-making, 
replacing ambiguities with findings or constructions. When we proceed, 
then, as if we have ‘found’ or ‘constructed’ the best or the key or the most 
important interpretation, we are misportraying what has occurred. 
(Scheurich, 1997, p.73) 
There is another responsibility, which is to be curious. Lather (2004) describes a 
post-foundational methodology of “getting lost”, where “one epistemologically 
situates oneself as curious and unknowing versus the more typical sort of mastery 
project” (p.281). Being an ethical researcher in a post-structuralist paradigm means 
staying with a certain level of discomfort around issues of knowledge and power, 
while avoiding being immobilised by that discomfort: 
There is always more that can be said and more that can be done. To 
subvert foundations is not to court irrationality and paralysis but to 
foreground dialogue, practical engagement and a certain kind of self-
referentiality. (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p.27)  
I have tried to approach this work with curiosity and a willingness to be surprised. I 
have not always succeeded in making sense of conflicting ideas, but I have tried not 
to turn away from what has confused me. For example, I was so disconcerted after a 
day spent with one of my ‘constellations’ that I wrote a fragmented field note to help 
unpick some of the reactions I was having – the only such piece of writing I did 
during this phase of research: 
One speaks of boundaries, and I wonder what that means, but don’t know 
how to ask. He turns my questions back on me when he doesn’t like them, 
refuses to draw for me, refuses any possibility of silliness or waste.  
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Another sees this as a way to mitigate uncertainty, talks of the credit 
crunch, the lack of jobs, the need to know and articulate her worth. No one 
else will do it for her. Selling herself, being value for money – she is all 
about the practicalities of being a commodity. 
They all react with surprise to the idea of putting something personal in 
these spaces. Yet their relationship with their tutor is the most intimate I 
have seen. What am I missing? 
The overwhelming sense I was left with here was of not understanding, of missing 
something important in this situation that did not fit with what I thought I knew 
about my topic. This kind of writing was not a method I stayed with, but a response 
to a crisis of understanding, a worried curiosity that I still have not fully resolved. 
Nevertheless, it has shaped this work and reminded me that uncertainty can be 
uncomfortable, even painful.  
What store, then, do I want readers to set by my findings? My main hope is that they 
find the stories I am about to tell “good things to think with” (Lather, 2006, p.35). In 
asking questions that have not been asked yet of emerging pedagogies of reflection, 
in being curious about what students and teachers said in response, I hope that I have 
produced a convincing, satisfying and useful case for rethinking high-stakes online 
reflection.  
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Chapter 4: Performing the reflective self – 
audience awareness in high-stakes 
reflection  
As we have seen, the literature on reflection and online reflection is largely silent on 
the nature of compulsory reflection and its orientation towards external standards and 
audiences. In constructing reflection as a process that authentically reveals a 
knowable self, and self-examination and self-development as the ultimate goal of 
such reflection, those who write about reflection in professional contexts, like Bolton 
(2005) and Johns (2004), offer a vision which, I will argue in this chapter and 
throughout this thesis, is unachievable in online high-stakes reflective practice and 
problematically masks its purposes, nature and potential. Those authors who do 
specifically address high-stakes reflection in formal educational contexts, on the 
other hand, have little enthusiasm for the practice. There is therefore a serious gap 
between theory and practice in this area, leaving teachers who wish or are required to 
formally assess online reflection with limited sources of support as to how that 
practice might be dealt with, and even appreciated, on its own terms.  
This chapter has two main aims. The first is to explore how students and teachers 
understand performance in high-stakes reflection. In this respect, the matter of 
audience awareness is of primary interest. I will ask what audience students believe 
they are writing for and show that what Hughes and Purnell (2008) call “anxious 
academic literacy practices of monologic addressivity” (p.151) are following 
students into reflective practices online. I have identified three types of audience 
awareness: awareness of the framework of assessment and the high-stakes nature of 
the online reflection being produced14; awareness of a specific audience in the form 
of the teacher; and awareness of a general Other as audience (which will be taken up 
in Chapter 5 as well).  
                                                
14 Assessment is an audience in the sense that it is experienced as making certain demands, and as 
structuring online reflection in very particular ways which are not associated, in the minds of students, 
specifically with their teachers. 
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The second aim is to establish high-stakes online reflective practices within a post-
foundational framework, focusing on Bakhtin’s theories of dialogue and addressivity 
as a route towards repositioning high-stakes online reflective practices as forms of 
speech which need not attempt to “hide [their] own mechanisms” (Foucault, 1998, 
p.86). From a post-foundational position, it is taken as read that, as McKenna (2005) 
puts it, “relationships between addresser and addressee are inscribed with power 
dynamics, and that these… have an impact upon what is said or written” (p.92). The 
literature around reflection is generally not written from such a position, however, so 
my goal is to unsettle existing discourses and create a space in a reflective practice 
context where explicitly audience-focused digital performances of self can begin to 
be seen as possible and even desirable. I take a cue here from Clegg, Hudson and 
Mitchell’s (2005) paper about personalisation, dialogue and new media, which 
makes the claim that “in conditions where personal reflection is paramount, dialogue 
becomes even more, not less, important” (p.6). They define reflection as “essentially 
dialogical” in nature (ibid), and make the point that it increases the need for 
“interpersonal awareness and attunement” (p.13).  
Bakhtin’s ideas about dialogism and speech genres are useful in understanding how 
it is that students are so audience-focused and aware. Most of Bakhtin’s work 
chronologically pre-dated the post-structuralist writings of Foucault, Derrida and 
others, but he has been credited with “precociously invent[ing] a post-structuralism” 
(Pechey, 2007, p.16), and with being at the forefront of the linguistic turn (Bell & 
Gardner, 1998, p.4). White (1988) maintains that Bakhtin held views that resonated 
with post-structuralism, including that the text was not closed or fixed; and that 
meaning is “governed by the constructed context of persons envisaged as speaker, 
addressee, and subject of statement” (p.228). What is most important for my 
purposes here is that Bakhtin’s theories and post-structuralist theories share, in 
Pearce’s (1994) words: “a newly relational view of language… and a theory of 
subjectivity that rejects the humanist principles of ‘wholeness’ and ‘autonomy’” 
(p.9). Pearce goes on to say that Bakhtin’s dialogic self resists fragmentation and 
alienation in a way that is at odds with the postmodern discourses that followed 
(pp.9-10), but Bakhtin’s ideas about addressivity in particular are highly compatible 
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with the Foucauldian governmentality, power and confession that are of broad 
overarching concern in this research. 
Addressivity is the theory that “in making meaning in language, whether in dialogue 
with someone else or thinking alone, we are always addressing, explicitly and 
implicitly, a person or people, a question or comment” (Lillis, 2001, p.43). This is 
because language is inextricably bound to context, a “territory shared” (Voloshinov, 
1973, p.86). It is a social construct that, in turn, constructs the subject as speaker. 
Holquist (2002) says that an utterance (which can be spoken or written) is a “border 
phenomenon” which takes place:  
between speakers, and is therefore drenched in social factors. This means 
that the utterance is also on the border between what is said and what is not 
said, since, as a social phenomenon par excellence, the utterance is shaped 
by speakers who assume that the values of their particular community are 
shared, and thus do not need to be spelled out in what they say. (p.61) 
Lillis (2001), in her book about student writing, describes the writing ‘voices’ of 
students as being informed by their multiple identities and experiences. She goes on 
to point out that student writing is also shaped “by the voices they are attempting to 
respond to” (p.46). She illustrates this in the context of higher education by 
describing two levels of addressivity in higher education: “context of culture”, which 
would include institutional practices, and the way that institutional values and beliefs 
are understood by students; and “context of situation”, which includes what teachers 
say, do and provide in written form; and how teachers’ values and beliefs are 
understood by students (p.47). In online reflective practices, a further level needs to 
be added, which contains the cultural context of online identity and disclosure, and 
of blogging in particular (Ross, 2012).  
In framing the data in this chapter as examples of ‘performance’, it may seem as 
though I am interested only in the deliberate strategies employed by students and 
teachers, the deployment of what Hargreaves (2004) calls “legitimate narratives” of 
reflection (p.199). Rather, I see this as a route to a broader point. The first step is to 
demonstrate that students are engaging in strategic, knowing reflective performances 
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that are orientated in multiple ways, and that currently dominant discourses around 
reflection are therefore manifestly problematic. The next step is to show why this is 
not necessarily a problem with the high-stakes nature of the task, but rather with a 
conception of reflection that avoids dealing with addressivity. All speech has an 
audience, and a richer and more generative engagement with online reflection would 
be to work with, rather than ignore, concepts of addressivity, dialogue and 
performance in high-stakes reflective practices.  
“I was writing for the person who was going to mark 
it”: demands of assessment 
This section demonstrates the extent to which students are orientated towards the 
assessment of their reflections, and how this orientation impacts on the ways in 
which they, and their teachers, think about and describe their writing. First, it is 
helpful to provide some context by showing how assessment of reflection can be 
framed through the assessment criteria and guidance that students are provided with. 
The content, timing and extent of assessment varied between the programmes 
participating in this research. Almost all, however, assessed online reflective writing 
as developed over time, usually over the whole period of a course, and the material 
to be assessed was presented in web-based blog or e-portfolio format. In one case, 
online reflection was expected throughout the course but only assessed as part of 
written assignments staggered through the course.  
The specific assessment criteria as they relate to reflection also varied. Four 
examples are given in the table below, from across a range of levels and disciplines. 
The excerpts given here are drawn from longer documents about assessment on 
given courses, and are the sections that specifically refer to reflection. Some notable 
features are described in the right-hand column. 
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Four examples of assessment criteria for reflection 
Excerpts from the assessment criteria Features of note 
Excerpt 1: Postgraduate  
Criteria: Some reference in the commentary 
to every item of evidence that is in the 
compilation (minimum nine items, 
maximum fifteen). All four of the areas of 
competency covered …All four of the areas 
of understanding and development 
covered… Some reference made to the 
activities and/or opinions of others on the 
course. …A coherent story of personal 
professional development showing the 
process of development, not just a list of 
things done on the course… A convincing 
story of personal professional development, 
believable and supported by the evidence. 
…Appropriate language – markers will look 
for a personal style and appropriate use of 
the first person, as well as expression of 
views, feelings, opinions, etc. personal to the 
writer. Descriptions and connections – 
markers will look for descriptions of 
experiences and events that make 
connections with the overall story of 
development that is being told. Analysis – 
markers will look for a systematic approach 
to the discussion of evidence and the 
demonstration of awareness of personal 
strengths and weaknesses. Change – markers 
will look for accounts of changes that have 
been identified as significant to the writer’s 
practice and for the relation of these changes 
to experiences during [the course]. 
Proactivity – markers will look for 
convincing evidence of engagement with the 
course and its participants that goes beyond 
satisfying the basic requirements above. 
• A mix of quantitative measures 
(“minimum nine”, “all four 
areas”) and qualitative 
judgements (“coherent”, 
“convincing”, “appropriate”).  
• Some specific information is 
given about what reflective 
writing contains: use of the first 
person; expression of views and 
feelings; descriptions of 
experiences; demonstration of 
awareness of strengths and 
weaknesses; evidence of 
development.  
• The concept of a “story” is 
repeatedly mentioned, indicating 
both a crafted or designed 
process, and an audience. The 
audience (“markers”) is 
specifically named and 
repeatedly referred to.  
• Despite a comprehensive 
description of requirements, a 
final criterion (“proactivity”) 
requires students to “go beyond” 
these in some unspecified way. 
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Excerpt 2: Undergraduate 
Description of activity: Try and identify 
common learning needs across activities 
…this may help focus your learning… 
Consider whether some needs require more 
attention than others - if so why do [you] 
think this is so?... Think about what you are 
doing and why and how well you have done 
it - areas for improvement? How will this 
impact on your practise? Any feedback from 
on your abi[l]ities / perfomance from other 
student[s] / staff / e-tutors etc.  
• Strong focus on attending to 
“needs”, self-identified and 
identified through feedback 
from others. 
• Link between learning and 
practice is given as a question. 
• Tone is more suggesting and 
questioning than instructing 
(“try”, “consider”, “this may 
help”, “how will this impact?”). 
• Not clear what the actual criteria 
for assessment are. 
Excerpt 3: Postgraduate 
Description of activity: The idea of the 
[blog] is that you use it as an online 
reflective diary – a place where you bring 
together your various threads of 
investigation and thought. The [blog] is 
intended to be a record of your thinking and 
development, not a neatly-finished ‘place of 
arrival’ – the main requirement is that you 
use it in an open and reflective way. 
Criteria: Does the [blog] demonstrate 
sustained reflection on the course content 
and its application for the participant’s 
professional practice?  
• No specific guidance about what 
constitutes reflection, but 
synthesis, development and 
openness are noted as desirable. 
• Reference to the digital (“blog”, 
“online”).  
• Relies on the student’s 
understanding of how to link 
“course content” and 
“professional practice” 
appropriately.  
• Overall emphasis is on 
continuity and progress 
(“sustained”, “record of 
development”).  
Excerpt 4: Undergraduate 
Criteria: In order to meet [the] assessment 
criteria you will need to demonstrate: 
reflections on … past performance and self 
assessment of current learning needs…, a 
critical evaluation of your performance and 
the dynamics of group working, role in 
facilitating problem solving in professional 
practice, presentation skills… evidence of 
personal development …final summary – 
written as if personal statement for 
prospective employer. 
• Refers to concepts that are 
presumably taught in other parts 
of the course or programme – 
“critical evaluation”; 
“facilitating problem solving”. 
• Performance and “skills” are 
emphasised over experiences as 
an appropriate focus for 
reflection. 
• An imaginary audience is 
proposed, in place of the “real” 
audience of markers: 
“prospective employer” – 
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These four excerpts vary in the amount of detail and clarity about the process of 
reflection that they provide. They all mention the necessity of recording 
development, and this would seem to be the underpinning purpose of reflective 
writing in higher education (as we also saw in Chapter 2). How this is to be achieved 
is less clear in most cases (Excerpt 1 being the most detailed), and students 
experience the demands of writing for assessment differently depending on their 
level of confidence in what is required of them. 
Where students are clear about assessment criteria, and secure about how they will 
be applied, the assessment of high-stakes reflection can be seen to be quite 
straightforward. Eileen had a sense, after two years, of having cracked the formula: 
Jen: You sound like you kind of feel confident that you know what is 
wanted from you, from having done it two years before? 
Eileen (student, UG): Oh yeah, I understand what they’re looking for. 
Jen: Yeah. 
Eileen: Yeah. 
Jen: What are they looking for? 
Eileen: What are they looking for? They’re looking to show that you’ve, 
you’ve developed and that you recognise that you’ve developed, so that 
you can say ‘This is where I was and this is the way that I’ve gone or the 
paths that I’ve travelled and the hurdles I’ve jumped over, to get to where I 
am now’. 
In articulating the looked-for qualities of her reflection, Eileen knew that the story of 
development is paramount, that it must include hurdles, choices and journeys, but 
ultimately must show positive progress. This is the paradoxical nature of compulsory 
reflection that both Hargreaves (2004) and Macfarlane and Gourlay (2009) address; 
the strategic practices that academic writing demands construct reflection as a story 
or a game, even while the content is supposed to be individual and confessional. This 
is discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Along with the general expectation, set out in all four of the excerpts in the table 
above, that reflection will tell a story of personal and/or professional development, 
there are also more specific requirements that shape and define what must be 
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produced. Helen noted that her hierarchy of audience had the marker at the top, with 
their criteria and structure taking precedence over her own desires: 
I was writing for the person who was going to mark it. Um second to that I 
was writing for me. …What I was trying to do was the, um obviously if it if 
they hadn’t have set out the parameters that they’d set out I wouldn’t have 
done it in that way. Cause there was certain headings we had to use and 
themes we had to follow …so we had to do it in those in those headings 
which certainly didn’t fit terribly well in a lot of cases with what I wanted 
to write. (Helen, student, PG) 
Helen depicts an active choice here, a modification of what she wanted to write to fit 
the ‘parameters’ set out for her. Beth described experiencing less agency, and no 
particular sense of a thwarted desire, in her framing of reflection on her course as 
part of a box-ticking exercise: 
It’s another tick box thing for uni, um, simple as. …I’ve been on courses 
before, different ones, and there’s always something, there’s always tick 
boxes. There’s always things that you feel like’s a tick box exercise, there’s 
always something on a course that you feel like ‘Do I have to do this?’ you 
know ‘What is the point?’ it’s, um and you have to do it because it’s down 
on the curriculum, that’s just what, you just have to do it, there’s no point 
arguing about it. And this is just another thing, um, it’s just another thing 
on another course that they need you to do and you have to do it and, it’s 
as simple as that. (Beth, student, UG) 
Another student in Beth’s cohort created this visual representation in response to my 
request for the group to draw or write their e-portfolio metaphors: 
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Metaphor of reflection: the robot 
 
“robotic, just another task” – drawing and description produced as 
part of a group e-portfolio metaphor activity led by me. 
 
The e-portfolio is represented as a long scroll or sheet of paper being held by or 
emerging from the arm of a robot figure. It is not specified if the robot is the student, 
the teacher, or the computer (or something else), but the caption on the drawing calls 
the process as a whole ‘robotic, just another task’. The paper is being held at arm’s 
length, apparently facing outward (though in the representation it is blank). The 
drawing gives me an impression of distance, detachment and a mechanical approach 
to a task. This is difficult to reconcile with the lively, personal, and above all critical 
practice that teachers on this programme, including Natalie, were trying to foster 
through the use of online reflection: 
I think reflective writing helps you as an individual, to begin to put things 
into perspective. Um, I think it could begin to help you, as an individual, 
make sense of things. Um, but I also think it could help you in beginning to 
see a way forward, um, so [pause] but that would be looking at reflective 
writing in, um, a an analytical critical way. (Natalie, teacher, UG) 
Where Natalie saw individuality, perspective, development and analysis as potential 
outcomes of the reflective process, Beth, and her fellow student, seem adamant that, 
in the high-stakes context, it amounted to no more than a “tick box thing for uni”. 
Natalie herself seemed to recognise this outcome for some students: “some of [the e-
portfolios] are amazing, and others I just think ‘You’re just going through the 
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motions. And you were going through the motions last year and the year before, so 
actually what have you learnt?’” (Natalie, teacher, UG). There is sometimes a stark 
contrast between what teachers want from reflection and what students are able or 
willing to produce for assessment. 
Moreover, where students are less clear about what is expected of them, assessment 
can be seen as fickle or unpredictable. I asked Yvonne if she knew how to do the 
kind of reflection her teachers wanted, and she replied: 
No not really. With my portfolio I’ve always kind of, I’ve never really 
understand, understood the marking for that, because I’ve had one year, 
um, where I hadn’t tried all that hard with it and I got a decent mark, and 
then another year, when I actually tried really hard, I did loads of 
[reflections] and tried to reflect on lots of things and I didn’t do so well 
that year. So I didn’t really understand the whole marking criteria for that 
or how it worked or anything so that did confuse me. So I’m not too sure 
how I’ll do with this, one that I just sent in. (Yvonne, student, UG) 
Yvonne went on to say that she knows if her reflections are good only after she 
receives a mark for them. Stewart was less inclined to take his teacher’s word for it, 
instead feeling sure that his work was worth more than the mark he received:  
I did everything from that checklist and I think I got 56, out of 100. And I I 
was disappointed with that mark but I know personally that the [reflection] 
pro, [reflection] process is, I mean personally I know I’ve benefited more 
than 56 from it. Um and I think, so for me personally I know that there is a 
discrepancy between the true value to me as a person and what I formally 
have on my degree, degree classification. (Stewart, student, UG) 
When I asked if he now knew how to get the mark he wanted in future reflective 
assignments, Stewart said “no”.  
In her book on student writing, Lillis (2001) reported exactly the same types of 
responses from students in relation to writing for assessment. She describes a 
dominant “practice of mystery” (p.74) surrounding academic essay writing in higher 
education, and reflective writing is no less mysterious if its strategic nature, audience 
focus and tacit requirements are not grasped by students. This connects also to the 
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concept of the “hidden curriculum”, a phrase coined by Jackson in 1968 to describe 
“the crowds, the praise, and the power that combine to give a distinctive flavor to 
classroom life” which may conflict with the “official curriculum” (Jackson, 1990, 
pp.33-4). The hidden curriculum of online reflection in higher education may differ 
in character from that of the school classroom, but the sense that there are 
requirements that are not discussed, but form the foundations of successful 
reflection, is a useful way to understand what goes on in this complex practice. 
Having discussed how the process of reflective writing itself is shaped by 
understandings (or lack of understanding) of assessment criteria, I will now turn to 
examine the process of preparing and submitting reflection for assessment. Many 
students and teachers describe the end of the process as the point at which 
assessment becomes an explicit audience, when they focus on the assessment criteria 
and review what they have created in preparation for submission. As Beth put it, “I 
just kind save, save the [items] through the year and then, towards the end, that’s 
when I kind of titivate it up”. Theresa explained that while her reflections are 
“shorthand and to the point” when she first writes them, for assessment “it needs to 
be better”. For some, this also meant ‘tidying’ aspects of the reflections that were 
seen as unsuitable for assessment: 
It’s picking out the bits that are relevant to what what you need to show 
really. …Much more structured, not so much waffle! I found, with [non-
assessed reflective] blogs, you can tend to get a bit carried away, can’t 
you. You sort of start writing something and then you take, it’s a bit like a 
thought process you you tend to sort of go off the tangent a little bit and 
then come back to say ‘oh, that, anyway’, and there’s a lot of, um, that sort 
of language in it ‘Anyway, must get back to the point, anyway mustn’t..’ 
…That, that was more how I found it, more like talking than writing. But 
yes, it did change for assessment, because it had to be more structured. 
(Hazel, student, PG) 
Students felt they should do things with their reflections before submitting them for 
assessment even when the same tutors were involved in both formative feedback 
aspects of reflective practice and the assessment of the reflections. Changes were 
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sometimes seen as necessary even if they meant removing material that showed 
humour and individuality: 
One of the presentations [a student] gave to the other group about his his 
e-portfolio, he’d actually found a clip on youtube, which was a Walt 
Disney, Donald Duck clip …and he actually included this clip in his e-
portfolio, well I mean it was a hoot, you know. Um, I mean he took it out 
[laugh] for the actual assessment. (Peter, teacher, UG) 
Although it is not necessarily clear from the transcript, Peter’s tone here suggested 
that it was obvious that such material would not be suitable for an assessed reflective 
piece in his discipline, though he did not go on to explain why that was.  
The endpoint of assessment is central to most students’, and some teachers’, 
approach to the task of online reflection. Bob was matter-of-fact about what his 
students are required to do, and where their concerns naturally lie. It is the 
summative, not the reflective, nature of the portfolio task that carries the day: 
Jen: Do you think that, um, students kind of enjoy doing reflection, and 
enjoy doing their portfolios? 
Bob (teacher, PG): Eh, [laughs], I think, probably, the better question here 
is do they enjoy doing summatively assessed work? …we try to, to look 
upon the use of e-portfol-, use of e-portfolios, not as just a summatively 
assessed, eh, tool, but as a formative assessed, formatively assessment tool, 
i.e. assessment is for learning. … once they get, get rid of the fear aspect 
‘oh, bloody hell, it’s not, this is all to do with summative assessment’, and 
then they do enjoy it a bit more. But, always, at the back of their mind, is 
this notion of ‘we’ll still have to get this right, because, at the end of the 
day, it’s a kind of pass or fail situation’.  
Bob saw his role as helping students “get rid of the fear aspect”, rather than 
acknowledging and working with the contradictions and implications of high-stakes 
reflection. We will also see teachers taking on this reassuring role in the next chapter 
looking at digital traces. As with the trace, reassuring students may not be the most 
useful approach to high-stakes online reflection, as it creates more reasons for both 
students and teachers to adopt performance as disguise, rather than in more creative, 
generative modes. 
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Whatever teachers say, marks matter greatly to students, and shape their choices in 
complex and sometimes counterintuitive ways. Alex, for example, discussed 
choosing not to edit his reflections at all because, he explained, he thought it would 
demonstrate his journey better, both for himself reading it back, and for his assessor: 
I didn’t think that assessment wise it would benefit from [editing] cause I 
thought that it, that the assessment would probably include whether there 
was a journey as well, well maybe not directly but I think, it wasn’t being 
assessed as a finished work, it was being assessed as a diary, my reflective 
work, so it doesn’t really make sense to edit what you thought at the time 
cause that’s still valid. (Alex, student, PG) 
Stewart articulated a tension he experienced between making his own judgements 
and producing work of value to him, and “pleasing the tutor”, as he put it:  
I care for my final degree classification and really I would want to get the 
highest mark possible I suppose by pleasing the tutor, but at the same 
time… I know that I have benefited …so I know that I’ve got the best of 
both worlds, although I do ultimately care about my degree classification. 
(Stewart, student, UG) 
For Hazel, aiming for a distinction was the driving force behind her willingness to 
devote a lot of time to ‘picking apart’ her reflective writing: 
I ended up putting myself under an awful lot of pressure to try and get a 
distinction... I did pick it apart, you know, really carefully to make sure I 
was doing what, what [the instructions] said. (Hazel, student, PG) 
Again, it is not unexpected that students are concerned about their marks and make 
strategic decisions to attempt to do well in assessment terms. What is quite 
challenging is that those decisions often move students away from the stated ethos of 
reflective practice (as differently articulated on different programmes, but having 
some features in common, as we have seen). On Mona’s programme, for example, 
peer sharing of portfolios and reflections was actively promoted as an important part 
of the learning process. Mona described the peer sharing elements as problematic 
because there was a concern that peers would use creative elements of her portfolio 
as “inspiration”, as she put it: “it’s hard work, so …you want to get credit for what 
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you, if you’ve done something better than others” (Mona, student, PG). We 
discussed the complexity of this, with Mona explaining that she was uneasy about it 
even though she knew getting ideas from peers should be encouraged, that it wasn’t 
plagiarism, and that the credit would come from being reflective about the material 
being developed. I mentioned that in a web format the structure and content of 
reflection could be made creative with the use of video, for example, and that this 
could potentially differentiate one portfolio from others. Mona replied energetically:  
That’s a good one though, yes. Because, yeah, we’ve been told to link into 
videos if you want to, but then you, you’ve got to pick the right one, and, 
and then, seeing it somewhere else might not be, you know, used by 
someone else it’s difficult to say who was first…. Eh, so nobody’s going to 
get the credit… [laughs] So a good tip is to leave it to the last minute! 
(Mona, student, PG) 
Mona knew that she should be understanding these sharing practices as beneficial, 
and that her personal reflections would be the basis upon which she was assessed. 
The web format in particular, though, allows creative expression of individuality, and 
it was not clear to Mona that this individuality shouldn’t, or didn’t, ‘count’ in 
assessment terms. Her half-serious conclusion was that what might be seen as poor 
time management could actually be a strategic, protective move aimed at keeping 
good ideas fresh and getting credit for them. How some other strategies for reflection 
work as ‘protection’ will be discussed further in Chapter 7. 
At the extreme end of this strategic practice, Wendy gave two examples of students 
who had been caught plagiarising their reflective writing. In one instance, a student 
copied reflections from his girlfriend, who had taken the same course the year 
before. In the other, two students had submitted virtually identical reflective 
statements in the same year (one having previously helped the other edit their work). 
In disregarding the core principle of reflective writing – that it reflects an 
individual’s learning – these students show that a completely impersonal approach to 
assessed reflection is possible. Reflective writing is like any other kind of academic 
writing in this sense; those who are willing or desperate enough can find ways to 
‘cheat’ the system. Of course such cheating is undoubtedly rare. The broader point is 
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that a reflective performance need have little or no relation to a “personal-
confessional” (Bleakley, 2000) self. Or it may, as in Alex’s case, mean choosing to 
perform an authentic journey. For many students, perhaps most, a high-stakes 
reflective performance will have elements of disguise and protection woven in. What 
separates a ‘good’ performance from a ‘bad’ one is the seamlessness or invisibility of 
those elements, not their absence. Assessment produces strategic performance, so 
assessed reflection produces strategic performances of various kinds – all the more 
varied and strategic because, arguably unlike traditional academic writing, they are 
supposed to hide their own mechanisms. The discourses of reflection described in 
Chapter 2 do not allow for the performance, or the sorts of sophisticated literacy 
practices that students engage in, to be acknowledged, explored, played with or 
pushed at. This produces anxiety, uncertainty and calculation, which affects not only 
students’ orientation towards assessment, but also towards their relationships with 
their teachers. 
“Didnʼt I make more impression than that?”: teacher 
as audience  
The individual personalities and preferences of teachers come into play in students’ 
accounts of their reflective writing. Kate was criticised by a tutor in an early 
(summatively assessed) reflective account for being too negative, and changed her 
approach considerably in response, even though she did not agree with the tutor’s 
interpretation of the assessment criteria, and felt she had to ‘sell’ a false vision of 
herself: 
When it came to my final reflection, I made sure it was positive the way 
through. I wasn’t going to write anything that might have been too much of 
a weakness or anything, cause I didn’t want to make that mistake again! So 
I was being influenced by the way the previous one had been marked. …I 
felt as though I was trying to sell my development and prove that I had 
developed massively when, perhaps, I hadn’t. And I think it would be just 
as valuable for me to say ‘this particular thing, I haven’t developed very 
well, because, but this is how I could develop it’ and that’s how I 
understood reflective writing to be. (Kate, student, PG)  
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Rachel (student, UG) understood that different teachers she wrote for had different 
opinions about reflection, and discussed with me which ones were very enthusiastic, 
which ones disliked the technology, and so on. Josie explained how writing for a 
series of three different tutors affected her reflection: 
Different tutors, you see, have different expectations as well, which is quite 
difficult. …what one tutor was looking for, wasn’t what somebody else was 
looking for. … So it was quite difficult at times to, ‘Okay, so who am I 
writing to today, cause that’s what they like?’ [laugh] (Josie, student, PG) 
She went on to explain that there were some tutors for whom it was appropriate to 
write personal reflections, but others would not welcome these. As she put it, “you 
choose the people you say that to”. Josie took on board the feedback she received 
from each of these tutors, and used it to inform her subsequent reflective entries. She 
recognised that her reflections were not straightforwardly authentic accounts, but 
were shaped according to her audience. 
The teacher in their role as mentor or assessor of reflective writing was also 
recognised, by both students and teachers, as potentially vulnerable to implied or 
explicit criticism of their teaching. Eileen thought teachers might not be able to help 
responding negatively to critical reflections on the nature of their courses: 
Students in our year might have um written reflections about, if, say, the 
timetable was a bit messed up at one point, or if they weren’t happy with a 
certain area, area of, the way that, um, the teaching was delivered, they 
might have written quite a critical reflection of that and, yeah, that, that 
might be taken personally, actually by the module leaders. I’d I’d like to 
think that they wouldn’t do that, but nobody likes criticism, do they? 
(Eileen, student, UG) 
Ian confirmed, from a teacher’s perspective, that students’ reflective writing can 
sometimes make teachers feel criticised, and expressed a worry that this could affect 
their assessment: 
It’s a very real issue of the tendency, when you’re marking something, if 
you’re marking some, somebody who’s being upbeat and positive and 
saying ‘Yeah, the course worked well, I did well, I felt good’. You’ve a 
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tendency to feel good about that and give them good marks. Versus the 
tendency to somebody who’s being very critical and saying they didn’t 
really get anything out of the course and this is the reason why, and what, 
blah, blah blah – you give them not so good marks because they leave you 
feeling a bit depressed. (Ian, teacher, PG) 
There is arguably no such thing as ‘impartial’ assessment, but what is different about 
assessing reflection is that the material being marked can relate explicitly to teachers’ 
own choices and practices. Students are aware of the human being performing the 
teacher’s role, and are careful not to bruise the human ego that very often wields the 
power of assessment.  
It can be difficult to disentangle concerns about assessment from other sorts of 
awareness of the teacher as audience, but on several of the programmes in my study, 
students received written formative feedback in the form of comments on their blogs 
or e-portfolios during their course(s), separate from the summative assessment that 
generally came at the end of a course or semester. Sometimes these comments could 
come from peers, but most often their ongoing reflections were only accessible to 
their teachers, who could access the reflections at any time, without asking or having 
to leave a trace to alert the student of their presence. Teachers only left a trace when 
they chose to comment, and these comments could come fairly regularly, very 
sporadically, or, in one case in particular, only in response to specific student 
requests for engagement and feedback. In these situations, where the teacher may, at 
any point, speak back in response to student reflections, silence becomes 
synonymous with absence for some students: 
If you were if you were speaking your blog to a person and they nodded, 
that would at least give you some indication that they were present. Um 
whereas if you’re writing a blog and you get nothing back [pause] it’s like 
you’ve spoken into a vacuum. (Alex, student, PG) 
Beth described being unsure whether her writing was being seen or not: 
If there’s no message returned, obviously, I’ve, I don’t know whether [my 
tutor’s] looked or anything. (Beth, student, UG) 
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Student reaction to this silence can be quite extreme: 
This kind of kind of dependency like one gets hooked on cigarettes or 
something [laughter], one kind of gets hooked on the tutor and thought, 
you know, ‘oh, why is she taking so long to mark this?’, you know ‘why 
aren’t I getting any feedback now?’, and it wasn’t long at all! …’oh, she’s 
forgotten about me, oh that’s a real shame’. ‘Oh, didn’t I make more 
impression than that?’ [laugh] (Charles, student, PG) 
Curtain (2004, online) characterises the primary emotion of the blogger as one of 
anxiety, in terms that very closely echo Charles’ reaction above:  
Anxiety may be the primary emotion associated with giving accounts of 
blogging, and perhaps of blogging itself — Do I updated [sic] enough? 
Why don’t I write? Who is reading me? Why aren’t there more? What do 
they think about what I say? Have I said enough about enough?  
This anxiety is tied most closely to fears of not being visible, and Mallan (2009, 
online) argues that it is part and parcel of the construction of “shifting subject 
positions” online:  
These subject positions are not just ontological states, but inevitably entail 
a politics of visibility, both at the personal level and at the level of 
technological infrastructure. It is this ‘visibility’ which gives rise to 
epithets of narcissism and susceptibility.  
To be responded to is to know one is seen. Where an audience could, but doesn’t, 
respond, the result, as for Charles, can be disorientating and distracting from the 
stated purpose of the reflective task, causing students to focus instead on what might 
get their audience’s attention. Even when students were aware of teachers’ time 
constraints and knew that their silence was very likely not personal, some were 
negatively affected by this space of possibility that was not realised: 
We were told ‘share this item with your tutor, share this with your tutor’ 
and you ex-, I think it said ‘your tutor’s not obliged to, um, respond to 
these’. So then you think well, if you’re sharing them, you know, what else 
do you expect? …I mean, I know they have a lot of people to tutor, but it 
would, yeah, I think I would have preferred more [comments] than, than I 
had received. (Kate, student, PG) 
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Kate’s assumption that a requirement to share, on her part, should be met by an 
obligation on the teacher’s part to respond, exposes a tension which seems to be 
inherent in high-stakes reflective practices online: teachers and course developers 
design an element of surveillance and compulsion into reflective tasks to ensure that 
students engage in them, but are unable to give enough feedback to make students 
feel like their time and effort has been fully appreciated, and that they have been 
heard and responded to as individuals. This matters especially in these sorts of 
practices because they ask students to be very personal, and to reflect on matters of 
professional and academic significance, and students therefore want a personal 
response. Where reflection constitutes a large percentage of marks for a course or 
programme (50% was the maximum for any of the courses in this study), students 
can shore themselves up to wait for that reward. In some cases, though, the mismatch 
can lead to feelings of bitterness or anxiety, and a disengagement from the process. 
Other students, like Lynne, creatively constructed tutor presence from silence, rather 
than assuming absence, and proceeded as if their reflections are being read even if 
they did not know for sure. Lynne described her teacher’s perceived presence as 
motivating: 
Jen: Did you feel like [your tutor] was reading everything you were 
writing, did you? 
Lynne (student, PG): I, I chose to believe that she was reading it. 
[laughter] 
Jen: Okay. And did that help to motivate you? 
Lynne: That was definitely motivating. Yeah. Yeah definitely. 
Lynne made her own supporting structure, through the figure of the teacher, to help 
her stay focused and on task. I will discuss elements of surveillance in more detail in 
later chapters, but the point Lynne makes here relates to performance because it 
demonstrates that her teacher was a notional audience even when silent. Nothing that 
Lynne wrote was out of bounds for the gaze of her tutor; her perceived presence was 
at the heart of Lynne’s writing. 
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Adele made a related comment, describing online reflection as much like offline 
writing in that “once you’ve submitted it you’ve submitted it you can’t change it 
again”. In effect, for Adele, her teacher’s gaze fixed her reflective writing and made 
it complete. I followed up on this, pointing out that technically the online work could 
be edited, but Adele replied:  
Once [my tutor’s] read it there’s no point editing it, because, because, 
yeah maybe in that, you were asking me about ownership, maybe in that 
sense it’s not really mine because, um, I did feel once she’s read it then, 
um, there’s no point …in changing it again. (Adele, student, PG) 
For Adele, there was no longer any work to be done on her reflective writing once it 
had been seen by her teacher in a formative capacity; the audience was presented 
with the writing, and once presented, the writing was no longer available as a work 
in progress. Her visual representation of herself and her tutor in relation to her blog 
shows the relationship as Adele perceived it: 
Metaphor of reflection: teacher presence 
 
Adele’s drawing of her blog, made at my request during our interview 
 
Adele is represented as the seated figure, while her tutor is the figure in green. Adele 
depicted the blog as a large sheet of paper, explaining that it was “more normal” for 
her to think of it that way – a matter I will discuss in the next chapter. She explained 
that her tutor is “not in connection with um it but she’s sort of standing over it 
[laugh] I do feel that a bit”. Both figures are smiling, but the configuration looks 
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much like a classroom, with a teacher standing over a student, who is sitting down 
and working. The student figure is in the process of writing, while the teacher 
appears to be observing. The process of writing apparently includes the (silent) 
presence of the teacher. For Adele, and other students, this presence may have been 
motivating, but it was also seen as constraining, as the next section will show.  
Students discussed being careful in a number of ways about how they presented 
themselves in their online reflection. There is always the question of what should not 
be said, as we will see, and about how to put a best face forward. What Lynne and 
Adele say here goes beyond caution, though, to an implicit Other to whom their 
words are spoken. The influence that teachers can have in these reflective practice 
contexts is considerable, especially online, where their panoptic gaze is much more 
strongly felt because they truly can observe unseen. This general, unseen Other plays 
a powerful role in shaping students’ reflections.  
 “Youʼre never going to be quite as honest”: 
awareness of the Other  
Students see what they are doing in their online reflections as something akin to a 
performance, and themselves as performers, in a broader sense than the individual 
teacher or the assessment requirements I have already discussed. For some students, 
writing for any audience at all results in a perceived loss of honesty or openness: 
“you’re never going to be quite as honest as you are if nobody’s going to read it” 
(Adele, student, PG). 
Adele seemed to understand ‘honesty’ as a spectrum of possibility, with full honesty 
dependent on total privacy, and only partial honesty possible in any context in which 
she knows somebody (anybody) will read her words. This is at odds with the 
literature on reflective writing which claims that reflective writing can be a method 
of ‘capture’ of experience (Moon, 1999a, p.31), and it begins to suggest that capture 
is entirely the wrong metaphor when choice and deliberation goes into the making of 
the reflection. It also suggests that Adele saw an internal or self-directed monologue 
as the ideal in reflection, perhaps in a similar way to what Fendler (2003) describes 
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as a cultural feminist position, where “some inner self remains untouched by social 
domination and exempt from the effects of existing power relations” (p.20). Such an 
idealising of the inner self is so central to the idea of reflection that it can be difficult 
for students and teachers to work creatively and critically with issues of audience in 
reflective writing. The notion of authenticity is disturbed by an explicit recognition 
of addressivity, and other values and theoretical frameworks are not on offer. This 
leads to complicated contortions as students attempt to reconcile the requirement to 
be honest with other, less ‘acceptable’ concerns around convincing and pleasing an 
audience. 
Hazel explained the change in her writing when she realised that a blog she had 
thought was completely private was in fact available for other students on her course 
to view: 
Probably [it became] less honest. Obviously, sort of looking at the 
language that you use. I maybe, eh, wouldn’t, you know, if I was getting a 
a bit frustrated or, um, concerned about something, maybe use different 
language than I might have done if I was writing my own diary which 
nobody could see. … and not sort of naming names … think that was 
something because, um, it would be too, not trying to rub people up the 
wrong way really. (Hazel, student, PG) 
The change Hazel described seems to be aimed at maintaining face and good social 
or working relationships with her course peers, by performing a self through her 
reflective writing who did not show frustration, pettiness or belligerence (qualities 
which she was concerned were coming through in her ‘honest’ reflections prior to 
realising others on her course could read her blog). Put another way, Hazel’s 
performance was one of politeness and non-confrontation. 
This is slightly different from, but related to, a thread that ran through some students’ 
accounts about the nature of writing for an academic audience. This was concerned 
with writing ‘properly’, paying attention to the formal features of grammar and 
spelling: 
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The fact that somebody was reading it meant that I, I tried to be articulate, 
you know I tried to write it properly I suppose. (Lynne, student, PG) 
This emerged also in the section about assessment, but here Lynne’s ‘somebody’, an 
audience in the abstract, was what provokes her to write ‘properly’. Finally, there 
was awareness of the importance of the visual and design aspects of online reflective 
spaces, where the use of visual enhancements was described as being for the benefit 
of an audience: 
Um [pause] the, the colour and the graphics, that comes in and the end. 
That’s …the icing of the cake, isn’t it? …it is really really important, I 
think, because… if you’re reading a lot of information and, certainly, 
things, such as reflection and action plans, I think that the colours there 
detract from the monotony. (Eileen, student, UG) 
The ‘you’ here is the audience for Eileen’s portfolio, and Eileen is showing a level of 
awareness and concern about their experience of reading her work online; she 
wanted it not to be boring, and crafted a visual element to entice and engage her 
audience. Importantly, this visual element of her portfolio was produced at the end of 
the process. It was not part of her own evolving understanding of the material, but 
was decoration, dressing up her portfolio for the audience’s benefit. Eileen saw the 
textual nature of the reflections as ‘monotonous’, and took steps to keep her audience 
engaged. 
All three of these features – a perceived loss of honesty; a concern with ‘proper’ 
writing; and strategies designed to attract and entertain the audience – are central 
elements of the experience of writing reflectively, and are given very little attention 
in the literature around these practices. These are seen by students as a consequence 
of having any audience at all, not a particular teacher, or a particular assessment 
framework. What students are talking about, and in some cases misunderstanding, 
can helpfully be related more to the nature of language than to the specifics of high-
stakes reflection. In the final part of this chapter, I return to the concept of 
addressivity, and propose it as a way of working with audience, performance and 
assessment in reflective practices online. 
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Addressivity and the place of the Other: restaging 
performance  
This chapter has demonstrated that students do experience their high-stakes online 
reflection in terms of audience and performance. They are able to articulate their 
orientation not only towards assessment, as might perhaps be expected, but towards 
their teacher(s) in particular, and an audience in general. The question is, what (if 
anything) do their teachers, and should we, make of this? Does it matter if reflection 
is being approached in this way? Is the performance more than a pretence that no one 
acknowledges? What outcomes could emerge from such practices if they were more 
critical and creative about their relation to audience?  
It may be more appropriate to work with the addressivity of online reflection, than to 
ignore it and leave students to deal unsupported with conflicting messages about 
authenticity and audience. Bakhtin (1986) discusses the “nuances of style” that differ 
according to the “personal proximity of the addressee to the speaker” (p.96). He 
describes intimate genres, which are produced in an “atmosphere of profound trust” 
in the addressee’s “sympathy, sensitivity, and goodwill” (p.97). This is the genre of 
writing that reflection is designed to foster, where the presence of the facilitator (in 
this case, the teacher) is “to create a climate of trust and safety in which confessions 
can be made and catharsis enhanced” (Bleakley, 2000, p.14). As Bakhtin puts it, 
“intimate genres and styles are based on a maximum internal proximity of the 
speaker and addressee (in extreme instances, as if they had merged)” (1986, p.97). 
However, this is not the kind of writing that students can produce, because even 
where compulsory reflection produces apparent revelations of interiority, these are 
“products of the genre itself, where identities are constructed through confessional 
modes, rather than confessional modes revealing identities” (Bleakley, 2000, p.16). 
There is no ‘there’ there, in other words; when teachers say they want expressions of 
authentic selves, they are asking for a performance. The result of denying the 
performative nature of reflective writing is writing which is: 
starved of its possibilities, anaesthetised or dulled, unable to find a 
plurality of aesthetic voices through metaphor, image, allegory; and unable 
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to exercise itself as a dialogic imagination that would offer a world-
orientation and communal practice. (p.19) 
In fact, what students will produce in the absence of strategies for working with 
performance may be more like what Bakhtin (1986) terms “objectively neutral” 
genres – which “presuppose something like a… unity of viewpoints, but this identity 
and unity are purchased at the price of almost complete forfeiture of expression” 
(p.98). These could take the form of conventional modes of academic writing that 
students will adopt by ‘default’ (see Chapter 8 for more on this), or the “legitimate 
narratives” that Hargreaves (2004) describes (which will be discussed further in 
Chapter 7).  
Some of the teachers I spoke with frame their assessment practice in ways that could 
complement an addressive approach to reflective writing, though they do so 
ambivalently. Penny, in our discussion of how to do well in assessed reflection, 
introduced the idea of “enculturating” her students into writing reflectively. This 
enculturation is related to, but different from, the analysis of ‘disciplining’ reflective 
writing that will come in Chapter 8. For Penny, many of the dilemmas students have 
with high-stakes reflection are part of a process of induction into a specific “writing 
culture”, with its own particular norms and structures: 
Jen: So you think, for the reflective assignments, it’s more important to be 
able to kind of, um… structure it well and follow the instructions, than it is 
to be experienced and reflecting for example? 
Penny (teacher, PG): It’s a, it’s an assessment. Yeah, that’s what you do 
with assessments! 
Jen: [Laughs] 
Penny: ... But they have, they have to be enculturated [pause] and, because 
these are criterion referenced assessments, um, they have to meet the 
criteria. 
Jen: When you say ‘enculturated’ 
Penny: Mhmm, into the writing culture. 
While Penny appeared to view this enculturation as a legitimate goal (perhaps the 
legitimate goal) of high-stakes reflective practice, she went on to note that it is 
largely a tacit one on her course. “That’s what you do with assessments” is 
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understood as both a frustrating truth and an obvious one. It is not always clear to 
students, however, as we have seen, that they are being asked to engage with a genre 
of writing, or what the genre entails. To make things more clear runs a risk that both 
Jane and Ian pointed out: that of making reflection, and teachers’ response to it, 
instrumental and “not very human”, as Jane put it. For Jane, the reason for being so 
explicit about the nature of the assessment aligns well with Penny’s comment about a 
writing culture, and with the more decisive approach to performance that I am 
proposing:  
I certainly don’t believe you know in, that there’s an essential kind of self 
or an essential identity that they’re expressing unproblematically in the 
weblog. They’re constructing… an idea of themselves through their 
reflective writing about the content of the course. Um, and I think it’s 
really important that they, that they know on what basis that is going to be 
assessed. So when students ask ‘am I doing this right?’, I always refer 
back to the assessment criteria… that might seem a bit sort of instrumental 
and not very kind of, human [laugh], but I think it’s the only fair way to do 
it. (Jane, teacher, PG) 
Ian observed that the risk of some students taking an instrumental approach to their 
reflection is “the price you pay” for being explicit about the assessment criteria, but 
that he had been criticised by students and colleagues for taking this approach:  
[One student said] that it was a bit like doing it by numbers, you know. It 
wasn’t really reflection, because you had to do this and you had to do that, 
and you had to mention this and you had to mention that and so. And, um, 
I’ve certainly had, um, I’ve certainly had this approach criticised by 
people from, you know, from other discipline areas in other universities in, 
in conferences where I’ve been talking, you know, or where people have 
been talking about reflection. And if you talk to people who do kind of 
creative reflective writing, you know, they think this is awful what we do, 
it’s terrible. (Ian, teacher, PG) 
Both are concerned about being seen to respond inhumanly to student reflections, but 
they are more concerned to deal fairly with students by making it plain how their 
reflections connect up with the high-stakes requirements of their courses. Jane saw 
reflection as a student’s construction of an idea of themselves, not an expression of 
an essential, autonomous identity, and tried to make her assessment practices support 
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that constructing, not revealing, task. In that distinction is an opening to a way of 
thinking about reflection that sits more easily with assessment, and within the digital. 
It leaves room for an understanding of power, of addressivity and of flexibility of 
identity work. The construction of an identity is always a performance, as Adele 
pointed out:  
The blog, obviously you’re trying to um portray yourself in a positive light 
um because it’s up for assessment and everything, and um, yes as I say 
before you’re maybe not always totally honest because you you wouldn’t 
write anything too negative or too critical in it but, um, but I don’t have the 
feeling that it’s, that I put on a different identity for it… I never had the 
feeling that I was making this up… It is, it is, maybe it is still a 
performance but in the way, in a way that, you’re always performing 
somehow …I think identity is made up of so many shades and it’s, you 
can’t really say the one is your true identity and the other one isn’t. (Adele, 
student, PG)  
While Adele laughingly said that “you’re always performing somehow”, she was 
also at pains to make me aware of her sincerity within her reflective blog: “I never 
had the feeling that I was making this up”. At present students feel they must be 
seen, above all, to be authentic in their reflections, and this, paradoxically, is 
hampering their understanding of and engagement with a challenging mode of 
writing. If explicitly offered the online reflective space as a space of construction, 
experimentation and refinement – as a challenge to situate themselves as academic 
and professional actors within a particular assessment framework – the need for a 
strategic, performative approach could be less confusing, and more rewarding for 
students.  
The mask as artefact of performance has something to offer here. The theatrical mask 
is both a demanding and a freeing element of performance. Actors must be taught to 
be expressive using masks, and it is a difficult discipline which some dislike 
(Griffiths, 1998, p.37). On the other hand, the mask can make it easier to play a role 
and to be subtle in conveying thought and emotion to an audience (Wilsher, 2007, 
p.31). And theatrical masks can give performances “expressive power and 
imaginative life” (Emigh, 1996, p.xvii). 
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Image of a masked performance 
 15 
This expressive power is what Bleakley (2000) wants in a “therapy of writing” (as 
opposed to writing as therapy): a contrast to the “puritan forms [which] are 
purposefully devoid of surprise, indeterminacy, invention, imagination, florid excess, 
disturbance, or ‘story’” (p.19). Ian suggests that his more explicit practices around 
assessment of reflection are producing “puritan forms”, but perhaps being explicit is 
just the start of the process. The next step is to show students how to construct, how 
to perform, a reflective self. In online practices, an important aspect of this is the 
webness or digitality of the construction, and it is to this aspect that we turn next, to 
explore the database and the trace.  
                                                
15 Creative Commons licensed work by Giant Gingkgo, 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/giantginkgo/162974551/ 
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Chapter 5: The database, the non-origin, 
and the trace 
The previous chapter focused on the nature of high-stakes reflective practice and on 
reflective writing as an audience-focused mode of writing. It pointed to aspects of 
performance which are mediated and intensified by technology, including the 
presentation of digital reflections, and experiences of collaboration and silence. This 
chapter looks in more detail at the effects of the digital, and in particular the digital 
database, on reflective practices. Most technologies for reflective practice employed 
in higher education use databases as building blocks, either within larger institutional 
structures of VLEs, or as part of portfolio archives, or as searchable, taggable blogs. 
As I discussed in Chapter 2, the database is an archive which is complex in its 
relation to subjectivity. This chapter focuses on what the digital database does: its 
persistence, its flow and permeable boundaries, the kinds of subjectivity it produces. 
The aim is to show that although mediation through technology matters, what I am 
calling ‘webness’ itself has its own effects and consequences for online reflective 
practices.  
As a structuring metaphor, the mask as trace will be applied here. The trace is the 
death mask as archive, record, remains. A death mask constitutes a material trace or 
archive of the person who has died. It is not for, it does not belong to, the person it 
represents, and nor does that person have any say or control over the matter, making 
this genre of mask an interesting route to exploring agency and archive in online 
reflective practices. The death mask is also something other than the singular 
archived image of the remembered dead. Death masks were not always precise 
impressions of their source; they sometimes had eyelashes and hair attached to them, 
and the eyes were sometimes changed “to make it appear as though the subject were 
alive” (death mask, 2010). Such masks have sometimes also been art objects with no 
definite connection to the once-living, most famously in the case of L’inconnue de la 
Seine, supposedly a mask of an unknown woman who was found floating in the river 
Seine. Multiple copies of this mask were created and hung in artists’ and writers’ 
homes across Europe, inspiring many new literary and artistic works. The 
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circumstances and date of the creation of the mask itself are unknown, however, and 
one story has it that the so-called death mask was produced in a German plaster cast 
factory, the image of the manufacturer’s (living) daughter (Zeidler, 2005). Its origin 
is therefore a profound, unsolvable mystery. The unknown woman (a mystery 
herself) is not really the ‘source’ or essence of the mask, and the story told of it is not 
the source either. Its source is overdetermined, and the replication of the mask and its 
story only appears to settle what is ultimately not possible to settle.  
Death mask: Lʼinconnue de la Seine 
 16 
A virtual death mask is produced every time we act online. Something is left behind 
that is us, but not us. The database structure produces and works with traces, through 
categorisation, identification, sorting, storage and reconfigurability. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, it produces ‘databased selves’, or ‘dividuals’ that are part of our online 
subjectivity. Land and Bayne (2002, online) have argued in relation to VLEs that 
“archival fixity and retrievability” binds students to the words and actions of their 
online past, and Kimball (2005) considers this to be potentially antithetical to the 
supposedly learner-centred pedagogies which underpin much reflective practice, 
discouraging students from taking risks, experimenting, or expressing uncertainty 
(p.454). In what follows, I present some evidence that supports Kimball’s position, 
and some that would seem to ask for a theory of the trace that leaves more space for 
                                                
16 L’Inconnue de la Seine: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Inconnue.jpg. Retrieved 6/8/11. 
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creative possibility – the possibility of a trace as a marker of what has never been – 
the non-origin, in Derrida’s terms.  
For Derrida (1997), the trace as non-origin is the impossibility of ever grasping an 
‘original’ sense of things: “the trace is not only the disappearance of origin… it 
means that the origin did not ever disappear, that it was never constituted except 
reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, which then becomes the origin of the origin” 
(p.61). There is no essence or ‘reality’ that is “not already …the trace of a trace” 
(Riddel, 1976, p.586). As such, Sedgwick (2001) says that Derrida’s trace is “the 
very process of signification”, and that it “indicates a fundamental possibility of 
repetition… that is inherent in the production of meaning” (p.207).  
Derrida’s (1995) essay about the archive offers further clues to the way the trace 
functions in a digital context. He suggests that “archival technology” determines not 
only the way in which events and data are recorded, but the way in which they are 
produced: “what is no longer archived in the same way is no longer lived in the same 
way” (p.18). He uses Freudian psychoanalytic theory to link the instinct to preserve 
through the archive with the “death drive”, the “anarchivic”, because the archive 
replaces human memory with a trace of memory. Its entire purpose is to exteriorise, 
to become a prosthetic: 
If there is no archive without consignation in an external place which 
assures the possibility of memorization, of repetition, or reproduction, or of 
reimpression, then we must also remember that repetition itself, the logic 
of repetition, indeed the repetition compulsion, remains, according to 
Freud, indissociable from the death drive. (pp.11-12)  
The archive is therefore held in constant tension between creation and destruction. 
This has implications not only for data, but also for the subject. Poster (1996) 
reminds us that databases are forms of discourse (p.278), “inscribing symbolic 
traces” (p.283) and constituting the subject as highly unstable: 
Through the database alone, the subject has been multiplied and decentred, 
capable of being acted upon by computers at many social locations without 
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the least awareness by the individual concerned yet just as surely as if the 
individual were present somehow inside the computer. (p.286) 
This constitution is “a complex configuration of unconsciousness, indirection, 
automation, and absent-mindedness” (p.288). Neither the creator of the database 
(portfolio, blog software, search engine) nor the individual represented in it are fully 
in control of what happens in the database. The issue of control is of particular 
relevance to the teachers and students I spoke with. 
In the rest of this chapter I explore how aspects of the digital trace – control, 
boundaries, absences and foundations – are explained and understood by teachers 
and students in relation to their online reflective practices. In doing so, I explore the 
argument that archival fixity entraps students in unhelpful ways, and look to a more 
expansive and generative view of the digital database as offered by Derrida’s theory 
of the trace. If there is no origin, no original source of meaning, as Derrida claims, 
perhaps the database offers the possibility of a meaning making and a pedagogy, 
including one of assessment, that does not fear a loss of control but instead celebrates 
mystery, disaggregation and replication. The conclusion of this chapter asks where 
online reflective practice needs to go in order to access such a possibility, drawing on 
Bayne’s (2010) and Edwards’ (2010) notions of posthuman pedagogy as provocative 
theories to think with. 
“It might disappear onto the internet at any time”: 
being in and out of control 
The context of writing reflectively online is different from other forms of reflective 
writing, with different sorts of implications for the identities of student-writers and 
teacher-readers. One aim of my empirical research was to find out how students and 
teachers deal with webness, and the concept of archival fixity, as it relates to their 
own, or their students’ disclosure or reflection. I hypothesised that students may 
strongly resist a loss of control in the online reflective environment, because the 
digital space seems to threaten them with fragmentation (Bayne, 2005) when they 
know they are supposed to present a coherent self. I imagined therefore that students 
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would be strategic and selective about what material went into the online reflective 
space, that they would seek to avoid risk and uncertainty, as we have seen Kimball 
(2005) suggest. And indeed, this is one – but not the only – way that students 
described their approach to reflecting online. I thought that, in contrast, teachers 
would encourage students to feel safe and to trust the system, to elicit spontaneity 
and authenticity in reflections. Again, this was some teachers’ approach, but the 
range of other perspectives was striking. Strategies for dealing with the online nature 
of online reflection for teachers and students include denial, caution, and consent, as 
well as rejection. Through many of these strategies runs a narrative of control: 
imagining it, keeping it, losing it.  
For some, a willingness to disclose or confess in these online spaces was dependent 
on a belief in the spaces themselves as private and safe. This belief can require some 
deft manoeuvring. Natalie explained that, in her students’ place, she would 
consciously choose not to think about her portfolio as being on the web: 
Natalie (teacher, UG): If it was me in their shoes, I don’t think I would 
particularly think about it being online. I would think about it in a way that 
I would think about word processing something. 
Jen: Right, you don’t think there’s any difference between writing it in a 
like a Word document or something? 
Natalie: [pause] I think, if it were me, that’s the way I would have to think 
about it in the beginning, until I got used to using it. 
Natalie’s clarification leaves open the possibility that the online nature of the 
portfolio could be thought about later on, but ‘getting used to’ the environment will 
first require denial of that nature. Some students appeared to approach their reflective 
spaces in exactly that way, choosing trust over a critical engagement with the context 
of their reflective practice, even in circumstances which would seem likely to 
cultivate mistrust. For Eileen and Yvonne, students of Natalie’s who were in a 
campus-based cohort together, a technical glitch in the privacy controls in their 
portfolios resulted in an event which they both told me about, in our discussion of the 
privacy of their reflections: 
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Jen: Do you have a feeling …of the e-portfolio being on the internet, like, 
in the way that, you know, a website is on the internet or anything? 
Eileen (student, UG): No. 
Jen: No. Why? 
Eileen: Um, because, because it’s, um, because you’re logging in and 
because it’s through the university, so I don’t worry about that. Um, I 
mean, yeah, people in my year have had really odd things happen where, 
suddenly, they’ve received somebody’s [items], and so they’ve got, like, 
another 100 [items] put into their, um, [portfolio]. 
Jen: Whoa! 
Eileen: And it belongs to somebody else. 
Jen: Whoa [laughs]. 
Eileen: But, you know, no, that, that doesn’t worry me at all. 
Yvonne told me the same story, and when I asked if she felt that her portfolio was on 
the web in the way that other things are on the web, she replied: 
Yvonne (student, UG): It seems kind of safer. Like, when you think about 
things going on the web, you think about everyone being able to see it and 
things. But, um, I don’t know, it’s just because the uni’s given it us I 
presume it’s safe and that no-one can hack into it or anything like that, not 
that there’s anything interesting in there for them to read anyway, but 
Jen: Yeah okay, that’s interesting. Even though you’ve had a, bad 
experiences of things not being where they should be, or going somewhere 
they shouldn’t be, it still feels kind of 
Yvonne: Yeah, yeah. I don’t think they’d go too far. I think maybe they get 
sent to other, like, my peers that are in my year and things like that, but I 
can’t see it being, like, spread to the whole world. 
Despite something happening with their portfolios that was definitely not supposed 
to, neither Eileen nor Yvonne translated this into a worry about their portfolios 
possibly ending up outside the confines of their institution. Rather than considering 
their webness, they instead considered their provenance, imagining their origins not 
in the web, but in and of their university.  
Other students acknowledged the webness of their reflective spaces, but developed 
strategies to help them avoid losing control of their message online until they felt 
they had perfected it: 
It felt safer writing it in a Word document first… There’s something about 
writing directly you know into an online format whatever that is more 
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[pause] live I suppose… I need to be absolutely sure that what I’m writing 
is what I want to write because it might it might disappear onto the internet 
at any time, you know? [laugh] (Lynne, student, PG) 
Because it felt risky and “live”, Lynne put off her engagement with the online 
reflective space so that she entered it only when she was sure of what she wanted to 
say. Her cautious approach would seem to support Kimball’s (2005) worry that the 
database-driven nature of e-portfolios would cause students to back away from a 
spontaneous, authentic process of reflection; the need to be “absolutely sure” does 
not sit easily with such spontaneity. Beth, a student on a campus-based programme, 
had a similar fear of losing her work to the wider internet, and she gave this as the 
reason she would not communicate unhappiness about a course or lecturer in her 
(non-public) e-portfolio; because it would then be “floating around in this virtual, 
you know, this void somewhere [laughs]” (Beth, student, UG). This use of language 
is revealing: a dangerous void was perceived by some even in the safety of digital 
‘walled gardens’. 
Megan, on the other hand, took a very different approach, claiming to be aware and 
accepting of the nature of the digital archive, and choosing to be there fully, with 
nothing to hide. Much of our interview was taken up with discussions of her various 
online presences, and her attitude to her private course blog was that she would have 
preferred it to be public: 
There’s nothing that I’ve expressed in any part of the course that I would 
mind being public. Uh, but I’m quite mouthy at work … I don’t really mind 
what’s recorded as me having said cause it’s nothing that I wouldn’t say 
anyway. And I don’t know if other people sort of it looked at that in a 
different way, if they were expressing stuff they wouldn’t normally express 
at work or they wouldn’t normally express in whatever context, so. 
(Megan, student, PG)  
Megan’s choice (or perhaps her privilege), to live an online life that she saw as 
completely in harmony with her offline life and her professional identity as an 
opinionated, honest, ‘mouthy’ person, is a conscious one; she went on to describe 
being aware of the possibility of being called to account for her online words. 
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However, she did not seem to experience this as inhibiting in the way that Kimball 
suggests. Instead, she felt she was in control of her message, her persona, to such an 
extent that inhibition was not necessary.  
“It does have to be policed”: privacy, confidentiality 
and disclosure 
Dyson (1998) predicted more than a decade ago that being online will reconfigure 
what privacy and display mean, and how they are experienced:	  
As people feel more secure in general on the Net, they will become 
accustomed to seeing their words recorded and replayed. They will no 
longer feel uncomfortable being on display, since everyone around them is 
on display too… Everyone has personal preferences for privacy, but they 
are influenced by the surrounding culture and by the surrounding economy. 
(p.275) 
Recent work on youth social media practices has revealed that privacy remains 
important, even to the so-called ‘net generation’. In digitally-mediated spaces, 
however, privacy changes to denote the ability to “limit access through social 
conventions” (boyd, 2008, p.131). Here, tactics such as “security through obscurity” 
replace structural boundaries (p.133). These tactics make people more vulnerable to 
changes in the way archives are constructed and surfaced. Boyd uses the introduction 
of the Facebook news feed as an example of such a change. The news feed, she 
argues, dramatically changed the social dynamics of the popular social networking 
site, such that content that was formerly obscure and available only to those who 
deliberately navigated to a user’s Facebook profile was made available to all of their 
Facebook contacts in an aggregated feed which became the Facebook home page:  
By aggregating social information and broadcasting it, News Feeds takes 
what people can access and places it at the forefront of their attention. … 
[Privacy] is about how people experience their relationship with others and 
with information. Privacy is a sense of control over information, the 
context where sharing takes place, and the audience who can gain access. 
(boyd, 2006, p.18)  
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Web users have become more aware in recent years of the ways in which changes to 
context can affect them, and those students and teachers who have concerns about 
who may be watching, and how much disclosure is too much, sometimes react by 
rejecting the notion of putting something personal or controversial in their reflective 
space in the first place, or of allowing or encouraging students to do so. 
Sam, a teacher whose students have the option (but are not required) to create their 
portfolios in the open web, actively discouraged disclosure of what she called the 
“darker parts” of reflection: “they have to have confidence that [pause] what they put 
in those portfolios is confidential. Unless they choose to publish it. And I try to 
discourage publication of the darker parts” (Sam, teacher, UG). In addition, she 
described the risk of exposure online, whether emotional or in terms of identity 
disclosure, as one that could be entered into without students’ realisation, and took 
great care to monitor her students’ digital output:  
I had a guy come to see me yesterday with a [public web] portfolio… and I 
just said to him ‘look, you’ve given up enough information here if someone 
really wants to, to claim your identity’ and he said to me ‘what do you 
mean?’ and I said ‘name, address, date of birth, family name’ and he went 
‘oooh my god’ and [I] said ‘so can you take that down off your [portfolio] 
now, can you sort it out’, and I and we went through various documents 
that were on there to do with his portfolio and I said ‘I’d like that off, I’d 
like that off, I’d like that off and I’d’ and it was ‘no no you’ll mark me 
down’ and I said ‘no I won’t. I won’t mark you down.’ (Sam, teacher, UG) 
Although Sam believed she conveyed her concerns about privacy to her students, the 
student she discusses here was under the impression that he was required to make 
these disclosures, and feared being penalised when it came to assessment if he did 
not. I believe his reaction is not a simple misunderstanding, but an indication of the 
complex, and perhaps sometimes contradictory, attitudes towards online reflection 
that teachers communicate to their students.  
To illustrate this further, here is a quote from Bob, a teacher whose postgraduate 
students undertook professional placements as part of their studies. Bob told me that 
students understood the concept of confidentiality and anonymising information they 
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put in their online reflections, but had to be ‘policed’ to ensure they adhered to the 
guidelines: 
While they’re out on placement, we actively encourage them to talk about 
different aspects of their placement. Now, if they’re not getting on with 
their [placement colleagues], whilst they’re out on placement, and they 
start to decry [a colleague], or, for that matter, they start to, to be too 
critical, in relation to the [organisation], then we, we try to step in to, to 
alleviate that situation as quickly as possible. In other words, anonymity is, 
is asked for in that kind of situation. But, because the students are used to 
using the wikis and the discussion forums themselves, it’s inevitable 
sometimes that, they don’t adhere to that, so it does have to be policed. 
(Bob, teacher, PG) 
Bob described anonymity in a way that seems to mean more than simply removing 
identifying details; students were stopped from expressing negative views about their 
placements or colleagues. In the context of his programme, this likely relates to the 
fact that students used their portfolios later for professional validation, and their 
reflections may be easily linked with their placement records. The potential use of 
reflective data to make negative professional judgments about students was one that 
Bob, as a teacher, believed he had a responsibility to shield students from.  
Bob identified his students’ familiarity with other online spaces, which presumably 
did not have the same injunction against negativity associated with them, as the 
reason why they did not always follow the guidelines for anonymity in their 
reflections. However, it seems at least as likely that the line between what is desired 
by teachers, and what is forbidden, is open to misinterpretation by students. Students 
must “talk about different aspects of their placement”, but not “be too critical”. They 
must not publish “the darker parts”, but they are assessed on their written reflections. 
The culture of high-stakes online reflection is one of policed boundaries, drawn and 
redrawn to attempt to keep control of traces which are always escaping, always 
vulnerable, always free to do later mischief, or have mischief done to them.  
Some teachers and students believe that the consequences of disclosure could be 
grave. Jess, another teacher, talked about being alarmed by a story she heard from a 
student, and used the rhetoric of “big brother” to explain her concerns: 
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I did have a student who, um, quite, quite scared me actually, in a way, 
because she was saying that, um, she didn’t, um, wish to actually be 
involved in the course blog … because she was aware that her employers 
had googled her previously and had actually, you know, picked up what 
she was doing in her in her own blog. …And I thought ‘Oh wow, big 
brother watching you, sort of thing’ and that’s quite extensive. But, you 
know, given all this stuff about, you know, what the government is doing 
about tracking our telephone calls and emails and all this sort of stuff, I 
mean, it makes you think doesn’t it? … And if they’ve exposed themselves, 
if you like, their personal sort of thoughts, innermost thoughts, uh, even if 
they’re professional ones, um, you know, is it is it something that’s going 
to be, you know, sort of used against them on another course or, indeed, 
you know, more broadly than that? (Jess, teacher, PG) 
Jess believed that even professionally orientated reflections could be personally 
exposing. Unlike Sam and Bob, this did not cause her to police her students’ 
reflective outputs, but she worried, not only about her students’ employers and future 
teachers, but also about a government which might take an interest in disclosures that 
appear in online reflective practice contexts. Teachers can be in a difficult position: 
bringing up their concerns too explicitly or too often could damage students’ 
confidence in their reflective spaces, and make them less likely to be spontaneous 
and emotionally engaged in ‘authentic’ reflection. To get the results they want from 
online reflection, teachers need to make students feel safe, even if this means 
ignoring or discounting thorny issues that come with doing this work online (as we 
saw Natalie do when she suggested students should think of their online reflection as 
being offline). Perhaps partly for this reason, some teachers prioritised reassuring 
students over engaging deeply with issues of concern to students: 
Students raised [privacy concerns] quite a lot about their portfolio. And, at 
the beginning, I mean, you had to reassure them that nobody else had 
access to your portfolio, um, your portfolio repository I’m talking about. 
What they then compile out of it for presentation is up to them. (Ian, 
teacher, PG) 
Some teachers, like Peter, described online reflective spaces as more private and 
secure than their offline counterparts, glossing over concerns that might specifically 
attend the digital: 
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It’s not like everybody’s reading their blog or their e-portfolio, there 
there’s a maximum only of four people. …what happens with the paper 
portfolios is that they’re just available and people come in and dip into all 
of them. With this [online] system …we actually had to give individual 
permission to the person who was just going to read that portfolio and they 
didn’t have access to the other ones. (Peter, teacher, UG) 
Some students were nervous, though, and responded by refusing to allow what they 
saw as personal into their online reflections. In my interview with Dave, he described 
the profound impact that his course of study was having on him personally and 
professionally. When it came to his e-portfolio, however, he was reluctant to write 
plainly about these experiences, choosing instead to code them in a way that he said 
he would later recognise, but that would not be obvious to anyone else. I asked why 
he was not more explicit about what he called “the depths of his soul”: 
Because you’re not quite sure who’s going to be reading it, or because 
[pause] and what I was writing in in the blog was honest I just, you know I 
just wasn’t going to you know go in to the depths. (Dave, student, UG) 
Sometimes students’ views about safety and risk evolved, and they came to regret 
what they previously disclosed: 
The first entry I was maybe, that was when I was writing quite a lot about 
my concerns and then um I was sort of writing, I think I, I wrote that ‘I’m 
not quite sure that this course is really what I want to be doing’ and um 
that it’s sort of taking the right, right direction and things like that, and I 
felt afterwards that maybe that was being too open, I wished I hadn’t 
written that. (Adele, student, PG) 
Much has been written about the moral panics surrounding internet safety and risk, 
especially in relation to young people (Carrington, 2007; Hope, 2008). The result is 
an undercurrent of fear, danger and caution which is certainly affecting how students 
and teachers approach their own online reflective practices, and the notion of online 
presence in general. For example, talking in the abstract about the potential of future 
‘portfolios for life’, one student, Hazel, saw benefits: 
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The idea of of somebody being able to have this e-portfolio and take it with 
them throughout their schooling and then into high school and then 
university and on into the workplace, it’s a great idea. Obviously the issues 
of connectivity and, um, that sort of thing but, um, yeah, I could see the 
potential for it, certainly. (Hazel, student, PG) 
Helen, on the other, hand, saw the same possibility as extremely problematic: 
I don’t trust anybody with data these days. Especially not the government, 
yeah… it could have huge stakes. I mean the kids have to do their personal 
statements for UCAS online which they do don’t they now? Yeah and 
submit an e-portfolio as well. And, you know, that’s life changing 
decisions. It doesn’t matter much for me but that is, you know, at that 
point. And then when they leave University, if that’s available to all these 
employers who are going to recruit them, again that’s life changing. So um 
there are some big issues. (Helen, student, PG) 
Helen, a mature student established in her career, did not believe she would 
personally be disadvantaged by the increasing availability and persistence of digital 
reflections, but felt sorry for younger people whose life choices and chances would 
be shaped by the compulsory online reflection they were required to undertake from 
a young age, and for high-stakes purposes.  
Though reflective practice is sometimes said to be about critical thinking, this kind of 
critical thinking is directly at odds with other foundations of reflective practice, 
which rely on personal disclosure for the development of independence and creative 
exploration (Creme, 2005, p.289). It is difficult (though perhaps not impossible, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 9) to square risk and fear with creative exploration. The 
archive is both a threat and an ambiguity, and this is reflected in uncertainty over the 
matter of ownership, which I asked students about in relation to their online 
reflections.  
“Itʼs a bit like driving somebody elseʼs car”: 
ownership and the archive 
The uncertainty that students expressed about the ownership of their reflective 
spaces, and the reasons they gave for this, are highly relevant to an understanding of 
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the trace. In their answers to the question of ownership, we can see the effects of the 
webness of these reflections most explicitly, and here students were also most likely 
to recognize the problematic nature of the archive. Eileen, for example, described 
working with her e-portfolio as “a bit like driving somebody else’s car”, and this 
description – of an object borrowed, whose functional properties are fixed and which 
will eventually have to be returned – indicates a rather sophisticated understanding of 
web-based tools and services. Rachel, whose programme used an e-portfolio tool 
called PebblePad, explained the stages she went through in considering the question 
of ownership: 
Jen: Who do you think kind of owns your portfolio space? 
Rachel (student, UG): [pause] Well, I used to think it was me! And I think, 
really, it’s this PebblePad character, because [laughs] they’re going to 
sort of, I think, I believe, you have to pay for it after you finish the course… 
or it just gets left. But, in the end, you could print it all out, but I would 
have thought, you know, it’s protected and no-one can get in to see it, or it 
just gets all [pause] deleted or they save a copy at the uni, I don’t know 
really. I think probably that, you know, this, eh, whoever set this thing up 
owns it and then, eh, it’s all my work, isn’t it, but, you know. 
Rachel explained that the content of the portfolio is “all my work, isn’t it”, and this is 
presumably why she used to think she owned her portfolio space, but she came to 
believe that it was not the only factor at play. She jokingly referred to the software 
company as “this PebblePad character”, and suggested that they “really” own it, 
because they would charge her for continued access to it once she graduates. She 
knew she could print or download the content of the portfolio, but was not so sure 
what would happen to the web-based version should she choose not to pay. She 
assumed that PebblePad would either delete it or continue to store it securely, 
perhaps also giving a copy to her University. She thought that the University’s stake 
in the portfolio might mean they had a right to a copy, perhaps including content that 
she created but did not initially share, because the portfolio was created under their 
auspices. 
Chapter 5: The database, the non-origin, and the trace 
 141 
Lynne’s initial response to who owned her blog was so definite that I moved on quite 
quickly to a follow up question. She interrupted me to modify her initial certainty, 
though: 
Jen: Who, who do you feel owns your blog? 
Lynne (student, PG): [pause] I feel that I own it. Yeah. Definitely, yeah. 
Jen: And, um, what do you expect to… 
Lynne: I suppose I feel that I own it but I don’t, I don’t feel that I own the 
you know [laughingly] the technology that publishes it. …because it’s 
sitting on um [the web site], I suppose I feel I I own it but I’ve um, I’ve 
given some permissions away.  
Finally, Mona turned the question back on me, rather anxiously: 
Jen: After you finish this year …what do you think is going to happen to 
your portfolio? 
Mona (student, PG): Oh, I don’t know, actually, I never thought of that. I 
hope they hide it carefully, but… probably not! Uh, do you know what 
happens? I don’t know. 
The deconstruction of presence: the promise of the 
trace 
Deconstruction of presence accomplishes itself through the deconstruction 
of consciousness, and therefore through the irreducible notion of the trace 
(Derrida, 1997, p.70) 
In Chapter 2, I remarked that in light of the challenge to autonomy and authenticity 
produced by the database, it was necessary for us to think carefully about what it is 
that we are compelling and assessing in online reflection. It cannot really be “an 
expression of a subject” (Poster, 1996, p.280): so what is it about, and for? Derrida 
(1997) explains the trace as playfully present/absent (p.71), and this is what online, 
compulsory reflection needs to take more account of – the database as itself, not a 
representation that needs to be harnessed and controlled. The trace offers us an idea 
to help us move beyond the need for students and teachers to deny, fear, bully or 
disown webness before they can engage in online reflection. What if online reflective 
practices deliberately set out to deal in fragments and fictions, and to reframe 
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themselves as places where many voices are possible and welcome? Postmodern 
educational theory provides us with a model for this, as Yancey (2004) points out:  
Making sense of …representation of student work requires multiple 
contexts, fluidity, plurality. Or: in a postmodern world, what in earlier 
times might have been regarded as fragmentation, indeterminacy, and 
heterogeneity are understood today as necessary virtues. (pp.739-40) 
Yancey asks us to acknowledge the “multiple contexts” from which student writing 
emerges, and notes that these are particularly evident in a portfolio (p.741). For 
Cousin (2005), a similar concern with multiplicity energises her adoption of the 
metaphor of the rhizome, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, to invite new imaginings 
of online learning environments. The challenge to authorship that the rhizome offers 
up, in its heterogeneity and deterritorialisation, is one that reflective practice has yet 
to really approach, attached as it is to the autonomous, authentic self. Engaging with 
the webness of reflective practice online can loosen some of those attachments 
enough to free up ‘openings’ for different sorts of reflections that: “support the shift 
from traditional anxious academic literacy practices of monologic addressivity to a 
more fluid and exciting literacy ‘infidelity’ allowing for increasing dialogue and 
exchange within student groups” (Hughes & Purnell, 2008, p.151). 
Looking at the web as a whole and guessing about its near-future shape, the database 
contains not just human activity, but also the contributions of objects. Bleecker 
(2006) refers to what he calls ‘blogjects’– objects that can contribute information 
about themselves to the network, and interpret and work with the information other 
blogjects provide. The human and the non-human will saturate each other in these 
posthuman networks and their archives, in what Edwards (2010) calls 
“entanglements”. For Edwards, an energising vision of education is one of 
“responsible experimental gatherings of things that matter” (p.15).	  Online reflection 
can be in and of this vision, but only if it is prepared to tell a different kind of story, 
not about itself as it never was, but about its context, and the nature of meaning: 
Meaning is always differential and deferred, never present as an original 
unity, always already a site of proliferating possibilities that can be 
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activated in diverse ways by the receivers of an utterance, and that 
therefore exceed the control of individual users. (Venuti, 2003, online) 
These proliferating possibilities are received and endlessly reconfigured by the 
database.  
Calling on Pitt and Britzman’s (2003) categories of “lovely knowledge” and 
“difficult knowledge”, Lather (2003) deems loss and mourning of “that which we 
think we cannot think without” as “the force of learning”: 
This is mourning not as consolation but as a tracing of loss that doubly 
affirms: both the loss and the still yet of the yes. … [“Lovely knowledge”] 
reinforces what we think we want from what we find and [difficult 
knowledge] is knowledge that induces breakdowns in representing 
experience. Here accepting loss becomes the very force of learning and 
what one loves “when lovely knowledge is lost” is the promise of thinking 
and doing otherwise. Such thinking is within and against Enlightenment 
categories of voice, identity, agency and experience. (p.12)  
The trace is both within and against these same categories, and it holds the same 
promise of difficult openings and affirmations. Bayne (2010) writes of the promise 
of “working creatively with the fragmented, spectral texts and presences which 
constitute the network” by consciously exploring “different modes of disaggregation 
and re-aggregation online” (p.10), and the delight, liveliness and exhilaration that can 
come along with a truly digital sensibility. Online reflection can and should produce 
such exhilaration. To do so, though, it must first grapple with the rituals of 
confession and compliance that it currently produces, through surveillance and 
discourses of development. The next chapter constructs a critical vision of what 
online reflection currently is and does, through the metaphor of the mask as disguise. 
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Chapter 6: Reflection as disguise – 
confession, surveillance and 
governmentality 
The previous two chapters introduced some key tensions around audience and 
webness that are described by students and teachers in my research, and suggested 
that denial of addressivity and digitality is producing unnecessarily cautious 
“practices of mystery” (Lillis, 2001) around reflection. This chapter takes more of 
these local and specific accounts and puts them in the broader discursive context in 
which high-stakes online reflection in higher education is situated. It takes up 
Foucauldian understandings of power, confession and surveillance, first described in 
Chapter 2, and argues that a humanist discourse of individual development, 
authenticity and visibility is masking, or disguising, the governmentality of 
reflection. 
Most commonly, disguises are understood as concealing a truth with a falsehood. 
The metaphor of the mask as disguise is common throughout art, literature and 
public discourse. Confessional practices are particularly sophisticated, though: they 
use a mask of truth, of deepest truth revealed through confession, so effectively that, 
as Foucault (1998) says, “we no longer perceive it as the effect of a power that 
constrains us”: 
The obligation to confess is now relayed through so many different points, 
is so deeply ingrained in us, that we no longer perceive it as the effect of a 
power that constrains us; on the contrary, it seems to us that truth, lodged 
in our most secret nature, “demands” only to surface; that if it fails to do 
so, this is because a constraint holds it in place. (p.60)  
Confessional practices reorient and deflect relations of power and governmentality so 
that failing to produce the mask becomes the marker of disguise and inauthenticity. 
Where a disguising mask often indicates its own falsehood, confession-as-mask is a 
doubled disguise: it is an absence of truth disguised by the appearance of complete 
truth.  
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Reflective educational practices have always demanded confession as a certain kind 
of story about the self. The rhetoric of reflective practice is powerful, as Edwards and 
Nicoll (2006) put it:  
not in the sense of whether it is literally true, but in the ways in which it is 
persuasive and the work it attempts to do. In other words, reflective 
practice is not simply a concept, but is a speech act within a contemporary 
discourse… and, as such, it does not simply describe but is also 
performative. (p.123)  
Performative rhetorical strategies position confession through reflection as a route to 
self development, and as a means of revealing an authentic self, “the subject as the 
originary authenticating source that knows itself by being present to itself and 
through not being touched by others” (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p.246). In contrast, 
Foucault theorised confession as a mechanism of social control which “constitutes 
the confessant as a ‘describable object’ which may then be arranged according to 
standards of normality” (Tell, 2007, p.10). 
Foucault’s theories have been applied to many kinds of educational practices, 
including reflection and e-learning, over many years. However, high-stakes online 
reflection is a context that brings issues of surveillance, confession, authenticity and 
development together in a new way. This chapter situates reflective practice as one 
of the points through which the obligation to confess is relayed, and the workings of 
power, surveillance and self regulation are explored and illustrated with data from 
my interviews. Reflection is never ‘authentic’, as we will see, and its practices of 
normalisation are particularly problematic where authenticity is demanded and 
closely monitored through techniques of surveillance, as is the case with high-stakes 
online reflection. I conclude by proposing how surveillance and authenticity can be 
reworked as sites of resistance to the normative discourses of reflection. 
Chapter 6: Reflection as disguise 
 147 
“Do you feel that those feelings get in the way?”: 
confession as a route to development 
As we saw in Chapter 2, neo-liberal governmentality de-centres power and makes 
individuals responsible for their own development and surveillance, a task they 
willingly participate in because their identity as citizens has been “manifested 
through the free exercise of personal choice among a variety of marketed options” 
(Rose, 1999, p.230). Usher and Edwards (1994) argue that these marketed options 
include “democratic participation” and “personal empowerment” (p.29). In the UK, 
one key method of “personal empowerment” emerging in a higher education context 
is personal development planning, or PDP (sometimes called ‘professional 
development planning’ in disciplines with a professional orientation). Development, 
personal and professional, is a duty that the good student (and the good academic) 
will embrace (Clegg, 2004; Edwards & Nicoll, 2006; McWilliam, 2002). 
Development in this sense is understood as a requirement of living in a world of 
constant change:  
Change is said to be everywhere and we are urged to be prepared to deal 
with the uncertainties it engenders. …The fact of change is positioned in 
the attempt to persuade us, the audience, of the need for change ourselves. 
Change is represented as the reality to which we must adapt. (Edwards & 
Nicoll, 2006, p.118)  
In other words, personal change and ‘growth’ is a necessary response to external 
change and uncertainty. The flexible, adaptable, responsive individual is highly 
prized in a world where technical-rational modes of learning are thought to be 
insufficient to ensure the relevance and prestige of the professional role (Schön, 
1991).  
Reflection, as the means by which the individual surfaces and discloses the self that 
is to be worked upon and to be made adaptable, flexible and responsive, is seen as an 
essential component of most personal and professional development practices. 
Reflection is therefore not positioned as a luxury or an indulgence: it is a 
responsibility that would-be professionals cannot ignore. In this sense (and in others, 
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as we will see), it is a normative practice, part of the shaping of professional identity 
that students in professional and vocational programmes are subject to. This will be 
discussed more in Chapter 8. Normativity is the way in which: 
rules and procedures formalised in the outer social and cultural life are 
reproduced in psychological life as a regulative self-discipline, thus 
paradoxically maintaining the status quo. (Bleakley, 1999, p.320) 
When reflection is high-stakes, it is normative by definition, given weight by the use 
of assessment criteria, professional standards and more general competences (for 
example, “graduate attributes” (Barrie, 2004)) to judge students’ reflections 
(formatively or summatively). Usher and Edwards (1994), taking a Foucauldian 
perspective, describe such development practices as techniques of panoptic 
surveillance, disguised by apparent objectivity: 	  
Learners ‘know’ what they have to demonstrate and can assess themselves 
as they move towards that goal. In operating within a discourse of 
competence, learners themselves become the subjects of their own 
surveillance; like the prisoners in the cells of the panopticon they sit in 
judgement upon themselves. (p.110)  
Standards, criteria and competences configure reflection as a method by which “the 
normalising gaze is internalised and turned upon the self, as reflection becomes self-
measurement and self-evaluation” (Edwards & Nicoll, 2006, p.128). This self-
measurement, which might otherwise be inaccessible to the gaze of the teacher, is 
made perpetually visible by online reflective practices: 
Overall I would say [the reflective portfolio] definitely definitely has 
helped the students develop. Most definitely. …as a tutor you can’t really 
see your students developing as such. You get to meet with them once a 
month …but you get to meet with them for an hour? Something like that. 
You don’t develop the relationship that the e-portfolio has allowed us to 
develop. (Maria, teacher, UG) 
Maria completely aligned her ability to see what students are doing, with their own 
development: the e-portfolio is first described not as helping her to see more, but 
rather as helping them to develop. When she says “you can’t really see your students 
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developing as such”, she meant that they were developing outside the limits of her 
ability to see it in ‘real time’, but she also suggests that her gaze improved the level 
and quality of their development. Foucault (2005) argues that the reader or listener of 
a confession is an essential component in the process of truth-telling: “the kinds of 
speech dragged, extorted, or extracted from [the person being guided], or provoked 
in him through the dialogue or the diatribe, are basically ways of showing that the 
truth exists wholly and solely in the master’s discourse” (p.366). As Devas (2004) 
puts it, “the power of the confessional resides with the listener, who lays down what 
can be said, what counts as knowledge” (p.39).  
This is illustrated by a story Peter told me about a student whose reflective writing 
revealed some bias against a particular group of people she was required to work 
with on placement. He described this as being strongly at odds with the ‘politically 
correct’ ethos of his discipline, but thought that it was beneficial for the student to 
confess these prejudices: 
Peter (teacher, UG): I think that was a, I think that was a was a positive, in 
the sense that it was out there and then you could work with it. And the 
[tutor] worked with that. Because she had access to that material she 
actually worked with that and said ‘well okay, you know, this is happening. 
Ah, you know, you know it’s good that you’re able to express these feelings 
but, you know, do you feel that that those feelings get in the way of your 
being able to work?’… and the student was then able to move on from that. 
Whereas, you know the [tutor] may well basically have struggled to get 
any indication about how that how that student was feeling had had the 
student not been able to write that down… 
Jen: yeah, so did the [tutor] feel by the end of that process that the student 
had, had moved on from that from that position? 
Peter: yes, yes definitely.  
Here the tutor’s access is constructed as a precursor to intervention or manipulation 
(“working with”). The student, in confessing this ‘truth’ about herself in her 
reflective writing, opened herself up to such intervention, but there is little to suggest 
what actions she took in response. The tutor’s question, “do you feel that those 
feelings get in the way of your being able to work?”, is rhetorical: there is only one 
correct response. The only power of the person in the confessional, as Foucault 
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(2005) explains, is to confess, to tell the truth about themselves (pp.364-5). So: the 
magic happens, the student “moves on”. The tutor’s ability to know and “work with” 
the material of confession is constructed as more important in Peter’s story than the 
student’s action (whatever it was) in “moving on”.  
Howley and Hartnett (1992), describing processes of faculty evaluation in higher 
education, point out that such evaluation “excludes the subject from judging his or 
her own revelations. [It] requires interpretation and judgment by others, without any 
meaningful opportunity for active participation by the subject” (p.281). The same 
processes can be seen at work in high-stakes, summatively assessed reflection, as we 
saw in Chapter 4 where students described not knowing if their reflections were right 
until they saw what mark they had received for them.  
The role of the confessor is even important in seeing and knowing what the student 
him- or herself does not, as Maria explained:  
If you start with exactly where they’re at and try to help them to develop 
and if you still don’t achieve it, you know, then [laughingly] maybe you 
need to think about different career options…. Um but at least you’ve tried 
to do it from, you know, their initial base. …the student that went away and 
cried …we realised where she was at um you know emotionally, which 
then made me reappraise where I thought she was at in terms of her 
professional development. And she had some demons that she needed to 
work through that actually were unconsciously acting as a barrier to her 
learning that she didn’t realise. (Maria, teacher, UG) 
This is the expertise of the teacher being applied at a highly personal level to the 
development of the student. The teacher’s knowledge of their field and what is 
required of a person who wishes to enter it is matched by the teacher’s intimate 
knowledge of the student, and “exactly where they’re at”. Even the student’s 
“unconscious barriers” are seen, understood and worked with by the teacher as 
confessor. 
Alex, in a visual representation of his reflective blog, captures something of this 
dynamic. He first drew the butterflies and the net, and described the butterflies as his 
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thoughts, and his blog as a net where they could be caught and kept. When I asked 
about his teacher, he drew the figure of the teacher-scientist who he said was 
“helping me classify the butterflies”. In other words, the student may be able to catch 
the butterflies, but only the teacher will know what they are.  
Metaphor of reflection: classifying the butterflies 
 
“classifying the butterflies” – Alex’s drawing of his teacher’s role in 
his blog, produced during our interview at my request 
 
Alex saw this as a positive role for someone with expertise and knowledge about the 
discipline and the subject being studied. However, it emphasises the point I have 
been making, that whatever lip service is paid to personal interpretations of 
experience and the empowering qualities of reflection, the confessor-assessor will 
judge if the reflection counts, and precisely how it should be counted.  
“It really empowers people”: the authenticity of 
reflection 
There are many theories of authenticity that could inform reflective practice, and 
very often these are not explicitly identified – ‘authenticity’ or ‘authentic reflection’ 
is taken as a concept which does not require unpacking, but which vaguely relates to 
the value of the ‘true self’ as a force for personal freedom and, consequently, 
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empowered change in the world. Kreber et al (2007) have found inexactness 
appearing in discourses of authenticity in teaching, as well.  
As we saw in Chapter 2, a Heideggerian perspective on authenticity seems to be most 
commonly what is meant by authenticity in the literature on reflection. It stresses the 
individual’s duty to find and confront the truth of him- or herself, not to “be defined 
by social norms” (Kreber et al., 2007, p.31), and to “accept responsibility for one’s 
own existence” (p.32). Authenticity affirms an autonomous subject with a unique 
truth to be revealed and lived by, a truth which needs to be uncovered through effort 
on the part of the individual. It is not easy to be authentic; it requires moral strength 
and an acceptance of duty and responsibility17. Reflective practices are a means 
through which to acquire the strength to uncover the authentic self. 
Cambridge (2010) offers a useful further perspective on authenticity and the process 
of e-portfolio building. Calling on the key values of authenticity and integrity, he 
proposes the concept of a “symphonic style of self-representation”18, which: 
provides an overall narrative, theory, or map that demonstrates consistency 
and identifies conflict, showing coherence and surfacing dissonance… 
Portfolio authors need to figure out how to establish authorship of their 
competencies, values, commitments, and relationships across all the 
domains of their lives, creating their own boundaries and principles to 
govern the whole. (p.50) 
To prove their authenticity, then, students must produce a narrative that establishes a 
consistent and integrated self, one that overcomes even conflict and dissonance. 
                                                
17 Charles Taylor’s perspective, which has become important in recent educational theory on 
authenticity, emphasises a moral responsibility to act authentically within a “horizon of significance” 
(Taylor, 1991, p.39). For Taylor, “history, the demands of nature, the needs of our fellow human 
beings, the duties of citizenship, or the call of God are all issues that can define the horizon of 
significance against which we need to define ourselves to construct authentic identities” (Kreber et al., 
2007, p.35). 
18 Cambridge contrasts the “symphonic self” with the “networked self”, claiming that e-portfolios 
support the former through synthesis, narrative and “matrix thinking”, while blogs and social 
networking platforms produce more fragmented, emergent, aggregated self-representations (2010, 
p.175). I discuss the pleasures and virtues of emergence and aggregation in Chapter 10. 
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Students in my research were insistent that they are both honest and authentic in their 
online reflections. For some, this was described as natural or intrinsic; they were so 
authentic themselves that their reflections could not be otherwise. Megan 
acknowledged a degree of formality associated with the assessed nature of the 
writing she did in her online reflection, but insisted on a ‘voice’ that was uniquely 
her own, that bridged her online and offline life, and that she made no attempt to 
‘cover up’: 
I’m not going to make no effort online, but I’m not going to make any effort 
to cover up, you know… maybe it’s slightly more formal in the blog 
because I know it’s going to be assessed, but it’s the same, there’s 
definitely a voice in there that I think if you had a look at my personal blog 
you you could see a definite, you’d go ‘okay I can tell these are the same 
person’. (Megan, student, PG) 
For others, authenticity was perceived as a requirement of their course: 
I can’t remember whether they said you know ‘make sure you’re creative 
and honest and free’ but I felt like that was part of the criteria somehow, 
whether explicit or implicit. (Alex, student, PG) 
Alex expressed no particular discomfort with the idea of being required to be 
authentic in his online reflective blog space, but notably the assessment criteria for 
his online reflection did not explicitly include such a requirement. He was not clear 
himself where the idea of being “honest and free” had come from. It was a “feeling” 
that he associated with the activity, rather than an instruction given by his teachers or 
in his course material. 
Online reflective practices, like their offline counterparts, continue to be framed in 
terms of authenticity, integrity, purposefulness and autonomous selfhood (Barrett & 
Carney, 2005; Stefani et al., 2007). However, to move online is to tap in to new 
modes of representing the self in what can seem like an especially public or 
surveilled space (Turkle, 2011, p.273). In addition, the very idea of authenticity is 
called into question online, as a result of the invisibility of the body (Land, 2004, 
p.531), and the volatility of digital text and authorship (Bayne, 2006b, p.21), both of 
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which were discussed in Chapter 2. Authenticity is therefore surfaced in online 
practices, for students and teachers, more explicitly than in an offline mode.  
A concern with authenticity is echoed in the growing body of literature that examines 
informal blogging practices. Bloggers outside educational contexts often appear to 
see their practice as not only necessarily authentic, but visibly so, and reflective of a 
knowable self (Holbrook, 2006). As Reed (2005) comments, “[bloggers] treat 
weblogs as straightforward indexes of self; they commonly assert that ‘my blog is 
me’” (p.227). The perception is that audiences expect and assess the authenticity of a 
blogger’s voice: “aware of the constant possibility that a fictional text may be posing 
as non-fiction, readers online have been exhaustive in investigating suspicious texts” 
(Freidrich, 2007, p.62-3). However, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 5, the databased, 
digital text is never a straightforward index. Its reconfigurability, unreliability and 
marginality of authorship (Bayne, 2006b), and the discursive power of the database 
to produce, reproduce and manipulate subjectivity means that online reflection, like 
assessed reflection, is never authentic. 
A related, but separate issue is that of disclosure. I have already discussed how 
changing norms associated with the web have been misconstrued by teachers who 
assume that students no longer value privacy (see Chapter 5), but the question of 
disclosure has a number of component parts, and another of these is the way in which 
the distancing or anonymising effects of the online environment might tempt 
students towards self-disclosure. Several lecturers on distance programmes saw a 
benefit to reflecting at a distance, because students will not have to face or deal 
socially with the lecturers who see their reflections, and can therefore be more 
honest:	   
Some of them are very very honest and up front in their weblogs in a way 
which I really doubt that they would be if, if the pedagogy was a, a face to 
face you know course with a, a written diary or something. (Jane, teacher, 
PG) 
Because they never meet us, they can in fact open their hearts and give 
very personal views about their difficulties, their hopes, their fears, you 
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know, what, what’s going on in a way that they do admit, some of them, 
that they have never opened up to with their partners even. …it’s cathartic 
(Jess, teacher, PG) 
A shift towards digital disclosure may produce reflections that appear to be quite 
personal, and this can align well with the desire for authentic reflection that 
underpins reflective practice in many disciplines. Peter picked up on this point, and 
remarked that the solitary, asynchronous context of online reflection provoked a 
degree of honesty and uninhibitedness even on programmes where teachers and 
students meet face-to-face: 
Some of them were reporting some quite you know personal stuff about 
feeling afraid… people write these things in the wee small hours of the 
morning when, you know, they’ve had a few beers or something… and and 
it’s almost like a a confession, like people write in their diaries about. 
(Peter, teacher, PG) 
A Foucauldian critique of authentic reflection links it to the problematic nature of 
experience, which is on shaky ground, as we saw in Chapter 2. Confessional 
practices such as reflection “[bring] forth ‘experience’ as an object of knowledge … 
[and assume] that there is a deep truth or meaning hidden within subjects which, if it 
is found, opens the door to personal autonomy and emancipation” (Usher & 
Edwards, 1994, p.95). These sorts of assumptions underpinned Peter’s enthusiasm 
for the portfolio: 
It does enable people to construct their own meanings, and em-, it 
empowers, I’m passionate about it, it really empowers people so rather 
than, you know when I came into this whole teaching business there was, 
you know we used to use virtual learning environments… very much the 
concept of the sage on the stage, they’re very much really still driven by 
what the lecturer says. Whereas you know we’re in a generation now 
where we’re creating our own knowledge. And certainly e-portfolios and 
this concept of having a wardrobe and you can dip in and dip out and and 
put things together in different ways kind of enables people to create their 
own reality and their own knowledge base. So I think it’s just an incredible 
powerful medium. (Peter, teacher, PG) 
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To construct one’s own meaning from a “wardrobe” of options implies a great deal 
of autonomy, choice and power, and this was what set a personal e-portfolio apart 
from an institutional virtual learning environment in Peter’s mind. A conceptual 
separation of the self from the outside world is required for such a rhetorical move, 
but, as Fendler (2003) argues: 
it is difficult to sort out exactly what is the subject doing reflection and 
what is the object being reflected upon. Given that the notion of modern 
democratic governance is inseparable from self-discipline, it is impossible 
to draw a line between an authentic experience of reflection and what has 
already been socialized and disciplined. (p.21)  
The discourse of the authentic self could seem to sit uneasily with the development 
discourse described above. In development terms, the self is to be changed and 
improved. In terms of authenticity, it is to be uncovered so that it is able to act 
positively in the world from a position of truth and empowerment. However, the two 
discourses are easily conflated. As Bleakley (2000) puts it, personal-confessional 
practices “reveal a core or authentic self that is promised through ‘growth’ or 
‘development’ techniques” (p.18). In other words, the practice of personal or 
professional development is a practice of unwrapping the inauthentic layers to reveal 
a true self. This is related to Boud’s (2001) claim that reflection allows for a re-
evaluation of experience to determine which thoughts and feelings resulting from it 
are authentic (p.14). Such practices mask or disguise relations of power, and instead 
make students “come to believe that what they are is entirely of their own making 
and that their success or otherwise educationally reflects the ‘truth’ about 
themselves” (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p.52). Jane described this conception of 
reflection as “dangerous”: 
I think it’s dangerous to see reflection as something that can be easily 
measured and I think there’s a tendency to um mask the power issues that 
are built in to the whole idea of assessed reflective practice by saying that 
it’s about your, you know it’s about the student’s voice, it’s about who they 
are, it’s about expression of their personal beliefs and selfhood and, you 
know. But then you get to the end of semester and you have to mark that 
student, so what are you marking, their essential selfhood? …you can’t 
have some kind of wooly idea of marking someone’s kind of worth as a 
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human being which has been somehow revealed through their reflective 
practice. (Jane, teacher, PG) 
As we saw in Chapter 4, Jane’s response to this was to be extremely explicit about 
the assessment criteria for reflection, because “there’s no point pretending… that 
you’re in in a relationship of a kind of therapist or, um, friend with a student in their 
reflective writing because you’re not”. For Jane, the power relations between student 
and teacher, and the institutional context of reflection, are what shapes reflection – 
not the authentic selfhood of the student. Other teachers were disinclined to think 
about power in this way. Sam engaged thoughtfully with me when I suggested that it 
seemed like she was in a position of responsibility and also power in relation to her 
students. She felt that she could choose not to “use any sort of position of power”, 
and she saw this as an ethical, not a structural, issue: 
Sam (teacher, UG): Ooh, I hadn’t thought about it like that. That’s quite 
interesting. Yeah, no, no you’re right, actually, there is there is a big 
power issue there, isn’t there? Um, I think, I take, hang on, how do I do 
this? I think what I do is I just take the view that they are clients, and I 
wouldn’t do that to a client so why should I do it to a student? 
Jen: Do what? 
Sam: Um, use any sort of position of power. …I think it’s a very ethical 
issue for me.  
Jen: Right. [pause] But you at the end of the day do [pause] mark them. 
Sam: Yeah. Yeah.  
Sam did not go further in speculating about the effect that her presence might have 
on the reflections being produced. When I asked if she thought students would try to 
write to please her, she described how she “discouraged” that, and that her 
discouragement was effective.  
Another teacher, Rose, dismissed the idea that there could be awkward power issues 
relating to her role as both mentor and assessor of students’ reflective work, because 
students knew going into the process what the rules of engagement were: 
They’re told right from the beginning of the, of the course, you know, what, 
what the form the assessment is going to take, what’s expected of them, um, 
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and you know that I’m going to be marking it so, no, they don’t really have 
a, an issue with that. (Rose, teacher, PG) 
Peter explained to me that the issue of power “just never raised its head at all in any 
size shape or form” in relation to the portfolio work and high-stakes assessment. He 
went on almost immediately to describe the workings of such power very explicitly, 
while at the same time denying that students had any sense of this: 
Peter (teacher, UG): We’ve had students, you know in the wider picture, 
where basically students have been convinced that they’re doing fine and 
their [tutor] has turned round and said ‘look’, you know, ‘mate, you’re just 
not… 
Jen: [laugh] You’re not doing fine! 
Peter: This is not reality, it’s not the reality of mine or the rest of the 
…team. And you’re not, you know unless you change, you’re going to fail’. 
…I think if you ask any of the students they, they didn’t have this sense of 
power and they didn’t have the sense that their portfolios were being 
looked at minisc- in minuscule by their, their [tutors].  
Jess was able to conceptually separate her powerful assessor’s position in which she 
herself has little personal autonomy, from the one she took as formative tutor or 
mentor “off record”, as she put it, in the reflective process: 
I don’t feel a tension, because I don’t think I’m necessarily, um, sort of my 
role isn’t quite the same in these different points. …When I look at what 
they share with me [during the course], I’m commenting only, I’m not 
marking. …And it is, and in that sense it’s …very much more personal 
between them and me and, when we get to the marking, we, you know, … 
they realise it’s a much more formal and public sort of ‘this is assessment 
of my work’ and, um, you know, ‘these are the things that my tutor’s going 
to mark my work against’. So we all know more or less where we stand. 
(Jess, teacher, PG) 
In this way, Jess believed that she could encourage and support authentic reflection, 
and be a force for the empowerment of students, while still fulfilling her assessment 
duties. As we saw in Chapter 4, though, students’ understanding of the role of their 
teachers is considerably less clear-cut. 
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These deflections of power by teachers echo what Darbyshire and Fleming (2008) 
found in their study of teachers in nursing education, who: “continually worried that 
what they were saying could be viewed as having power over the students in any 
way” (p.175). The discourse of authenticity in reflection requires the exercise of 
power to be completely disowned and disguised. 
Authentic reflection is a disguise in another sense, too, because of how it is aligned 
with techniques of development, external standards and assessment (as we saw in the 
last section). If these techniques are said to reveal the innermost truth of each and 
every reflective practitioner who engages ‘correctly’ with them, then innermost truth 
is whatever can be uncovered by these practices. Authenticity is then framed in terms 
of neo-liberal governmentality, which: 
presupposes an impossibility—the equitable and totalizing production of 
rational, self-governing neo-liberal agents who always act in accord with 
neo-liberal value orientations—and the ruptures that point to the 
impossibility of the neo-liberal fantasy result in ever more invasive efforts 
to properly produce, manage, and discipline neo-liberal subjects. (Nadesan, 
2006, online) 
As we will see in the next section, any amount of invasiveness in the form of 
surveillance is constructed as beneficial to the good professional. The nature of the 
self that is recognised and recognisable as ‘authentic’ does not flow outward from a 
core inner truth, but inward from complex social processes of governmentality. 
These are disguised by a discourse of confession, which rejects the social and “works 
to mould subjectivities with the characteristics identified as valuable and necessary… 
by the needs of governmentality” (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p.52).  
“We donʼt want to just see what you are at the end of 
the course”: visibility and transparency 
In this section I connect the small body of critical literature on surveillance and 
offline reflection, which was reviewed in Chapter 2, with practices of online 
reflection. Online reflection is even more affected than its offline counterpart by a 
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culture of panoptic surveillance, but this has not been analysed in the context of 
normalisation and governmentality. This section provides such an analysis. 
Arguably, all education involves surveillance and the relations of power that 
circulate within it: 
To educate is to subject teachers and learners to powerful hierarchical 
techniques of surveillance, examination and evaluation …which constitute 
them as objects of knowledge and subjects who know. What knowledge is 
produced as teachers extort truth or provoke action from learners (and vice 
versa), is conditional upon the relations of power through which subjects 
are constituted. (Deacon & Parker, 1995, p.115) 
As we have seen, in the terms of the confessional it is the confessor (the teacher) 
who defines what is and is not legitimate knowledge, and so the teacher’s gaze (real 
or imagined) directly legitimises the student’s reflection. High-stakes reflection, as a 
form of appraisal, is “a formal ritual of power and ceremony of visibility, a 
technology of objectification. It links the formation of knowledge with the display of 
power” (Ball, 1990, p.159). Furthermore, usually no distinction is made between 
seeing the reflection and seeing (through) the student, as Gilbert (2001) explains: 
“[reflective practices] make individual practitioners ‘visible’ and through this 
visibility subject to modes of surveillance” (p.201). Writing of reflection in a teacher 
education context, Erlandson (2005) describes the reflective trainee teacher as “a 
function of the production of institutionalized (discursive) bodies” who: 
reinterprets herself as an object for control in accordance with the light-
metaphor of the Enlightenment tradition… [making] her knowing, more 
professional, more ‘reflective’, more efficient and therefore more 
beneficial (in economic terms) and at the same time more docile (in 
political terms). (p.667) 
In this sense, what matters is not what the teacher does or says, but what happens to 
the student’s subjectivity as a result of being rendered supposedly ‘transparent’ in 
this way. Transparency is even more problematic than visibility, partly because, as 
we saw in Chapter 4, students are very aware of the audience(s) for whom they are 
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performing their reflections. Their reflections may be literally visible, but this does 
not necessarily bear any relation to ‘transparency’.  
In addition, these metaphors of transparency and visibility link directly to the 
ocularcentrism described in Chapter 3. The association with seeing as knowing 
(Rose, 2007, p. 3) is particularly pernicious as, even leaving aside deliberate 
strategies of performance or storytelling, any apparent transparency of self through 
the visibility of reflection is a disguise. Bleakley (2000) explains this as a matter of 
closures and gaps, saying that the confessional mode of reflection “promises closure, 
[but] actually leads to necessary aporias” (p.22) – what he calls “a life written in 
invisible ink” (ibid). The story that is told in reflection is “selective, and porous” 
(ibid), leaving out the construction of the subject as inter-textual and inter-subjective. 
Scott (1991) returns us to the notion of experience, and argues that conceiving of it 
“through a metaphor of visibility or in any other way that takes meaning as 
transparent, reproduces rather than contests given ideological systems …the project 
of making experience visible precludes critical examination of the workings of the 
ideological system itself” (p.778).  
Despite these problems, visibility is held up as a beneficial quality of both the 
practitioner and the practice, and it allows other propositions to follow. Clouder and 
Sellers (2004), for example, acknowledge the intensity of surveillance that 
professionals (and would-be professionals) are subject to, but argue that “if it is 
presented as a transparent means of enhancing quality, members of staff who 
genuinely strive to attain a high quality service clearly embrace it” (p.265). This is 
what it boils down to: ‘real’ professionals who ‘really’ care about service will 
embrace any amount of surveillance of their practice, and of themselves. They will 
be happy to expose and disclose themselves and to forfeit personal or professional 
privacy. This is perfectly parallel to all kinds of arguments for surveillance – the 
video recording of public space (through CCTV), tracking and monitoring of 
communication, invasive airport screening: if you have nothing to hide, you have 
nothing to fear (Crossman, 2008). Shore and Wright (1999) critique such an 
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alignment of surveillance (in the guise of audit culture in higher education) with 
professional self-actualisation and empowerment:  
One of the main claims made by advocates of auditing is that it ‘enables’ 
individuals and institutions to ‘monitor’ and ‘enhance’ their own 
performance and quality, and to be judged by targets and standards that 
they set for themselves. This suggests that audit is an open, participatory 
and enabling process; so uncontentious and self-evidently positive that 
there is no logical reason for objection. (p.559) 
However, as we have seen, “in order to participate ‘successfully’ in the process of 
‘confession’ the discursive and material practices which constitute confession as 
‘truth’ must have already been accepted” (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p.95). 
This auditing or monitoring process is part and parcel of some reflective practice 
contexts. Olive explained how students’ reflective blogs are spaces of monitoring 
and disclosure of both their own, and others’, performance and even emotional 
states: 
There’s individual cries for help from a person saying ‘I’m struggling’ and 
this, you know ‘I haven’t, I haven’t told the rest of my [group] this, I’m a 
very private’ I mean, I actually see these words in personal logs ‘I’m a very 
private person’. …And they’ll, they’ll say that in a written log, and they 
won’t have said it to their [group], and they know it’s having an impact. 
Equally, what you’ll see often is other members in the [group] saying ‘We 
know that so-and-so is going through a difficult time. We’re really worried 
about them, although they don’t want us to help them’ and so, actually, you 
get a kind of almost two-way thing of them thinking about others within 
their working environment and, and wanting it to be taken off their hands, 
to some extent [laughs], and the tutor to kind of intervene and try and help 
them and solve the issue. (Olive, teacher, PG) 
I asked Bob if his students expressed uncertainty about what they could disclose, and 
how visible they should make their strengths and weaknesses in their reflective 
writing. He described them as having “a lot of concerns” in the early stages, despite 
encouragement to be “honest with themselves” in their reflections, because: 
once they actually share it with their peers and their tutors, to a certain 
extent, it becomes public. What we, what we suggest to them is, ‘Well, look, 
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this is part of the development process. If you’ve identified these 
weaknesses in, say, placement one, and it’s obvious… you’ve overcome 
these weaknesses by the end of placement three, then that’s what it’s all 
about’, right? ‘It’s not, we don’t want to just see what you are at the end of 
the course, we want to see how you developed as a result of going through 
the course’. (Bob, teacher, PG) 
Students must take on faith that they will overcome any weaknesses they identify 
early on. This is high-stakes in more than one sense. The process is framed as one of 
confession so that others (teachers and peers) can “see how you developed”. 
Development is a given, and any weakness that can be identified, confessed, made 
visible can be overcome.  
Importantly, visibility does not necessarily correspond with the moment at which a 
reflection is actually seen. As Foucault (1977a) explained, the disciplinary power of 
the panopticon means that the subject of the gaze (the student, in our context) need 
only know that it might be seen at any time. This is why online reflection can be 
more intensely panoptic than offline reflection (Poster, 1996). Processes of formative 
reflection mean students are required or encouraged to ‘share’ their reflective 
writing, in almost real-time, with their teachers. In doing so it is implied or promised 
that they will receive feedback. Many students anxiously await the response of their 
teacher, as we saw Charles describing in Chapter 4, while others, like Lynne, 
construct teacher presence whether or not the teacher responds. Maria contrasted her 
practice of viewing portfolios every six weeks or so with the insistent, almost 
imploring question that her students asked – “have you looked at it, have you looked 
at it?”: 
Maria (teacher, UG): To be fair I’ve only logged on and seen their 
portfolios I would say once every six weeks. I’ve not looked at them 
extensively at all, um 
Jen: That’s interesting, so they want you to be there, and they know you 
can be there, but actually in reality 
Maria: I’ve not been… They’ve said ‘have you looked at it, have you 
looked at it?’, and I’ve always said ‘if I look at it I will add a comment so 
you know I’ve seen it’.  
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Maria reassured students that she would show herself through a comment, but they 
appeared not to believe her. As a result, through their reflections, they were made 
subject to the invisible, panoptic gaze at all times.  
Indeed, it is not just the teacher whose gaze need concern us. Kimball (2005) warns 
that apparently empowering practices in digital space: 
may simply accelerate the growing institutional appetite for data. 
…Ironically, by attempting to gain a more valid vision of student learning, 
portfolios are potentially more intrusive than large-scale testing. …The 
addition of database technologies …enables an unprecedented penetration 
of vision—not from a visible observer, but from an invisible, institutional 
gaze. (p.438) 
Writing of VLEs in particular, Mullen (2002, online) argues strongly that the 
tracking capabilities found in quite a lot of educational software are a manifestation 
of a “pedagogy of suspicion”: 
Under this model – and it is one that cuts across disciplines, institutions, 
and course types – students will resist the workload demands of your 
course with every means at their disposal. Now, using this kind of tracking 
functionality, we can finally catch the little bastards at it.  
Wendy described the ways that “technical staff” can track and monitor student 
participation in the private e-portfolio space (a space where these students are urged 
to do their own writing and reflecting before sharing certain items with teachers): 
Our technical staff now can, can produce reports for all sorts of things, 
and they can see who’s logged in and who hasn’t, who maybe needs a bit 
of a kick and, um, so that, you know, [teachers], if they want to, can wield 
the big stick. (Wendy, teacher, UG) 
She also explained that these technical staff can see the full portfolio: 
I mean not that we’re going to, but if we needed to go in and impersonate 
someone, to see if there was a problem, somewhere we can do that, um, but 
it’s only the two [technical staff] that have those rights. Um, no-one else 
has them, or needs them. (Wendy, teacher, UG) 
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The implication is that technical staff should report a lack of ‘participation’ (as 
construed by the act of logging in) to teachers, who could then approach students to 
compel them to log in to the portfolio tool. This would be done within limits, 
however, as “no one else needs” the right to see the full portfolio. Metaphors of how 
teachers might respond to the tracking information are menacing, though – “kick”, 
“wield the big stick” – and I wondered if Wendy could imagine there being a push 
towards cutting out the technical middle-people, and giving teachers direct access to 
these reporting functions or to the portfolios themselves. She was convinced that this 
would not happen: 
Oh no, I don’t think we’ll ever have that, because we’ve made it very clear 
that it’s the student’s portfolio, that’s it’s their personal one, and that 
we’re only getting to see what they choose to share with us. (Wendy, 
teacher, UG) 
Typically, in any online system, there will always be someone in an administrative or 
technical role with access to the entirety of the content in that system. The only 
question is how far away, in terms of power and anonymity, that person is from the 
content they can view. The closer they are, the more important it is to disguise or 
downplay this aspect of surveillance. Wendy argued that the reporting functions were 
not really ‘seeing’ in any objectionable sense, that the students had meaningful 
control over their portfolios, and that the tracking they were subject to did not 
undermine this. This belief is necessary for students and for teachers, because the 
entire framing of reflection as empowering, student-led, developmental, personal-
confessional and authentic depends on it. We cannot really afford to let the disguise 
slip. 
Sites of resistance: subversion and disguise 
This chapter has discussed justifications for the use of reflection in educational 
contexts – development and authenticity – from a Foucauldian perspective, exposing 
their problematic roots in confessional practices of surveillance and normalisation. 
As I argued in Chapter 2, online reflective practices are often cut loose conceptually 
from their offline counterparts, and concerns about reflection are too frequently 
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treated as resolved in online contexts, when in fact they have become even more 
complicated.  
In continuing to frame reflection as individually empowering and developmental, 
teachers and researchers are failing to ask the right questions about the larger 
political and social structures that privilege this mode of writing and subjectivity. 
Choosing to view online surveillance as unproblematic, and neglecting to consider 
the effects of power in teacher-student reflective relationships, is to be complicit in 
the construction of students as transparent subjects who can and should be visible at 
all times. Such complicity and avoidance disadvantages students because, as Clegg 
(1999) puts it: 
there is a presumption of practitioner change, but the parameters of that 
change are discursively constructed prior to the novice’s engagement. The 
process is part of a system of surveillance whereby professional 
competence is judged in terms of compliance with practices or innovations 
that the practitioner feels powerless to change. (pp.172-3) 
According to Marshall (1990), Foucault maintained that his theory of power was not 
intended to overshadow other approaches, but that instead he was “trying to offer us 
another aspect, another ‘mask’, that reality wears. …the problem is to recognise 
when modern power is being exercised and whether resistance is the appropriate 
response” (p.26). Although in this thesis I generally frame my recommendations in 
terms of generative processes, creative alternatives, and positive principles, it seems 
to me that matters of confession and surveillance are so deeply ingrained in reflective 
practices, and so problematic, that resistance is the correct response. So, having 
identified online reflection as a space where power is circulating in problematic and 
‘masked’ ways, I want to finish this chapter by proposing two sites of possible 
resistance: surveillance and authenticity.  
In both physical and digital contexts, surveillance is a fruitful area for contestation, 
resistance and criticality. Crang and Graham (2007), writing about resistance to 
commercial and military surveillance of urban spaces, describe the kinds of counter-
constructions that trouble and subvert dominant discourses. They describe these as 
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“social performances” that inscribe urban spaces with memory, enchantment and 
multi-vocality (pp.805-6). Such performances often involve creating more ‘noise’ in 
the system, or siphoning off and using data for new purposes. Their aim is “to show 
how pervasive technologies do not have to pacify us …but can allow us to claim and 
mark our territory” (p.807). Online reflective technologies are not literally pervasive 
in the way that Crang and Graham mean, but they do increasingly attempt to see, and 
be, everywhere, and so the notion of adding noise and (mis)using data is relevant 
here. As teachers, we might also consider the extent to which we can resist 
surveillance by declining, explicitly, to use the online surveillance and tracking tools 
at our disposal.  
Schoneboom (2008), in her thesis on anonymous workbloggers, theorises their 
practice as a form of “creative resistance”, a subversive space where the intensive 
surveillance, corporate ‘branding’ and depersonalising practices of (for example) call 
centres is subject to scrutiny and even ridicule by nameless, anonymised workers. 
Strategies for subverting and working against the grain of surveillance will be local 
and specific, and must be handled with care in high-stakes contexts where anonymity 
is not permissible. However, ‘creative resistance’ can take many forms, including 
critical rethinking of the relative positionings of student, teacher and gaze. De Laat 
(2008) proposes the exhibitionism of blogging as a kind of resistance, because it:	  
always amounts to an effort to create one’s own synopticon, i.e., to be the 
director of one’s own theatre performance, revolving around one’s 
personal life. Furthermore, if exhibitionism is taken to extremes, it may 
affect panopticism as well by returning the gaze of surveillance and 
rendering it potentially meaningless. (p.63) 
Authenticity, too, has points of possible slippage which we can appropriate to think 
reflection differently. Authenticity is problematic because it relies on “experience” as 
“an irreducible essence” (Bondi, 1993, p.95) which can never be questioned. As we 
saw in Chapter 2, there is no such thing as ‘raw’ experience, and if there were, we 
could not express it except through language, which is constitutive of the experience 
it would attempt to disclose (Belsey, 1994, p.10). Bondi (1993) aligns a post-
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structuralist orientation to language with a feminist concern for experience, and she 
rejects its status as beyond, or beneath, construction and contestation:  
To claim that experience is valid is not the same as claiming it to be true; 
rather, it allows experience to be understood as salient but contestable, 
rather than as a foundational phenomenon. (p.95) 
If experience is understood as being constructed in the process of articulating it, and 
as a question rather than a statement, then this opens up new ways of thinking about 
authenticity. We can tell stories about ourselves and our experiences that are valid 
without having to be true. As teachers we should recognise our own role in 
disciplining and normalising our students’ reflective writing, and explicitly reject the 
link between visibility of writing and transparency of student ‘self’, as Ian did: 
We’re looking for, for convincingness and we’re looking for coherence, 
um, and there comes a point where, if something’s convincing, it sort of 
doesn’t really matter whether it’s true or not, it’s up to them, in a sense, 
cause …you’re sort of not exactly marking their progress, you’re marking 
their awareness of their progress. And it, and, and if you, if what they write 
is relatively convincing and it’s coherent and it’s adequately evidenced, 
um, in a way, you don’t really need to go any further than that. (Ian, 
teacher, PG) 
There are gaps in our online reflective practices through which subversive or 
disruptive practices could slip. Perhaps these would go unnoticed in the macro 
scheme of things, but then it is at the micro level that governmentality operates on 
and through the individual. There is no way to stand outside the discourses that 
comprise reflective practices, but there is space to be more aware of those discourses, 
and more adept at subjecting them to our critical gaze.  
Some tactics for resistance may, in their own right, produce new problems. In 
making their requirements explicit, teachers may generate closure and constraint 
through their reflective practices. In the next chapter we will see how students use 
what Hargreaves (2004) calls “legitimate narratives of reflection”, and how the 
structures and templates they are provided with may be protective masks that 
uncritically depersonalise reflection.
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Chapter 7: Protection, imitation and safety 
in online reflection 
Pedagogy cannot help but encounter the problem of imitation. What is 
example? …And is there virtue in being virtuous by imitation? (Derrida, 
1997, p.204) 
In the previous chapter I raised the issue of normativity: of the way that reflective 
practices are part of a system of governmentality, surveillance and confession that 
disciplines and shapes the responses of students and teachers. Practices of 
governmentality “aim to discipline and normalize all aspects of human experience” 
(Darbyshire & Fleming, 2008, p.173), and education is no exception. This chapter 
explores in detail two aspects of normalisation: how students produce what 
Hargreaves (2004) has called “legitimate narratives of reflection”, and how the 
templates and interfaces of online reflective tools and environments work to 
construct a particular vision of reflection, and to standardise student output within 
the terms of that vision. I see both of these as forms of protective mask which keep 
students safely within the bounds of what is acceptable, but at the cost of limiting 
and constraining other possibilities of expression.  
A protective mask is one that might be worn for doing dangerous activities – 
welding, for example, or sport, or fighting. Unlike performance or death masks, 
protective masks are usually generic, designed for strength and safety rather than for 
aesthetic or expressive purposes (though war masks have sometimes been exceptions 
to this, for example the expressive Japanese battle masks, or ‘menpô’, which had a 
dual role – to protect the wearer and to frighten the enemy (war mask, 2011)). 
Without such masks, some activities would simply be too unsafe, and the face too 
vulnerable. The masks themselves can be restrictive and heavy, though, and the 
protection they offer is often gained at the cost of clear vision, mobility and comfort. 
High-stakes online reflection should, I will argue, be seen as dangerous sport, and the 
tactics employed by students (or created by the technical system) akin to donning a 
mask that protects, even as it restricts metaphorical vision and mobility.  
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This chapter also extends the line of reasoning I began in Chapter 4, that reflective 
writing should be seen as a genre of writing with its own conventions and rules. To 
teach students these rules is not, as might be feared, to ‘falsify’ reflection or render it 
inauthentic, for reflection was never authentic to begin with, as I argued in Chapter 
6. For many students, experiences of high-stakes online reflection are experiences 
primarily of constraint, where creativity is discouraged, if it is possible at all. Here is 
another of the metaphors offered by one member of a group of undergraduates 
engaging in high-stakes reflection in an e-portfolio tool. 
Metaphor of reflection: ball and chain 
 
“ball and chain restricting of my thoughts” – a representation of high-stakes 
online reflection produced in a session I led on e-portfolio metaphors, 
conducted with a group of undergraduate students. 
 
This student’s “learning” and “experiences” are attached by a chain to a heavy ball. 
The giant question marks are labelled “not sure what they want us to do half the 
time”, and there is a drawing of a sheet of tick boxes, some completed and some not, 
that says “tick box exercise” beneath it. This is echoed in the bottom right corner by 
what looks like a structured bullet list, with the words “organised systematic format 
not much room for creativity” beside it. There appears to be a contrast here between 
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the sense of uncertainty and the sense of constraint, where confusion about how to 
succeed in the terms of the system sits alongside a feeling of having little room for 
manoeuvre. 
Let us look first at the first part of this contrast, at the matter of ‘rules’ for reflection. 
I will show how some students can understand and exploit these rules (“imitate”, to 
use Derrida’s word), while others find them difficult or impossible to negotiate. The 
second half of the chapter turns to an exploration of the concept of the ‘template’ in 
online systems – the visual and structural aspects of the online reflective process that 
are highly constitutive of the reflections that can be produced within them. The 
chapter closes with some thoughts about the virtue of the blank page, and the ways in 
which a culture of active writing might benefit reflective practices. 
“Start from how things werenʼt very good, and then 
see the progression”: legitimate narratives of 
reflection 
High-stakes reflective practices do not, and cannot, sit outside the governmentality of 
education. Normalisation is what the project of teaching strives for at every level: 
As subjects we are always already overdetermined by the cumulative 
effects of a pedagogy on and within us. We are to a great extent the 
products of a body of teaching and its overt and covert curriculum, facets 
of which we reject or internalize in varying degrees and eventually enflesh 
by personalizing them and thus making them our own through the 
performativity of our thoughts and lives. We can never totally divest 
ourselves of the traces of a teaching body no matter how hard we try. 
(Trifonas, 2001, p.113)  
In reflective practices, normalisation takes the form of a system of performance and 
confession that produces the ‘reflective self’ the practices are supposed to uncover. 
This process has both ‘covert’ and ‘overt’ aspects. Returning to Eileen’s comment 
first discussed in Chapter 4, students often think that a particular kind of story is 
required in their reflections, and consciously shape their reflective writing 
accordingly. As Eileen said of her assessors, “they’re looking [for you] to show that 
Chapter 7: Protection, imitation and safety 
 172 
you’ve, you’ve developed and that you recognise that you’ve developed, so that you 
can say ‘This is where I was and this is the way that I’ve gone or the paths that I’ve 
travelled and the hurdles I’ve jumped over, to get to where I am now’” (Eileen, 
student, UG). In telling this story, students must also construct the required narrative 
in such a way that it does not appear that they know it is required. This can be linked 
also to students’ own acceptance or adoption of the development discourse described 
in Chapter 6. Mona described writing an end-of-course reflection and why she 
crafted this as she did: 
Mona (student, PG): I tend, yeah, tend to put the good things and the 
[laughs] positive things, I suppose, yes. … you’re reflecting on the whole 
year, and it’s kind of been a sort of long journey, so you tend, I would say, 
start from how things weren’t very good, and then see the progression. So 
you want to kind of see or highlight the progression …if you’ve seen 
improvements, you want to see, highlight the improvements, rather than 
things that have kind of [laughs] not changed much. I think that’s the 
reason. Not that there is anything I can think of that was particularly bad, 
but 
Jen: Yeah, it’s a question of emphasis, though, isn’t it? 
Mona: Yeah, I think so. You want to see it as a progression, even if 
slightly. And you, still, even if there hasn’t been a progression, you can 
emphasise the learning, and being more aware of certain problems. 
Macfarlane and Gourlay (2009) describe the process of strategic reflection with a 
degree of irritation: 
What is implicitly rewarded is initial fragility, tentativeness and penitence, 
followed by uncritical adherence to some deeply flawed and outdated rules 
of thumb. The forced enactment of this can result in a grotesque simalcrum 
[sic] of authenticity in response to a powerful normative regime of 
surveillance, at root unconcerned with individual or context. The details 
may vary – but the ‘journey’ has to reach the ‘right’ destination, via the 
correct stages …Only then is the ‘transformation’ complete. (p.458) 
I am less annoyed about a so-called “simulacrum of authenticity” than they are, 
because I do not believe that there is an alternative version of reflection which 
produces ‘real’, as opposed to simulated, authenticity. What bothers me is that 
students are rewarded, or otherwise, for understanding the rules of what Macfarlane 
and Gourlay term a “reflection game”, and those students who do not get it, who are 
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not able to recognise the “practices of mystery” (Lillis, 2001, p.21) surrounding 
reflection, are at a disadvantage.  
A conversation I had with Natalie illustrates one way this disadvantage might be 
understood. She described looking at some students’ reflection over time and seeing 
them having “the same experiences over and over again” because they “never learnt 
from the last one”. I asked if there was a correlation between successful reflection 
and overall academic performance. Natalie said that she had the feeling that students 
who engaged with reflection were “good students anyway”: 
Natalie (teacher, UG): The ones who do well on the e-portfolio, 99% of the 
time they’re the ‘good’ students, sorry, I’m just putting little speech marks. 
…They’re the ‘good’ students. The ones who don’t do so well are not the 
‘good’ students, but do they not do so well because they don’t understand 
how important reflection is and what you can learn from reflecting, um, or 
are they just not able? You see I don’t think they’re not able I think they 
just don’t understand and don’t engage with the importance of reflection. 
Jen: Yeah. And have you found ways of getting those ones to kind of, to get 
it, like 
Natalie: No! 
Jen: Not really [laugh]. 
Natalie: If you’ve got any ideas! 
Jen: Yeah, sure [laugh]. 
Natalie: …have I got people to do, improve their reflection? Very rarely, I 
would imagine, very rarely. 
Natalie admitted that in her experience almost no one got better at reflection, and that 
those who were good at it were also (already) good at the other things that make up 
the academic programme of study. This suggests a possibility: if reflection was not a 
process Natalie’s students learned and improved at, then perhaps she was not 
teaching the right thing (which is different from teaching ‘badly’, I should stress). 
Natalie framed the problem as a lack of “engagement” with “the importance of 
reflection”, but I would argue that what the ‘bad’ students lack is an understanding of 
the “legitimate narratives of reflection”, as Hargreaves (2004) describes them, and 
how to construct these.  
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Hargreaves’ “legitimate narratives” (in a nursing education context) are: 
“valedictory”, where the writer improves a difficult situation; “condemnatory”, 
where a negative outcome is analysed and the writer feels “guilty and/or angry”; and 
“redemptive”, where the writer can “express inappropriate attitudes”, as long as these 
are ultimately corrected (p.200). She associates the emergence of these legitimate 
narratives with the assessment of reflection, and shared ideas within a discipline of 
what ‘good practice’ entails. She argues that construing reflection as “morally open”, 
or as what I have been describing as ‘authentic’, is inappropriate in a professional 
education context where there are “personal attributes associated with being a 
competent and acceptable practitioner” (ibid).  
Some teachers appeared to be aware of these personal attributes, and shared with 
students something of how to hook into the genre requirements of reflection: 
Jen: Do you think that students ever, I mean, have you noticed that the 
students ever write anything in their portfolios that you would consider to 
be kind of too personal? 
Bob (teacher, PG): Eh, yes, that happens occasionally right, and it also 
happens with the reflective pieces as well. And what, it, we’re doing with 
IT inductions right at the start of year, and this is nothing to do with e-
portfolios, it’s just general use of IT in teaching and learning, we we we 
always stress, in relation to anything they’re writing, from day one of their 
… course, to think of themself as [professionals], right. And, from that 
point of view, any writing they’re doing online, whether it’s in an email, 
whether it’s in a discussion forum within the virtual learning environment, 
or whether it’s within the electronic portfolio system, right, they, they write 
in these areas in a professional way. And from that point of view, um, it 
shouldn’t necessarily, well, it will be personal, but it’ll be personal from 
the professional reflective point of view.  
The alternative Hargreaves proposes, and which Bob perhaps was also asking for, is 
for students to explicitly be told to create an “exemplar illustrating a shared 
understanding of acceptable professional behaviour, or the dilemmas faced in 
practice” (p.201). Producing such an exemplar is radically different from the 
personal-confessional mode of reflection that most reflective practices are modelled 
on. It requires an entirely different set of skills and a different orientation to the task 
of reflection. Arguably what is produced in such an account or exemplar is not 
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‘reflection’ at all in a traditional sense, but narrative fiction. For Hargreaves and 
others (Bleakley, 2000, for example), this is not a problem, but it does require letting 
go of the idea of reflection as a mode of revealing an authentic self. Explicitly 
fictional accounts can offer “a protective disguise for a teacher wishing to discuss 
problematic professional issues” (Convery, 1993, p.140). However, like the visual 
and structural templates I will be discussing in the next section, exemplars may also 
be forms of protection that constrain students, even as they allow them to do well in 
assessment terms.  
This is illustrated by the uncertainty some students expressed about how much 
experimentation was acceptable in their reflective accounts and strategies. Eileen, 
who we saw earlier expressing confidence in her understanding of the ‘formula’ of 
reflection, was less certain about how her final year’s portfolio, which had not been 
assessed at the time of our interview, would be received, because she had chosen to 
structure her reflections somewhat differently than in previous years. She was 
concerned about whether her assessors would take the time to understand what she 
had done: 
Jen: Does it feel risky to do something different? 
Eileen (student, UG): Yeah, it does. I’m worried, actually. I’m worried that 
they’ll sort of, because it’s not the same as year one and year two, not the 
same format, that they might think ‘you haven’t done it’. …I don’t know 
how much time they’re actually going to take reading it. …So, yeah, I 
might end up being disappointed. 
Jen: Mm, do you mind if you’re disappointed? 
Eileen: [Pause pause] mmm it depends how, it depends on the grade. It 
depends on the grade.  
Eileen felt able to take a different approach to her final portfolio, ‘reflecting’ in other 
parts of the portfolio rather than in the explicitly labelled reflective space, but she 
acknowledged that she would regret the risk if it did not pay off in assessment terms.  
It is possible to see how extreme caution and a relatively uncritical acceptance of 
legitimate narratives of reflection can take hold for students. Tom, a mature student 
on an undergraduate course, described this as a generational issue, criticising the lack 
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of critical skills or radical outlook that the “kids” he studied with brought to higher 
education: 
A lot of the students are just saying ‘alright well this gets me so many 
points and’, you know, like I say a quantitative type point of view, it it you 
know the system has given the students that that kind of ‘tick the boxes and 
move on’ without any qualitative appreciation of what they’re doing, you 
know. (Tom, student, UG) 
However, Lynne, also a mature student, described the effect of becoming a student as 
an act of “handing herself over” to the processes of the course: 
I had so much to take in at the beginning of the course and …because I 
was really keen to do it, do it properly and I I don’t think I stopped to think 
about how I was learning or or how I was being assessed …for these 
things I I kind of do a bit of research before I start the course and then 
[pause] I don’t know sort of hand myself over. [laugh] Um, and see how it 
goes. (Lynne, student, PG) 
To be a student is to be essentially not responsible. This can be framed positively, as 
a matter of trust, or negatively, as a lack of critical capacity, but in either case, 
despite protestations about student-centred learning, students are usually powerless 
to dictate the terms of their engagement beyond their choice to participate (which is 
only really a choice in post-compulsory education, it should be added). 
Powerlessness in this sense has the effect of both protecting and constraining 
students. To this is added, in the online domain, the intensely normative 
‘standardised’ structured environments within which reflection is produced. 
“Whatever templates we gave them on the e-portfolio 
they used”: safety and constraint in online reflective 
environments 
Each portfolio has two composers, (1) a student and (2) the system. 
(Yancey, 2004, p.745)  
There are two key aspects of standardisation that are of interest in online reflection: 
the interface and the template. I will mainly be focusing on the template in this 
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section, but the structure of the tool itself, and the way it is interacted with, its 
interface, makes from the very start some important decisions on behalf of the user. 
These decisions are very often not recognised, even by interface designers, who see 
their work as creating ‘windows’, not ‘mirrors’: 
[Designers] usually assume that the interface should serve as a transparent 
window, presenting the user with an information workspace without 
interference or distortion. They expect the user to focus on the task, not the 
interface itself. (Bolter & Gromala, 2006, p.375) 
Bolter and Gromala argue that it is only when things go wrong or unexpectedly that 
users typically look “at” rather than “through” the interface (p.378). It is perhaps not 
so surprising, then, that this aspect of online reflection is rarely, if ever, addressed in 
the literature in more than superficial or descriptive ways. Yancey (2004) makes a 
brief mention of the role of the ‘system’ in the creation of a portfolio (stressing the 
system’s “greater authority”, p.745), while Kimball (2005), as we will see, focuses 
on the standardisation of student output through the use of templates, but pays little 
attention to the effects produced by the interface. 
To get a sense of the importance of the interface in online learning, then, we need to 
look at the small body of literature which does address it. VLEs have been subject in 
recent years to a few important but small-scale critical visual and interface analyses 
(Bayne, 2008; Coopman, 2009; Rose, 2006). These have drawn attention to what 
Selfe and Selfe (1994), in one of the earliest critical studies of computer interfaces in 
learning contexts, describe as “non-innocent physical borders …cultural borders 
…and linguistic borders” (p.495). As Coopman (2009, online) points out: “research 
on power distribution in online classes traditionally focuses on instructors and 
students, yet …those who design the e–learning system software must be included in 
the mix”. For Coopman, the so-called ‘design’ decisions that are made affect the 
choices subsequently available to teachers: 
[The VLE] allows users to have it open only in one window per browser. I 
asked my university’s support staff why this was the case, but they did not 
know. After checking with Blackboard Inc., the support staff reported it 
was to prevent students from cheating on quizzes. Yet I wanted students to 
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access various parts of the class Web site when taking a quiz so they might 
refer to online lectures, discussion, and other materials.  
Rose (2006) frames the interface of the VLE as deprivileging the role of both the 
teacher and the student, in favour of “content”. She refers to a specific commercial 
VLE, WebCT:  
The Web-based systems are organized around technology and content. 
…the clear expectation of the… designers of WebCT, is that I will 
‘migrate’ all of my content… into the WebCT structure, and that, having 
done so, I will regard this imported content as a course (rather than, say, a 
course resource or supplement). (p.147) 
For Bayne (2008), the visual rhetoric of the VLE, particularly in its ‘default’ values, 
is value-laden indeed, and the value it embraces most of all is a refusal of the digital, 
made apparent through its structuring “within the terms of nostalgia”: 
It attempts an isolation of the everyday practices of learners and teachers 
from the shifting forces of digitisation, globalisation and 
‘postmodernisation’, masking their effects and limiting the possibility for 
creative and possibly resistant pedagogical engagement with the new. In 
seeking to make us ‘comfortable’ with the digital it renders us – lotus-eater 
like – incapable of grappling with its real challenges. (pp.401-2) 
Interfaces are no less value-laden in online reflective environments, but there is a 
lack of literature that explores this. I offer as a postscript to this chapter a brief visual 
analysis of one e-portfolio environment which is growing in popularity in higher 
education in the UK at the time of writing: PebblePad. This analysis is not intended 
to be comprehensive, but rather to give a glimpse of what some students are 
encountering in their engagement with reflection in higher education, and to indicate 
some directions for future research and analysis. 
Related to, but different from, the question of interfaces and their effects, are the use 
of templates in online reflective environments. Drawing from Feng’s (2003) review 
of the literature on standardisation, Friesen and Cressman (2007) describe three 
theoretical lenses through which standardisation can be viewed in relation to e-
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learning: uniformity, objectivity and justice (p.509). Uniformity and objectivity are 
interrelated: uniformity emerged from industrialisation and the mass production of 
goods, while objectivity – apparently about flexibility and customisation – relies 
heavily on uniformity at a systems level. To illustrate this, the authors give the 
example of email, which may vary in content but which must be structured, or 
programmed, so that it is readable on any computer anywhere in the world (p.511). 
Uniformity, they argue, “has the ultimate effect of valuing forms of knowledge that 
are universal, modular, and interchangeable, at the price of knowledge and practices 
local and contextually dependent” (ibid). Justice, the third lens, is perhaps illustrated 
best for my purposes by the example of standards of competence, or even assessment 
criteria: a fixed set of requirements that is applied to every student, and is made 
visible to everyone in the interest of fairness. In Chapter 6 I discussed several issues 
related to visibility and standards, so I will focus here on the interplay between 
uniformity and objectivity as set out by Friesen and Cressman, and how this relates 
to the use of templates in online reflection. 
Institutionally provided e-portfolio and blog systems typically provide a limited 
number of pre-designed templates for displaying content. The use of design 
templates to structure reflection, even if there are a wide variety on offer, “has the 
potential of stereotyping students, forcing them to make their work and their identity 
fit into a preconceived visual rhetoric of a certain kind of student” (Kimball, 2005, 
p.453). Kate explained how even seemingly minor constraints within the design of a 
reflective space could be off-putting. She described the blog as “her personal 
identity”, and said that: “you’re publishing yourself on the internet here so you want 
to reflect you in the way it looks as well” (Kate, student, PG). The blog or e-portfolio 
is its author’s virtual face.  
The limitations of most high-stakes reflective spaces – their structural uniformity – 
are often masked by the student’s ability to make minor modifications (to ‘set 
preferences’): for example to change a colour scheme, switch between templates or 
insert a personal photo in the place of a standard image. Eileen was enthusiastic 
about this: “some of those templates are naff, you know? But if you got something, 
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say, like a flower template, and you change the font colour and then put a photograph 
in as well, it just transforms it completely” (Eileen, student, UG). I contend that this 
is not really a transformation, but rather a very thin veneer of the personal 
(objectivity) applied to the sameness of the (uniform) structure. 
Many courses that assess reflection also provide students with templates for content: 
forms they can fill in for various kinds of reflection, which might include action 
plans, evidence against set standards, critical incidents, and so on. In the case of a 
blog, the content template may simply be a title, a main body and very often a space 
for tags or keywords that describe the content. Or it may, in the case of an e-
portfolio, comprise multiple screens of questions, prompts and required information 
(see the postscript of this chapter). Templates can come as standard with the e-
portfolio, and can also in some systems be created by teachers specifically for their 
students. Content templates have a more explicit role in shaping the content that is 
produced through (perhaps I should say ‘with’) them than the design or interface. 
Teachers described these sorts of templates as ‘scaffolding’, and as a way of making 
things simple for students: 
We’re just asking them to fill it out, and it’s basically whatever need 
they’ve got, what their action might be, did they feel they’ve achieved it, 
what sort of dates. And, again, it’s the same sort of form, everything’s all 
very similar, um, and they just fill it out …that’s what we wanted, simple, 
clean, easy to use, um, nothing difficult. (Wendy, teacher, UG) 
The e-portfolio template can, Wendy suggests, accommodate “needs” and “actions” 
as particular sorts of reflective statements – framing their reflection (and perhaps the 
needs themselves) in terms of structured and procedural development of the kind that 
can be anticipated and met by a form or series of forms.  
Maria and I discussed the power that templates have in terms of constructing 
professional identity. She described this discovery as one of the “unintended 
outcomes” of the use of electronic portfolios: 
Jen: It really puts the development of the templates… in an interesting light 
in as much as it potentially has a huge impact on students going forward 
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and you know who they’re ultimately going to become. 
Maria (teacher, UG): Yes yeah absolutely, in much the same way as the 
power of any any template that you connect to information technology can 
affect overall outcomes. …we’re using those prompts to help develop and 
shape a professional identity which I don’t think that [we] were conscious 
of at the start. That’s been one of the unintended learning outcomes. 
Maria is suggesting that the power of the template can be harnessed and used, 
deliberately and well, by the teacher in support of “developing professional identity”. 
However, the ways in which students will adopt and use these templates is always an 
unknown quantity. Jess described a “very good student” whose adherence to the 
templates amounted, in Jess’s view, to “ticking boxes”: 
There was no insight, she didn’t really engage with it, um in any 
personally meaningful way. In fact, I would go so far as to say she’d lost 
touch with what she actually believed. She was churning out what was, you 
know, the official line, if you like. And, and I think that’s the other side of, 
you know, the the problem with reflective writing is where you are given a 
framework or whatever, then you can avoid, uh if you’re so inclined, this, 
you know, sort of personal approach to a large extent. And that’s what she 
did, and she didn’t get high marks as a result. (Jess, teacher, PG) 
The implication here seems to be that, as we have seen again and again in other 
chapters, there are rules within rules of what is expected. Teachers want the 
templates (especially the ones they create) to shape what is produced, but they also 
want students to show independence and personality; not too much, but enough to 
reassure the teacher that the process of reflection is really ‘uncovering’ something 
personal. However, templates provide a pre-generated structure for reflection that 
students very often treat as fixed, even if teachers encourage “playing” and 
“tailoring” behaviour: 
Even though we did say to them ‘you are encouraged’, so we didn’t say 
‘you have to’, what we did find is whatever templates we gave them on the 
e-portfolio they used. Almost as if it was mandatory. And we did say on 
many occasions ‘you can play with it, you can’, you know, ‘tailor it to your 
needs’. But they stuck to it almost religiously. (Maria, teacher, UG) 
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This description of students following templates “religiously” resonates strongly 
with the metaphor of confession in the previous chapter. It also suggests a level of 
faith that recalls Lynne’s comment above, that she “hands herself over” to the 
processes of her course. Thought about in terms of protection, this makes sense: the 
safest thing to do is to follow the rules, and templates are seen as manifestations of 
rules. Other manifestations, such as exemplars, have a similar pull. Ian described 
some students “expressing appreciation” for the exemplar he provided, but also that 
they had a tendency to: 
[adhere] quite closely to to what it models, even though we did, I did say, 
you know, this isn’t supposed to be something for you to do exactly as it is, 
it’s just the way I’ve done it. But quite a lot of them took it as a as a 
relatively, as a template, really. (Ian, teacher, PG) 
Ironically, students are not unreflective about why their reflections can seem 
impersonal, or why they rely heavily on templates. For some students, like Stewart, 
the process of reflection is simply too obscure – “airy fairy”, as he put it – and he 
opted to disengage and distance himself from the concept of reflection, focusing 
instead on the most heavily templated activities (such as SWOT analysis, a method 
by which ‘strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats’ are identified) that did 
not require such delicate negotiations: 
Stewart (student, UG): I personally view [reflection] as a bit of, you know 
an airy fairy, well what does it actually mean? And [pause] yeah I’m not a 
great fan of reflection [laugh]. But I suppose it does have its benefits. Um 
but I suppose personally I don’t think I can write down a reflection. Cause 
it’s quite personal, but I could write down a swot analysis, I could write 
down action plans... I suppose it is a bridge between you and what you’ve 
experienced, you reflect on it which is still personal inside, and then you 
would formulate it into a written, sort of like a formulated grid or whatever 
you want to call it… 
Jen: Yeah, so it is like deper-, like do you go through a process of like 
depersonalising it somehow to put it in your swot or put it in your 
Stewart: Yeah, I suppose yeah depersonalising it to make it more 
professional.  
For Stewart, templates offered a reprieve from the insubstantial, fuzzy processes of 
reflection, and a bridge that separates written accounts of experience from the ‘self’ 
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of the student. In focusing on the pre-given structure, Stewart was both ensuring that 
he ‘ticks the boxes’, and protecting himself from the uncertainty and danger of going 
‘off script’ into uncharted, unformulated territory. 
Natalie made a further suggestion: that scaffolding in the form of templates might be 
particularly important for students who lack confidence or who “struggle”, and for 
whom a “blank page” would be off-putting: 
I think the scaffolding is, um, is really important, until students develop the 
confidence to go it alone, um, because at least with that scaffolding there, 
it means that, they’re not faced with that blank page syndrome you know 
when you’ve got to write something for somebody? A report or, and you 
start off, you’ve opened your document, you’ve given it a heading, ‘I’ll put 
page numbers on it, I’ll do a title page. Oh, it’s about time I had a coffee’. 
(Natalie, teacher, UG) 
This is an extremely common argument for the use of templates in reflective 
activities. The so-called “tyranny of the blank page”, the “anxiety all writers are apt 
to experience when faced with the task of overpowering the silence” (Heller, 1989, 
p.210), is thought to be unhelpful and destructive, something that students need to be 
protected from. Perhaps this is because reflective writing is conceived of as a 
transparent window, much as Bolter and Gromala (2006) describe the interface. If 
writing is seen in this way, it becomes merely a hurdle to be jumped over, not an 
essential part of the meaning-making process of reflection.  
For my benefit, Peter likened the interplay between choice and constraint in an e-
portfolio to the process of writing a PhD : “you will write it to a structure with 
headings [rather than] 50,000 words of just free form thoughts” (Peter, teacher, UG). 
What this overlooks, though, is that academic writing is usually in large part a 
process of developing that structure. There are norms of academic prose, and these 
do profoundly shape what is produced, but the reward of writing a PhD, of dealing 
with the blank page, is the possibility of producing something original that ‘breaks a 
mould’ rather than ‘fitting into a template’. 
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I have come to conclude that the blank page is a necessary part of the process of 
being or becoming a writer (of reflections or anything else). This need not be a 
complete free-for-all – indeed, the constraint offered or imposed by the legitimate 
narratives described above, and the presence of a demanding audience in the form of 
teachers and assessors, would preclude that. Kimball (2005) argues that ‘real’ 
reflection and learning comes not through overstandardising in the form of templates 
(uniformity), but through students’ interpretation of educational standards (justice):  
Standardization… should pertain to the educational standards, rather than 
to the unique individuals who will be arguing that they have fulfilled the 
standards. Within locally determined limits, we should give students 
flexibility in how they choose to show rhetorically that they have fulfilled 
those standards. (p.453) 
Some students would actively prefer the blank page. Beth very articulately described 
feeling restricted by the template options available:  
I think sometimes the format, um, doesn’t allow it to to, you’ve got different 
[forms] that you can use. You can do a thought, which is like a reflective 
journal, you can do an achievement, an ability, um, an experience. Um but 
there was something I was trying to do the other day, um, and I didn’t want 
it set out the way that it was, the templates, they’re very, they’re very 
specific. It would be like description, then reflect, and then, um [pause] 
something else, and I didn’t want that format. I can’t explain what I 
wanted, it was just, what I was trying to to say didn’t fit into any of the 
templates that they had, so even that can be quite restrictive. (Beth, 
student, UG) 
She had previously mentioned the constraints of the electronic interface and that she 
would prefer a ‘blank piece of paper’, so I asked her if she would have known what 
to do with the blank page in this instance. She replied: 
Yeah, yeah, I would have set it out my way and highlighted the things I felt 
were more important and, you know, in my way… I was just trying to, um I 
just didn’t feel, so I ended up using a particular [form] that I didn’t feel 
really matched, um, what I was trying to say. But, again, I was stuck with, 
with the one they, what, what they provide. … if you just want to… do a 
different kind of text, different kind of entry, um, but it’s, it’s, quite 
structured, but the whole thing is structured, isn’t it? (Beth, student, UG) 
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Beth talks about being “stuck”, and about using a form that didn’t “match” what she 
wanted to say. Particularly telling is her comment that she couldn’t explain what she 
wanted, she just knew it was not a fit with the templates available. This supports the 
need for the blank page: sometimes the only way to understand something is to do it 
– to write, structure or create it from scratch. The notion of authorship here becomes 
relevant, and Yancey’s (2004) point about the portfolio system’s greater authority 
becomes more problematic. 
Kimball (2005) conceives of authorship as relating to control over structure as well 
as content. He advocates for the use of ‘static’, student-authored HTML pages as 
portfolios, not database-driven systems, in part because: 
in portfolio pedagogy, students are not merely the users of the system; they 
are, or should be, the authors of it. The user of a database portfolio system 
is more accurately the teacher or administrator who employs the system to 
manage and assess student work. Students in these systems risk becoming 
even less than authors or users, dropping to the level of content providers. 
(p.442) 
A ‘web-sensible’ portfolio, as Yancey (2004) calls it, “is suggestive rather than 
deterministic” (p.753), but students are seldom encouraged to produce content within 
web-sensible environments, to acquire relevant skills or even to use the ones they 
may already have. The web authoring skills that students acquire through the process 
of creating online artefacts can be at a very superficial level, or a more profound one. 
Templates emphasise the former: 
On one hand the templates made the electronic portfolio easy to use; on the 
other hand, the templates possibly discouraged candidates from developing 
the technology skills that were embedded in the templates. …The 
electronic portfolio rendered content using a pre-selected template. 
Therefore, the Web editing tasks were almost invisible to the candidates 
who only filled in blanks. (Ma & Rada, 2006, p.115) 
By making impenetrable the processes of web authoring in the name of simplicity 
and ‘user-friendliness’, templates subvert students’ sense of agency in relation to 
technology (Gillespie, 2006, p.663). Protection here is best understood as a well-
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meaning but ultimately misguided attempt on the part of teachers to shield or protect 
students from difficulty or uncertainty. User-friendliness, guidance and clear 
expectations are of course important, but students need more, not less, flexibility and 
leeway if they are to go beyond imitation in their writing and digital practices. 
Uniformity is boring for both students and teachers, and students who resort to 
‘ticking the boxes’ do so from a place of constraint, anxiety, or calculation.  
From imitation to negotiation: making protection 
work 
I tell you, if one wants to be active, one must not be afraid of going wrong, 
one must not be afraid of making mistakes now and then. Many people 
think that they will become good just by doing no harm — but that’s a 
lie… Many painters are afraid in front of the blank canvas, but the blank 
canvas is afraid of the real, passionate painter who dares. (van Gogh, 1884, 
online) 
In the quote that opened the chapter, Derrida raised the problem of imitation. He 
asked what we mean by ‘example’. This chapter has described two ways in which 
‘example’ might be understood – through the deployment of ‘legitimate narratives of 
reflection’, and through the templates and interfaces which structure online reflective 
practices. I have asked, in effect, what the virtues of imitation might be, and what the 
trade-off is in terms of homogeneity, constraint and the depersonalisation of student 
reflection.  
Creative possibilities – the expressive performances I proposed in Chapter 4 – are 
largely closed off by the exigencies of box-ticking and legitimate narratives, the 
sterility of fixed and standardised reflection, and the superficiality of web ‘authoring’ 
within highly structured digital environments. The apparent personalisation of these 
spaces and structures is a disguise, and the overall effect is likely to be a uniform 
production of online reflective accounts. This is one area in which research that 
analyses reflective accounts, in their digital contexts, would be extremely valuable, 
and this is an area for future study that I would like to pursue. 
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Imitative features of online reflection also have their benefits: structure gives 
students the safety that limitations bring. When students must protect themselves 
from an uncritical discourse of disclosure and authenticity, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, imitation of this kind can be necessary and even desirable. So the 
conclusions I am drawing here should be taken as part and parcel of my call for a 
new orientation towards reflection and reflective writing. Without a critical 
engagement with the dominant discourses of reflection, encouraging a more flexible 
mode of expression in online reflective writing will result in an intensification of the 
governmentality that I have been describing and critiquing. 
In addition, high-stakes reflection might not be able to be a space of risk taking, for 
all the reasons discussed so far in this chapter and in previous ones. A turn towards 
fiction as Hargreaves (2004) describes it may not lead to more flexible and creative 
engagement – it may, instead, be just a more overt practice of imitation. 
However, it is worth asking the question: could the online reflective space be a space 
of activity, in van Gogh’s words, rather than imitation? If we stop attempting to 
shield students from the experience of the blank page, what sorts of strategies might 
emerge, and would they be of value? It seems that at least some students are finding 
a way to negotiate expressive spaces for themselves. In our interview, I asked Megan 
how she decided on and evolved her approach to writing her reflective blog. She set 
out the ways in which she was influenced, but also took control, in that space: 
Reading it over myself and my partner reading it over my shoulder [laugh] 
and also getting some feedback from [my tutor] earlier on and sort of, I 
think the first couple of times I had feedback I sort of asked questions back 
and, with that in mind, and with um sort of talking to other people on the 
course in Facebook and um and what was coming out of discussions and 
things with the online tutorials, I got a sort of better feel of what was okay 
and, I did have a look at some of the other blogs that were public …I had a 
little look… to see what I could see and that was kind of interesting cause 
there was such a wide variety of different styles there I sort of thought 
‘right, okay, I can do whatever my style is going to be’. (Megan, student, 
PG) 
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Megan did not reject the influences of others, she was interested in the standards 
being set and the expectations being placed on the work, but she felt able, within 
those boundaries, to develop a personal style. Such confidence has to emerge from a 
course or programme culture of active writing, because a personal style cannot easily 
develop in a heavily structured digital environment, or in a context where teachers 
are worried about protecting students from the riskiness of the blank page, or where 
students are required to conform to very rigid modes of performance. 
Chapter 9 will explore further what it might mean to develop risk-taking digital 
cultures of active writing. First, though, another aspect of normativity needs to be 
discussed: the practices of professionalism and disciplinarity that inform the 
subjectivity of students as they become professionals. These are more active forms of 
normalisation, as we will see in the next chapter, and they involve the developing 
habits and ways of thinking and practicing that reflection in professional contexts 
fosters.  
Postscript: a brief visual analysis of an e-portfolio 
platform 
It is worth briefly examining a specific example of the kind of environment in which 
online reflection is being produced, to better understand what sorts of values these 
interfaces and templates might be constructing. At time of writing, PebblePad is the 
e-portfolio package that the University of Edinburgh provides and supports, and is 
also in use by two of the programmes in my study. The screenshots below come from 
my own portfolio space, set with the default ‘pebble’ template. 
PebblePad brands itself “much more than an e-portfolio”, but its functionality – 
storing, organising, and presenting personal content – is typical of most e-portfolio 
systems. Its official website describes it as having been “designed with the learner at 
the centre”, and it promises to improve both formal and informal learning through 
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“scaffolding”, “sharing”, and “publishing”19. Individual items uploaded or created in 
the system are called “assets”, emphasising a corporate orientation to user content 
and supporting a ‘personal branding’ approach to reflection and portfolio-building. 
This use of language may appear unproblematic (if obnoxious), but it encodes or 
interpellates the sort of user who can be at home within these spaces: 
Students who want to use computers are continually confronted with 
…grand narratives which foreground a value on middle-class, corporate 
culture; capitalism and the commodification of information; Standard 
English; and rationalistic ways of representing knowledge. (Selfe & Selfe, 
1994, p.494) 
In contrast to this orientation, PebblePad’s interface aims for a friendly, 
approachable, informal style, with various default templates that make the home 
page look like a beach (complete with water sound effects), a garden, an urban 
silhouette or a living room (complete with white, male, cartoon avatar). These are 
mostly notable for their use of iconography of the material world, and for their 
positioning of users as in need of such friendliness and non-digital reference points – 
perhaps inadvertently taking a condescending approach to those who might choose, 
or be required, to approach their reflection, personal or professional development via 
this system. 
PebblePad: e-portfolio home page 
 
                                                
19 http://www.pebblepad.co.uk/, retrieved 1/6/2011. 
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Amongst the templates on offer there is also the option to create “your desktop”, 
which invites the user to upload a photograph of themselves and choose a 
background that customises their home page. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
these superficial forms of customisation mask a more fundamental uniformity of 
structure. PebblePad provides a number of pre-defined templates and forms for 
students to fill in. Reflection is ‘scaffolded’ through a number of specific templates 
for adding and displaying reflective content. Each “reflection” is a discrete object, 
and to create one users must first decide what sort of reflection it is: for example, is it 
a “thought” or an “experience”?  
PebblePad: set of options for creating a reflection 
 
This decision made, a further set of choices appear. For “thoughts”, a title must be 
provided, tags selected that indicate what the thought will contain, and the thought 
must be further labelled as a “journal”, “reflective journal”, or to fit one of two 
simple models of reflection – a three-stage “what, so what, now what” model, or 
four-stage “reflective cycle”.  
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PebblePad: page one of three for recording a “thought”  
 
Choosing “reflective cycle”, for example, then offers the user three additional 
screens of forms to fill in, including the four stages of reflection identified by the 
template: experience, reaction, analysis, planning. Each stage has a “help” tip to 
explain what content belongs there: 
PebblePad: roll-over guidance for writing about an experience  
 
“describe your thoughts and feelings about the experience” 
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Along with the observations about constraint and templates made above, in Chapter 
9 I will discuss what other problems such intensive scaffolding might produce. 
Suffice to say here that I think this small set of screenshots demonstrates how far e-
portfolio systems can be from the challenge and risk of the blank page. More visual 
and structural analysis of this kind would open up new ways of thinking about and 
critiquing these environments, and might give teachers the confidence to try 
alternatives that do more to embrace the riskier aspects of the web and its 
possibilities for more challenging expressions of subjectivity. 
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Chapter 8: Allegiance, repetition and 
discipline in professional reflective 
practices 
Earlier chapters have not focused extensively on the professional educational 
environments in which the programmes in my study are located. This chapter aims to 
situate earlier matters of concern – which I would argue would largely apply to any 
high-stakes reflective context – within professional educational discourses, and 
examine what might be particular about these disciplinary settings.  
Ideally, the whole of this thesis would have specified disciplinary contexts alongside 
pseudonyms, and would have preserved rather than removed discipline-specific 
terminology from interview quotes. In this chapter especially, the value of analysing 
particular discourses of professionalism would have been substantial. However, 
because the community of people actively involved in promoting and researching 
high-stakes online reflective practices in the UK is relatively small, and because 
several of my teacher interviewees are part of this community and might be 
identifiable if associated with their disciplinary context, I have decided to give up 
specificity for the sake of taking extra steps to preserve the anonymity of my 
research participants. As with the analysis of reflective artefacts, this would be a 
fruitful area for further research. This chapter concludes with a brief postscript which 
begins to indicate how such an analysis might be undertaken, using interview data 
from a social work context and from an education context, but not identifying the 
speakers with their pseudonyms or any additional information. 
Chapter 6 introduced the ideas of confession and transparency as problematically 
fundamental to reflective practices, and explained how these can be normative 
mechanisms. In Chapter 7, normalisation was approached in terms of how protection 
(in the form of templates and legitimate narratives of reflection) keeps students safe 
while at the same time constraining them. However, there is a certain passivity in the 
idea of protection that does not fully capture what normalisation does. The argument 
in this chapter is that processes of reflection actively do and produce new things – 
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though not necessarily the things that are intended, due to the complexity of 
disciplinary discourses. The concept of ‘discipline’ here is shorthand for talking 
about subject and professional allegiances, and is also a frame for the processes of 
practice and repetition that typify professional reflection. Both these definitions of 
discipline are underpinned by a Foucauldian approach, in which discipline has a 
particular goal: that of maintaining order through analysis and categorisation. 
Foucault (1977a) argues, writing of the disciplinary responses to the plague that 
characterised the end of the 17th century: 
The plague is met by order; its function is to sort out every possible 
confusion …It lays down for each individual his place, his body, his 
disease and his death, his well-being, by means of an omnipresent and 
omniscient power that subdivides itself in a regular, uninterrupted way 
even to the ultimate determination of the individual, of what characterizes 
him, of what belongs to him, of what happens to him. Against the plague, 
which is a mixture, discipline brings into play its power, which is one of 
analysis. (p.197)  
He contrasts this with the earlier response to the leper, which was exile rather than 
control: 
The exile of the leper and the arrest of the plague do not bring with them 
the same political dream. The first is that of a pure community, the second 
that of a disciplined society. Two ways of exercising power over men, of 
controlling their relations, of separating out their dangerous mixtures. 
(p.198)  
My point in this chapter is that becoming a professional is best understood as a 
process of discipline, rather than purity. No one is suddenly and perfectly a nurse, or 
a lawyer, or a teacher: it is through a process of disciplining and categorising 
students into particular ways of thinking and practicing (McCune & Hounsell, 2005), 
or “controlling their relations”, that the periphery gradually becomes the centre. The 
mechanisms of surveillance and confession I described in Chapter 6 show how 
power is subdivided so that members discipline and watch each other and 
themselves.  
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Disciplining mask: the scoldʼs bridle 
20  
Returning to the metaphor of the mask, I offer the example of a scold’s bridle as a 
way of thinking about discipline. The scold’s bridle, or branks, was used in parts of 
Scotland and England between mid-sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries. Its 
purpose was to punish women for talking too much, nagging or inappropriate speech. 
It worked by restraining and sometimes injuring the tongue. It was an unofficial (not 
legally sanctioned) alternative to the ‘cucking stool’ – a method of punishing women 
formally found guilty of being scolds by dunking them in water (Boose, 1991).  
The scold’s bridle’s double function was to physically prevent the undesirable 
behaviour (talking), and to humiliate the wearer in public and thus underscore 
community standards of acceptable behaviour for both the woman being punished, 
and her observers. The community’s observation of the punishment was part of the 
punishment. Boose argues that punishments for men did not have the same 
‘carnivalesque’ or degrading quality as those for women, because women’s marginal 
social status allowed: 
a blunted form of community sacrifice, a scapegoating mechanism through 
which the public body expels recognition of its own violence by projecting 
it onto and inflicting it upon the private body of a marginal member of the 
community. (p.190) 
                                                
20 © 2005 David Monniaux; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Branks_dsc05369.jpg, retrieved 
6/8/2011. 
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I propose that, in professional education, students are the marginal figures whose 
behaviours can be disciplined by being displayed through reflection. This is not to 
draw inappropriate parallels between public humiliation and reflection, or indeed to 
make much of the ‘punishment’ aspects of discipline. Reflection is mostly produced 
or consumed in a private, albeit confessional and normative, mode between students 
and teachers, against a background of generosity and with students’ best interests at 
heart. However, the broader context in which reflection is deployed is one in which 
acceptable behaviour is determined by a combination of professional and academic 
standards. The job of the student is to absorb and replicate or imitate these standards 
through confessional practices that produce what they are intended to demonstrate. 
The greatest force of discipline comes when it is internalised, when the professional 
discourse is reproduced by the individual as if it were (indeed, because it is) their 
own. 
Replication is not superficial, however: over time, repetition becomes memory, 
instinct and ‘common sense’, because “what we ask students to do is who we ask 
them to be” (Yancey, 2004, p.739). The work of the teacher as confessor aligns the 
production of professional selves with the desirable discourses of that profession. 
Students on professional and vocational programmes practice writing like, talking 
like, the professionals they aspire to become, and in doing so, they become them.  
The logic of discipline is the logic of immobility: “that which moves brings death, 
and one kills that which moves” (Foucault, 1977a, p.205). The templates described in 
the previous chapter share this logic of immobility. However, reflection is not 
exclusively a process of disclosure or constraint, but of performance and shifting 
subjectivity. For this reason, replication of discourses is never exact. Indeed, the 
categories ‘academic’ and ‘professional’ as used in this chapter should not be seen as 
homogeneous, but rather as indicative of something of a clash of cultures that takes 
place in the practices of higher education, and which disturbs the political dream of 
discipline (and disciplinarity). This dream always masks disorder (p.198) and 
complexity. The process of disciplining allows community to persist in recognisable 
forms, but it is full of gaps, accidents and novelty, too.  
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The focus in this chapter on professional practices reflects the orientations of the 
programmes in my research, and is not intended to suggest that similar processes do 
not take place in “pure” academic subjects, those without an explicit professional 
dimension. Academic practices are always about disciplinarity and disciplining, and 
there are ways of thinking and practicing that attach to every subject area (Becher & 
Trowler, 2001).  
In the next section I describe the importance of professional identities for both 
students and teachers. I then go on to demonstrate how disciplined reflection, in the 
sense of habit and repetition, is deployed to produce the professional subjects 
required from higher education in the programmes in my study. Finally, I explore 
how competing paradigms of professional and academic discourse are exacerbated, 
rather than resolved, by reflection. This chapter closes by proposing that the concept 
of “supercomplexity” (Barnett, 2000) is a useful way of considering how competing 
disciplinary paradigms play out in reflective practice. Teaching students to manage 
conflicting ways of knowing, such as ‘professional’ and ‘academic’, is an example of 
the sort of pedagogy which supports uncertainty and openendedness, and is therefore 
an important aspect of professional education in a supercomplex world. 
“If you want to make a difference youʼve got to be at 
the universities and the colleges”: being in and of a 
profession 
In professional and vocational programmes in higher education, teachers typically 
have a dual role; they are both academics and professionals themselves, with 
ongoing ties to the industries and professions that they have come from. They are 
often members of the same professional bodies that their students will join, and are 
therefore subject to the practices of development and surveillance through reflection 
that those bodies require. Natalie commented wryly on her own and her academic 
colleagues’ reflective practices as compared with what students are encouraged to 
do: 
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Natalie (teacher, UG): The professional body [pause] requires, um, its, 
um, registrants, eh, to keep some type of portfolio …I can tell you, cause 
we’re all [in the professional body], eh, just as a, and we’re a small 
sample, I imagine there’d be less than half of us who would be able to say, 
hands on heart, ‘I can show you my portfolio tomorrow’. Some of us might 
be up all night, trying to make it for tomorrow, um, you know, but that’s 
human nature, isn’t it? 
Jen: Yeah. And would you be in that half? 
Natalie: I’d be in the half that haven’t got it 
Jen: Yeah! [Laughs]. 
Natalie: I’d be in the half that might anticipate, when I left here, I could 
stay up all night and do it but, by 1 o’clock in the morning, I’ve realised 
how foolhardy [laughter] that was, and I’d just have to come back and 
admit I didn’t have it. 
Several teachers I spoke to described a sense of responsibility for maintaining quality 
within their professions, and an example of this is given in the postscript of this 
chapter. However, sometimes, rather than wishing to maintain the status quo, 
teachers are driven to try to change aspects of their professions that they have found 
problematic. Sam felt passionately that part of her role was to send people out into 
practice who could hold their own against what she called the “dinosaurs” in her 
traditional industry: 
If you want to make a difference if you want to change things you’ve got to 
be at the universities and the colleges, cause that’s where the thinking is is 
taught. You know the dinosaurs are cleared by you know people who are 
working in the colleges and the universities challenging and changing 
thinking and facilitating students, that’s where it changes. (Sam, teacher, 
UG) 
Conversely, though, the requirements of professions have a direct and non-negotiable 
impact on what goes on within professional education, so teachers’ ability to foster 
change may be more limited than they would wish. Professional programmes are 
usually validated by the relevant professional body, and so the priorities of that body 
have substantial influence, which Sam also recognised:  
Jen: Are your courses validated in conjunction with your professional 
bodies? 
Sam (teacher, UG): Oh yes yes yes [laugh] yeah, big time 
Jen: …and are those requirements that they have for you reflected in what 
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they do with their own members after graduation? 
Sam: Um, what I do Jen is I I actually work from that end back. …I just 
basically started from the, what happens in industry back …the first [year] 
portfolio really is about who they are as a person …in the middle bit of the 
degree they’re moving from the personal into the professional and 
vocational and then in the last bit of the degree they’re moving out of that 
stage which is vocational into continuing professional development… 
preparing to leave and join the industry or preparing for a promotion 
within the industry and complying with the co-, the continuing professional 
development requirements.  
Sam held both the hope of preparing her students to “clear the dinosaurs”, and the 
recognition of the constraints that were and would continue to be placed on them by 
the professional body’s requirements and the need for both skills and attitudes that 
would make them employable.  
Professional bodies themselves may sometimes be part of a project of transformation 
within professions and industries. Wendy described the changes in her profession 
which have led to her traditionally science-based curriculum shifting to put more 
emphasis on “touchy-feely” skills such as reflection and communication: 
[Professionals] now are reflective practitioners, this is what the 
[professional body] want, um, and they’ve been trying, they have a 
portfolio for CPD …the idea was that, once they beca- went into [practice] 
all of a sudden they would become reflective practitioners, and they 
realised that that didn’t happen it wasn’t something that [they], because 
they’re quite sciencey, came to easily. Um, reflection was one of these 
touchy-feely things that scientists didn’t do, so [people in this profession] 
couldn’t quite cope with it. …and really, it’s because the [body] is 
saying… you have to think about reflection. (Wendy, teacher, UG) 
She went on to describe the transformation of the profession from one of data and 
analysis to one of engaging with clients and a more therapeutic ethos, and the 
consequent changes in the way that she teaches: 
They have to develop, and part of that development is reflection, not just 
saying ‘well, if this happens, this should happen’. They’ve got to see 
everything else, reflect on it, and then make a decision. So, for us, we’ve 
got to, you know, start at first year, and build that up… [The profession is] 
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changing, as a career, and the course has to change to to reflect it, and 
part of that is making them reflect. (Wendy, teacher, UG) 
In some of the more highly-regulated professions, work that students do in portfolios 
and other reflective spaces ultimately forms part of what gets them in the door to be 
registered members of the relevant body, and is even sometimes a condition of 
getting a job after graduation. This is the other sense in which reflection can be high-
stakes for students in these kinds of programmes. It is not only about assessment and 
the class of degree they obtain, but also, and very directly, about their subsequent 
working life. This can mean that portfolios and reflective writing have to do double 
duty, and be reframed after assessment so that they are suitable for their next 
purpose: 
Within the e-portfolio itself, one of the submenus is development targets. 
Like any other education [in this profession], eh, they have to complete a 
…profile, which goes to their [employers]. So what happens is, within their 
development targets within the e-portfolio, that’s the, that’s a, that’s what 
they address. So, for that point of view, it’s just a simple copy and paste 
job, but from their e-portfolio into their …profile. Which is good, because 
it means that we’re seeing it, right, before it goes into their …profile, so if 
there’s anything contentious, eh, we [laughs] …can advise them that it’d 
be a good idea to take that contentiousness out. (Bob, teacher, PG) 
Bob had both academic and professional gatekeeping roles. These roles overlapped 
in places, and in others, such as points of assessment and accreditation, they 
diverged. Reflective statements which might be acceptable in assessed work, which 
might be welcomed as evidence of criticality, or ‘authentic’ reflection, are reframed 
as “contentious” in the context of accreditation.  
The tight coupling between the professional and academic spheres sometimes also 
breaks down at the point of the digital environment, and this can be a cause of 
frustration for teachers. Wendy described having to give up on waiting for her 
professional body to specify and develop an e-portfolio that students could use (a 
portfolio system was already in use in the profession, but was proving difficult to 
adapt to academic requirements), and instead having to develop a bespoke system. 
She was concerned about students eventually having to move all their material, and 
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learn a new system, but was sceptical about when, or if, the professional system 
would meet her needs: “we just couldn’t, we couldn’t wait for them to catch up with 
what we wanted, so we’ve just gone and built our own” (Wendy, teacher, UG).  
Bob explained how his students’ portfolios might soon move into a national 
professional system, away from the institutionally provided system they currently 
used. I asked whether he thought that reflecting in a more professionally orientated 
space would impact on how students perceived the audiences for their reflections, 
and he described this as a “major issue”.  
There may be some benefits to keeping academic and professional portfolio spaces 
separate, so that the sorts of “contentious” statements that students might make 
during their time in university are less likely to haunt their professional lives. The 
apparent inability of professions and universities to work together at a technical level 
is in this sense a blessing in disguise. This is hinted at by the practices of 
postgraduate students who are also working professionals on very professionally-
focused programmes, as Ian’s students were: 
Ian (teacher, PG): If somebody wrote, you know, a kind of confessional, a 
big confessional reflective piece, you know, which was full of insight and 
angst, but didn’t actually meet the criteria [laughs] I don’t quite know 
what, what we’d do. That hasn’t actually happened yet, I don’t think.  
Jen: No, it hasn’t, right okay.  
Ian: So yeah, I mean, there’s a whole, there’s a whole other set of, of, um, 
sort of you know quality considerations about reflection, aren’t there? A 
different kind of reflection, if you like, more spontaneous and more kind of 
psychosocial kind of reflection, um, we don’t get too much of that. … 
Jen: Yeah. Yeah, I wonder, I mean, I wonder if this is some, to some extent, 
a disciplinary thing? Um, not exactly disciplinary but, because the course 
is so focused on kind of professional, professionalism and professional 
development, that maybe, you know, maybe students [pause] engage with 
that hat on, you know, as not so much as students but as professionals… 
Ian: I think, I think that that is definitely a factor. I think we do, right from, 
from the start, we made quite a lot of issue about, about, you know, being 
co-professionals and, and the whole thing about being professionalism and 
the extent to which, you know, you kind of develop as a professional, and 
so on and so forth. …it may be that some of them do actually sort of pick 
this whole thing up as part of the general discourse of professionalism, 
yeah.  
Chapter 8: Allegiance, repetition and discipline 
 202 
While not adopting a professional body’s technology, the emphasis on professional 
development in Ian’s course would seem to preclude not only confessional modes, 
but experimentation with writing that diverges from the accepted discourse of 
professionalism.  
Professional expectations and requirements may sometimes mean that reflection 
itself is not possible or desirable in a practice context. I asked Olive about a comment 
she had made in an earlier discussion we had, that her students value reflective 
writing, but could not carry on with it in practice because of the competitive nature 
of their profession. She expanded on this:  
There’s two issues for the trainee, if you like, once they move into  
…practice. One is they don’t want to be seen as being people who make 
mistakes [laughs] …there is a genuine fear …it’s such a competitive 
environment, that they’re worried they will not be kept on …unless they are 
flying up there and showing what a great, wonderful safe pair of hands and 
wonderful [professional] they are. (Olive, teacher, PG) 
The other issue she identified was employers’ concern that disclosures of mistakes or 
uncertainty in reflective writing could fall into the wrong hands and be used to 
disadvantage the organisation as a whole.  
How students understand the demands their professional contexts will make on them 
affects how they approach reflection even in a “safe” educational context. Students, 
as well as their teachers, are often strongly orientated towards their prospective (or, 
in the case of postgraduates, current) profession, and are certainly very able to speak 
the language of professionalism, describing the purposes of reflection definitively in 
terms of practice: 
I suppose [reflection is] to improve practice, like, at the end of the day, it’s 
got, in order to become a better …professional, you’ve got to learn from 
your mistakes, so you’ve got to, at the end of the day, if you come away 
thinking ‘I don’t know something’ or ‘I did something and I’m not quite 
sure if there might have been a better way of doing it’ then, when you 
reflect on it, you do find what other, well, when you’re looking at other 
people’s research, you find out perhaps better ways that you could have 
gone about things that just improves your practice. And also, even if 
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there’s something positive that you’re reflecting on, then it’s also good as 
well then, because you think ‘Oh well, I did it right, so in the future I will 
continue to do things like that’, so whether it’s something positive or 
something negative that you’re looking at, it still helps to improve your 
practice. (Yvonne, student, UG) 
I asked Mona if she could see herself continuing to use her portfolio after graduation 
and her response, again, was orientated to the ways in which the portfolio is already 
‘about’ professional requirements:  
Yes, I think so. I think it’d be, well, if I need to do …something similar [at 
the end of next year], I think, at the end, and, having done it already, you 
know, all the links to the [professional] benchmarks, it will help me if I 
need to do it again, or for interviews. (Mona, student, PG) 
Dave described himself as his harshest critic of his reflective work and e-portfolio, 
but expressed his self-judgement as judgement about his employability. The ultimate 
measure of quality was whether he would be happy to show his portfolio to 
prospective employers: 
Dave (student, UG): the whole content including the blog itself, I would 
like to have had to a a standard that I would deem admissible you know to 
a prospective employer. So that that was the sort of thing I had in the back 
of my head… 
Jen: so you may have been actually holding yourself to a an even higher 
standard that what would have 
Dave: yeah, definitely, and the amount of time I actually spent on it I think 
it was was, it was far more than I had to. 
For Daniela, the evidence that she was getting her reflection and self-evaluation 
“right” was related to whether she was chosen for one of the prestigious placement 
years available to some students on her programme: 
Daniela (student, UG): some people can uh evaluate their skills too high 
and some people can underestimate there, so it’s uh, and I think if you 
have an assessment actually part of an assessment it it helps you sort of to 
find the balance between to overestimate your your skills or to 
underestimate. 
Jen: yeah. So how do you know when you’re getting it right?  
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Daniela: Um, to to be honest I think if I got a placement year I got it right! 
[laugh]  
A discourse of professionalism, and the alignment of reflection with matters of 
employability, can lead students to take a competitive stance in their descriptions of 
their courses and their own place within them. Josie expressed this obliquely, 
discussing the rigours of the training and the high dropout rate as essential aspects of 
preparing students for a profession which not everyone would be cut out for: 
Josie (student, PG): it’s such a tough job, and it’s such tough training, that 
you have to weed people out, you know, and that, and that’s what 
happened. If you couldn’t hack that, then there’s no way you would hack 
[the work], you know… I think it was about a 10% dropout, but there was 
only 45 of us to begin with. It was more than that, I’m sure it was more 
than that… So yeah, they are, you know, I wouldn’t say ‘ruthless’, cause 
that sounds a bit aggressive, but, you know, they really are quite, you 
know, ‘this is the criteria, and if you don’t meet it, you don’t get it’. Um, 
but you have to, because what is expected of you is so much when you go 
out there, that, if you can’t do that, then there’s no way you would manage 
it. 
Stewart was even blunter, wondering if he was at a disadvantage because his 
programme had processes in place to support less motivated students to do reflection 
and professional development planning: 
Stewart (student, UG): It’s it’s a fine line to press whether you you do it to 
get students involved or you don’t and leave it voluntarily. I suppose in in 
my, as a student, it would benefit me if they didn’t because it would mean 
that the competition when it comes to looking for jobs is is less.  
Jen: [laugh] yeah. 
Stewart: But, that’s a rather cynical view. So are you effectively you know 
compressing the market and and stopping those who would take take PDP 
seriously from excelling, and those who don’t, to fall behind. 
Stewart’s ambivalence about supporting reflection, and his description of it as a 
competitive advantage, may appear to be at odds with the individual development 
and authenticity teachers believe they are fostering through reflective practices. It 
does, however, link these individual accomplishments to a broader context. In a 
context of enhancing professionalism, quality and employability through reflection, 
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measures of success may have less to do with personal growth than with getting on 
in a world where success is relative and not everyone can ‘win’. 
I have shown in this section how reflection in professional education is intimately 
involved with its professional context, because of the priorities and allegiances of 
teachers and students, and how discourses of reflection shift to take account of 
professional priorities. The next section discusses how reflection is thought to 
produce the qualities that are professionally valued, through practices of repetition. 
Repetition through reflection is a form of performativity that is aimed at providing 
new professionals with the discipline to be ‘instinctively’ effective in practice. 
“Theyʼll reflect and hopefully that will go into their 
muscle memory”: practice, persistence and 
performativity 
The metaphor of ‘muscle memory’ emerged as part of a conversation with Peter, 
who sparked this association for me during a discussion we had about surviving 
emergencies. Muscle memory, in its non-metaphoric sense, describes the motor 
learning that allows people to ‘instinctively’ or ‘automatically’ perform physical 
skills they have practiced repeatedly. Peter explained that people who are routinely 
in dangerous situations often practice emergency procedures over and over again so 
that certain actions and decisions become second nature. Otherwise, panic and 
adrenaline can make them do the wrong things. He noted that practice, in the sense 
of persistent and disciplined repetition, is part of what professional training and 
reflection is about: 
Peter (teacher, UG): Ensuring survival is by training people about what to 
do so it becomes second nature, so they don’t have to think, it’s almost like 
part of their bodily DNA.  
Jen: Yeah. …muscle memory. 
Peter: Muscle memory, yeah absolutely. And it’s, so so the thing about 
[our] students being on placement is that what you’re hoping to do is that 
you’ll give them that muscle memory when they’re on placement. So they’ll 
be faced with a particular situation and they’ll respond to it and then 
they’ll unpack it and they’ll reflect upon that experience and hopefully that 
learning will be, you know, go into their muscle memory as well, so that 
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the next time they’re faced with that situation or similar, or that they can 
generalise out from that one situation to another situation so that they can 
actually go into that as well.  
Peter distinguished this form of activity from “just writing about it” – and he was 
critical of trusting what can be assessed in the academic environment: 
We give people a case study and we say ‘well how would you intervene in 
this’ and what they do is they write about it. Now whether they would do 
that in reality you know, you don’t know. Cause you’re making judgment 
about what people write. And often there’s a huge disparity between, you 
know, walking the walk and talking the talk. And ideally what you want 
students …to do is to be able to to walk the talk. (Peter, teacher, UG) 
This concept of muscle memory – of “walking the talk” – is central to the matter of 
discipline, because it is through repetition that it is accomplished. Schön (1991) 
describes the “know-how” that allows practitioners to act spontaneously in novel 
situations: 
It does not stretch common sense very much to say that the know-how is in 
the action – that a tight-rope walker’s know-how, for example, lies in, and 
is revealed by, the way he takes his trip across the wire... Although we 
sometimes think before acting, it is also true that in much of the 
spontaneous behavior of skillful practice we reveal a kind of knowing 
which does not stem from a prior intellectual operation. (pp.50-1) 
This know-how is both of, and revealed by, action. Metaphorically speaking, again, 
muscle memory of professional identity is developed in the same way as physical 
skill – through persistence and repetition. Persistence brings changes in approach and 
attitude. Some students described reflection as “discipline” and “habit”:  
The fact that it was assessed meant that I was more disciplined about 
doing it. … I just set myself targets so that I would definitely aim to write 
in the blog twice a week and you know try to keep it to a manageable 
chunk so write 4 or 5 hundred words a time um and focus it on something 
different every time. So it gave me a, I suppose it gave me a an enforced 
discipline, that I might not otherwise have had. You know if I if I’d done it, 
if I was just doing it for myself and only I was reading it [pause] I don’t 
know if I’d have managed to push myself to maintain it. (Lynne, student, 
PG) 
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While Lynne indicated that it was the externally enforced discipline of writing 
reflectively that changed her way of approaching her studies, Kate found that 
reflection became a habit that was more self-motivated, but still governed by rules 
and a disciplined approach:  
I find it hard to find the time to do it sometimes. …I don’t want it just to be 
a ‘oh, that was a tough week’. I need it to be more than that, if I’m going to 
use it like a revision. Um, so it is extra, it’s finding extra time to do it… I 
would like to get more disciplined in that… it gets you into a habit of doing 
it which is important, so I did try and get into the habit of, before turning 
the page on to the next lesson, just making sure the last thing I did was a 
little reflection and I move on to the next one. (Kate, student, PG) 
For other students, the conscious, rule-bound discipline gives way to something else. 
When Josie began her course, she found reflection to be challenging: 
It took me a little while, cause I was writing a bit factually, and they 
wanted a little bit, you know, more depth than that, you know. ‘Okay, so 
you know that, so now what are you going to do about it?’ It was that kind 
of thing. Um so it did take me a few weeks, but, you know, you soon get into 
the swing of it, you know, what the tutors were expecting (Josie, student, 
PG) 
However, by the end of her course, the problem was “switching off”, rather than 
getting into the swing: 
Josie (student, PG): When you constantly process in that way, you know, 
that intensely for this length of time, it’s very difficult to switch off. You 
know, so I used to go to bed, and I’d be thinking ‘Right, oh, that’s a good 
idea’, you know. And short of getting out of bed and writing it down, I 
made myself not do that, but it was really, really difficult to stop doing it. 
Jen: Yeah. You got going and you couldn’t stop. 
 Josie: Yeah ...I’ve kind of had to shut my office and not look at anything. 
…It’s so much more than what you think it is, so, so much more. You can’t 
even describe how much more it is.  
Josie’s practice of reflection, initially somewhat foreign and a discipline to be 
mastered, eventually took over. The various aspects of reflection that she initially 
had to consider, such as teacher expectations, and questions that were carefully 
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articulated, were absorbed so that they were no longer separate from her processes of 
thinking.  
Similarly, Theresa talked about moving from a starting point of confusion and dislike 
towards an appreciation, or at least an understanding, of her e-portfolio: 
Theresa (student, UG): I decided [the e-portfolio] was the spawn of the 
devil last year. [laughter] I just couldn’t get my head round it and [pause] 
I don’t think I um was able to use it to its full potential. Whereas now I 
understand it more and actually how important it is. 
Jen: Mm. What do you think has made the difference for understanding 
that? 
Theresa: Um, probably the pressure that we’re under this year is a lot 
more than last year. And um [pause] oh I don’t know. I just prefer it a lot 
more this year. 
Theresa’s transformation from someone who didn’t understand, to someone who did, 
is a matter of repetition, practice, and discipline. After a time, what it means to be 
reflective, or a professional, becomes second nature, and students cannot even really 
identify when or where the shift occurs. Natalie framed this as “internalising”, and 
for her it was the goal of her students’ reflective practice:  
I’m much more interested about in, in what the students internalise, rather 
than what they’ve written on a, I was going to say ‘a piece of paper’, a 
virtual piece of paper. (Natalie, teacher, UG) 
Maria discussed the process of internalising professional discourse: 
Maria (teacher, UG): [For the very young students], what did change over 
time is the way that they were recording ‘I’ve had a crap day’. Um, you 
know, so it did start with, cause and the way that they write very often is 
using street speak. 
Jen: [laugh] Like, like what?  
Maria: Well, like you know, ‘I’ve had a shit day’. You know just, just 
language that means something to them. …But what they started to do is, 
you know, instead of putting ‘I’ve had a shit day today’, ‘today’s been 
rather challenging’. 
Jen: [laugh]  
Chapter 8: Allegiance, repetition and discipline 
 209 
She went on to describe the sorts of things that students would begin to identify in 
their reflections, and how they learned to contextualise and analyse what had 
occurred. She listed the sorts of questions that became, over time, a “natural” part of 
the reflective writing process:  
It’s part of the reflective process to actually look at, you know, the here 
and now and what’s happened. And what might have influenced that. You 
know where’s the concept of them as an individual in that? What issues 
were going on for them? And then separating out then, you know, wider 
issues in terms of, you know functional things that might have affected that 
intervention, you know policy, law, processes, systems. But also, where’s 
the [client] in that? And what might have been going on for them and the 
impact of of the intervention on them. Um the student was able then to use 
that to start to analyse the situation and then think, ‘right, what learning 
have I had from this situation? How might I have responded differently?’. 
(Maria, teacher, UG) 
What Maria is suggesting, I think, is that repetition, through reflection, of what she 
called “separating out”, analysis of students’ own practice and behaviours on 
placement, is the sort of discipline that changes both discourse and practice.  
There is a tension here, however, in that students often come to professional 
programmes with extensive practice in writing academically. Their habits of 
academic writing conflict with the sorts of habits that produce ‘muscle memory’ for 
practice. This is a conflict that is exacerbated by the tendency of university 
programmes to demand academic, professional and personal discourses to come 
together in reflective writing. The next section explores how students both resist and 
persist in thinking and writing in a traditionally academic mode, and the complexities 
of this in relation to assessed reflective writing. 
“Theyʼve continued with academic expectations of 
writing”: the discipline of academic discourse  
The nature of academic discourse, and how it belongs in reflective writing, varies 
considerably between disciplines and programmes, and different levels of 
expectation are placed on students’ ability to integrate modes of writing. Jess, who 
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taught on a postgraduate programme that mostly catered to working professionals, 
described what was expected of students and how they were disappointingly lacking 
in certain sorts of academic writing skills: 
There is an expectation that they have some, some skills generally that 
mean that, you know they, if they don’t know, they can find out, um in that 
sort of way. What we’re experiencing, in fact is that the students quite 
often do not have, or do not meet our expectations. I don’t think we’ve got, 
you know, tremendously high expectations but they …they let us down you 
know. (Jess, teacher, PG) 
She noted that a skill students were expected to have was the ability to find out how 
to write in genres they weren’t already familiar with, including the genre of reflective 
writing. However, Natalie suggested that moving into a reflective mode – even 
moving to writing in the first person – can be challenging precisely because students 
have had another genre “drummed into them”: 
Natalie (teacher, UG): Maybe they’ve continued with a fairly sort of 
academic expectations of writing, of it being not, even if you’re writing in 
the first person which you do in a reflective essay, you still don’t I don’t 
know, you might say ‘I did this’ or ‘I did that’ but that’d be it. You 
wouldn’t then go on to really use the first person in, eh, or or the second 
person in that ‘I did this, I did that’ ‘But what will you think?’, that’s not 
what you would you anticipate or expect in somebody’s academic written 
assignment, so… 
Jen: Yeah, so they kind of keep that feeling 
Natalie: Yeah, I think so. 
Jen: about their reflective writing? 
Natalie: Yeah. 
Jen: That’s interesting, mm. 
Natalie: We’ve, well, they’ve had that drummed into them for three 
[laughs] three years! 
Academic essay writing is a very challenging mode to master (Lillis, 2001), and once 
students have achieved a measure of competence in it, they can resist thinking about 
reflection in ways that would contradict the ideals of objective, logical and passive 
writing they have learned: 
Jen: Is it different, do you think, the kind of tutor-student relationship, 
when you’re doing reflective writing as part of a programme, than it is on 
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a programme where you aren’t? Like, are there, is it, do you need to trust 
the person who’s going to be reading it, um, in a way 
Beth (student, UG): No. 
Jen: that’s different from an essay? You don’t think so? 
Beth: No, no, I don’t think so at all, because, although it’s a reflective 
piece, it’s got to be backed up by sort of hard evidence. So it’s not just you 
reflecting daydreamily of, you know, of what you’ve been doing. You you 
see something, you’re reflecting on it, you have to use a model which is set 
in stone. That doesn’t change, so that’s like, you know, a a strong guide, 
but you also have to back everything up with evidence. Um, so no, it’s still 
an academic piece, it’s it’s still an experience you’ve had that you 
Jen: That’s really interesting, yeah. 
Beth: Yes. But, but, no, you don’t have to, I don’t feel like you need to 
develop a trust, not at all, so, like, a strong academic piece of, you know, 
essay writing, just as it would be on a history degree or whatever, you 
know. 
Beth was emphatic that nothing she did in her reflective portfolio made her 
vulnerable, and insisted that by following a model “set in stone”, reflective writing 
could be just as academic as an essay. Perhaps this insistence should not be 
surprising, as a number of teachers also emphasised the structure and discipline that 
is involved in reflective writing. Bob described how reflective writing, while being 
non-traditional, carried expectations of “academic rigour”, along with sensitivity to 
practice issues and personal philosophy: 
It’s not a traditional essay, but there are parts of it where, eh, you are 
looking for academic rigour. If you remember from the, the structure, it 
started off with a, an introduction and then a profile, and then something 
about their own …philosophy… something about critical reflection on 
their [own] experience etc. In relation to the section on [professional] 
philosophy, what we’re really after, in that particular session, is them to 
give us a, a description of their own developing value base, right, and also, 
eh, their own developing practice experience, and practice competencies. 
…we’re also expecting them to, to relate to the, the theory, whilst linking to 
the literature. And, in relation to the critical reflection, as I said, that’s 
more orientated towards their, their… placement… So, really, uh, this idea 
of reflection and interlinking with theory and the literature, it’s still 
regarded as a very much a, an academic piece of work although we do, we 
do look for that academic rigour in specific sections within their e-
portfolio. (Bob, teacher, PG) 
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This requirement to balance the personal, the professional and the academic is 
understandably tricky for many students, and might explain why teachers find they 
tend to err on the side of caution and lean towards traditional ‘academic’ prose, and 
ways of thinking, in their reflections. 
Other students welcomed the opportunity to use their reflective spaces to move away 
from what they saw as the constraints of academic writing: 
Although I haven’t done lots of academic writing before …I know from 
what I’ve read that sometimes the formality of academic writing is such 
that you just, it’s not always helpful, it just has to be in that structure 
because that is the, that’s the norm and that is your way of showing that 
you’ve got however many years of academic experience …I used to 
proofread some articles for my flatmate uh several years ago and his 
would be the same it would be stuff like ‘well this is, this is really appalling 
English’, but ‘yes but that’s international academic scientific language’ 
and you read journal articles and you can see that, that going on but it’s 
clear to read, but only if you’re trained in that particular method of 
communication, and so the thing that I really liked about doing the 
blogging was it was something that didn’t need to be in that level of 
formality, which I would have had a much bigger struggle with… it’s a sort 
of easing in kind of thing it seemed useful to be able to be assessing what 
the course is about rather than only learning about the approvable, you 
know approved method of communication. (Megan, student, PG) 
Charles praised the blog format for its “liberating” qualities: 
I don’t like the style that most academic papers are written in. I, that’s not, 
I find it a contrived style, and I and I think that one’s obliged to use it. And 
so I found it very liberating in the blog to be able to, as I said allow my 
identity to emerge. (Charles, student, PG) 
He observed that a different sort of voice “emerged” from his blog than he expected 
– one less formal and academic than “conversational”: 
Charles (student, PG): I didn’t know when I started the blog what kind of 
identity would emerge. And the one that emerged wasn’t necessarily what I 
what I would have guessed at. 
Jen: And how would you describe that identity that emerged? 
Charles: [pause] Um much more conversational, like we’re having a 
conversation now, rather than academic 
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Teachers were sometimes also ambivalent about the impersonal nature of academic 
discourse, and Maria summed these up by saying: 
We don’t just want an academic debate, we want we want to hear the 
person, you know. (Maria, teacher, UG) 
This is not so easy, though, especially when reflection is being assessed, or is 
restricted in other ways, as Floyd found: 
Floyd (student, PG): I found that really tough to do, uh [pause] this 
business of, re, doing reflection and then having a deadline. Um, that, I the 
two don’t, are not a, it’s not a happy marriage, uh, trying to do, eh, trying 
to do reflective writing under time pressures, because I really found 
reflective writing, deep reflective writing based on, and at the same time, 
meeting the criteria of a, of the course… was really tough to do. Eh, it just 
seems 
Jen: Tough in a good way, or tough in a bad way? 
Floyd: Um, I, oh, I [pause] I think it was, in the end it was good, in the end 
it was good.  
After thinking about it for a moment, Floyd described the difficulty as being good 
“in the end”, echoing Theresa’s change of heart about her portfolio, and the point I 
made in the previous section about the disciplining of discourse that characterises 
professionalism. Nevertheless, the sense demonstrated in this section is that 
reflection is something quite different from, and maybe incompatible with, the kinds 
of writing practices that fit with academic requirements: “not a happy marriage”, as 
Floyd puts it. Reflective writing is framed as iterative, subjective and personal, while 
academic writing is often seen as separate (from research, or perhaps from 
experience), a neutral summary, and uncreative (Badley, 2009, p.209).  
The ideal of perfect discipline and muscle memory that informs reflective practice is 
therefore undermined when competing expectations are placed on the reflective 
writing space. There is no real possibility of simplifying and streamlining these 
processes, however. Rather, it is a question of recognising the complexity of both the 
academic and the reflective writing genres (separately and together), and how each is 
informing the shaping, through practice, of students’ professional identities. 
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Every possible confusion: professional reflection, 
discipline and supercomplexity 
Penny observed that reflection is not necessarily a special genre, but is a challenging 
one to grasp: 
All modes of writing have culture attached to them but, eh, this is just, I 
would see it as having just a specific culture attached to it and it, it’s a 
more difficult one to pin down, I think. (Penny, teacher, PG) 
It would seem, however, that professional reflection in higher education contexts has 
multiple cultures attached to it: at the very least, a culture of the particular profession 
or discipline, and a culture of academia (though, as noted already, these categories 
should not be seen as homogeneous across disciplinary contexts). The practices of 
reflection in professional higher education are challenging in situations where habits 
collide. Yancey (2004) is correct in saying that “what we ask students to do is who 
we ask them to be” (p.739), but we are not always constant in what we ask. This is 
not necessarily a problem – there is no “pure community” (Foucault, 1997, p.198) 
into which perfectly trained professionals can cross, and the fuzzy boundaries of 
practice make their way into students’ experiences of education through placements 
as well as through reflection. However, such inconstancy does seem to ask for a 
more nuanced approach to discipline. 
Barnett’s (2000) theory of supercomplexity can usefully be brought into play here. 
Supercomplexity is “the outcome of a multiplicity of frameworks” (p.415), where 
“contestability, challengeability, uncertainty and unpredictability” (p.416) 
characterise the knowledge landscape. Barnett argues that it is important for higher 
education, and also for the professions, to change to take account of the demands of 
multiple frameworks. The “political dream” (Foucault, 1997, p.198) of a disciplined 
profession, and of disciplinary knowledge, gives way to “the capability of living 
effectively amid …openendedness” (Barnett, 2006, p.52).  
In reflective writing, professional knowledge does not appear to be displacing the 
academic (nor vice-versa). Instead, these knowledges are expected to co-exist. 
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Professional reflection in higher education is, by its nature, a space of 
supercomplexity, where “no longer are the boundaries, or the forms of right knowing 
clear” (Barnett, 2000, p.415). Professional reflective practice might therefore be a 
pedagogy that supports “the challenges of professional life”: 
Higher education, if it is to be adequate to the challenges of professional 
life, has to incorporate moments of supercomplexity into the curriculum – 
such as situations bearing multiple descriptions and the handling of 
multiple identities and value conflict. (Barnett, 2006, p.53) 
For Schön (1991), practice settings mirror such situations, and so what he calls 
“reflection-on-practice” can only benefit from more contestation and multiplicity: 
When leading professionals write or speak about their own crisis of 
confidence, they tend to focus on the mismatch of traditional patterns of 
practice and knowledge to features of the practice situation – complexity, 
uncertainty, instability, uniqueness and value conflict – of whose 
importance they are becoming increasingly aware. …if the art is not 
invariant, known and teachable, it appears nonetheless, at least for some 
individuals, to be learnable. (p.18)  
Supercomplexity is a good theory to think with when reframing reflective practices 
for spaces, and subject positions, of conflict and instability. However, we must be 
careful about what we take to be the purpose of approaching reflection in this way, 
and take care that it does not simply replicate the humanist ideals of individual 
coherence and autonomy that supercomplex discourses challenge. For example, 
Barnett (2006) argues that the ultimate point of education in a supercomplex world is 
authenticity, not in the sense of uncovering an unchanging and stable self, but of 
making and remaking individuality: 
If the world is continually changing, is continually presenting conceptual 
and value challenges, and continually calls us into new relationships with 
others, with technologies and social structures, then individuality has to be 
remade anew each day. …the first task of higher education in an unstable 
world is to call students and course participants into a state of being in 
which they can contemplate identifying and expressing their individuality 
on a continually changing basis. (p.59) 
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This comes dangerously close to the ideals of continual development that were 
critiqued in Chapter 6. There is much to worry about in any conception of reflection 
that ignores circulations and relations of power, because relations of power in 
professional settings are so highly contested (see the second excerpt of this chapter’s 
postscript for an example of these contested relations).  
Foucault (1977a) observes that the tactics of exile and discipline began to merge in 
the 19th century, when “all authorities exercising individual control” began to effect 
“the constant division between the normal and the abnormal… by applying the 
binary branding and exile of the leper” (p.199). Elden (2003) describes this change 
as one of control: “instead of the exclusion without control of banishment… the 
space of exclusion is now rigidly regimented and controlled” (p.244). The 
panopticon, with its perfect visibility, stems from technologies of regimentation and 
control. 
However, professional practice is still more like a plague-stricken town than a prison. 
It is a space of both supercomplexity and disorder, and this has been a problem for 
those whose vision of effective and quality practice involves panoptic surveillance 
and control. With no possibility of ‘seeing’ all that goes on in practice – with some 
still-autonomous spaces of engagement between teacher and student; client and 
social worker; nurse and patient – the instrument of reflection gains political traction 
where it is seen as a mechanism through which to control and regiment from within 
what is otherwise outside the scope of institutional control. For that reason, teachers 
in professional and vocational subject areas must acknowledge their own stake in 
reproducing practices of division, categorisation and regimentation through 
pedagogies of reflection, and must examine their practices from a political and 
discursive, not just an individual, perspective. 
There is also, however, a value in thinking about what forms of selfhood are being 
expressed through reflection. In the next chapter, I look at how students and teachers 
describe transformation and time, and how we might understand this in a post-
structuralist context.  
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Postscript: quality, autonomy and reflection in two 
disciplinary contexts 
This postscript sets two interview excerpts against one another to give a sense of how 
the disciplinarity of reflective practices works at a more specific level than the 
generalised discourses of professionalism discussed earlier in this chapter.  
The first excerpt comes from a social work context. The interview took place at the 
same time that a progress report on protection of children in England was published 
(Laming, 2009) in the wake of the Climbié enquiry into the abuse and murder of a 
young girl in London who had been known to the social services of a number of local 
authorities. This was a period of intense scrutiny and criticism of social workers, and 
one of Laming’s key recommendations was that: 
the Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families must 
immediately address the inadequacy of the training and supply of frontline 
social workers. (p.7) 
He went on to say that “many social workers believe their training fails to prepare 
them for working with families in crisis” (p.14) and identified the shortage of 
qualified social workers as a serious failing in the arena of child protection (p.45).  
The interviewee cited below spoke at length on this matter, remarking upon the 
relationship of their teaching to this broader professional and policy context, and 
connecting the visibility of student work within the e-portfolio to the need for quality 
assurance that Laming identified: 
It’s ironic we had the recommendations from Laming yesterday that that 
you know, one of them is that there should be wider scrutiny of the um 
training programmes for social work. Um one of the reasons why I came 
into this job, um, was because I was concerned about the quality of some 
newly qualified social workers coming into practice. And you know as a 
manager of services we were having to deal with issues of competence and 
having to develop um newly qualified workers above and beyond what I 
thought we should be doing. So, you know part of my thought ‘well, get in 
there and teach then, you know and and take some responsibility of of 
ensuring that we get good quality practitioners’. Um I think one of the 
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benefits is for me, I think that because… we don’t ask for actual evidence 
to be supplied by the students when they’re out on placement, we rely 
heavily on the reports of their practice assessors to say that they’ve met the 
required standards, and yet it’s us at the university who sign that off. Now 
I have a problem with, I don’t like to sign something off unless I’ve been on 
that journey or experienced some of it. And that’s not to say that I doubt 
our practice assessors, but for our second years very few practice 
assessors are qualified social workers. And, I I just th-, I kind of think, 
‘hang on a minute, do they really know the requirements of what’s needed? 
From the profession?’ Um, what the e-portfolio allows you to do is to see 
more of that journey and see the development for yourself. So it’s meant 
that when I came in to mark these and to determine whether they were pass 
or fail, by the time I came to mark them, I’d seen the developments, I 
wasn’t just seeing it as a final product, it was more of a process. Um, and 
that did raise a dilemma when we had our practice assessment panel, 
which is like a subgroup of the exam board, you know because I was 
saying that I could mark mine straight away, knowing what the outcome 
was without having to sit and read it from scratch, because I’ve read it as 
it’s developed. Um, you know, and and in much the same way that 
managers in practice would through supervision of their staff. 
Many ideas and assumptions come together here: the sense of obligation to the 
profession that brings some professionals into teaching; the explicit linking of 
reflection with visibility; the role of non-professional academics in professional 
education contexts; and the nature of assessment of reflective writing. What connects 
these is this speaker’s depiction of an uneasy alliance between the university and the 
social work profession, each with their own values, ways of knowing, methods of 
assessing skill and competence, and requirements, and all expected to co-exist. It 
should not be surprising, therefore, if students receive mixed messages about what it 
means to be a ‘good’ social work student. These mixed messages reproduce the 
academic and professional boundaries and confusions described in this chapter. 
The second excerpt comes from an interviewee in an education context, who 
observed from their own experience working with teachers in further education that 
standards of reflection amongst teachers are often not high. They attributed this 
partly to the professionalisation of teaching in even non-professional courses, and the 
mismatch between how teachers of those subjects have come to be teachers and what 
teaching as a profession now encompasses: 
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The background to the sector and these are the sort of people who have 
come in because they can make skirts or because they can knit or because 
they can paint …It’s very much that sort of practice based sector. And the 
engagement with theory very few and far between …the whole 
professionalisation agenda is quite a culture shift with the sector as well. 
The fact that they’ve got to do CPD [continuing professional development] 
and they’ve got to, you know, reflect on how this has helped them etcetera 
is, is quite different for people, yeah. 
This interviewee identified a tension between teacher acquiescence to new models of 
professionalism – with their regimentation, administration and target-drivenness – 
and the expectation of and pleasure in autonomy that keeps people willing to do the 
job:  
Interviewee: We are, as teachers we are all fairly used to being told we 
have to do this and we have to jump through some more hoops, more tests. 
And we’re a very accountable profession aren’t we. Yeah so I think the, 
you know, the sort of rebellion is past. 
Jen: [laughs] We’re way past that now. 
Interviewee: [laugh] Yes, think back to the sixties when we were all 
rebelling all over the place but yeah. 
Jen: Yeah, yeah it’s a bit sad in a way. 
Interviewee: It is, yeah you’re right. …it’s all more and more regimented. 
And we do more and more paperwork. And everything is measured on um 
achievement rates and success rate of learners. Yeah it’s a mess really. 
Jen: Yeah teachers don’t any more have the expectation that they are 
going to have choices about how they [pause] proceed as professionals in 
the same way that I suppose they used to. 
Interviewee: [pause] Yes although I do think a lot of the, I’m doing a 
research project …which is looking at teachers’ experiences in adult 
education. Um and they are all saying to me that they do still feel 
autonomous. They still feel that alright there’s all this regimentation 
around figures and standards and things but they still feel when when they 
are in a classroom they are autonomous. And they can do what they like 
[laughs]. And they are right, you know, observed a lot but, once that 
classroom door closes the teacher is on their own. And always has been. 
Jen: …do you think that that keeps people in the profession who might 
otherwise not? 
Interviewee: Huge factor cause it gives a real satisfaction yeah. We all get 
satisfaction from professional autonomy don’t we. And that’s, you know, 
but they and then on the other hand if they say ‘well we don’t like the 
salaries and we don’t like the paperwork, this, that and the other’. But 
yeah that’s probably a big factor in keeping them there, yeah. 
Jen: …I wonder what, what might happen as more and more teaching 
moves online and and that sense of being able to close the door and not be, 
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um, observed in action maybe recedes somewhat. I mean I know there is 
that sense of, you know, within the VLE situation or when, when every 
teaching interaction is recorded for posterity if you like. So that may 
change the way teach teachers feel about their autonomy. 
Interviewee: It may well do. Um, I don’t know what your experiences have 
been but certainly our experiences of teaching with the VLE are still very 
um sort of minimal I would guess. 
Again, issues of visibility are surfaced here, with the contested space of the material 
classroom providing teachers with a ‘last stand’ against the encroachment of 
regimentation, as represented by the compulsory reflective practices. The spectre of 
the digital becomes a great danger, as it threatens to subject even the relatively 
autonomous space of the classroom to the panoptic gaze of measurement, 
professionalism and accountability. A future strand of research that explored 
reflective practices in professional, post-education contexts would add much to an 
understanding of how reflection is wielded, resisted and co-opted in the service of 
accountability or autonomy.  
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Chapter 9: Transformation, shifting 
subjectivity, and time 
This chapter approaches the concept of transformation rather cautiously, and not 
accidentally last. There are two important threads in my interview data that have not 
yet been explored in depth: the changes in themselves that students describe in 
relation to the process of reflection, and both the necessity for and the pressures of 
time that appear to make reflection more or less meaningful and successful. These 
strands come together to form a compelling story about what ‘real’ reflection does, 
and what it needs. Unfortunately, this story about transformation and reflection poses 
several problems in the context of the arguments I have been making so far: it 
requires a humanist conception of the self (because of the intellectual history of 
transformative learning); it furthers the “practices of mystery” (Lillis, 2001) that I 
have been critiquing (because transformation is mystified and rarefied); and it denies 
webness (because of the way that speed, superficiality, and technology are conceived 
as intertwined).  
In this chapter I propose an alternative way of looking at transformation and online 
reflection. This alternative has two main features that differentiate it from the story 
sketched above (and told below in more detail). First, it positions transformation as a 
matter of shifting subjectivity instead of ‘deep’, essential change. Second, it offers 
speed and digitality, or what I have been calling “webness”, as a generative mode in 
which to conduct risky posthumanist “gatherings” (Edwards, 2010). Each of these 
features will be described and discussed in this chapter. Here, as in other chapters, 
the vision of reflective practice that is proposed looks different – perhaps 
irreconcilably different – from much of what is currently understood as online 
reflection in higher education. This is both intentional and unavoidable as I seek a 
theoretical and pedagogical approach that is appropriate for high-stakes online 
reflection.  
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“Itʼs not just words”: the story of transformation 
In this section, I draw together some of the things that teachers and students told me 
about the impact of reflection, and the explanations they gave for the changes they 
saw in students or experienced in themselves. What is most striking is how 
inextricably the passage of time, time for reflection, and change and transformation 
are linked. For example, Lynne described taking time as the most significant aspect 
of reflection for her: 
I suppose the most important thing was taking the time to um I don’t know 
if articulate’s the right word but put into words or or to think about what 
I’d been reading or what I’d been doing and then I suppose the act of 
being reflective um, trying to put into words what, what I thought about it. 
(Lynne, student, PG) 
For Lynne, who described herself as usually being “lazy” about articulating her 
responses to her studies, the high-stakes nature of the reflection on her course 
supported her to carve out the necessary time to understand the course material:  
The reflective nature of it but also the sort of the regularity and the 
discipline and actually the the act of writing that stuff down to 
communicate it to somebody else meant that I was understanding it better. 
(Lynne, student, PG) 
For some students, the experience of change is emotional as well as intellectual. 
Towards the end of our interview, Mona spoke of becoming attached to her portfolio: 
I’m quite fond of my portfolio. …It’s a kind of end of a year that, I didn’t 
think it might, it would end! …it’s not just words… it’s kind of, yeah, it 
kind of reflects on the whole, quite a long and emotional and hard year. 
(Mona, student, PG) 
Mona saw her reflective writing as a representation of a year of experiences that had 
transformed her. Perhaps predictably by now, she went on to qualify her fondness in 
the terms of assessment: “I haven’t had any feedback on my e-portfolio, it might all 
be complete rubbish”. And she wished she could have done more: 
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Mona (student, PG): I did enjoy it, and it did [pause] I wished I had more 
time during my placement to actually be reflective …and, um, yes, I think, 
to some extent, I didn’t have enough time to do that, so. So it means that, 
you know, I found it valuable, and I wish I had had the time. 
Jen: If you’d had more time, what, um, what would you have done more 
of? 
Mona: Just, um [pause] look at individual [projects] and think about, you 
know, more about each one and how to move forward, and do better. 
More reflection, for Mona, would have led to additional beneficial change in her 
practice. Perhaps there could never be enough time, and a reflective text is always 
partial and insufficient. However, her conclusion about what reflection has given her 
was a sense of the passage of time that is “not just words”, but a text that captures 
and produces pleasure and pride. This pride was echoed by several other students, 
including Dave. Dave associated his pride with a dawning sense of what he 
accomplished during his professional placement, and described revisiting parts of his 
portfolio again as a pleasurable process: 
I’m not quite sure whether it’s actually sank in how much I actually did 
over that placement but it is beginning to and I do, you know I do sort of 
look back at the [portfolio], I’m quite proud of it, and I do sort of dip in 
and out of all the blogs and stuff and yeah, it’s yeah, yeah so I am quite 
pleased with it. (Dave, student, UG) 
I spoke with Dave and Mona around the end of their respective courses. Adele’s 
experience of reflection on a course that had ended several months before our 
interview suggests that this feeling of closeness and attachment to reflective writing 
may not always be lasting. For Adele, once the reflective period was over it quickly 
faded into the past: 
It’s interesting how quickly it’s… a thing of the past because, um, you 
know once, when you’re still writing it it’s more constantly on your mind 
when you think ‘oh, I have to do my next entry soon’ and it’s never very far 
from my consciousness, but um as with all modules and all things like that, 
once I finished, it is quite quick that you turn to other things. (Adele, 
student, PG) 
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We saw in Chapter 4 how Adele thought of her reflections as being unavailable for 
further work once she made them available to be viewed by her teacher. Here she 
seems to be saying that reflection is of the moment – a fleeting experience. I will 
explore this idea more in the section on time in higher education. However, several 
of my interviewees mentioned understanding the learning process better when 
reflecting after some time had passed: 
Doing it now, I’m sort of reflecting back on my work experience thinking 
‘oh that’s why they did that!’. It’s all sort of slotting in to place. (Theresa, 
student, UG) 
Similarly, Wendy reported that the same students who complained about the 
difficulty of reflection came to see its benefits later on: 
[They] really thought we worked them too hard with reflection. …they 
were sort of saying ‘This is far too much work, why are we doing it, blah, 
blah, blah’. In the course evaluations, at the end, it was, um [pause] ‘So 
glad that you’ve, eh, you made us do this, um, we really feel that we’ve got 
somewhere with it’. (Wendy, teacher, UG) 
This is an indication, perhaps, that reflection itself takes some time to get to grips 
with, which Mona also commented on: 
Jen: Did you feel that it came, once you kind of understood what it was 
about, does it, does [reflection] come quite naturally for you? 
Mona (student, PG): Um, no, I wouldn’t say naturally, but slowly.  
Assessing reflection, too, takes time. In fact, according to Helen (a student who is 
also a teacher), it is a process that requires observation over a period of time: 
I don’t think [reflection is] visible in a sort of one off going in to look. But 
if you’ve observed somebody and given them a satisfactory grade and then 
the ne- you’ve given them some advice and next time you go back and 
they’ve got a good, yeah, then you, you can sort of extrapolate and say ‘oh 
well okay they must have thought about what we said and they’ve 
addressed these things, they’ve changed the way they do things, they’ve 
added new techniques or whatever. So clearly there’s been some reflection 
in action going on here’. (Helen, student, PG) 
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While time is framed as essential for producing, understanding and assessing 
reflection, various factors would seem to work against the ‘proper’ speed at which 
reflection should take place. I discussed with Penny whether the assessment of 
reflection might encourage students to view it as a short-term process, when in fact 
the benefits might be greater later on. She agreed, and said: 
I’m trying to encourage them to think of using these as tools to see how far 
they’ve come, ra-, and within a six month course, you know, there’s, you 
can see some development but you won’t see very much because you’re too 
close to it. (Penny, teacher, PG) 
Reflection was sometimes also viewed by students as being less important to 
teachers than teachers claimed, because they did not allow enough time for it. Josie 
described herself and her classmates as “drowning in other stuff” and unable to 
prioritise reflection: 
I don’t know whether that could have been presented in a different way 
somehow, um, because everybody, I mean, I didn’t leave it till the last 
minute, I did mine in my Easter holidays, but still, that’s coming towards, 
you know, the end of the programme, to some degree. …if it’s that 
important, you know, if it’s that important, I’m not sure that’s the right 
place to put it, because it’s an assignment, and it, whilst they did say you 
should be doing this over the year, that, you know, people kind of ignored 
that. (Josie, student, PG) 
For Jess, the tendency of students to be strategic in their learning is natural, but to her 
the solution was more encouragement and, importantly, more time, to take a 
“deeper” approach: 
Because people have very limited time, you know, they they want to get 
their qualifications, they are often doing surface or strategic learning, and 
deep learning actually is a a conflict with those things and is demanding. 
Is personally and time, um, you know, hungry, isn’t it? So unless they are 
encouraged and really motivated and see the value of it for themselves, 
and also are given the time or have the time to do it, then they won’t. (Jess, 
teacher, PG) 
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This circular argument – that the solution to being busy is to prioritise reflection 
more, and the way teachers know students have prioritised is if students find more 
time – leads to a sense of futility. It may also lead to a culture of blame which 
suggests that students who do not take or make time for reflection are lacking 
compared with an ideal which may not, as we will see in the section on time in 
higher education, really exist. This paradox is symptomatic of other, more serious 
problems with the concept of transformation. In the next section I will discuss these 
problems, and show what an alternative discourse, in the form of shifting 
subjectivity, might look like. 
“By the end of my paragraph, I could have changed 
completely”: reflection and shifting subjectivity 
Mezirow (2000), whose work on transformative learning theory has been very 
influential in recent years, claims that: 
[a] crucial mode of making meaning [is] becoming critically aware of 
one’s own tacit assumptions and expectations and those of others and 
assessing their relevance for making an interpretation. (p.4) 
Reflection as part of a transformative learning philosophy is designed to get students 
to be able to ‘stand outside’ themselves and see how their beliefs and assumptions 
are formed, and how they could be different. Moon (1999b) describes stages of 
reflective learning, with “transformative learning” being the most advanced, where 
students: 
are capable of evaluating their frames of references, the nature of their own 
and others’ knowledge and the process of knowing itself. (p.146) 
This contrasts with how students may be inclined to see themselves. In their study of 
undergraduate students’ use of personal development planning and experiences of 
time, Clegg and Bufton (2008) found that students see aspects of themselves as 
fixed:  
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For some students the selves they project in these accounts is of an 
underlying self which is not susceptible to radical change, even when set 
alongside very detailed accounts of the ways their mode of being made 
things very difficult for them. They acknowledged that they would perform 
better were they to adopt different strategies but in practice felt that they 
were unable to change the ingrained dispositions of the ‘always’ being like 
that. (p.10)  
Theorists of transformative learning would likely respond that these students have 
“assimilated” certain values, and that these values require “critical review”: 
Critical reflection implies undergoing a transformation of perspective. 
Many of our actions are governed by a set of beliefs and values that have 
been almost unconsciously assimilated from our experiences and 
environment. To undergo a change in perspective requires us to recognize 
and change these presumptions. (Kember et al., 2008, p.374) 
The assumption here is that these “unconscious” beliefs are amenable to recognition 
and change. This is tricky territory, and even those who take an explicitly 
Foucauldian approach to analysing subjectivity, such as Zembylas (2003), can be 
susceptible to the appeal of “transformation” in the guise of rule-breaking. People 
can, he argues:  
overcome the emotional rules that make them objects, to negotiate new 
positions and new emotional rules in their professional lives. This 
perspective encourages [them] to think and ‘author’ themselves differently, 
to ask not only how emotion discourses and performances have cut them 
off from their desires but also how these have installed alternative desires 
and habits that they take on as part of themselves. (p.125) 
Even as Zembylas maintains that “we need to challenge the widespread notion that 
self-disclosure constitutes a knowing of one’s self”, he is still able to describe 
“dramatic transformations” of subjectivity “through the power relations and the 
resistances that the self reshapes through performances that create greater freedom” 
(ibid). However, the metaphor of “rules” that can be “authored differently” suggests 
a self that is not fully constituted by these rules. This is challenging, since as we have 
seen in previous chapters, a Foucauldian analysis of power and subjectivity is not 
really compatible with an emancipatory rhetoric of ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ desire or 
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voice: “the notion of modern democratic governance is inseparable from self-
discipline, [so] it is impossible to draw a line between an authentic experience of 
reflection and what has already been socialized and disciplined” (Fendler, 2003, 
p.21). Indeed, a related Butlerian reading of identity would suggest that rules and 
their repeated performance are what constitutes perspective in the first place (Atkins, 
2005, p.254), a position that resonates with the arguments made in the previous 
chapter about practice and discipline. 
Reflection cannot, therefore, be about transformation where a ‘real’ self is able to 
emerge by shedding the assumptions that hold it back. This reading of reflection is, 
however, extremely alluring. In our interview, Sam talked about reflection as 
“undoing the script” that disempowers students: 
[Reflection is] actually about recognising who you are and where you are. 
Okay? And actually just taking some time to go ‘hang on a minute. I can’. 
And actually recognising that things don’t have to be the way other people 
try and enforce them on us. Okay? So it it sort of gives you an opportunity 
to [pause] undo the script if you like. (Sam, teacher, UG) 
Like the ‘rules’ described above, Sam’s “script” suggests an externally imposed way 
of being that can be undone by “taking some time” for reflection. Sam admitted to 
not fully understanding how this works, but knew that it did:  
If somebody asked me to dissect the magic of it I can’t tell you, I just tell 
you it’s it’s a blend of things, and I can’t tell you the proportions it’s like 
cooking… it’s an intuitive response to what’s needed I suppose. (Sam, 
teacher, UG) 
Reflection here is described as a magical process of empowerment and emancipation. 
Sam described fine tuning the “ingredients” of the recipe to keep the magic flowing, 
but I am not sure that it is helpful to mystify reflection and its workings to this 
extent. If ‘real’ reflection is positioned as a magical state of enlightenment, our 
ability to critically examine it is limited. As we have already seen, a lack of critical 
perspectives contributes to the “practices of mystery” (Lillis, 2001) that disadvantage 
students in their approaches to high-stakes reflection. 
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In my view, transformation has to be understood as a matter of shifting subjectivity, 
not as deep changes to an essential selfhood. Subjectivity is best understood as 
always in process, and so shifts are commonplace, part of the negotiations that take 
place as a result of the discursive nature of subjectivity: 
Subjectivity is a discursive effect, a character in a story as much as the 
‘author’ of the story. Representations of the self, instead of being seen as 
‘truth’, need to be seen more usefully as stories, often very powerful 
stories, which perform a variety of social functions, including the 
construction of selves with appropriate characteristics. … Subjectivity is 
never a once-and-for-all construction, and the experience that meaning can 
have is never permanently fixed. …Subjectivity is therefore always 
shifting and uncertain and has to be continually ‘re-formed’. (Usher, 
Bryant, & Johnson, 2002, p.88)  
By approaching subjectivity as a process, we can demystify transformation and view 
it as a response to the uncertainty and iterativeness of subjectivity. To initiate, and 
then channel, these shifts in a particular direction could be seen as the purpose or 
project of both reflection and education more broadly. This is a purpose that may still 
be complex and contestable, but which at least has the benefit of being open to 
analysis. 
The metaphor of the mask helps here, by alluding to transformative rituals that are 
about performance, display and subjectivity: 





Since Masks are themselves 
transformations they are used also as 
metaphors-in-action, to transform events 
themselves or mediate between 
structures. That is why they so often 
appear in rites of passage. In particular 
they are often conductors, exemplars and 
operators in those innumerable initiation 
sequences which enact the death of the 
old self and the rebirth of a new one. 
(Tonkin, 1979, p242) 
By changing face, masked individuals enact the stories of their culture and the 
passage between states of subjectivity. These are social, formal and performative 
rituals. In reflective writing, we could consider the writing itself as the ritual mask – 
the engine of initiation that Tonkin describes. 
Students and teachers describe reflection in ways which could be compatible with 
this understanding of transformation. For example, some of my interviewees 
described reflective writing as a process of developing ideas and understanding. This 
aligns with the work of Richardson (1994), who talks about writing as a process of 
transformation through developing insight. Kate explained the benefit of reflective 
writing in much the way that Richardson describes, as a method of inquiry:  
The writing process certainly helps, I think… by the end of my paragraph, 
I could have changed completely, just because the process of writing seems 
to help me inform my opinion. (Kate, student, PG) 
Eileen said that reflective writing provided her with a shift of subjectivity in the form 
of seeing her own behaviour through another’s perspective. She described the 
process as making her less “selfish”: 
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Eileen (student, UG): I think [reflection] makes you more aware how you 
work and how you are. And, um [pause] it [pause] it sort of teaches you 
not to be selfish, I suppose, because you you do sort of end up, um, 
considering how what you’ve done or what you’ve said affects other 
people. 
Jen: That’s interesting. Yeah, I never, yeah, I never thought about it like 
that before. 
Eileen: No, because I think that you, you can do things and you don’t even, 
if you don’t consider the impact of what you’ve done, then, um, if you’d 
done something that, let’s say, wasn’t quite right or has offended 
somebody then, unless you’re actually sit and analyse it, how are you 
going to change your behaviour?  
For Eileen, these were emotional or even moral shifts – ontological rather than 
epistemological. There is a sense of riskiness here, because the changes that are 
taking place are highly personal. Indeed, Dave explained that transformation was not 
a safe or comfortable experience. He described himself as having been “stretched” 
by his experiences: 
I don’t think it would be a proper degree or it wouldn’t be a proper course 
or it wouldn’t be a proper job at the end of it unless there was an element 
of stress and an element of you know sort of soul searching and … this 
degree probably stretches me to a sort of to a level which is slightly 
uncomfortable which is probably a good thing. (Dave, student, PG) 
The element of stress that Dave describes, and the discomfort of being changed by 
the experiences of his course, was seen as “proper” and probably beneficial. In the 
final section of this chapter, I will discuss risk and discomfort more, in the context of 
speed and webness.  
First, though, I want to look in more detail at the association of reflection with 
contemplation, integration and introspection in time-rich contexts. In the next 
section, I will explore the notion of time, and argue that the fantasy of “slow time” 
(Eriksen, 2001), so vital to ideals of reflection and to higher education more 
generally, obscures the actual practices of teachers and students. 
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“And time, whoʼs got enough time? Nobody.”: time, 
online reflection, and higher education 
The literature on reflection in formal learning generally assumes an ample supply of 
time, and positions students as time-rich. There can therefore be no reason that 
prevents students from ‘making time’ to reflect, other than a lack of commitment to 
the process. This vision of the privileged student, one with nothing to do other than 
study, fits poorly with the experiences of most of my interviewees. Although much 
has been written about time pressures in the university, generally these are construed 
as impacting primarily on academics (Crang, 2007). However, even full-time 
undergraduates, these days, are likely to be working in addition to studying 
(Callender, 2008), and many mature and part-time students bring careers, families 
and complex life situations into the mix (Yorke & Longden, 2008). Furthermore, the 
experience of placements for students on programmes with a professional focus (as 
all of those in my study have) is generally also one of significant time pressure.  
In addition to these demographic, disciplinary and societal factors, work on the 
changing nature of higher education emphasises the seemingly endless acceleration 
and compression of time itself in a globalised, technological world. In the current 
climate, academics lament the theft of time resulting from neo-liberal reframing of 
academic work and higher education as matters of efficiency, effectiveness and 
output. Workloads are increasing, administration is taking up a larger proportion of 
time, and consumer-students are becoming more demanding (Archer, 2008). 
Furthermore, intrusive and instrumentalising technology is blamed for the 
disappearance of peace, privacy and introspection, while the pre-digital age is held 
up as a haven of contemplation for both teachers and students (Levy, 2007; Menzies, 
2007). This broader connection between time and technology has been forcefully 
made by Virilio (2007) and Eriksen (2001).  
Virilio’s (2007) work has been orientated towards the acceleration and compression 
of time which is ultimately in the service of the military-industrial complex: 
Chapter 9: Transformation, shifting subjectivity, and time 
 233 
Let’s make no mistake: whether it’s the drop-outs, the beat generation, 
automobile drivers, migrant workers, tourists, olympic champions or travel 
agents, the military-industrial democracies have made every social 
category, without distinction, into unknown soldiers of the order of speeds 
– speeds whose hierarchy is controlled more and more each day by the 
State (headquarters), from the pedestrian to the rocket, from the metabolic 
to the technological. (pp.136-7) 
For Virilio, one of the most dangerous aspects of speed is what it does to our sense of 
place: 
“To be” used to mean to be somewhere, to be situated, in the here and now, 
but the “situation” of the essence of being is undermined by the 
instantaneity, the immediacy, and the ubiquity which are characteristic of 
our epoch. Our contemporaries will henceforth need two watches: one to 
watch the time, the other to watch the place where one actually is. 
(Oliviera, 1996, online) 
Deeply suspicious and critical of technology, he relates automation and the 
“miniaturization of action” to the end of the “finite world” (Virilio, 2007, p.156). 
However, his “reliance on idealized notions of the human subject” (Bartram, 2004, 
p.295) leads him to a simplistic separation of subject from object which Actor 
Network Theory, in particular, has challenged in recent years: 
Absolute spaces and times are meaningless [from an actor network theory 
perspective]. Agency is a purely relational process. Technologies only 
have contingent, and diverse, effects through the ways they become linked 
into specific social contexts by linked human and technological agency. 
(Graham, 1998, p.178) 
Eriksen’s theory of fast and slow time is equally susceptible to charges of 
oversimplification, but focuses more on the sorts of losses that affect individual 
reasoning and learning. His theory describes the disappearance of ‘slow’ principles 
of order, completeness and deliberation. These principles are understandably seen as 
important to higher education, so talk of their disappearance marks a crisis in 
institutional identity for the university.  
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Land (2006, 2011) has applied Eriksen’s theory to practices of networked learning 
and the concept of the digital university. He asks whether networked learning and 
Web 2.0 is inevitably a product of fast time, which replaces slow time (Eriksen, 
2001, p.68), destroying contemplative, sequential modes of thinking and writing in 
favour of speed and superficiality: 
Web 2.0 practices seem caught in an awkward tension, if not disjunction. 
The pedagogical claims made for them seem to be located within, and to 
require the integrative and deliberative logic of, what Eriksen characterises 
as slow time. As digital phenomena, however, they increasingly serve to 
constitute fast time, can only accelerate in their future modus operandi, and 
reinforce the dromocratic principle that fast time drives out and occupies 
the place of slow time. (Land, 2011, pp.64-5) 
Land (2006) contrasts “fragmentation” with “integration”, and emphasises the 
importance of integration in “learners’ construction of new conceptual 
understandings within disciplinary contexts, and the transformative effect that such 
new understandings bring” (p.6). He argues that only “integration” leads to 
transformative learning, and asks if “the long hallowed academic prerequisites of 
slow time, reflection, tranquillity, and solitude” are becoming irrelevant to a new 
“generation” of learners immersed in digital practices (2011, p.68). 
Where transformation is viewed as inextricably linked to slow time, resistance to or 
denial of the digitality of online reflective spaces would appear to be the only option 
for teachers and students who wish to preserve the notion of transformation in their 
practices. The ways in which online reflective practices are framed by teachers and 
students as unweblike (as we saw in Chapter 5) may be in part a response to a belief 
that they rightly belong to slow time and therefore cannot be in and of the web.  
However, it may be the case that contemporary higher education is doing the work of 
squeezing out ‘slow time’ regardless of teachers’ adoption, or otherwise, of digital 
environments for reflection. As Clegg (2010) has pointed out: 
there is a major contradiction in the claims for ‘reflection’ in higher 
education which assumes slow time. The fast time of the academy and the 
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‘empty future’ of policy imply a very different conception of reflection. 
This form of reflection looks to the future as something to be filled with 
employable subjects and new discoveries. The forms of planning and 
reflection involved are also inescapably competitive, individualistic, and 
oriented to exchange value not use value. (pp.358-9) 
Understandably, there is resistance to this vision of ‘fast reflection’. I do not wish to 
deny the value of contemplation, nor to undermine the important insights about the 
relationship of neo-liberal political economies, speed, efficiency and the depletion of 
resources both human and natural that both Eriksen, and Virilio in particular, point 
to. However, teachers and students are not experiencing ‘slow’ time in very many 
aspects of their reflective practices. What they are experiencing is anxiety in relation 
to the lack of slow time, and doubt as to the value of what they can do in the kind of 
time they have available.  
What different sorts of possibilities can speed and fragmentation bring? Land (2011) 
suggests two: that “alternative contemplative and creative spaces” might be forged 
from the digital, or that higher education “might develop new forms of subjectivity 
that accommodate states of almost perpetual liminality, or, at least, quickly shifting 
provisional stabilities” (p.69). Both of these possibilities are explored in remainder of 
this thesis. 
In the next section, I seek to frame speed in a generative way. I offer some thoughts 
about an alternative vision for online reflection that can be fast, weblike, fragmented 
and experimental by design, not by accident. The concept of the “placeholder”, as it 
emerged in a couple of my interviews, may help in linking current thinking with this 
alternative vision. 
Natalie and I discussed the matter of time in relation to reflection, observing that 
principles of reflection-on-action (Schön, 1991), as embedded in online reflective 
practices, imply that there will be a ‘later’ in which to really examine and consider 
things. In contrast, the only time for reflection is very often during, or immediately 
after, an incident or event: 
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Natalie (teacher, UG): There’s stuff you can’t look at til later and then 
unfortunately later comes and there is no time. And sometimes, to be able 
to sort the wheat from the chaff, …you need that bit of time and space …to 
help you review or reflect on the experience and then maybe come to some, 
a different conclusion or, eh, make more sense of it, um, when the thing’s 
not so raw and fresh in your mind. …And time, who’s got enough time? 
Nobody. 
Jen: Nobody [laughs]. Yeah, so in a sense, sometimes we’re kind of 
collecting stuff up, with a view to looking at it later, and there isn’t going 
be a later, really.  
Natalie: …you’re reflecting whilst you’re actually doing it. I don’t know 
whether that’s good, bad or indifferent, but it’s better than nothing. 
Jen: Yeah. Does the e-portfolio, or the portfolio model, really support that 
kind of reflection in action? 
Natalie: …No. Um, it would support the student reflecting on [pause] what 
had happened. …and most e-portfolios are PC based… you’re in the 
middle of a stressful situation – ‘Just hold on, while I just log on to [my e-
portfolio] so I can reflect in action’. 
Natalie suggests that there is a value in putting ideas and experiences aside for a 
while – to allow them to become less “raw and fresh” before reflecting on them – but 
that this value cannot be taken advantage of in the context of a higher education 
course or programme because there is so little time available. Penny made a similar 
point, talking about even longer timescales: 
The reflective parts of the [assignments], they’re doing it as they’re doing 
the course and I’m not sure that that’s the best point at which they should 
be reflecting. Um, it’s as I say that, only 20 years later, have I worked out 
why we did certain things in a certain way for [a course I took]… when 
you’re reflecting as you’re doing a course, for example, you’re having a 
learning experience, you’re [pause] kind of putting in a placeholder. 
(Penny, teacher, PG) 
The idea of immediate reflection as a “placeholder”, as Penny described it, aligns 
with the comments made earlier by Dave and Mona about appreciating later on what 
they had done, when they returned to their reflections after the end of their course. 
The persistence of some online reflective environments could support this, as Megan 
suggested when talking about being able to access past knowledge and reflection 
through the blog search facility: 
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The blog’s very useful for being able to go back and sort of going ‘okay so 
that’s what I thought about that’ or ‘that’s what I meant’, and you can sort 
of search through the text and so it sort of, it became more evident that it 
was useful. (Megan, student, PG) 
In this sense, the traditional notion of slow, contemplative reflection may be replaced 
by alternative modes of reflection more appropriate to the digital, and to the notion 
of shifting subjectivity. Clegg and Bufton (2008) observe that time, in the sense of 
“time management” and “organisational skills”, is of central importance to students 
in their understanding of their own learning and development. Rather than viewing 
this as a superficial or ‘surface’ concern, as much of the literature on personal 
development planning does, the authors suggest that “time itself might be much more 
complex than appears and that wrestling with time constitutes a major and necessary 
preoccupation for students” (p.14). The same observation can be made in relation to 
‘placeholder’ reflection – it may disguise complex practices and preoccupations. The 
placeholder could provide a new way of thinking about reflection as a series of 
standalone fragments of content that function across and through time, that can be 
repeatedly returned to, remixed, reconfigured and worked with. This concept will be 
explored in the concluding chapter. 
Hemmi, Bayne and Land describe the volatile communicative landscapes of social 
media as products of speed and fast time, contrasting this with the “cloistered, 
analogue academy” that requires “slow time” and “reflection” (Hemmi, Bayne, & 
Land, 2008, p.29). They suggest, though, that there are “potentially radical and 
challenging effects of the new media formations” (ibid), and that universities may be 
starting to work with (as well as against) these. It does not seem that online reflective 
practices in higher education have yet embraced the radical challenges of speed and 
volatility. Speed may bring some valuable rewards: the energy and freedom to 
experiment, for example. Could ‘fast time’ and online reflection be seen differently? 
And what would the consequences be, if so? 
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“The exercise of the blog was to take some risks”: 
speed, experimentation and bricolage in online 
reflection 
Tensions and uncertainties around online subjectivity were discussed at length in 
Chapter 2. Attachment to ‘slow’ time, and its importance in reflection, has prevented 
certain sorts of conversations about online reflection from taking place. Many current 
learning theories are inadequate to address “the complexities of agency, discursive 
practice, identity and subjectivity within virtual learning environments” (Land & 
Bayne, 2002, online). Humanist theories which underpin reflection:  
posit learners primarily as unified and stable subjects. Such analyses tend 
to emphasise and privilege notions of interior processing (the ‘deeper’ the 
learning the better) and cognitive restructuring. Transformation is sought to 
a more reflective ie more fully interiorised, individualised and unified 
subject. (ibid)  
However, in framing online subjectivity as a space of liminality, we can get a 
glimpse of what a weblike reflection could be like. Meyer and Land (2005), in their 
writing about threshold concepts, suggest the concept of liminality as a space where 
subjectivity is in flux: “Liminality appears to be a ‘liquid’ space, simultaneously 
transforming and being transformed by the learner as he or she moves through it” 
(p.380). 
Land (2006), as we saw in the previous section, suggests that ‘fast time’, associated 
with digitality, is incompatible with the sorts of “integration and synthesis” that take 
place in a liminal space (p.6). However, digital environments can be, and often are, 
spaces where liminality and liquidity are foregrounded because of the instability of 
digital texts, of authority and of self-representation. As Bayne (2010) argues, “when 
used well, [volatile digital spaces] open us to vibrant new domains where generative 
intellectual uncertainties might be nurtured” (p.7). Intellectual uncertainty need not 
stop at the door of reflection. Indeed, to assume that it does is to reify and disguise 
the nature of subjectivity, which is a matter of “liminal transformation”, as Haraway 
(2007) puts it: 
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To recognize ‘oneself’ as fully implicated in the world, frees us of the need 
to root politics in identification, vanguard parties, purity and mothering. 
…This is not just literary deconstruction, but liminal transformation. Every 
story that begins with original innocence and privileges the return to 
wholeness imagines the drama of life to be individuation, separation, the 
birth of the self, the tragedy of autonomy, the fall into writing, alienation. 
(p.54) 
In contrast, a cyborg or posthumanist reading of subjectivity foregrounds 
entanglements of conditionality: 
Central to [a] post-human condition could be (rather than should be) 
entanglements in the world that entail practices of conditionality, including 
fallibility – experimentation and the possibility of failure (i.e. things falling 
apart) and responsibility – responding to others and otherness. (Edwards, 
2010, p.7) 
A digital sensibility, as explored at the end of Chapter 5, might push us towards 
theories of posthumanism that would see transformation as an increasing awareness 
of the lack of boundaries between ourselves and our worlds. Digital environments 
can be disruptive spaces that demand a reflexive stance (Macleod & Ross, 2011). 
When these sorts of issues are allowed to emerge (and often they are not, as we also 
saw in Chapter 5), they can propagate shifts in subjectivity for both students and 
teachers. In this sense, perhaps we should back away from aligning digitality with 
negative ‘fast time’, and instead consider it in terms of generative liminality and 
speed. Instead of seeking transformation to greater unification and interiority, which 
is the goal of humanism, the speed and looseness of digital flows presents an 
opportunity to look towards fragmentation, gatherings and a posthumanist 
sensibility.  
Speed also gives us small, fleeting openings through which to experiment, to take 
risks, and to create work that is ephemeral and liminal by design. The concept of 
‘bricolage’ might contrast here with a slow time approach of ‘scaffolding’22. Where 
scaffolding is about stability, safety, caution and protection, bricolage is about 
                                                
22 Thanks to my colleague, Mae Shaw, for suggesting this connection. 
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experiment, precariousness, and unlikely combinations of ideas or materials. 
Scaffolding can be problematic if it creates constraint, as we saw in Chapter 7, and 
also because attempting to stage concepts in a safe and slow way can produce 
oversimplifications that prevent more complex understandings from emerging: 
When teachers introduce, or ‘scaffold’, a naïve version of a threshold 
concept (in that it is a deliberately simplified and limited delineation), it 
seems to act to a certain extent as a proxy for the threshold concept. But… 
the concept offered appeared to have an enchanting, beguiling or ensnaring 
effect, simultaneously promising understanding but curtailing it at the same 
time by seeming to close down further avenues of enquiry or complexity. 
(Meyer & Land, 2005, pp.381-2) 
Bricolage, in contrast, welcomes experimentation and complexity. The term emerged 
from Levi-Strauss’s (1966) anthropological work on what he saw as contrasting 
(‘western’ and ‘primitive’) conceptions of scientific method, but has since been 
applied in a number of contexts, including learning. Turkle and Papert (1990), 
observing children learning to write computer code, describe “bricoleurs” as having 
an orientation towards writing that is characterised by play: 
Their work at the computer is marked by a desire to play with the elements 
of the program… The bricoleur resembles the painter who stands back 
between brushstrokes, looks at the canvas, and only after this 
contemplation, decides what to do next. For planners, mistakes are 
missteps; for bricoleurs they are the essence of a navigation by mid-course 
corrections. (p.136) 
In Chapter 7, in my discussion of the value of the blank page, I described the anxiety 
that comes along with starting continually from scratch, and called this a necessary 
part of being a writer. Speed and digitality might make this process less intimidating, 
if it is viewed as a process of continual experimentation undertaken with a light, 
quick touch. Chandler (1998, online) emphasises the iterativeness of web based 
spaces of self-expression: 
No version of the resulting text need be regarded as final – completion may 
be endlessly deferred in the medium in which everything is always ‘under 
construction’. Bricolage is not merely a ‘reflection’ of the bricoleur, since 
long-term engagement in regularised practices may also contribute to 
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shaping the user’s values. Bricolage may transform the bricoleur as well as 
the materials.  
Many creative writing manuals advise exercises that foreground speed and 
experimentation over careful construction, for the very reason that they provoke 
creativity and lateral – perhaps liminal – thinking (Goldberg, 2005).  
Some students do describe taking risks in the online reflective environment. Alex 
characterised his blog in terms of the risks he was willing to take there, as opposed to 
in a discussion board with peers: 
Alex (student, PG): I suppose it’s a different style of communication as 
well where you can write things that you haven’t formalised as well as you 
might have on the discussion board, so it was good to be able to be wrong 
a bit more than you could be in the discussion board. 
Jen: Yeah. What do you mean by wrong? 
Alex: Well, take a risk and say something that you weren’t sure about. 
…you could say, um ‘this is an idea I’m tossing around and it might be 
really stupid’, but [pause] you could kind, you felt a bit more comfortable 
doing that… my tutor …would encourage that kind of risky thinking 
anyway, cause he knew that that was the exercise of the blog was to to take 
some risks and and experiment with your ideas. 
The reflective space as a space of “tossing around” ideas, of experimentation with a 
light touch, of risk that is not really too risky because it is fragmented and fast, would 
seem to fit well with digital environments. Digital environments which are truly 
digital – which allow for hypertext and for multimodality – are even more amenable 
to experimentation. For Peter, the online reflective space contrasted favourably with 
the “turgid” work students produce in paper form: 
Students have to provide evidence that they’ve met these [professional 
standards]. And traditionally they do, they’ve done this, in the programme 
I’m working in and most [similar] programmes up and down the country… 
is by writing lots of text… And generally speaking these documents are 
very turgid and not really very easy to read, and they don’t give a very 
clear indication of the student’s um, what the student’s actually been 
about… by the time you’ve read number six or number seven you know 
you, you’ve lost the will to live. (Peter, teacher, UG) 
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He associates text with dullness, and perhaps that is part of the story: some kinds of 
online spaces can free students up to be stranger and more imaginative than their 
offline strategies permit. Teachers who explicitly support risk-taking in the online 
reflective environment see its value in the nature of the work that students produce: 
We make it quite explicit that the weblog is about their voice and about you 
know, and if they want to experiment with the weblog form then we really 
encourage that, and some students really do. …there’s one guy a couple of 
semesters ago who did it all in the form of dialogue, kind of, he used to 
make up little mini playlets in each posting. It was brilliant, it was really 
stimulating, so, a lot of the students take a really creative approach to the 
writing of the, of the blog and that we, we encourage that too. (Jane, 
teacher, PG) 
A critical and conscious appreciation of what webness can offer helps us to reframe 
reflection for a digital context that has positive gains, not just losses. It also presents 
challenges to assessment which are the same ones that teachers encounter at every 
turn in trying to use innovative online methods for writing. However, remixability, a 
lack of closure and the transformation of academic discourse are aspects of reflective 
practice in higher education that have always existed, and assessment of reflection 
should always have been addressing these challenges. In bringing together 
assessment and digitality, as high-stakes online reflection does, we have an 
opportunity to look towards truly innovative teaching, writing and assessment. The 
concluding chapter of this thesis imagines some digital futures for high-stakes 
reflection. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions 
This concluding chapter has three goals: to state the contribution that this thesis has 
made to understandings of high-stakes online reflection in higher education; to point 
the way for future research in this area; and to imagine some plausible digital futures 
for these practices. Each of these will be taken in turn in the sections that follow. 
Stating the contribution 
The story about high-stakes online reflection that I have been telling is that it is well 
worth the effort involved in breaking away from a humanist perspective that 
demands for it to be seen as honest, authentic, self-motivated and free. A humanist 
stance demands a denial of the very qualities of addressivity, power and webness that 
make high-stakes online reflection fascinating. Imagined otherwise, reflection 
reveals itself to be multifaceted, challenging and generative. Where problems such as 
surveillance, constraint and normativity are acknowledged, and strategies of 
resistance deployed, new spaces of shifting subjectivity, speed, risk and complexity 
can emerge. 
I am not proposing that reflective practices should retreat to some pre-digital, pre-
assessment state of perfect authenticity. As I argued in Chapter 6, reflection was 
never authentic; critical, ethical teaching demands that we address this if we are to 
compel students to produce reflective artefacts as part of our courses and 
programmes. It does not help when the governmentality and normativity of reflection 
is disguised with masks of authenticity and self-development: on the contrary, it 
makes things worse for students who are unable to figure out the rules of a game that 
is manifestly not the one they are told they are playing. Furthermore, the pretence 
deadens the practices of reflective writing that could emerge as aesthetically, 
ethically and intellectually rich.  
I have argued that a demand for authenticity in reflection is hampering students’ 
engagement with the audience-focused nature of high-stakes reflective writing, and 
the instability of subjectivity in digital environments. Strategic, performative, 
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experimental and explicitly digital engagements with reflection might be more 
generative and more rewarding for students, but achieving these will involve 
deliberate resistance to routines of institutional and professional surveillance, and to 
the discourse of authenticity that pervades reflective practice. Teachers will also have 
to acknowledge their own stake in reproducing practices of division, categorisation 
and regimentation through pedagogies of reflection, and their own positions of power 
in relation to assessment of reflection.  
If teachers can take a critical stance in this way, there are new possibilities for online 
reflection. Giving students more experience of the ‘blank page’, emphasising 
compelling accounts rather than confessional narratives, and encouraging risky, fast 
and fragmented digital modes of reflective writing could open spaces for creativity 
and personal style to emerge. 
Data from my interviews with teachers and students has shown that we require a 
different way forward for high-stakes online reflection. The present lack of criticality 
on the part of many students and teachers is unsustainable, and cracks are already 
showing in the stories that they are telling about their practices. Students are not 
doing what teachers think they are or should be doing, teachers are disappointing 
students by giving them less clarity and support than they require to negotiate the 
tricky practices of reflection, and both students and teachers are uncomfortable with 
aspects of the reflective practices they believe they are engaging in.  
As with any research, there is always more that could be done. What I have 
presented here is neither exhaustive nor flawless. I have in a number of places 
pointed to areas in which more research could, and should, be done, and I will review 
these in the next section, and suggest some further ideas that have emerged during 
the course of this research. 
Future research 
The analysis of interview data has produced a rich and varied set of issues, concerns 
and ideas that have been discussed in this thesis. Alternative modes of generating 
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data would, I think, be equally productive and would build on the arguments I have 
made here. For example, a discourse analysis approach to analysing online reflective 
artefacts would be extremely fruitful in teasing out further the implications of 
arguments concerning the effects of templates and ‘legitimate narratives’ (Chapter 
7), and the addressivity of reflection (Chapter 4). As discussed in Chapter 3, two 
concerns prevented me from conducting such an analysis in this project. One was the 
issue of linking interview data with reflective artefact data, and the risk that students 
(even given pseudonyms) would be recognised by teachers and possibly others on 
their programmes who were familiar with their reflective writing. This could be 
addressed by undertaking a standalone analysis of reflective artefacts, perhaps 
drawing on interview data as well, but not conducting interviews with the students 
who participate in the artefact phase. There would then be no risk of exposing 
students to scrutiny from peers or teachers of what they might choose to discuss in an 
interview setting. 
The other main issue that would need to be addressed in an analysis of online 
reflective artefacts is how to capture the webness of these artefacts. This would need 
to be planned carefully, with a view to storing a copy of a blog or e-portfolio in as 
close to its original online format as possible. This might be accomplished through 
the use of a web-page capture tool23. A combination of textual and visual analysis 
could then be undertaken based on both textual analysis (using Nvivo or similar) and 
analysis of screenshots, for example. Such an analysis of artefacts would sit 
extremely well alongside an interface analysis of the reflective environments in use, 
such as the one briefly sketched in the postscript in Chapter 7.  
A further strand of visual research would be to do more work around asking students 
and teacher to create visual metaphors for their reflective practices. One of the most 
generative experiences of this research was the session I ran with a group of 
undergraduate students, where we discussed the concept of a metaphor and they 
produced visual-textual metaphors of their e-portfolios. Further image-elicitation 
                                                
23 One option for capturing web pages is the ‘scrapbook’ plugin for the Firefox web browser: 
https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/scrapbook/ , accessed 15/08/2011. 
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(Rose, 2007, p.240) of this kind could provide a larger set of visual data that could be 
analysed in a number of ways, including by following a discourse analysis approach 
that would explore the “rhetorical organization” (p.156) of images and their ways of 
constructing the meanings of reflection, disclosure, compulsion and surveillance. 
As discussed in Chapter 8, there is also much that could be learned from an analysis 
that focussed in detail on disciplinary contexts. A project that set a number of 
disciplinary approaches to reflection and professional development side by side and 
explored them in detail would draw out further the issues of complexity, surveillance 
and normativity that were raised here. The postscript in Chapter 8 gestures towards 
the richness of exploring reflection in the disciplines. 
Building on ideas of disciplinarity, another useful direction for future research could 
be to look at reflection and continuing professional development in professional 
practice. Moving out of the higher education context and into the realm of practice 
would, I think, expose some of the tensions that emerge when those who are 
expected to act as reflective practitioners are able to be more critical, and have 
different strategies for resistance, than students, on the whole, can be and have. I was 
offered a number of informal, personal or anecdotal accounts during the course of 
my research that would seem to suggest that such resistance is widespread and 
complex in its presentation. To explore this in detail would be of interest in its own 
right, but would also shed further light on the practices of students and teachers in 
professional education. 
Finally, the new pedagogy for online reflection that is proposed in the next section of 
this chapter – with the key concepts of the spectacle and the placeholder 
underpinning it – could be explored, refined and tested in the context of a course 
design that explicitly set out to do ‘reflective practice’ differently. I would like to 
investigate this in my own teaching in the field of e-learning, and to work on 
educational development resources that could be used to put into practice the 
theoretical perspectives and ideas this research has generated. 
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Digital futures for reflective practices 
As a transitional object, the screen—like Alice’s looking glass—offers us 
passage through a liminal space in which our knowledge, our activities, 
and even ourselves are brought into conflict with the other. This transition 
and its concomitant transformation affect us directly, challenging the way 
we perceive and construct our world(s) and ourselves. In our own 
experience, for example, the seeming constants of language, identity, 
engagement and time were shown to be inconstant and made ‘unfamiliar’ 
through this transition or crossing. (Boon & Sinclair, 2010, p.54) 
The moment of digital transition, as Boon and Sinclair describe it, is a moment of 
both discomfort and renewal. I believe we are in such a moment in terms of online 
reflection in higher education. This thesis has urged a move further into, rather than a 
retreat from, the unfamiliarity that online reflection brings, and I have pointed to 
some of the considerations we will need to attend to in making such a move.  
What could a new way forward look like? What is a pedagogy for risky, creative, 
digital, fragmented reflection? In making proposals about a possible shape of digital 
futures for reflection, I am opening myself to the critiques of those who will see 
reflection differently. I think this is right: I have built a case for demolishing the 
foundations of reflective practice as it stands, and this has often meant taking a 
critical stance towards the current practices and theories of teachers and educational 
researchers. It is only fair to offer something in its place, and that is the purpose of 
this section. I recognise that these proposals are contestable, contingent and require 
testing and refinement, and that will be one of my tasks going forward. 
Two concepts underpin my pedagogy for online reflection: the spectacle, and the 
placeholder. The spectacle acknowledges performance, audience, and surveillance, 
and suggests a playful and knowing orientation towards seeing and being seen. The 
placeholder gestures towards speed and partiality, and offers fragmentation, 
appropriation and creativity in the form of the remix.  
Some of what is discussed below is inspired by my experiences in co-developing and 
teaching a course on the MSc in E-learning at the University of Edinburgh. This 
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course is called “E-learning and Digital Cultures” (EDC), and it makes use of 
strategies of visuality, openness, remix and fragmentation to encourage students to 
explore their own engagement with digital cultures, individually and as a group. 
Since its inception in 2009, the course has been completely open to the web, and 
students are assessed in part on the basis of a ‘lifestream’. The lifestream is an 
aggregated stream of content automatically pulled in from their activities across the 
web, including blogging and microblogging, social bookmarking, and collections of 
‘liked’ and created content on a range of other web-based platforms. EDC is not 
mainly or explicitly about ‘reflection’, but it has features which can inform the more 
digital mode of self-representation that is needed to move online reflection forward. 
These features will be noted in what follows. 
The spectacle 
In the social sciences, the spectacle has mostly been theorised, following Debord, as 
the ghastly antithesis of authenticity – as obsessed with the surface, the image and 
the act of looking (rather than being or encountering), which renders the world 
“hyperreal”, “self-referential” and “abstract” (Harris & Taylor, 2005, p.101). In a 
spectacular culture, “the meaning of images becomes less important than the fact that 
there is a steady supply of images to be viewed by ‘greedy eyes’” (ibid). 
Consumption and access are privileged over context and experience (p.102). 
Debord’s Marxist emphasis on oppression – which underpinned the Situationist 
movement he belonged to – makes his spectacle a one-way, tyrannical imposition. 
Debord’s (1983) work on the “society of the spectacle” has contributed to shaping 
decades of critical responses to the ocularcentric, scopic regimes that characterise 
postmodern society. There is little to celebrate, it would seem, in a world made up 
entirely of superficiality, of passive spectators, and of commodification: “the current 
society of the spectacle is based on the stimulation of visual desire without true 
fulfillment” (Jay, 1988, p.311). However, much as I argued in the previous chapter in 
relation to ‘fast time’, there is in the current digital moment another 
conceptualisation of the spectacle which can offer an alternative: not authenticity, but 
participation and creation. 
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Mid- to late-20th century theories of the spectacle take little or no account of the 
creation of the spectacle, because they are so preoccupied with the effects of its 
consumption. As Dean (2010) has observed, this made sense at a time when most 
images were produced in a context of “broadcast media”, but offers no way to think 
about what she calls the “reflexive circuit” of social media and user-generated 
content: 
Debord offers the notion of the “integrated spectacle” as the highest stage 
of the spectacular society. The integrated spectacle is an element of the 
world it depicts; it is part of the scene upon which it looks. It is a circuit. 
Debord misses the circuitry of the integrated spectacle because his account 
of the spectacle is embedded in a model of broadcast media. …Debord’s 
worry stems from the fact that the images the spectator sees are “chosen by 
someone else”. (pp.108-9) 
As Bayne (2008) points out, “the incursions of the digital add a mutable new 
dimension to decades of theorising of the visible and visual in culture” (p.395). 
Webness positions the spectacle within circulations of power and authorship, and 
needs alternative perspectives through which to theorise the spectacle for spaces 
where people create, appropriate and consume.  
Digital visual culture offers a connection to theories of production and consumption 
found in art and film theory:  
Theories of aesthetics and spectatorship developed within art theory and 
film study …suggest possibilities for studying the kinds of interactivity and 
pleasures associated with the new media genres of digital visual culture 
that focus on surface play and spectacle. (Nixon, 2003, p.410) 
In both film and art theory the apparent position of the spectator is neither absolute 
nor natural; it is variously shaped, contested, disguised and played with by 
filmmakers and artists. Mulvey’s (1975, online) key text on the pleasure of the gaze 
in the cinema describes the source of that pleasure as being taken in by the illusion 
crafted by the filmmaker: 
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What is seen of the screen is so manifestly shown. ...Although the film is 
really being shown, is there to be seen, conditions of screening and 
narrative conventions give the spectator an illusion of looking in on a 
private world.  
Similarly, Fried (1980) observes the “paradox” of the neutralisation of the beholder’s 
presence in paintings and theatre: 
In Diderot’s writings on painting and drama… the very condition of 
spectatordom, stands indicated as theatrical, a medium of dislocation and 
estrangement rather than of absorption, sympathy… [T]he success of both 
arts… are held to depend on whether or not painter and dramatist are able 
to undo that state of affairs, to detheatricalize beholding and so make it 
once again a mode of access to truth and conviction. (p.104) 
Silverman (1992), following Lacan, understands these sorts of complex masking 
practices as hiding a breakdown of the “binarization” between spectacle and 
spectator (p.151). We are all held in “scopic relations” (ibid), and:  
exhibitionism unsettles us because it threatens to expose the duplicity 
inherent in every subject, and every object – to reveal the subject’s 
dependence for definition upon the image/screen, and his/her capacity for 
being at the same time within the picture, and a representative for the Other 
of the gaze… We have at times assumed that dominant cinema’s scopic 
regime could be overturned by ‘giving’ women the gaze, rather than by 
exposing the impossibility of anyone ever owning that visual agency, or of 
him or herself escaping specularity. (p.152) 
The visuality and theatricality of the spectacle comes from being crafted with 
spectators in mind, with a view to impressing them with performances and displays. 
However, students writing reflectively, and teachers reading their writing, are neither 
purely the spectacle nor the spectator. Where students display ‘themselves’ (as the 
exhibitionist does – knowingly and partially), they are both within the picture and the 
representative of the gaze. Teachers are equally subject to the gaze of the Other 
through their students’ attempts to write for them.  
Student-writers are writing to be seen, to produce an image of themselves and to 
engage their audience. As teachers, we should help them produce digital spectacles 
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of reflection that acknowledge the audience(s) for their work, and craft the work 
explicitly towards those audiences. In Chapter 6, I quoted one teacher, Ian, as saying 
that reflective accounts needed to be “convincing” rather than “true”, and I suggested 
this as a possible way forward for breaking the link between visibility of writing and 
transparency of student ‘self’. However, to be a way forward, convincingness, or 
plausibility, in itself needs to be further theorised, and it is helpful to consider what a 
spectacle of conviction might entail.  
In essence, conviction should be seen as an aesthetic rather than a narrative gesture. 
Narrative implies humanist concerns with coherence and consistency, where a more 
postmodern perspective values the loveliness of surfaces and simulacra. Spectacular 
reflective accounts need to be knowing about the craft and context of their 
production; and concern with aesthetic dimensions of reflection can have a 
broadening and contextualising effect: 
The locus for reflection is then not ‘in’ the individual (decontextualised), 
but ‘in’ the total event, involving the embedding of act in a context that 
itself guides or moulds the act. Importantly, the reflective act can then be 
framed as a sensitivity – an aesthetic event rather than a functional or 
technical adjustment. (Bleakley, 1999, p.324) 
In a subsequent article, Bleakley (2000) goes on to call for reflection to be reframed 
as “a reflexive dialogue with language’s registers and aesthetic possibilities, and with 
language’s deep structure as the discursive production of identities through social 
practices” (p.19). Lillis (2001) has made a similar point about student-writers’ need 
for an understanding of context, offering an “academic literacies/critical language 
awareness” frame for teaching students how to write (p.167). This frame emphasises 
language as “socially situated discourse practices”, moving away from other 
conceptions of academic language as transparent, individual, or unconsciously or 
mechanically absorbed (p.164). Many new sorts of questions emerge from such a 
critical and reflexive approach, including how to move away from practices of 
“monologic addressivity… where there is a denial of actual participants” (p.170). 
With her focus on essay-type literacies and texts, Lillis does not explore how texts 
Chapter 10: Conclusions 
 252 
can be produced in other modes, but her frame is equally applicable to digital 
reflective practices.  
The webness of online reflection offers new possibilities for aesthetic practices. It 
offers the screen as a surface where multimodality, hypertextuality and bricolage can 
be played out, and where dialogue can be foregrounded. It also shows how audience 
might be able to be wider than teachers may have previously assumed possible. 
Bringing students together in their online reflective spaces produces new kinds of 
discourse and addressivity: 
The notion of audience for this reflective storytelling was shifting and I 
became aware that the group were not writing for me as tutor but were 
instead calling out to each other. At this point I had to learn to sit on my 
hands at my keyboard and allow the group blog to take on a life of its own. 
I felt both excited and bereft. Now that the shift of addressivity was 
established we began to explore the creative potential of storytelling in this 
online environment. The group shared metaphors, music, image and video 
as their reflective confidence grew. The digital/digitised stories were 
explored with reference to theories and lived experiences and rooted in the 
ongoing shared story of becoming a teacher. (Hughes & Purnell, 2008, 
p.149) 
Opening reflective practices in this way can solve a number of problems about 
addressivity, by providing students with an unavoidable understanding of the 
visibility of what they are producing. This has been one of the best features of the 
EDC course: students engage energetically with one another in the space of their 
personal blogs, and the audience of peers makes itself felt through a vibrant culture 
of comments, Twitter messages (“tweets”) and cross-linkages. Occasionally others 
outside the course have become involved in conversations with students on Twitter 
or in the blogs as well, and student awareness that this can happen adds an extra 
dimension to the addressivity of their practices in the course spaces. Their 
performance of self-exploration is foregrounded, and the effect is a socially situated 
spectacle in which students “call out” (as Hughes and Purnell put it) to each other, 
and to a wider, unknown and unknowable audience who may be lurking beyond the 
footlights. 
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However, such openness must be accompanied by alternative approaches to 
‘authenticity’, confession and disclosure. Convincingness in the spectacle is about 
mastery of form, not authenticity or revelation. The ability to craft spectacle within a 
given genre is a result of critically examining the genre, and reflective practice as it 
stands is very poor at subjecting itself (rather than the student self) to critical 
examination: 
Secular humanism’s grip on the narrative mode may …lead to superficial 
and sentimentalised confessional writing as reflective practice, where 
aesthetic is suffocated. (Bleakley, 2000, p.22) 
The demonstration of competence, so essential to professional education in 
particular, might be undertaken differently than in the dominant personal-
confessional mode. Alternative modes of reflection might encompass both the 
production and analysis of imagery, film and hypertextual accounts of professional 
practice. Fictional and idealised (Hargreaves, 2004) (or perhaps deliberately 
catastrophic) narratives of practice could be produced and then critiqued by 
deconstructing categories of “good” and “bad” practice (Kamler & Thomson, 2006, 
pp.67-8). Creative analytical practices (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005, p.962), such 
as deliberately constructing the same account from a number of perspectives (Bolton, 
2005, pp.56-7), might take the place of more literal “dominant fictional forms” 
(Bleakley, 2000, p.19), while still giving teachers a way to interpret their students’ 
grasp of theoretical perspectives and practice issues.  
Furthermore, through digital practices of tagging and aggregation, the production and 
gathering of fragments of observation, analysis and objects of interest can generate a 
culture of reflection as placeholding – the creation of a resource that students can 
return to, not as a narrative of the past or an artefact of development, but a space of 
continual bricolage in the present. 
The placeholder 
In Chapter 9, the fleetingness of time and space for reflection was noted by a number 
of interviewees, and I suggested the metaphor of the placeholder (first mentioned by 
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Penny, a teacher I interviewed) as a way of understanding what fast, fragmented and 
immediate reflection might be like. Here I expand on this idea to explore the concept 
of digital placeholders in online reflection. 
I propose the placeholder as a taggable, searchable, reconfigurable fragment of 
content. The opposite of a narrative or a “symphonic representation” (Cambridge, 
2010), the placeholder stands alone as an expression of a thought, idea or moment. It 
has value in itself as an aesthetic object, and it can also be combined and recombined 
with other placeholders to create a spectacle of reflection. It is not intended to tell a 
story of development, personal growth or change. The bricolage or remix process 
itself may sometimes tell such a story, however, as students choose from amongst the 
content in their reflective environment to produce a particular effect. 
An important feature of a placeholder pedagogy is that placeholders should be 
created in spaces that are not highly structured, the way most e-portfolio 
environments are. A placeholder begins, always, with a blank page. This might mean 
that students choose to take photographs or create digital images, films, animations, 
wikis, blog posts or audio files. It does not suggest that these activities can be 
conducted in a ‘neutral’ space, because all interfaces have ideological implications 
(as we saw in Chapter 7). However, the ability to experiment with form, content and 
meaning-making in multimodal digital space, and to pull these new forms together in 
various ways, makes for a more exploratory, creative experience than filling in 
blanks on a pre-designed template can be. Modern blogging environments are 
increasingly becoming the sorts of flexible spaces where multimodal accounts can be 
produced and worked with in this way. 
Placeholders can furthermore be worked with through tagging. To explore this it is 
useful to compare the concept of a bookmark (one sort of placeholder in a literal 
sense) in digital and analogue space. A bookmark in a print book can be in just one 
place at a time, and its function is to store one piece of information: “return to this”. 
It is a marker of past interest or a record of stoppage (“this is the place I’ve got to”). 
Many of us probably have books scattered around our homes or offices full of these 
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bookmarks – flags, notes, scraps of paper, receipts, paperclips, folded corners. Each 
one is individual, disconnected from the rest, and has to be sought out and 
deliberately returned to before further connections emerge from it. 
Digital bookmarks are different. They are stored as hypertext, and augmented with 
metadata: descriptions, notes and most importantly, tags. Tags are keywords that 
describe the content of the link being bookmarked. This is a snapshot of a few of my 
digital bookmarks in the online social bookmarking service, Delicious. 
Digital bookmarks as placeholders 
 
Each of the links above is accompanied by a set of keyword tags (in pale grey at the 
bottom right of each link).  
A single tag is emblematic of brevity, surface and speed. It can represent the content 
it tags in only a superficial way. However, taken together, and turned into hyperlinks, 
tags become an evolving and complex “gathering” (Edwards, 2010) of subject and 
object. Ewing (2010, online) has described “hashtags” (the form of hyperlinked tags 
used on Twitter, for example) as “secret doors”, “time machines” and “collisions”. I 
can click on any of my own tags and be taken to all the other links I have given the 
same tag to. The result of that click is a remix of my links. The remix has not been 
deliberately created by me, but it reflects something of my interests over time that 
might be relevant or interesting to me now. It might spark new ideas or connections.  
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I can also, within the same system of tags, go beyond my own collection to see what 
others in the system have tagged using the same keyword. A collection of tags is 
sometimes called a “tag cloud”, and an example from the 2009 EDC course is given 
below (tags that have been more frequently used appear in a larger font): 
List of tags from across a course  
24 
On the course web site, clicking any of the tags above leads to a page with all blog 
posts containing that tag, from all students on the course. These evolving 
folksonomies (user-generated taxonomies) can be markers of community and the 
social space of a course. 
Tags are not really about completion or the past. Rather, they are agents of the 
present, insistently drawing the past out of itself and presenting it anew. They take us 
“from one place to another without traversing time”, and for Baudrillard (1994b) this 
is the true pleasure of speed: 
                                                
24 Source: http://digitalculture-ed.net/tags , retrieved 31/7/2011. 
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What does speed itself mean to us if not the fact of going from one place to 
another without traversing time, from one moment to another without 
passing via duration and movement? Speed is marvellous: time alone is 
wearisome. (p.70) 
A collapse of time, or what Bayne (2010) calls “the problematising of the ‘natural’ 
relation between past and present”, can contribute to an uncanny and posthumanist 
approach to learning which: 
works with the idea of the learning process as volatile, disorienting and 
invigorating, and it also stretches conventional assessment frameworks to 
their limits. In defamiliarising the familiar through creative pedagogical 
appropriation of the digital, teaching becomes newly, and productively, 
strange. (p.10)  
Here, as with the spectacle, access is privileged over context, which is another way 
of saying that context is continually represented, made part of the present moment. 
Each time I reuse a tag – knowingly or unknowingly – I am producing a link, a 
wormhole between my experiences and present and someone else’s (which might be 
a past self). The tag is in this sense the ultimate reflective practice, as it makes the 
past newly generative each time it is used.  
Walker Rettberg (2008) has pointed out a paradox of personal weblogs: those that 
seem most confessional and intimate are often saturated with strategic 
fictionalisation, redaction and caution. Personal-confessional bloggers have to be 
careful about what they say, because their own identities, relationships and lives are 
being exposed to some degree, publicly. Anonymity is called for, but this can be very 
difficult to achieve and can require significant planning and thought. By contrast, 
those personal blogs which are gatherings of matters of interest (topical blogs, for 
example), but not confessional, can be intensely revealing of the shifting priorities, 
subjectivities and practices of their authors (p.121), without the problems of 
confession to contend with.  
What we might gain from a more flexible approach to reflection that privileges 
aggregation over confession, is a rhizomatic (Cousin, 2005), smooth (Bayne, 2004b) 
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digital learning space. Asking students to tag the content they create or curate in a 
digital space is therefore a method by which to encourage a different mode of 
reflection: one that is instantly accessible through time and context, and available for 
reuse or remixing. 
Practices that foreground reconfigurability and remixability are central to digital 
culture: 
Two mutually constitutive features of digital culture: remediation as in the 
remix of old and new media, and bricolage in terms of the highly 
personalized, continuous, and more or less autonomous assembly, 
disassembly, and reassembly of mediated reality. (Deuze, 2006, p.66) 
As dominant ‘vernacular’ forms, these practices are inevitably making their way into 
formal education (Carpenter, 2009), but are also contested there, as they are seen as 
coming into conflict with core academic values of textual supremacy, individual 
authorship and originality. At the same time, some teachers and educational 
researchers are arguing that the remix represents a fruitful lens through which to 
consider creativity: 
Regardless of context – be it literary text or commonplace book or audio 
performance – [remix] is identified as a means of invention and a source of 
creativity. (Yancey, 2009, p.6) 
It may also be central to pedagogical design: 
From fixed and immutable, curriculum needs to conceptualised as content 
for meddling with. And this means a significant shift in what many 
teachers prioritise in their teaching. While the written text remains 
important, the remixable curriculum demands that the contribution of other 
‘non-text’ media – visuals, animation, sound – be elevated from their 
currently marginal status in an overwhelmingly text-dependent curriculum. 
(McWilliam, 2005, p.7)  
As has been argued throughout this thesis, ‘experience’ is not a sacred category of 
knowledge that can never be questioned; it is constituted by and through its telling, 
and the context of its production. More creative and fragmented modes of 
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representation would emphasise the malleability of experience, and could give 
students new ways of understanding the academic and professional identities they are 
(re)producing – it could make experience into “content for meddling with”. Remix 
shakes things up, and offers new perspectives, and it is here that its value for 
reflective practices may be most apparent: 
Representing material in a kaleidoscope fashion …affords ambiguity in a 
positive sense. Fracture and vignette allow sorting and resorting (or 
remixing). They can help resist ordinality, a given hierarchy of things. 
Thus, they avoid teleology (looking at the end of the story). (Bowker & 
Star, 2007, p.279)  
Remix challenges our categories of “coherence” and “consistency”, and shows us 
that “consistency or coherence can only be achieved in theory and not in practice. Or 
consistency depends on non-coherence” (Law, 2004, p.92). Using the example of the 
cinematic flashback, Jarrett (2004) draws attention to the “temporal montage” that 
blogging makes possible, and argues that the blogger’s subjectivity is “unfixed” by 
its continual assemblage and re-assemblage: 
The assembled subjectivity of the blogger is never fixed, but always 
becoming. The dynamic nature of the content of a blog and thus of the 
selective representation of Self effected by the blogger renders it an 
unfixed subjectivity. De-centred and re-centred by each new entry, the 
subject who is represented by a blog is the epitome of the postmodern 
identity Poster sees reflected in the database. (online) 
Burgess (2007) calls remix “the more spectacular end of the DIY media continuum” 
(p.8), and in large part this is because, like any good spectacle, its focus of 
production is on an eventual audience. The success of a remix depends heavily on 
the presence of a discourse community that can interpret it (Knobel & Lankshear, 
2008, p.28), and so a focus on remix in reflection will need a more social context 
than has traditionally been provided for reflective practices. 
In the EDC course, the lifestream is an example of a placeholder pedagogy. Though 
content in the lifestream appears in chronological order, the combination of sources 
that ‘feed’ into it create a fragmented spectacle rather than a coherent narrative. Each 
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week, students review this spectacle and draw their own connections and conclusions 
about what the content from the week has ‘revealed’ to them about their learning. 
This practice, repeated for 12 weeks, merges into the stream, as the weekly reviews 
are incorporated into the lifestream itself. The end result is a posthumanist 
“gathering” (Edwards, 2010), a machinic remix of the various online actions of each 
student, punctuated by sense-making exercises which – often playfully – attempt to 
impose order on the fragments of the week. Here is an excerpt from one such 
ordering exercise: 
Making sense of fragments 
(Gibb, 2010, online)  
This student, working within the constraints of an online cartoon generator (Pixton), 
produced weekly comics summarising the key issues that emerged that week in his 
lifestream. This comic’s meaning emerges from both its text and its imagery (for 
example, the replicated self, the juxtaposing of natural and built environment). It is 
both personal and spectacular – designed for an audience of his peers and teachers, 
part of a discourse community that will recognise the references he makes. 
Another student on the same course explained at the end of the course why the 
lifestream was not of the past: 
Comments I made, notes to myself at the beginning, are far enough from 
me now in time that I can look and be inspired anew, or reminded of things 
I thought I would do and have forgotten – or haven’t started yet. This isn’t 
the past, it’s a guide for the future, for me anyway. (Boyd, 2010, online) 
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Marvellous digital speed and fragmentation brings the past into the present, where it 
can be taken up and made anew. 
In closing 
In our interview, Floyd mentioned that he felt there were many complicated aspects 
of reflection that he would want to understand better before he would be prepared to 
do what his teachers had done, and summatively assess reflective writing. I asked 
him to say more about this, and he replied: 
Floyd (student, PG): I think it must tough for an assessor to do, because 
how, how, what kind of, uh, assumptions are they making about the 
reflection …I mean, how do you train somebody to write reflectively, and 
then how do you train somebody to mark reflection? They, I would hope 
that they’ve got a pretty deep understanding of reflection and then, on top 
of that, have, eh, understanding of some of the issues that [pause] that uh 
can impact on reflection… 
Jen: And do you have the impression that the [teacher], who was marking 
your work for this course, did have that kind of deep understanding of how 
to assess reflection? 
Floyd: I assume so… They’re teaching the course and they’re asking for 
me to to do it and, I guess, I’m just making an assumption that they know 
what they’re doing. Or they bloody well ought not be doing it! [laughter] 
I agree with Floyd that responsibility for ensuring that reflective practices are 
ethically and pedagogically sound lies with teachers, in their more-powerful position 
as professional and academic gatekeepers, and in their role as assessors and primary 
audiences for student reflective writing. However, the confidence that Floyd wants 
his teachers to have would be badly misplaced where humanist understandings of 
reflection are left unchallenged. 
As teachers in higher education we are bound up in and constituted by professional 
discourses and institutional demands just as our students are, and our own 
approaches to reflection are neither autonomous nor easily dismantled and 
reconstructed. Nevertheless, high-stakes online reflection needs to be rethought, and 
we need to start by adopting more critical and creative approaches to subjectivity, 
addressivity and webness in reflective writing. These approaches need to be helped 
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along and underpinned by research that demonstrates what the problems are, and 
what possible alternatives might look like. This research has tried to create some 
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Appendix A: Research interview 
schedules 
Questions for students 
about you 
• How did you come to be studying on this course? 
• Have you had other experiences of writing reflectively? What? 
reflection on your course 
• Was reflection an important part of your course?  
• What is reflective writing for on this course? 
• How much did you write reflectively in your portfolio/blog? How often? 
What motivated you to write? 
• Did your tutor read your writing? Comment on it? How did it work? 
• [if relevant] Peer feedback – what was this like? What kind of comments did 
you get? 
• Did you get as much feedback as you expected? Was it the right amount? 
• Are there issues around trust and the student-tutor relationship that are 
different in this way of working? 
• While you were writing, how aware were you of the assessment criteria or of 
being assessed? 
reflection and you 
• What did you get out of doing reflective writing? Do you enjoy it? 
• Are there any problems for you with the notion of reflective writing?  
• Have your feelings about writing your portfolio/blog changed since you 
started? How? 
• Who is your audience for this portfolio/blog? How do you hope they will see 
you? 
• Can you write personal things in your portfolio/blog? Have you? What 
happened/ would happen if you did? 





• How is it to do this writing online? 
• Who owns your portfolio/blog? Why? 
• Have you edited the portfolio/blog at all? Would you? 
• What do you think is going to happen to your portfolio/blog after this course? 
After you graduate? Will you continue on with your portfolio/blog? What 
will you use it for? 
• What kind of identity did you construct (or reveal) in your portfolio/blog? 
• Do you have other online identities besides this one? What is the relationship 
between your identity in this portfolio/blog and your other online identities? 
• Have you shared your portfolio/blog with other people besides your 
tutor/peer feedback group? Why? What has happened? 
 [ask them to draw or describe a metaphor for their portfolio/blog] 
Questions for teachers 
about you 
• Can you tell me something about your involvement with this course? (how 
long teaching, own background) 
• Do you do reflection yourself in any context? What do you do? 
• What do you personally think reflection is for? 
reflection on your course 
• Can you describe how reflection is incorporated into your course? How is it 
assessed? What does it count for? 
• What led to reflection being done in this way? 
• Is reflection an important part of your course?  
• Are your practices conventional in this area of study?  
• How are students on your course supported to be reflective? 




• Are there any problems for you with the notion of reflective writing? 
• Are there any awkward power issues involved for you in this way of 
teaching? 
student reflection 
• How ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ does your students’ reflection seem to you?  
• What kind of identities do you think students negotiate or manage when 
writing in this way? 
• Do students ever address you in their reflective writing (implicitly or 
explicitly)? What do you make of that? How do you respond? 
• Do you think of yourself as an audience for your students? What kind of 
audience are you? 
• Do you think your students enjoy doing reflection? (who does/doesn’t? why?) 
• Do you enjoy reading your students’ reflection? Why (not)? 
• Has a student ever shared information in their reflections that you felt was too 
personal? How have you responded to this? 
• What makes a good reflection? A bad one? 
working online 
• Who owns the reflective spaces students use? Why?  
• What happens to the students’ reflection after the course? After the students 
graduate? 
• How would you describe what students are doing when they reflect? (Are 
students being themselves? Constructing an identity? Performing?) What 





Appendix B: Information and consent form 
for research participants 
Form for students 
Research project: Online reflective practices and performances in higher education 
Participant Information and Consent Form for Students 
As part of my PhD research in the School of Education at the University of 
Edinburgh, I am talking to lecturers and students in the UK whose courses or 
programmes involve ‘high-stakes reflection’ online. This means reflective blogs or e-
portfolios which are assessed and count towards your grade, or which are used as 
evidence for progression or membership in a profession or professional body. I am 
hoping to learn about how students and lecturers negotiate issues of identity, 
authenticity, ownership, privacy and performativity in high-stakes online reflection. 
I am very grateful that you have agreed to be interviewed, and to share some of your 
reflective writing with me. The interview questions themselves will be very open-
ended. I am interested in hearing about your thoughts about and experiences with 
reflective writing, working online, and your expectations and ideas about 
authenticity, authorship and identity in online reflection. The information you share 
with me will help me to understand more about how reflective identities are 
constructed and performed, and will help inform the future direction of my research. 
I will be extremely careful to make sure that no identifying information is used in 
any reports or publications arising from my research. In particular, as your lecturer 
could potentially recognise an extract from your reflective writing, I will be cautious 
about how I use this material. I will also be mindful of my publication timeline to 
ensure that your course is completed before publishing anything potentially 
recognisable to your lecturer. 
The following questions aim to ensure that you are aware of my role and the kinds of 
uses I will and won’t make of the information you share with me today or in the 
future. If you have any queries at all, please get in touch with me, Jen Ross, at 
jen.ross@ed.ac.uk 
Please tick the boxes beside the statements you agree with, and sign and date the 




 I understand that I am being interviewed as part of Jen Ross’s PhD research 
project at the University of Edinburgh. 
 I understand the purpose of this research, and that I am able to ask questions 
about it at any time. 
 I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent for involvement at any time. 
 I am willing for this interview to be digitally recorded and transcribed for use as 
part of the research. 
 I am willing for illustrative examples or extracts from any written material I share 
with Jen to be used as part of the research.  
 I am willing for anonymised extracts from this interview to be used as part of the 
research.  
 I am willing to be contacted about participating in further interviews for this 
project. 
 I understand that the data Jen collects will - though fully anonymised - appear in 
publications relevant to this area of research. 
Interviewee: _________________________________ Date: _________________ 





Form for teachers 
Research project: Online reflective practices and performances in higher education 
Participant Information and Consent Form for Lecturers 
As part of my PhD research in the School of Education at the University of 
Edinburgh, I am talking to Higher Education lecturers and students in the UK whose 
courses or programmes involve ‘high-stakes reflection’ online. This means reflective 
blogs or e-portfolios which are summatively assessed, or which are used as evidence 
for progression or membership in a profession or professional body. I am hoping to 
learn about how students and lecturers negotiate issues of identity, authenticity, 
ownership, privacy and performativity in high-stakes online reflection. 
I am very grateful that you have agreed to be interviewed. The interview questions 
themselves will be very open-ended. I am interested in hearing about your thoughts 
about and experiences with facilitating and assessing reflection, working online with 
students, and your expectations and ideas about authenticity, authorship and identity 
in online reflection. The information you share with me will help me to understand 
more about how reflective identities are constructed and performed, and will help 
inform the future direction of my research. 
I hope that you may find the results of my study useful in developing resources to 
support online reflective practice, and I will send you a brief report of my findings. 
In addition, if you wish to be kept informed of publications or other related materials, 
please tick this box.  (Please note that I will keep your contact details on file, but 
will use them only in relation to this research project, to send you the information 
you request or to communicate with you about your participation.) 
The following questions aim to ensure that you are aware of my role and the kinds of 
uses I will and won’t make of the information you share with me today or in the 
future. If you have any queries at all, please get in touch with me, Jen Ross, at 
jen.ross@ed.ac.uk 
Please tick the boxes beside the statements you agree with, and sign and date the 
bottom of the page. I will leave you with your own copy of this information and 
consent form. 
 I understand that I am being interviewed as part of Jen Ross’s PhD research 
project at the University of Edinburgh. 
 I understand the purpose of this research, and that I am able to ask questions 
about it at any time. 
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 I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent for involvement at any time. 
 I am willing for this interview to be digitally recorded and transcribed for use as 
part of the research. 
 I am willing for illustrative examples or extracts from any written material I share 
with Jen to be used as part of the research. 
 I am willing for anonymised extracts from this interview to be used as part of the 
research. 
 I am willing to be contacted about participating in further interviews for this 
project. 
 I understand that the data Jen collects will - though fully anonymised - appear in 
publications relevant to this area of research. 
Interviewee: _________________________________ Date: _________________ 
Interviewer: _________________________________ Date: _________________ 
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Appendix C: Snapshots of coding using 
tree nodes 
Snapshot 1: July 2009 
This snapshot shows the first page of tree node headings from the category 
“lecturers”. The nodes have not yet been organised into broad themes, and are 
largely descriptive. There is one example of nesting, where the node “staff time” sits 
within “implications for teaching”, but the rest are single nodes with no parents or 
children. 
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Snapshot 2: February 2010 
The first page of tree nodes, still separated into categories of ‘lecturers’ and 
‘students’. This page shows the start of the lecturers category, which now has nested 





Proposed structure, generated in Spring 2010 based 
on theoretical work and coding 
Performance 
• ‘good’ and ‘bad’ reflection, narratives of reflection 
• awareness of assessment 
• competitiveness and academic vs reflective identities (esp re peer sharing) 
• design and visuality? (portfolios) 
• writing for an audience 
Trace 
• archives and compulsory memory 
• privacy 
• (ownership?) 
• being public 
• blogging and literacies 
Disguise 
• hidden power relations 
• surveillance 
• instrumentalism? 
• authenticity and the ‘true self’ – identities vs layers 
Protection 
• revealing and confessing, self revelation 
• strategies of resistance or caution (box ticking, playing the game, silences 
and gaps, superficiality) 
• (ownership?) 
Transformation 
• changing practice and professions 
• personal and professional development and progress 
• subjectivity and voice 
• time? 
Discipline 
• self-discipline, habit 
• talking the walk 
• array of meanings of reflection 
• developing professional/disciplinary ways of writing and thinking 
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Snapshot 3: June 2011 
The first page of the final version of the tree node coding, from which nodes were 
exported into Word files and extracts were selected for use in data chapters. Teacher 
and student data is combined here, and nodes have been renamed to reflect points of 
particular interest.  
Appendix D: Publications relating to this thesis 
 293 
 
Appendix D: Publications and 
presentations relating to this thesis 
Peer-reviewed publications 
Ross, J. (2012). Just what is being reflected in online reflection?: new literacies for new media 
practices. in L Dirckinck-Holmfeld, V Hodgson, D McConnell (eds), Exploring the Theory, Pedagogy 
and Practice of Networked Learning. New York: Springer. 
 
Ross, J. (2011). Traces of self: online reflective practices and performances in higher education 
Teaching in Higher Education, 16/1. 
 
Ross, J. (2010). Was that Infinity or Affinity? Applying Insights from Translation Studies to 
Qualitative Research Transcription. Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 11/2. http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1357 
 
Conference presentations and invited talks 
• “Just what is being reflected in online reflection?: new literacies for new media practices“. 
Networked Learning, 3-4 May 2010, Aalborg, Denmark. 
• “Reflective practices as masks: thinking about online reflection in higher education”. Invited 
talk, University of Glasgow Learning and Teaching Centre seminar series, 13 January 2010, 
Glasgow. 
• “Reflective practices as masks: a new way to think about reflection in higher education”. 
Society for Research into Higher Education conference, 8-10 December 2009, Newport. 
• “Personal, professional and academic voices in online reflection: new literacies for new 
media practices”. Invited talk in the research students session of the ESRC-funded Literacy 
in the Digital University seminar: The relation of new media practices to traditional literacy 
practices in the academy and the professions. University of Edinburgh, 16 October 2009. 
• “Was that infinity or affinity?: qualitative research transcription as translation”. Invited 
seminar at the Translations, Adaptations and Modalities seminar series, Institute of Advanced 
Studies in Humanities, University of Edinburgh. 10 February 2009, Edinburgh. 
Appendix D: Publications relating to this thesis 
 294 
• “Traces of self: online reflective practices and performances in higher education”. 









pre-print version of a chapter which appears in L. Dirckinck-Holmfeld et al. (eds.) 
(2012), Exploring the Theory, Pedagogy and Practice of Networked Learning. 
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-0496-5_11, New York: Springer 
 
Just what is being reflected in online reflection?: 
new literacies for new media learning practices 
Jen Ross 
Institute for Education, Community and Society, University of Edinburgh 
Abstract 
This chapter makes the case that new literacies are required when reflective prac-
tices in higher education move online. Online reflective writing is profoundly in-
fluenced by wider cultural understandings of blogging and personal disclosure and 
risk online. We can see in current blogging practices a convergence of the rise of 
the concept of personal branding (Peters 1997, Lair et al 2005), and what Scott de-
scribes as the “cultural tendency to seek out confessional narratives of self-
disclosure” (2004, 92). This convergence exposes a number of tensions: between 
self-promotion and authenticity, between accusations of narcissism and pressures 
to confess, and between moral panics around privacy and safety and a growing 
sense that online invisibility equates to personal and professional negligence, and 
that the more presence the better. As students negotiate the management of per-
sonal, academic and sometimes also professional voices in blogs and reflective e-
portfolios, they bring in to play writing approaches which are new not in their sub-
stance but in their modality. This chapter proposes a set of (often conflicting) 
norms and expectations widely associated with blogging. These cluster around 
themes of authenticity, risk, pretence, othering, narcissism and commodification. 
It explores how these are reflected in the assumptions and practices of students 
and teachers, and goes on to argue for greater attention to be given to the nature of 
online reflective writing, and a more explicit and critical engagement with the ten-
sions it embodies. 
Introduction 
In this chapter I argue that new literacies are required when reflective practices 
in higher education move online. Online reflective writing in education, whether 
publicly visible, limited to small groups of learners, or restricted to just a student 
and their teacher, is profoundly influenced by wider cultural understandings of 
blogging and personal disclosure and risk online. Addressing this demands under-
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standing spaces for formal online reflection (primarily weblogs and e-portfolios at 
the time of writing) as a new site of practice which takes its meaning from a spe-
cific and complex set of social and technical relations (Goodfellow and Lea, 
2007). 
Reflective writing and practices are an important element of teaching and learn-
ing (and, increasingly, assessment) in many disciplines, particularly those with a 
professional or vocational focus. Reflection in education is generally grounded in 
a humanist discourse of a ‘true’ or ‘central’ self which can be revealed, under-
stood, recorded, improved or liberated through the process of writing about 
thoughts and experiences. This discourse underpins the various projects of reflec-
tive writing in higher education as described by (for example) Boud, Keogh and 
Walker (1985), Brockbank and McGill (1998) and Moon (1999). However, it is 
problematic for two main reasons: it masks the increasingly invasive character of 
educational practices which demand confession and self-surveillance as evidence 
of progress and learning, and it assumes a knowable, malleable yet autonomous 
self at its centre. These problems are greatly exacerbated by the increasingly 
common use of online environments for reflection. 
Despite this, the literature dealing with educational blogs and e-portfolios most-
ly uncritically accepts these tools and practices as beneficial above and beyond of-
fline practices, in terms of efficiency, accessibility, relevance, the enhancement of 
technical skills, and in terms of the ease of finding an audience and fostering 
community and dialogue. Where drawbacks are identified, these are usually at-
tributed to lack of motivation, understanding or technical proficiency on the part 
of students or teachers, lack of institutional understanding or support, concerns 
about privacy and safety in the online environment, or sometimes a lack of time or 
resource to properly implement these otherwise promising technologies.  
There is also very little in the way of engagement with the online subject in this 
literature. Online reflective accounts are assumed to have a straightforward rela-
tionship with the offline selves of students, and few authors writing about online 
reflection ask what it means to create digital-textual selves or what impact reflect-
ing online has on the subjectivity of students and teachers. Where digital differ-
ence is acknowledged in online reflective practices, it is seen to be technological 
rather than conceptual, and beneficial rather than problematic (Butler, 2006, p.12). 
In this chapter, I challenge this technicist perspective. I argue that online reflec-
tive practices are conceptually different from their offline counterparts, by show-
ing one way that they are affected by their digitality: by their association with 
blogging as a cultural phenomenon.  
Blogging is a genre which privileges individual voice, addressivity, and a 
blurred distinction between public and private spheres (Walker Rettberg 2008). 
We can see in current blogging practices a convergence of the rise of the concept 
of personal branding (Peters 1997, Lair et al 2005), and what Scott describes as 
the “cultural tendency to seek out confessional narratives of self-disclosure” 
(2004, p.92). This convergence exposes a number of tensions: between self-
promotion and authenticity, between accusations of narcissism and pressures to 
confess, and between moral panics around privacy and safety and a growing sense 
that online invisibility equates to personal and professional negligence, and that 
the more presence the better. As students negotiate the management of personal, 
academic and sometimes also professional voices in blogs and reflective e-
portfolios, they must bring in to play literacies which are new not in their sub-
stance but in their modality. Literacies are socially situated and multiple practices 
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(Barton, Hamilton and Ivanič 2000; Lillis 2003; Lea and Street 2009), and writing 
both reflects and constructs identities (Ivanič 1998).  The context of writing reflec-
tively online is different from other forms of reflective writing, with different sorts 
of implications for the identities  and practices of the student-writers. 
In what follows I propose a set of (often conflicting) norms and expectations 
widely associated with blogging. These cluster around themes of authenticity, risk, 
pretence, othering, narcissism and commodification. I explore how these are re-
flected in the assumptions and practices of students and teachers, and go on to ar-
gue for greater attention to be given to the nature of online reflective writing, and 
a more explicit and critical engagement with the tensions it embodies. 
This chapter in the context of networked learning 
This chapter defines “networked learning” in two senses. First: as learning that 
involves students being purposefully digitally connected with other people and 
with electronic resources. In 2002, the E-quality for E-learning manifesto declared 
that in “quality” networked e-learning, “connectivity and process is as valuable as 
the substance and focus of the connection” (E-quality Network, 2002). The mani-
festo proposes a balance between content and conversation, and attempts to re-
dress what the authors saw as a harmful fixation on information, at the cost of 
connection. The manifesto was prescient in its insistence on this: a trend towards 
connectivity is apparent in the rise of web 2.0, in subsequent writing about e-
learning, and in more recent popular writing about the web. Goodyear et al, for 
example, warn that “use of online materials is not a sufficient characteristic to de-
fine networked learning” (2004, p.2), and Doctorow has provocatively reversed 
the maxim that “content is king”, claiming that: “conversation is king. Content is 
just something to talk about” (2006). Online reflective practices in higher educa-
tion are complex in their connectivity – they can cover the continuum from private 
to public, from intensely networked to one-to-one. Nevertheless, the foundational 
notion is one of personal engagement in a digital environment for the gaze of an-
other or others (see McKenna’s 2005 work on addressivity for an exploration of 
the effects of writing for a ‘superaddressee’ or unknowable potential audiences in 
digital environments) and the concept of networked learning in this sense most 
certainly applies to online reflection. 
The second notion of “networked learning” I am working with here is of learn-
ing that is immersed in networks and digital flows of information and culture. In 
emphasising the value of the network, quality e-learning is proposed by the mani-
festo as social, communicative and, by extension, cultural. However, the culture in 
which all learning, but especially e-learning, is immersed extends beyond the 
walls of the institution, as Carpenter contends: “[electronic] environments allow 
for and even encourage active integration and dynamic interaction, resulting in a 
mixing of genres and literacy practices that does not respect conventional catego-
ries, divisions, or dichotomies, including the border that separates… the popular 
from the academic” (2009, p.144). Jones and Dirckinck-Holmfeld (2009) make a 
similar claim, that computer networks have a tendency to “disrupt and disturb tra-
ditional boundaries in education” (p.13), including the boundaries of public and 
private which are of great relevance here. I would argue that this is due not pri-
marily to the homogenising power of digital interfaces, as Carpenter claims, or to 
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the extent to which tools “fundamentally mediate both higher mental functioning 
and human action”, as Jones and Dirckinck-Holmfeld (ibid) put it. Instead, as Cas-
tells has argued, organisations (including educational institutions) may trigger, but 
ultimately cannot control, flows of information and communication in digital 
space: 
A structural logic dominated by largely uncontrollable flows within and between 
networks creates the conditions for the unpredictability of the consequences of human 
action through the reflection of such action in an unseen, uncharted space of flows. 
(Castells 1999, p.59).  
Online reflection is highly attuned to its cultural context – sometimes deliber-
ately, as for example with pedagogical designs which aim to ‘harness’ what Duffy 
and Bruns call “a growing impetus towards personal expression and reflection, 
and also the sharing of personal ‘spaces’” (2006, p.34). However, even when not 
intentional, online reflection is perceived by students and teachers in my research 
as part of a wider cultural move towards digital disclosure. The issues of privacy, 
authenticity and risk that attend blogging, social networking and the social and 
digital practices of popular culture are also to be found in the educational practices 
which reflect them. Students react to this momentum towards disclosure with var-
ying degrees of alarm, resistance and performativity – and in ways which can be 
significantly at odds with the stated aims of the reflective practices they are en-
gaged in. Rehabilitating online reflection requires attention to be paid to the ap-
propriateness of those aims in a digital context, and to the literacy requirements of 
practices which are multivocal, personal, and “drenched in social factors” 
(Holquist 2002, p.61). 
Research context 
This chapter emerges from my research exploring how students and teachers 
negotiate issues of identity, authenticity, ownership, privacy and performativity in 
high-stakes online reflection in higher education. By high-stakes, I mean reflection 
which is summatively assessed or has a direct impact on access to a profession or 
professional body. The chapter draws on data from 31 semi-structured interviews 
with students and lecturers from across 8 university programmes in the United 
Kingdom which have a high-stakes reflective component. The programmes span 
face-to-face, online, undergraduate and postgraduate contexts, and subject areas 
including education, social work, built environment, health, and law. Four of the 
universities involved in my study are based in England, and the other four in Scot-
land. I spoke with 14 female and 6 male students, and 9 female and 3 male teach-
ers. The cultural backgrounds of participants was mainly English or Scottish, but I 
also interviewed students from Germany, Italy, Australia, Canada, and the 
Ukraine. The interview extracts cited in this chapter have been anonymised and 
pseudonyms used in place of real names.	  
Participanting teachers defined themselves as doing high-stakes online reflec-
tion on programmes or courses. I worked with constellations of students, teachers 
and reflective artefacts, to situate the data in specific contexts of practice. Partici-
pants took part in one interview, and were also asked for documentary data – rele-
vant documentation about their high-stakes reflective practices in the case of 
teachers, and access to their reflective artefacts in the case of students. 
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Interview transcripts were produced by me in some cases and by an external 
transcriber in others, reviewed in detail, and coded according to emerging themes 
from the interviews and the parallel theoretical work being done to analyse reflec-
tive practices as masks (Ross 2011). The data that is presented in this chapter is 
drawn from work around a broader theme of the ‘trace’ – focusing on the cultural 
practices which make their way into academic practices (as discussed here), but 
also on the concepts of ownership, subjectivity and the archive. 
Having described the context in which this data was generated, I now move on 
to describe six ‘stories’ associated with blogging, and show how these are reflect-
ed in the assumptions and practices of teachers and students. The chapter con-
cludes by proposing engaging more creatively and critically with the digital, and 
with matters of subjectivity and authenticity, in online reflective practices. 
Six stories of blogging 
In the past decade, blogging has become emblematic of the social or read-write 
web, and its influence has been felt in social, political, cultural and professional 
spheres (Bruns & Jacobs 2007). Before Facebook and Twitter emerged to attract 
the indignation of commentators dismayed by the narcissism, pointlessness and 
disregard for privacy that apparently characterises social media, blogging was the 
prime target of such speculations (Nardi et al 2004). At the same time, bloggers 
themselves, along with some social media and business scholars position blogging 
practice as one of authentic self-development, personal branding, or both (Reed 
2005, Dutta 2010). These discourses are now part of the digital cultural landscape, 
and both students and teachers in my research are influenced by them when they 
come to engage in online reflection.  
Lillis describes the writing ‘voices’ of students as being informed by their mul-
tiple identities and experiences. So, the meanings that students attribute to the 
writing practices of online reflection are influenced the social and cultural context 
they are in. She goes on to point out that student writing is also shaped “by the 
voices they are attempting to respond to” (2001, p.46). Where teachers have their 
own tacit understandings of being online, students must feel their way through a 
minefield of overlapping, conflicting discourses in order to arrive at a mode of 
writing which meets the explicit criteria, but also the implicit expectations that are 
being shaped by a broader digital cultural context.  
Poster calls the online domain a “new speech situation” (2006, p.156). He 
frames this in terms of subjectivity, but it can also be framed as a literacies issue – 
it is a new “system of authoring, owning and appropriating texts” (Goodfellow 
and Lea 2007, p.52). Despite the academic setting of online reflection, and regard-
less of the specific tools being used (institutional or commerical weblogs, e-
portfolios, or virtual learning environments), the structures employed are those of 
the blog as cultural product, and teachers and students “read and construe meaning 
from cultural products in complex, nuanced ways” (Carpenter, 2009, p.139). The-
se six stories of blogging are an attempt at capturing different facets of this broad-
er context and aligning them with what teachers and students say about their 
online reflective practices. In doing so, the stories tease out the conflicts and ten-
sions which need to be addressed in developing and deploying these practices. 
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Authenticity: blogs should be authentic and honest 
Reflective educational practices have always demanded confession and certain 
kinds of stories about the self (Hargreaves 2004, Devas 2004, Macfarlane & Gour-
lay 2009, Ross 2011). Online reflective practices, like their offline counterparts, 
often continue to be framed in terms of authenticity, integrity, purposefulness, and 
autonomous selfhood (Barrett and Carney 2005, Stefani, Mason and Pegler 2007). 
However, to move online is to tap in to new modes of representing the self in what 
can feel like an especially public or surveilled space. Authenticity is surfaced in 
online practices, for students and teachers, more explicitly than in an offline mode. 
This is echoed in the blogging literature. 
Bloggers outside educational contexts often appear to see their practice as not 
only necessarily authentic, but visibly so, and reflective of a knowable self 
(Holbrook 2006). As Reed comments, “[bloggers] treat weblogs as straightfor-
ward indexes of self; they commonly assert that ‘my blog is me’” (2005, p.227). 
The perception is that audiences expect and assess the authenticity of a blogger’s 
voice: “aware of the constant possibility that a fictional text may be posing as non-
fiction, readers online have been exhaustive in investigating suspicious texts” 
(Freidrich 2007, p.62-3).  
Students in my research were insistent that they are both honest and authentic 
in their online writing. For some, this is described as natural or intrinsic. Megan 
acknowledged a degree of formality that may be associated with the assessed na-
ture of the writing she does in her online reflection, but insists on a ‘voice’ that is 
uniquely her own, that bridges her online and offline life, and that she makes no 
attempt to ‘cover up’: 
I'm not going to make no effort online, but I'm not going to make any effort to cover up, 
you know… maybe it's slightly more formal in the blog because I know it's going to be 
assessed, but it's the same, there's definitely a voice in there that I think if you had a look 
at my personal blog you you could see a definite, you'd go 'okay I can tell these are the 
same person'. (Megan, PG student) 
For others, authenticity is perceived as a requirement of their course: 
I can't remember whether they said you know 'make sure you're creative and honest and 
free' but I felt like that was part of the criteria somehow, whether explicit or implicit. 
(Alex, PG student) 
Alex expressed no particular discomfort with the idea of being required to be 
authentic in his online reflective space (which was structured as a blog), but nota-
bly the assessment criteria for his online reflection did not explicitly include such 
a requirement. He was not clear himself where the idea of being ‘creative and 
honest and free’ had come from – it was a ‘feeling’ that he associated with the ac-
tivity, rather than an instruction given by his teachers or in his course material. 
The distancing or anonymising effects of the online environment was seen by 
some interviewees to be associated with an increasing comfort with self-
disclosure. Several lecturers on distance programmes saw a benefit to reflecting at 
a distance, because students will not have to face or deal socially with the lecturers 
who see their reflections, and can therefore be more open and honest:	   
some of them are very very honest and up front in their weblogs in a way which I really 
doubt that they would be if, if the pedagogy was a, a face to face you know course with a, 
a written diary or something. (Jane, lecturer, PG) 
 
because they never meet us, they can in fact open their hearts and give very personal 
views about their difficulties, their hopes, their fears, you know, what, what’s going on in 
7 
a way that they do admit, some of them, that they have never opened up to with their 
partners even. …it’s cathartic (Jess, lecturer, PG) 
This openness may relate, as Dyson (1998) predicted, to the way that being 
online is reconfiguring what privacy and display mean, and how they are experi-
enced: 
As people feel more secure in general on the Net, they will become accustomed to seeing 
their words recorded and replayed. They will no longer feel uncomfortable being on 
display, since everyone around them is on display too… Everyone has personal 
preferences for privacy, but they are influenced by the surrounding culture and by the 
surrounding economy. (p.275) 
This shift towards digital disclosure may produce quite personal reflections in 
the digital domain, and this can align well with the desire for authentic reflection 
that underpins reflective practice in many disciplines. Peter picked up on this 
point, and thought that the solitary, asynchronous context of online reflection pro-
voked a degree of honesty and uninhibitedness even on programmes where teach-
ers and students meet face to face: 
some of them were reporting some quite you know personal stuff about feeling afraid and, 
… there’s something about the, I don’t know whether it’s the fact it’s people, you know 
enter their, you know enter their details and write these things in the wee small hours of 
the morning when, you know, they’ve had a few beers or something… and and it’s almost 
like a a confession, like people write in their diaries about. (Peter, lecturer, UG) 
Teachers are often worried about the implications of ‘oversharing’ online, 
though, and this produces a problematic tension for students when they are not 
clear about the line between authentic reflection and dangerous disclosure.  
Risk: sharing too much information is dangerous 
Recent work on youth social media practices has revealed that, as boyd has point-
ed out, privacy remains important, but its meaning is different in mediated spaces, 
where it denotes the ability to “limit access through social conventions” (boyd, 
2008, p.131), and where tactics such as “security through obscurity” replace struc-
tural boundaries (p.133). Despite these tactics, the erosion of privacy online is 
viewed as highly ‘risky’ in cultural discourses around blogging, and the dangers of 
too much disclosure are disturbing for students and teachers. Many experienced 
online disclosure as risky in the sense that it is or has the potential to become pub-
lic, and to be misused: 
I had a guy come to see me yesterday with a [public web] portfolio… and I just said to 
him ‘look, you’ve given up enough information here if someone really wants to, to claim 
your identity’ and he said to me ‘what do you mean?’ and I said ‘name, address, date of 
birth, family name’ and he went ‘oooh my god’ and [I] said ‘so can you take that down 
off your [portfolio] now, can you sort it out’, and I and we went through various 
documents that were on there to do with his portfolio and I said ‘I’d like that off, I’d like 
that off, I’d like that off and I’d’ and it was ‘no no you’ll mark me down’ and I said ‘no I 
won’t. I won’t mark you down.’ (Sam, lecturer, UG) 
Sam’s students are allowed (though not required) to create their portfolios on a 
public web site, but she worries about the implications of what she sees as a lack 
of common sense in their approach to personal disclosure – both factually and in 
terms of what she calls the “darker parts” of reflection. At the same time, the stu-
dent she discusses here clearly believes that he is required to make these disclo-
sures, and fears being penalised when it comes to assessment if he does not. Like 
Alex’s perception of ‘honesty’ as an assessment criterion, this student interprets 
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the task of reflection as a task of disclosure, and this creates problems for some 
teachers who fear the risks and consequences. 
Some students have the same fears, and respond by withdrawing from or re-
moving what is seen as personal from their online reflection: 
Jen: how come you didn’t put, be more sort of explicit about the kind of the depths of 
your soul or however you put it? 
Dave (UG student): Um, because, I mean, again because you’re not quite sure who’s 
going to be reading it, or because [pause] and what I was writing in in the blog was honest 
I just, you know I just wasn’t going to you know go in to the depths. 
Similarly, Beth, an undergraduate student on a campus-based programme, ex-
plained that she would not communicate unhappiness about a course or lecturer in 
her (non-public) e-portfolio, because it would then be “floating around in this vir-
tual, you know, this void somewhere [laughs]”. This use of language is revealing: 
a dangerous void is perceived by some even in the safety of digital walled gar-
dens.  
Much has been written about the moral panics surrounding internet safety and 
risk, especially in relation to young people (Hope 2008, Carrington 2007), and as 
Efimova and Grudin (2007) argue, “people are not careful”. The result is an un-
dercurrent of fear, danger and caution which is certainly affecting how students 
and teachers approach their online reflective practices. This is at odds with many 
of the foundations of reflective practice; where what is personal becomes, through 
the process of reflective writing, fused with other materials of learning in ways 
which allow for independence and creative exploration (Creme, 2005, p.289). It is 
difficult (though perhaps not impossible) to square risk and fear with creative ex-
ploration, and negotiating that process requires more sensitivity on the part of 
teachers to the complex rhetorical strategies that online reflection demands. These 
strategies are not routinely discussed with or taught to students, and this is a seri-
ous gap in an increasingly common digital practice. At present the gap is filled in 
part by an intense concern on the part of students about a discourse of ‘pretence’ – 
they equate strategic performance with dishonesty. The cultural context of blog-
ging positions the web as a medium for deception, and students energetically dis-
tance themselves from such a possibility. 
Pretence: no one is really themselves online 
A key narrative around blogging and online presence in general is that, in con-
trast to the notion of authenticity and the associated riskiness of online disclosure, 
the web is a medium which facilitates deception. Research into online dating (El-
lison et al 2006) and teenagers’ self-presentation in social networking (Bortree 
2005), for example, emphasises the careful and self-conscious crafting of identity 
which goes on in spaces which are, for one reason or another, high-stakes. This is 
a delicate operation, however, as the appearance of authenticity remains extremely 
important.  
I have previously suggested that in educational contexts students may commit 
with extra intensity to ‘authenticating’ the self they perform in reflection online, in 
order to regain or maintain a sense of control in a digital space which invites them, 
as Bayne (2005) has argued, towards a dangerous fluidity (Ross 2011). Adele had 
quite a sophisticated understanding of identity itself as performance:  
you're always performing somehow I mean … [pause] you know I think identity is made 
up of so many shades and it's, you can't really say the one is your true identity and the 
other one isn't. (Adele, PG student) 
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She was, nonetheless, adamant about her authenticity within her reflective 
space: “I don't have the feeling that it's, that I put on a different identity for it. 
[pause] …I never had the feeling that I was making this up”. Identity may be fluid, 
in other words, but it is still under her control.  
One lecturer in my research explained how her students embraced and even 
demanded their tutors’ presence in their reflective space: 
I’ve been able to log on and see what they’ve they’ve been doing, literally on a daily basis 
if I wanted to. We did give the students the option to not have me do that and to take me 
off that facility. What was interesting was, the students were all unanimous in that, no no 
no, they wanted that. …what they were actually saying was that made them think about 
how to use it and how to behave in in terms of recording their reflective journal. (Maria, 
lecturer, UG) 
For these students, having their behaviour monitored was preferable to the 
doubt over their engagement, or of getting it wrong, that not being monitored 
opened up. I think this is partly about being seen to be a ‘real’ reflective person 
who is observable at any time because they are doing what they are supposed to 
do. Alex was quite explicit about this, describing his choice not to edit his blog be-
fore submitting it for assessment because, he explained, he thought it would 
demonstrate his ‘journey’ better: 
I didn't think that assessment wise it would benefit from [editing] cause I thought that it, 
that the assessment would probably include whether there was a journey as well, well 
maybe not directly but I think, it wasn't being assessed as a finished work, it was being 
assessed as a diary, my reflective work, so it doesn't really make sense to edit what you 
thought at the time cause that's still valid. (Alex, PG student) 
The ‘othering’ of the blogger in the press and other popular media produces a 
range of ambivalent positions on the part of teachers and students. Alex’s orienta-
tion towards assessment is also interesting because it suggests a response to the 
problem of blogging being seen as an illegitimate or narcissistic activity – to stress 
the extent to which it is being done as a requirement, externally imposed, rather 
than as a result of a desire on the part of the student.  
Othering: what kind of person would share that with the whole 
world? 
An important aspect of popular narratives of blogging is that they are very of-
ten constructed by outsiders who examine blogging culture and practices from a 
conspicuous distance. There is a discourse of othering running through many if 
not most media reports, editorials and even some academic literature (for example, 
Nardi et al 2004) on the subject, where blogging is very often represented as the 
sort of thing that other kinds of people would do. Sometimes blogging behaviour 
is even pathologised, as in Buffardi and Campbell (2008) and Jacobs (2003), who 
claims that “the very interactive nature of blogging makes it innately supportive of 
both exhibitionistic and voyeuristic behaviours” (p.2). 
This tendency to view bloggers as strange or ‘other’ extends to some of the 
teachers I spoke with: 
I [pause] I don't know why people blog. I, I'm not, it doesn't appeal particularly. [pause] I 
can see having a public voice on the web would be nice, but it assumes that people are 
interested in what you've got to say and it means that you know that you have to have 
interesting things to say every week or twice a week, and that's not really a pressure that I 
particularly want but, a lot of people obviously do, so. (Jane, lecturer, PG) 
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Students, too, make comments which emphatically demonstrate their non-
blogger status: 
Jen: do you think at all about what you do, were doing in [the e-portfolio] as being like a 
weblog? 
Beth (UG student): No, not really. No, I just, I just see it as a means of me getting, you 
know, getting my work done, really. 
Jen: Yeah, okay. Um, and what do you think about kind of blogging, in the world, more 
generally? 
Beth: …I can’t see me doing it. Maybe I feel like I, I honestly haven’t got anything 
interesting to say, but I just think I haven’t really got time and I don’t… And what I think 
I just kind of kind of keep it to myself, I’m not really bothered about spreading it 
internationally! It’s not a, not a great urge of mine, and I just, well, who’d read it, who’d 
really care, you know? 
In order to stake a claim of not being like the people described above, students 
and teachers have to distance themselves from their own practices to some extent. 
They do not want to be seen as one of the strange, narcissistic people who choose 
to engage in blogging practices (writing or reading):  
“I don’t read other blogs really. I’m just not that interested. If people have got something 
to tell me they’ll come and tell me. And I’m not in to the big brother idea. I’ve never 
watched that programme. I just, um I don’t see the fascination that some people have with 
knowing everything about certain people’s moves. (Theresa, UG student) 
 For students, who generally have not had a choice about whether to engage in 
online reflection, the claim is that they are just doing what is required of them, that 
it is nothing to do with who they are; arguably not a very conducive starting posi-
tion from which to develop reflective habits: “a lot of students will start by saying 
'oh my god I hate blogging, why are you, why are you asking me to do this?'” 
(Jane, lecturer, PG). For teachers, who in many cases design these practices, or at 
least are responsible for promoting them to students, the claim would seem to be 
more subtle: that their practices are different, are not of the risky, self-absorbed, 
problematic sort that they can critique as well as anyone:  
I think there’s a big psychological risk to being online too much. You know why do we 
want to go out and, I don’t know … I’ll tell you what I think it is, I think it’s this 
celebrity, cult of celebrity thing” (Sam, lecturer, UG) 
 For both students and teachers, there is a shadow hanging over their online re-
flective practice, one that illustrates the extent to which discourses of blogging 
leak into educational settings. 
Narcissism: bloggers are shallow and self-obsessed 
As we saw above, most discourses of blogging ‘other’ the blogger in ways that 
are problematic for educational uses of online reflection. The most common 
charge is that only narcissistic, self-involved people blog. Guadagno et al (2008) 
claim that bloggers are predisposed towards neuroticism, while Curtain character-
ises the primary emotion of the blogger as one of anxiety:  
Anxiety may be the primary emotion associated with giving accounts of blogging, and 
perhaps of blogging itself — Do I update enough? Why don’t I write? Who is reading 
me? Why aren’t there more? What do they think about what I say? Have I said enough 
about enough… (2004, online) 
The discourse of the self-obsessed blogger is pervasive and problematic for the 
use of online reflection in educational contexts. Some students may be happy to 
claim and perhaps subvert these less flattering descriptions: 
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I'm a show off and loudmouth by nature … So, I kind of feel like I'm happy for anybody 
to see sort of anything about me, I'm the sort of person who has a public profile on 
Facebook. [laughter] (Megan, PG student) 
Megan’s confident construction of herself as naturally ‘showing off’ indicates 
both a clear understanding of the discourse, and a certain degree of powerlessness 
in the face of an intrinsic character trait. Other students are more susceptible to 
anxieties when they are reflecting online, especially when they are aware that their 
teachers can see their work at any time, and may be looking. It is notable, I think, 
how closely Charles’ questions here echo Curtain’s above: 
this kind of kind of dependency like one gets hooked on cigarettes or something 
[laughter], one kind of gets hooked on the tutor and thought, you know, 'oh, why is she 
taking so long to mark this?', you know 'why aren't I getting any feedback now?', and it 
wasn't long at all! …‘oh, she's forgotten about me, oh that's a real shame'. 'Oh, didn't I 
make more impression than that?' [laugh] (Charles, PG student) 
Charles believes that his task is to make an impression on his teacher – and that 
the mark of his success will be if he provokes her feedback. He sees himself as 
having been addicted, ‘like one gets hooked on cigarettes or something’, to her re-
sponse, and both desperate and helpless in the face of her silence. Mallan argues 
that, rather than implying mental health issues on the part of the blogger, these 
sorts of fears of invisibility are a fundamental aspect of the construction of “shift-
ing subject positions” online:  
These subject positions are not just ontological states, but inevitably entail a politics of 
visibility, both at the personal level and at the level of technological infrastructure. It is 
this ‘visibility’ which gives rise to epithets of narcissism and susceptibility. (2009, p.51-2) 
Another possible response to this charge of narcissism is to view blogging in a 
very pragmatic, commodified way, tapping into discourses of employability and 
personal branding. The online context intensifies questions of what should not be 
said, as we have seen, and also about how to put a ‘best face forward’, how to lev-
erage online presence as ‘personal brand’ to best effect. 
Commodification: your online presence is your personal brand 
Within the framing of the web as medium for deliberate self-presentation, there 
is increasingly the notion that it is essential for success in today’s world to nurture 
and manage a highly visible “personal brand” online. This discourse is managerial 
and market-driven: 
A strong personal brand identity ideally can endure for decades… To be successful, 
aspirants must adapt to the growing maturity of the marketplace, competitive threats, 
changes in social mores and values, proliferation of communication channels, and other 
factors that serve to challenge brand resilience. (Rein et al 2005, p.349) 
The personal brand which lasts for decades is cast as not only a benefit, but one 
which can and must be harnessed and controlled by the ‘aspirant’. Cultivating a 
personal brand requires a strategic and calculating posture towards online disclo-
sure and identity, and just the right combination of authenticity and marketing 
prowess. Some students, taking this to heart, are very concerned about getting 
their online reflections ‘right’ in the first instance, and wary of losing control of 
their message online: 
It felt safer writing it in a Word document first. There's something about writing directly 
you know into an online format whatever that is more [pause] live I suppose… I need to 
be absolutely sure that what I'm writing is what I want to write because it might it might 
disappear onto the internet at any time, you know? [laugh] ...maybe it's something to do 
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with um what you, sort of preconceptions of what a blog is and what the internet is …you 
know, that blogs are very public things. (Lynne, PG student) 
Because it felt risky, public and ‘live’, Lynne put off her engagement with the 
online reflective space so that she entered it only when she was sure of what she 
wanted to say. Lynne’s cautious approach would seem to bear out Kimball’s con-
cern that the persistent nature of digital archives may cause students to back away 
from a more spontaneous, authentic process of reflection (2005, p.454). The fear 
of losing something in the web – something which can never be retrieved, but that 
will forever follow and mark its author – is where the risk of disclosure meets the 
promise of the personal brand, and it is extremely problematic for traditional no-
tions of what reflective practice should be about.  
Personal branding also goes hand in hand with a stated need to stand out in 
what is often referred to as an ‘attention economy’ (Lanham 2007). Here again, 
students are aware of and engaged with the possibilities for their reflective online 
spaces, even if it is not immediately intended for a wider audience: 
there's something quite motivating and engaging about just publishing something even if 
it's only to one person… if I wanted to I could share it publicly and I could promote it and 
I could get people to look at it. And even though I'm not doing that I kindof know that I 
could. (Alex, PG student) 
The rhetoric of empowerment and professionalisation that blogging carries with 
it depends to a large extent on a belief in the control of the individual over their 
brand, and the harnessing of the web for the individual’s goals and purposes. 
However, even if bloggers manage only to release aspects of themselves which are 
professionally appropriate, the archive constitutes a form of compulsory memory 
over which individuals have little control: “we do not produce our databased 
selves, the databased selves produce us” (Simon 2005, 16). Database-driven tech-
nologies for storing the data produced in online reflection may, in the case of pub-
lic or potentially public reflection, produce a radical recontextualisation, as “digi-
tal archives allow situational context to collapse with ease. …search engines can 
collapse any data at any period of time” (boyd 2001, 33). A remixed, recontextual-
ised version of yourself may bear little resemblance to the identity you are trying 
to project. The carefully crafted online personal brand is therefore an illusion, and 
a constraining one at that. 
Conclusion 
There is a growing openness in higher education to an e-learning agenda which 
positions new digital ‘tools’ as the answer to market needs, globalisation, and a 
new generation of so-called digital native consumer-students, without an accom-
panying critical stance which would support students and teachers to engage crea-
tively and carefully with digital practices and cultures (Clegg et al, 2003; Goodfel-
low and Lea 2007; Bayne and Ross 2011). These tools and environments are 
neither innocent nor culturally neutral, though, as they are “inscribed with social 
meaning, power relations, possibilities for and restrictions on the expression of 
personal identity” (Goodfellow and Lea 2007, p.128), and their use in higher edu-
cation can produce many points of tension.  
As we saw in the previous section, new pressures and problems are produced 
when reflection moves online. Cultural constructions of the blog as a space of con-
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fession, the reconfiguration of privacy online, and a perceived need to ‘prove’ 
one’s authenticity in the face of a web which facilitates deception sit uneasily with 
the riskiness and danger associated with too much disclosure. Too much disclo-
sure also carries with it the possible charge of narcissism, and the construction of a 
‘bad’ personal brand, archived forever. It is clear that new rhetorical strategies are 
needed to make the best use of online reflective spaces, and that more explicit en-
gagement with the ‘webness’ of these practices is urgently required. In particular, 
online reflection in higher education requires a new orientation towards authentici-
ty that takes account of issues of power, identity and disclosure in the online con-
text.  
Lillis describes a dominant “practice of mystery” (2001, p.74) surrounding ac-
ademic writing in higher education. In her research context, teachers know what 
they want and expect students to know how to deliver it. In online reflective prac-
tices, teachers are in a new and complex space in which they do not always know 
what they want. This is partly, as Carpenter claims, because online literacy prac-
tices are at odds with notions of boundary crossing, joining the club, or “insider-
dom” (Russell et al 2009, p.413) that characterise traditional academic practices 
(Carpenter 2009, p.142). It is also because a discourse of replication is so preva-
lent in the sphere of e-learning, claiming that online practices can be imported 
wholesale from their offline counterparts. This is, quite simply, not so. 
As teachers, we need to review and revise how we induct students into the 
practice of online reflective writing, and what we expect of their online reflec-
tions. This could mean, for instance, being more definite in welcoming students' 
fictions, and their experiments with voice and subjectivity, whether cautious or 
playful. At present students feel they must, at all costs, be seen to be authentic in 
their online reflections, and this, paradoxically, is hampering their understanding 
of  and engagement with a challenging mode of writing. If explicitly offered the 
online reflective space as a space of construction, experimentation and refinement 
– as a challenge to situate themselves as academic and professional actors within a 
particular disciplinary framework –  the need for a strategic approach could be less 
confusing, and more rewarding for students.  
The values of authenticity and personal development need to be reviewed for 
networked learning contexts which are social in complex ways, and enmeshed in 
webs which do not respect boundaries separating vernacular and academic dis-
courses or spaces. Some university teachers are actively exploring these kinds of 
new perspectives, and are both excited and challenged by what they are finding. 
For example, Hughes and Purnell (2008) have been working with e-portfolios, and 
are concluding that: 
the new landscapes may offer exciting ‘openings’ (Stronach and MacLure, 1997) for 
learning and teaching that support the shift from traditional anxious academic literacy 
practices of monologic addressivity to a more fluid and exciting literacy ‘infidelity’ 
allowing for increasing dialogue and exchange within student groups. (p.151) 
More broadly, as researchers into networked learning we should always be at-
tending to networks in both senses described in the early part of this chapter: pur-
poseful digital connections, and inevitable digital flows. In their networked learn-
ing practices, students and teachers are working at the boundaries of the deliberate 
and the unruly, and this is a difficult and fascinating space which would benefit 
from more exploration and creative and critical attention. 
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This paper explores issues emerging from the question of how students and
teachers negotiate issues of identity, authenticity, ownership, privacy and
performativity in high-stakes online reflection in higher education. I examine in
particular the notion of traces as both inscriptions and archives. Working online
amplifies the destabilising and disturbing effects of compulsory reflection, and the
combination greatly complicates the humanist notions that legitimise their use:
that there is a ‘true self’ which can be revealed, understood, recorded, improved or
liberated through the process of writing about thoughts and experiences. Online
reflective practices are implemented without acknowledgement of the difference
being online makes, and issues of power in high-stakes reflection are disguised or
ignored. These practices normalise surveillance of students’ emotional and
developmental expression, and produce rituals of confession and compliance.
Keywords: online reflection; higher education; e-learning; masks; trace;
confession
Introduction
This paper explores conceptual issues emerging from the question of how students
and teachers negotiate issues of identity, authenticity, ownership, privacy and
performativity in high-stakes online reflection in higher education. I argue that
working online amplifies the destabilising and disturbing effects of compulsory
reflection, and that the combination greatly complicates the humanist notions that
legitimise their use: that there is a ‘true self’ which can be revealed, understood,
recorded, improved or liberated through the process of writing about thoughts and
experiences in educational contexts. Online reflective practices are imported whole-
sale from their offline counterparts without acknowledgement of the difference being
online makes, and issues of power in high-stakes reflection are disguised or ignored
in discourses of authentic self-knowledge, personal and professional development,
the improvement of practice and transformative learning. These discourses are not
appropriate to the nature of assessed or otherwise high-stakes online reflection, and
the combination normalises surveillance of students’ emotional and developmental
expression, and produces rituals of confession and compliance. In this paper, I
explore the notion of traces, which refer to both inscriptions (what traces we can find
of gaps, silences or other meanings in language and practices) and archives (the
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traces we leave behind, as with computer-mediated communication). My theoretical
approach is informed by poststructuralist perspectives, in particular the work of
Foucault and Derrida.
Although there are specific technologies currently associated with online
reflection in education, primarily electronic portfolios (e-portfolios) and weblogs
(blogs), I deliberately avoid focusing in what follows on any particular technology,
and instead refer where possible to ‘online reflection’ or ‘online reflective practices’.
Lines between different online environments are constantly shifting and blurring,
and a focus on practices rather than technologies offers better scope for exploring the
issues of interest here.
There is an emphasis in what follows on policy and practice in the UK, which
differs in important respects from, for example, North America or Europe. In
particular, the UK’s Quality Assurance Agency’s (QAA 2000, 2009) Progress Files
initiative requires universities to provide structure and support for personal
development planning (PDP) for all students. This policy move has resulted in a
flurry of interest in reflection, especially online reflection, and institutions are
embedding PDP at a number of different levels, including by assessing it as part of
the formal curriculum. This policy is having a major impact on how reflection is
perceived and integrated in Higher Education (HE) in the UK: ‘as enshrined in
PDP . . . reflection is now expected to form part of every student’s analytical learning-
to-learn armoury’ (Clegg 2004, 292).
Discourses of reflection: an array of meanings
Apart from the policy drivers mentioned above, reflective writing and practices are
an extremely important element of teaching and learning (and, increasingly,
assessment) in many disciplines, particularly those with a professional or vocational
focus. This does not mean, however, that there is a common definition of reflection
in the literature or in practice. Fendler (2003) draws out four interrelated
theoretical threads of the educational uses of reflection: Cartesian rationality,
Dewey’s reflective thinking, Schön’s reflective practice and feminist concerns with
voice and agency. She argues that discourses around reflective writing in education
are confused and confusing, and incorporate ‘an array of meanings’, including
‘a demonstration of self consciousness, a scientific approach to planning for the
future, a tacit and intuitive understanding of practice, a discipline to become more
professional, a way to tap into one’s authentic inner voice, a means to
become . . . more effective . . ., and a strategy to redress injustices in society’ (2003,
19). Moon, on the other hand, identifies four slightly different theoretical sources
of reflective practices (Dewey, Habermas, Schön and Kolb), but maintains that
these are merely ‘frameworks of meaning’ imposed on the ‘simple mental process’
that is reflection (1999b, 93): a purposeful consideration of complex or open-ended
problems or ideas (98).
My stance is that reflective practices in higher education always produce certain
subject positions and power relations, which are too often ignored or overlooked.
This leaves students and teachers to negotiate extremely tricky practices such as




































































their complexity. Reflection in education is generally grounded in a humanist
discourse of a ‘true’ or ‘central’ self which can be revealed, understood, recorded,
improved or liberated through the process of writing about thoughts and experiences.
This discourse underpins the various projects of reflective writing in higher education
as described by (for example) Boud, Keogh, and Walker (1985), Brockbank and
McGill (1998) and Moon (1999a). However, it is problematic for two main reasons: it
masks the increasingly invasive character of educational practices which demand
confession and self-surveillance as evidence of progress and learning, and it assumes
a knowable, malleable yet cohesive self at its centre. These problems are greatly
exacerbated by the increasingly common use of online and high-stakes reflection, as
we will see.
Raising the stakes: the nature of high-stakes reflection
I group online reflective practices in higher education into four main categories:
informal, extra-curricular, low stakes and high stakes. Some students, tutors,
lecturers and researchers engage in voluntary reflective writing, primarily blogging,
outside the formal structures of their institutions. These practices can be intimately
connected with research, teaching and learning but are informal in nature. Extra-
curricular activities, structures or processes are often put in place in institutions to
support transferable skills, PDP and employability agendas. These are usually
unrelated to formal coursework and are often supported by Career Development
staff, personal tutors or directors of study, or provided as optional and non-
supported activities through an institutional e-portfolio or purpose-built PDP
system. These activities are both dependent upon and intended to foster self-
motivated learners who value reflection and are prepared to invest time in writing
about their own progress in an institutionally provided or sanctioned digital space
(Clegg 2004). The evidence so far indicates that take-up by students in these
initiatives is low, but the rhetoric around these activities will be increasingly heard as
universities invest heavily in systems to meet their obligations under schemes such as
the UK’s QAA’s (2000) Progress Files policy initiative.
Online reflection is often included as part of a course or programme as a non-
assessed, non-compulsory, peer-assessed or minimally formatively assessed compo-
nent. In some cases, this ‘low stakes’ reflection is intended as a developmental stage
towards a summatively assessed project. In other cases, it is supposed to be entirely
student-led and (particularly in professional education) habitual as students strive to
become members of professional communities which prize self-regulation and
continuing professional development. In addition, discourses of ‘effective’ or
‘deep’ learning often privilege the ability to reflect and self-regulate as the hallmark
of a good student (Nota, Soresia, and Zimmerman 2004).
Teachers are sometimes wary of assessing reflective writing directly as it
is assumed to be an inappropriate object of judgement or measures of quality
(Hargreaves 2004, Hinett 2002), and these competing discourses  to be a
good student you have to reflect, but reflective writing belongs outside the academic
gaze  may partly account for the many reports in the literature about confusion and
modest participation from students (Tosh et al. 2005) in low-stakes reflection.



































































I define high-stakes reflection as reflection which is summatively assessed or
which serves a gatekeeping function in terms of entry, progression or continued
membership of a profession or professional body. The specific rubrics or standards
applied to these practices vary from discipline to discipline and course to course, as
do the models of reflection they are based on,1 but they usually involve judgements
of critical thought, the application of theory, evidence of growth and development,
and the impact of institutional learning on individual practice. I propose the
metaphor of high-stakes online reflection as ‘mask’, and I have identified six
(overlapping) genres of mask: performance, disguise, protection, transformation,
discipline and trace.
Performance 2
Theatrical traditions around the world involve performers donning masks to portray
different characters, and Goffman’s (1969) work is extremely helpful in untangling
some of the complexities of identity performance in everyday life. One key issue
documented in recent e-portfolio literature concerns ‘conflicting’ or ‘competing’
paradigms  ‘positivist’ (product-driven, performative, externally assessed, based on
externally defined outcomes) vs. ‘constructivist’ (process-driven, reflective, learner-
constructed outcomes) (Barrett and Carney 2005). The model of a learner-centred
and -owned process, which is intrinsically motivating and a stepping stone towards
lifelong reflective practice, sits on one hand, while on the other are institutional and
professional demands for accountability, evidence and the performance of profes-
sional or academic identities (Barrett and Carney 2005). However, in high-stakes
reflection at least, the apparent tension between these ‘conflicting’ paradigms is in
fact an intrinsic part of reflective writing. When what is being assessed and
monitored is the learner’s ability to be authentically reflective,3 then reflection itself
is performative, and claims for the authenticity and intrinsically motivating nature of
reflection become part of the performance of a reflective identity which is produced





































































The idea of a person’s ‘true self ’ or, in some cases, their deformity, being hidden
behind a mask is an extremely common metaphor in art, literature, popular culture
and in everyday life. Power is also often described as being ‘masked’: ‘power is
tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is
proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms’ (Foucault 1998, 86). This
intersects with a Foucauldian understanding of the workings of neo-liberal
governmentality, where governing power is decentred and located within individuals,
who become responsible for their own surveillance (Lemke 2001). Goals of self-
regulation, authenticity and personal development are intimately connected with
governance, the market and the creation and control of the professional, but these
connections are rarely discussed with or revealed to students, or perhaps even
recognised by teachers.
The rhetoric of self-fulfilment and self-awareness disguises practices that are
fundamentally prescriptive, being bound, as Hargreaves argues, ‘within the ethical
code of [a] profession’ (2004, 200) (perhaps we can substitute ‘ethical code’ and
‘profession’ with ‘learning outcomes’ and ‘course’ here). Rather than being
diametrically opposed to a performative discourse, as Barrett and Carney claim,
learner-centred discourses informing reflective practice in higher education are ‘easily
transformed into the kind of instrumentalism which underpins the increasingly
dominant training and enterprise culture . . . learners can be more readily manipu-
lated under the guise of democratic participation and personal empowerment’
(Usher and Edwards 1994, 29).
Protection
5
Protective masks are worn while doing dangerous activities (fencing or welding for
example). The deliberate use of what Hargreaves (2004) calls ‘legitimate narratives’
of reflection on the part of students can be seen as a way of dealing with stress and
uncertainty, and the sense that their stories and experiences may not be acceptable.
My interviews with students reveal that they generally have a good idea of what is a
legitimate narrative within their own context, and are attentive to the signals that
their teachers give in this respect. Students are also strategic about the extent to



































































which they ‘get personal’ within a high-stakes reflective space, often resisting voicing
what they consider to be personal thoughts or experiences.
Transformation 6
Formal, ritual performances involving masks are transformative in the moment, but
may also have a lasting impact on communities and individuals. Yancey argues that
‘What we ask students to do is who we ask them to be’ (2004, 739), and in many cases
reflective writing is seen by lecturers as ‘good’ if it demonstrates that a student is able
to ‘talk like’ the professional they aspire to be. As I argue in the next section, as
students practice writing within compulsory and often highly structured online
reflective spaces, their own experiences are shaped and transformed. Furthermore,
the personal and professional development agenda in higher education constitutes
individuals as particular sorts of ‘subjects-in-process’, for whom no amount of
development is ever enough: ‘All professional workers need to be developed.
Moreover, there should be no end to this process  the true professional knows
that learning is for life’ (McWilliam 2002, 1). The pressure to be constantly
developing shapes individuals to meet the market’s demand for flexible, self-
regulating workers who will accept employers’ demands for ‘explicit confessional
critical reflection’ (Fenwick 2001, 82), and even to internalise these in forms of
voluntary self-surveillance and confession, an idea I return to in the last section of





































































The scold’s bridle was used in Scotland from at least the mid-sixteenth century to
punish women for talking too much, nagging or inappropriate speech  it worked by
restraining and sometimes injuring the tongue.8 There is self-discipline involved in
establishing habits of reflection and reflective writing, and methods of constraint and
strategies of self-constraint in high-stakes reflection governing what students can and
will say. Furthermore, disciplinarity shapes the sorts of reflection that are desired 
demonstrating again that the notion of ‘reflection’ has many different meanings, as
Fendler (2003) has argued.
Trace 9
The death mask constitutes a physical trace or archive of the person who has died. It
is obviously not for the person it represents, and nor does that person have any say or
control over the matter, making it an interesting route to exploring agency and
archive in online reflective practices. Database-driven technologies for storing the
data produced in online reflection may produce radical recontextualisation of
identity. At the same time, as we will see in the next section, the archive constitutes a
form of compulsory memory over which we may have little control.
So, drawing on the metaphor of the mask, high-stakes online reflection may offer
a narrative of the student’s self, which disguises their more complicated or perhaps
‘illegitimate’ (Hargreaves 2004) thoughts or experiences. It may allow or require
certain types of performances  for example that of the ‘good student’, or the
‘autonomous learner’  and be constraining, painful or transformative as
the student’s voice is disciplined (Foucault 1975) through the analytical interventions
of teachers, peers or professional mentors. Finally, it may constitute traces or



































































archives by which a student’s virtual face can be captured  with or without their
knowledge or consent (Kimball 2005).
There is a tension at the heart of high-stakes reflective practices: the arguments
for assessing reflection assert that it can be assessed because it truthfully captures
traces of students’ developing selfhood, while the practice of assessment itself
destabilises those constructions of selfhood and reveals them to be performances,
disguises and disciplines. For instance, Hargreaves (2004) argues that compulsory
reflective practices are essentially narrative in character. She claims that: ‘in
producing narratives for assessment students are being asked to produce a story,
and . . . in nursing (and possibly other professional settings) only three ‘stories’ are
legitimate’ (199). She identifies these as ‘valedictory’, ‘condemnatory’ and ‘redemp-
tive’ narratives (200). In constructing a narrative for the purposes of assessment, the
successful student understands which kinds of stories are legitimate, and shapes her
words accordingly.
Hargreaves leaves unexplored, however, the question of what the relationship of
these narratives to a true or authentic self might be. To answer this, I turn to
poststructuralist theory, which conceives of subjectivity and language as intimately
entwined. The poststructuralist subject, online or off, does not choose from an
infinite number of possible selves which identity to perform. The relationship
between subjectivity and language is symbiotic: ‘Lives are narratable as coherent in
terms of the categories language makes available’ (Belsey 2002, 51). These categories
of coherence map on to embodied situations: gender, race, class, sexuality and
(dis)ability. They also map on to available social discourses and contexts, out of
which the subject may construct meaningful identities. Perhaps Hargreaves’
legitimate narratives discipline members and prospective members of communities
of practice into certain understandings of themselves and their identities. It may be
impossible to conceive of ‘being a nurse’, for example, without reference to the
categories of coherence and cultural meanings that ‘being a nurse’ makes available.
Davies maintains that the poststructuralist subject ‘is constantly in process; it
only exists as process; it is revised and (re)presented through images, metaphors,
storylines and other features of language, such as pronoun grammar; it is spoken and
respoken, each speaking existing in a palimpsest with the others’ (1997, 275).
Taking up the metaphor of the palimpsest, though, raises the question: is there an
essential self (the ‘paper’ foundation of the layered palimpsest) which can be revealed
through reflection? Or should we ask, with Butler: ‘what kinds of constructions are
foreclosed through the figuring of this site as outside or beneath construction itself ?‘
(1993, 28). We might think of these closed off constructions as ‘traces’, in the
Derridean sense: the (n)ever-present origin, that which is absent and always already
unspeakable when we pretend  for the sake of being able to speak at all  that
concepts like ‘self ’ are clear: ‘the trace is not only the disappearance of origin . . . it
means that the origin did not ever disappear, that it was never constituted except
reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, which then becomes the origin of the origin’
(Derrida 1997, 61).
Online reflection: layering, authenticating and archiving
Working online amplifies the effects of compulsory reflection in the form of assessed




































































the ‘true self ’ and authenticity in educational contexts that legitimise their use.
Online reflective practices occupy the territory of experience and selfhood in
especially volatile and shifting ways. The notion of an authentic, choosing, reflecting
self already brought into question by poststructuralist theory is further destabilised
by digital representations, which are like liquid: always in motion (editable, non-
material), but often leaving permanent traces (archives). A sense of fragmentation
has been shown to be particularly pronounced within certain kinds of environments
on the Internet, in what Turkle describes as: ‘a new practice of identity as multiplicity
in online life’ (1997, 260).
However, the Internet is not a homogenous whole, but a patchwork of different
kinds of spaces and tools, and the ones most likely to be used in higher education are
those where online identities are meant to map fairly closely on to offline ‘student’ or
‘teacher’ identities and bodies (virtual learning environments, for example). Much as
reflection is supposed to authentically mirror a stable, autonomous self, so the
‘walled gardens’ of institutional learning spaces online are supposed to provide the
authentication necessary for both learner and teacher to feel sure that others (and
they) are who they are meant to be. Logging in, in other words, forces us into certain
subject positions (Land and Bayne 2002).
Furthermore, students themselves may strongly resist a loss of control they see
implicit in the possibility of fragmentation online. Bayne (2005) found that students
experience the online self as a threat to the ‘real’ self, and feel themselves to be invited
towards a dangerous fluidity: ‘without the safety net of our commitment to a
truthful, unitary identity, we might fall permanently into another (untrue) version of
ourselves. Identity formation online becomes a performance here, with the risk of the
role taking control of the player’. Students may therefore commit with extra intensity
to ‘authenticating’ the self they perform in reflection online. This authentication may
readily take the form of efforts to ‘prove’ their sincerity through what Foucault
describes as the ‘obligation to confess’, a possibility that reflective practice makes
available and possibly actively encourages (Gilbert 2001). The student may in this
case be both ‘penitent’ and ‘listener’, in the terms of the confession (Hewitt, in
Gilbert 2001, 202), when they try to gain a secure footing online through
confessional reflection, and to be ‘authenticated by the discourse of truth [they
are] obliged to pronounce concerning [themselves]’ (Foucault 1998, 58). Ironically,
the structure of the confessional offered (or at least pretended at) a mask of
anonymity which online reflective practices do not allow. Students are disciplined
from without and within in online reflection by urgent demands for authentication.
Such demands may be both tempered and reinforced by an awareness of the
permanence or potential exposure of the traces being set down online. Database-
driven technologies for storing the data produced in online reflection may, in the case
of public or potentially public reflection (blogs, for instance), produce a radical
recontextualisation, as ‘digital archives allow situational context to collapse with
ease . . . search engines can collapse any data at any period of time’ (Boyd 2001, 33).
At the same time, and regardless of the extent to which it is public, the archive
constitutes a form of compulsory memory over which we may have little control: ‘we
do not produce our databased selves, the databased selves produce us’ (Simon 2005,
16). As Land and Bayne have argued in relation to virtual learning environments,
‘archival fixity and retrievability’ (2002) binds learners to the words and actions of
their online past. Like Kimball, I consider this to be potentially antithetical to the



































































supposedly constructivist and learner-centred pedagogies which underpin much
reflective practice, discouraging students from taking risks, experimenting or
expressing uncertainty (Kimball 2005, 454). However, the ‘institutional appetite for
data’ that Kimball (2005, 438) wants to shield students from is only part of the wider
picture of online reflective practices.
A cultural moment
Online reflective writing in higher education, whether publicly visible, limited to
small groups of learners, or restricted to just a student and their teacher, is
profoundly influenced by wider cultural understandings of blogging and personal
disclosure and risk online. As Carpenter contends, ‘[electronic] environments allow
for and even encourage active integration and dynamic interaction, resulting in a
mixing of genres and literacy practices that does not respect conventional categories,
divisions, or dichotomies, including the border that separates . . . the popular from
the academic’ (2009, 144).
Blogging is a genre which privileges individual voice, addressivity and a blurred
distinction between public and private spheres (Walker 2008). We can see in current
blogging practices both within and outside academia a convergence of the rise of the
concept of personal branding (Lair, Sullivan, and Cheney 2005; Peters 1997), and
what Scott describes as the ‘cultural tendency to seek out confessional narratives of
self-disclosure’ (2004, 92). This convergence exposes a number of tensions: between
self-promotion and authenticity; between accusations of narcissism and pressures to
confess; and between moral panics around privacy and safety and a growing sense
that online invisibility equates to personal and professional negligence, and that the
more presence the better.
The idea that the blog as a whole is a reflection of a coherent and knowable self is
a powerful one for bloggers (Ewins 2005, Holbrook 2006). As Reed comments,
‘[bloggers] treat weblogs as straightforward indexes of self; they commonly assert
that ‘‘my blog is me’’’ (2005, 227). Research is also showing that blog audiences have
strong expectations about the authenticity of bloggers. Freidrich (2007) explicitly
connects the authority of a blog to its perceived authenticity, arguing that online
audiences are especially attuned to cues of authenticity because of the increased
possibility of anonymity and deception accompanying online writing. She maintains
that ‘aware of the constant possibility that a fictional text may be posing as non-
fiction, readers online have been exhaustive in investigating suspicious texts’
(Freidrich 2007, 63). Kitzmann (2003) links audience expectations of online
authorship to Lejeune’s theory of the ‘autobiographical pact’ of truthfulness and
authenticity entered into by authors and readers of work in that genre: ‘web-based
forms of self-documentation are so concerned about . . . violation [of the autobio-
graphical pact] that ‘‘reality’’ has been almost fetishized’ (59). This performance of
truth demanded by audiences in this genre can produce intense feelings of personal
exposure. Curtain (2006) characterises the primary emotion of the blogger as one of
anxiety: ‘Do I updated [sic] enough? Why don’t I write? Who is reading me? Why
aren’t there more? What do they think about what I say?’
Holbrook argues, however, that it is the assumption of truth that matters, and that
many bloggers play with the pact (2006, 9). As well they might, because at the same




































































managerial and market-driven discourse of the ‘personal brand’, essential for success
in today’s world, provokes a calculating and strategic approach to self-disclosure:
A strong personal brand identity ideally can endure for decades . . . To be successful,
aspirants must adapt to the growing maturity of the marketplace, competitive threats,
changes in social mores and values, proliferation of communication channels, and other
factors that serve to challenge brand resilience. How frequently and how radically the
identity is transformed to sustain depends on the aspirant’s sector. (Rein et al. 2005,
349)
Change and development is framed here as a market demand rather than a personal
need  quite different from, and arguably more superficial than, the pedagogical
models of reflection discussed above. The message, however, is the same: change, and
be seen to change. The promise (or threat) of a personal brand which lasts for
decades has echoes of the archive, but is recast as not only a benefit, but one which
can and must be harnessed and controlled by the ‘aspirant’. Indeed, Eichhorn argues
that the concept of the archive itself is changing as a wave of self-representation
emerges: ‘In blogs and other social networking spaces, the drive to collect and re/
present one’s self is apparent in a myriad of emerging forms of expression . . . part of
the radical reconfiguration of the archive currently underway’. (2008, 3)
There is a growing openness in higher education to an e-learning agenda which
positions new digital ‘tools’ as the answer to market needs, globalisation, and a new
generation of so-called digital native consumer-students, without an accompanying
critical stance which would support students and teachers to engage creatively and
carefully with digital practices and cultures. These tools and environments are
neither innocent nor culturally neutral, as they are ‘inscribed with social meaning,
power relations, possibilities for and restrictions on the expression of personal
identity’ (Goodfellow and Lea 2007, 128).
Conclusion
In this paper, I have identified and explored some important theoretical issues
impacting on high-stakes online reflective practices. These are the humanist
discourse underpinning reflective practices; governance, the market and the
discipline of confession and development; the performative nature of assessment
and assessed reflection; masks as metaphors for understanding how students may
knowingly perform or (in the case of the trace) be performed in high-stakes
reflection; the complexity of identity and authenticity online; archives and the
permanence of online data; and cultural understandings of blogging.
There are powerful tensions and traces inherent in these reflective practices. I do
not think that these are grounds for criticising students or teachers, or even
necessarily making the case that reflective practices should be abolished. Rather,
what is needed next is some insight into how people think about, negotiate and
transform these complicated issues in practice, and this is the focus of my research as
it goes forward. After all, as Youdell reminds us, the trace, or ‘subordinate discourse’
in Foucault’s terms, does yet another piece of work:
[Derrida asserts] that any performative is open to misfire and so might fail or
do . . . something unintended or unexpected. And Foucault’s (1990a) account of



































































discourse insists that no discourse is guaranteed  while particular discourses prevail in
some contexts and endure over time, the potential for the meanings of these to shift and/
or for subordinate discourses to unsettle these remains. (2006, 515)
High-stakes online reflective practices constitute a demanding and invasive form of
educational practice. Here the convergence of surveillance, authentication, assess-
ment and reflection exposes students and teachers to a new intensity of gaze and to
increased demands for confession-as-performance. Rather than revealing and
developing a true and unitary self, reflecting online and for assessment produces
fragmented, performing, cautious, strategic selves. As a result, it offers an
opportunity to work with an awareness of audience and the development of
professional and academic voices. As teachers we need to be able to look critically at
these practices and make choices which leave space for us, and our students, to
subvert and unsettle the prevailing discourses of reflection in digital spaces.
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Was That Infinity or Affinity? Applying Insights From Translation 
Studies to Qualitative Research Transcription1
Jen Ross
Abstract: Despite a small but compelling body of literature arguing that transcription represents a 
key moment of choice and the exercise of power in the research process, many qualitative 
researchers appear to believe (or at least proceed as if they believe) that transcription is relatively 
unproblematic. Translation studies and its engagement with visibility, power, authenticity and fidelity 
has a lot to offer to qualitative researchers working critically with transcription theory and practice. 
This paper explores the translation studies theories of equivalence, overt and covert translation, 
foreignisation and domestication, and the remainder, and demonstrates some fertile connections 
between transcription and translation. These connections help us to think about some broader 
political and cultural issues in relation to transcription and academic discourse, the complexity of 
equivalence and the central role of the situated transcriber. 
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"Do I believe 'in fidelity to the original,' you ask. Yes, yes, not because it's possible, 
but because one must try." (SPIVAK, 2001, p.14)
Many qualitative researchers will recognise the sentiment SPIVAK, though talking 
about translation, expresses above: the notion of "fidelity to the original" is one 
that troubles and challenges those of us working critically with an understanding 
of language as non-transparent, meaning as situated, and the power of 
interpretation as fundamental to meaning making. [1]
1 This paper emerged from a seminar presented by the author at the Institute for Advanced 
Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh, 10 February 2009, as part of their 
Translations, Adaptations and Modalities research theme.
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The following extract came from an interview I first encountered in transcript form 
(i.e.: I did not have access to the recordings, and was not present at the interview 
itself):
"it was a first ever class I had taught, he was one of the first students I knew, it's 
something that you know he was at the university as long as I was, so when he left he 
had been there four years, I had been there four years, so I sort of have had an 
infinity with him." (Extract from an interview transcript) [2]
"Infinity with" as opposed to "affinity with" was probably an error in the 
transcription of this interview, but I chose in my analysis not to correct it, as it 
served as a reminder of how full of meaning-making the transcription function is, 
and that there are many other places where "errors" and decisions on the 
transcriber's part will not be visible. This insight is not a new one, as we will see. 
Nevertheless, many qualitative researchers appear to believe (or at least proceed 
as if they believe) that transcription is relatively unproblematic in the sense that 
either meaning is totally separate from form and therefore transcription choices 
are merely a matter of preference (or budget), or that meaning is intrinsically 
bound to form but that an accurate transformation can be produced. [3]
I believe that transcription represents a key moment of choice and the exercise of 
power in the research process. TILLEY and POWICK (2002, p.292) make this 
point, using a metaphor of translation:
"In our research on transcription, we critique the naive realism that leaves 
unquestioned the possibility of an objective transcriber, and ignores the complexities 
of transcription, which resemble more the work of translation than that of 
transference ... We argue with Lapadat and Lindsay and others that transcription is 
an interpretive act." [4]
Translation offers us more than just a metaphor, though. The field of translation 
studies has been engaging with the complexities of translation for more than 30 
years, and scholars in that field share many concerns with qualitative researchers 
(TEMPLE, 2002, p.846). It offers a very rich body of theoretical work which we 
can draw on to get new perspectives on what is at stake in our transcription 
practices. This paper is an attempt to apply some of the insights and debates in 
translation studies to the theory and practice of transcription, paying special 
attention to the idea of visibility—of translator, translation, and process. [5]
I do this by first giving some brief background to the literature on research 
transcription and on translation studies, then discussing how important translation 
studies theories of equivalence, foreignisation and domestication, assumptions 
and the remainder have implications for research transcription. Finally, I offer 
some comments about how the work I have done around transcription and 
translation is impacting on my research practice, and how I think this productive 
critical connection might be taken forward. [6]
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2. Research Transcription in Context
"The problems of selective observation are not eliminated with the use of recording 
equipment. They are simply delayed until the moment at which the researcher sits 
down to transcribe the material from the audio- or videotape." (OCHS, 1979, p.44)
"By neglecting issues of transcription, the interview researcher's road to hell becomes 
paved with transcripts." (KVALE, 1996, p.166)
In 2000, Judith LAPADAT criticised the lack of attention given to the issues and 
complications inherent in transcription (p.204). The transformation of speech to 
text is a component of many qualitative methods in social science research. 
Interviews and focus groups are routinely used as techniques of data generation, 
and these events are typically recorded with an audio recorder and later 
transcribed, either by the interviewer or another researcher or, as commonly, by 
someone outside the immediate research project or setting—an external 
transcriber2. [7]
Despite its widespread use and importance in qualitative research, approaches to 
transcription in qualitative research literature were, and remain, varied. Many 
general texts are more or less silent on the matter. For example, DENZIN and 
LINCOLN (2005), one of the most widely cited of mainstream qualitative research 
texts, barely mentions transcription, and only one chapter (peripherally) discusses 
it as a potential site of interest (CHASE, 2005, p.665). Other literature tends to 
focus on practicalities such as cost and time, as LAPADAT and LINDSAY point 
out (1999, p.77), but not the epistemological or methodological implications of 
transcription. [8]
Others take transcription seriously as a research challenge, but maintain that it 
can be done accurately. SILVERMAN claims that transcripts can "offer a highly 
reliable record" (2001, p.13), and calls on researchers to adopt some of the 
practices of conversation analysis (CA). CA, which studies talk and interaction, 
employs standardised conventions, symbols and notation to attempt to capture, in 
text, features of breath, pause, changes in pitch and volume, and emphasis from 
recordings of conversations. CA transcripts are extremely detailed, in response to 
analysts' need to meticulously examine these different aspects of talk. For 
example:




25 Lyn [heh heh ºheh hehº=
2 This is a practice which is fraught with many complications around the low status of the work, 
lack of guidance and context given to transcribers, and the effects of transcriber distance from 
the research, which are well documented by TILLEY and POWICK (2002).
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26 Zoe [hh what ye' DOINg then
27 Lyn =hahh hahh hahh
28 (1.0)
29 Zoe wh't's the ↑point:h
30 (1.5)
31 Zoe ↑oh ↑go:d (.) look what ↑I'm wearing (ANTAKI, 2009, n.p.) [9]
These transcription practices produce texts which bear little resemblance to 
typical academic prose, but the record of pause lengths and specialised notation, 
for example, imply that these texts are scientific, technical and precise. [10]
Authors working in other traditions tend to dismiss the idea of a "reliable" 
transcription. A "post-structuralist turn" (DAVIES & DAVIES, 2007) in the social 
sciences has opened up questions about the relationship of language and 
meaning. LAPADAT and LINDSAY (1999) point out the irony of replicating 
discredited assumptions of transparency in transcription practices (1990, p.65), 
while RIESSMAN notes that "transforming spoken language into a written text is 
now taken quite seriously because thoughtful investigators no longer assume the 
transparency of language" (1993, p.12). KVALE (1996) devotes a whole chapter 
in his popular book on interviewing to transforming speech to text, and he 
encourages readers to think of transcriptions as "interpretive constructions": "the 
question 'What is the correct transcription?' cannot be answered—there is no 
true, objective transformation from the oral to the written mode. A more 
constructive question is: 'What is a useful transcription for my research 
purposes?'" (pp.165-66). [11]
Narrative analysts such as RIESSMAN and MISHLER look at stories as important 
units of meaning, and are often interested in the effect of the way that 
researchers choose to represent oral narratives in written form on the page, since 
"textual display, a re-presentation of speech, is in itself a rhetorical device" 
(MISHLER, 2003, p.304). MISHLER gives several examples of the same stretch 
of talk, transcribed in different ways, to illustrate that "transcriptions of speech, 
like other forms of representation in science, reflexively document and affirm 
theoretical positions" (2003, p.310). In other words, transcripts are highly 
individual, saying as much about the transcriber as the transcribed. Attempting 
"fidelity to the original", in this case, is an interpretive and perhaps even creative 
process on the part of the transcriber—whomever he or she may be, and 
whatever his or her relationship to the research. [12]
Even if we accept the non-transparency of transcription as a positive—or at least 
unavoidable—part of the research process, though, this does not mean that we 
understand all the implications and limitations of our choices. Theories of 
translation offer some new ways of seeing these choices and constraints, and I 
believe they can help move the theoretical discussion and debate about 
transcription forward in fruitful new directions. [13]
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3. Some Background to Translation Studies
Translation theory and practice has been written about for centuries but, 
according to BASSNETT (1996), the field of translation studies emerged in the 
1970s, in parallel with "polysystems theory" (systems within systems, of which the 
literary system is one, and the social system thought to be another—CLASSE, 
2000, p.1098) in the humanities and an increasing resistance to the conception of 
translation as a "secondary, second class activity" (BASSNETT, 1996, p.12). In 
the decades since, theorists in the field have drawn extensively from post-
colonial, post-structuralist and feminist theory, literary studies, linguistics, 
anthropology and translation's own long history. BASSNETT traces a shift in 
emphasis from history in the 1970s, to power in the 1980s and visibility in the 
1990s (1996, p.22). These themes continue to be important today, along with 
what VENUTI calls an "ethics of difference" (1998)—an emphasis on diversity, 
difference and the politics of otherness. Theories of globalisation and networks 
are also coming to the fore in translation studies today (CRONIN, 2003). [14]
VENUTI, in the introduction to his "Translation Studies Reader", describes the 
collection's scope and organisation as follows:
"Selections can be grouped to explore basic concepts of language (instrumental vs 
hermeneutic), key theoretical concepts (translatability and relative autonomy, 
equivalence and shifts, reception and function), recurrent translation strategies (free 
vs literal, dynamic vs formal, domesticating vs foreignising), and various cultural and 
political issues (identity and ideology, power and minority situation)" (2005, p.7). [15]
The ideas I am touching on in this paper: equivalence, overt and covert 
translation, foreignisation and domestication, and the remainder, take up and cut 
across themes of power, visibility and otherness. Although I will push what I see 
as the parallels between translation and transcription in the social sciences as far 
as I can in what follows, it seems important to say that some of the most 
compelling ideas and themes in translation studies—the marginalisation and 
othering of cultural difference, globalisation and the politics of language and the 
canon—cannot be adequately addressed in such a comparison. I recommend 
VENUTI's work (1998), as well as that of BASSNETT (1980, 1996), BAKER 
(2005) and HERMANS (1996, 2002) for those wishing to learn more about 
translation studies beyond what is discussed in this paper. [16]
4. Equivalence
One of the key theoretical contributions of translation studies is in the evolving 
and contested understanding of what makes a good translation—fidelity and 
equivalence are complex and shifting concepts which are deeply engaged with by 
translation scholars. Indeed, equivalence would seem to be a shared central 
issue in both transcription and translation: how to create a target-text which bears 
the closest possible relationship to the source-text (or data). What this actually 
means, or what a "good translation" might be, is the subject of much debate in 
translation studies. For example, HOUSE (2006) argues that equivalence is 
© 2010 FQS http://www.qualitative-research.net/
FQS 11(2), Art. 2, Jen Ross: Was That Infinity or Affinity? 
Applying Insights From Translation Studies to Qualitative Research Transcription
extremely complex, as it is socially and historically determined, and affected by 
the constraints of specific languages, linguistic and social conventions, as well as 
the translator's comprehension, creativity, and implicit theories (2006, p.344). She 
makes the distinction between overt and covert translation—a covert translation 
"is a translation which enjoys the status of an original source text in the target culture. 
The translation is covert because it is not marked pragmatically as a translation of a 
source text but may, conceivably, have been created in its own right" (p.347). [17]
An overt translation, on the other hand, "is not as it were a 'second original'" 
(ibid.) and not directed at the target audience. A translator producing a covert 
translation is therefore concerned with equivalence at a contextual (social, 
cultural) level, while someone producing an overt translation might be more 
concerned with equivalence at a textual level (creating a word-for-word match, for 
example). [18]
The difference between contextual and textual equivalence is illustrated simply by 
BASSNETT (1980), who gives as an example a description of the English word 
"butter" and the Italian word "burro". Both refer to the same substance, but the 
cultural significance and practical uses of butter in Britain are quite different from 
burro in Italy, so "the problem of equivalence here involves the utilization and 
perception of the object in a given context. The butter-burro translation, whilst 
perfectly adequate on one level, also serves as a reminder ... that each language 
represents a separate reality" (p.19). [19]
In transcription, we might consider a covert transcription as one which blends in 
seamlessly to material which was "born" textual, while an overt transcription might 
look more like what is often called "verbatim" transcription—marked by its origins 
in speech: repetition, hesitation, stumbles and interruptions, for example. The 
former would achieve equivalence in the sense that it provided readers with a 
comfortable reading experience, that it gave the appearance of transparency of 
meaning, and that it did not break the flow of prose or stand out in an academic 
text. The latter might achieve equivalence by recording (or attempting to record) 
each verbal utterance as text, even if it drew attention to itself by being manifestly 
un-text-like. [20]
HOUSE maintains that different types of translation are appropriate for different 
purposes, and this may be the case with transcription as well. However, the 
decision about which to attempt is complicated by the significant practical and 
political implications of visibility (of the translator and the translation). The rest of 
this paper is devoted to these implications. [21]
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5. (In)visibility 1: Domestication and Foreignisation
VENUTI's concepts of domestication and foreignisation are extremely useful in 
theorising transcription practices. These concepts are essentially a reworking of 
HOUSE's overt and covert translation model, where domestication implies 
assimilation to dominant "home" values of the target culture, while foreignisation 
is a deliberate othering or making strange of the target text to highlight its source 
in another place and/or time. [22]
What sets VENUTI's concepts apart, however, is his attention to the political and 
ideological implications of translation and the way he links these strategies 
explicitly to concerns of power, subordination and cultural marginalisation. He 
argues that translation is "fundamentally ethnocentric", and that "the very function 
of translating is assimilation, the inscription of a foreign text with domestic 
intelligibilities and interests" (VENUTI, 1998, p.11). Later he draws on BERMAN, 
who writes of the problems of ethnocentrism and the desirability of preserving 
"foreignness": "A bad translation I call the translation which, generally under the 
guise of transmissibility, carries out a systematic negation of the strangeness of 
the foreign work" (BERMAN, 1992, p.5). [23]
BUCHOLTZ (2000), in her work on the politics of transcription, identifies many 
important ways in which transcription can demonstrate attitudes towards race, 
otherness and power, for example. To this I would add that considering the 
politics of transcription in terms of foreignisation and domestication invites a look 
at academic discourse in the social sciences and the privileged status of what is 
generally thought of as "academic" prose over alternative forms of knowing and 
expression. As BAYNE argues, the scholarly written text "is still the primary 
marker of academic legitimacy. The linear, logically-developing scholarly text, 
with its hierarchical structure and build toward conclusion, is still the primary 
expression of the academic mind" (2006, p.1). [24]
If we consider academic writing as the dominant mode of discourse in the social 
sciences, then it becomes possible to explore transcription as an act of either 
domestication to or foreignisation from that discursive centre. The question: "Can 
a translator maintain a critical distance from domestic norms without dooming a 
translation to be dismissed as unreadable?" (VENUTI, 1998, p.84) becomes 
highly relevant to transcription, and indeed helps us to understand some of the 
discomfort and resistance to more verbatim forms of transcription in academic 
writing and publishing. For example, a recent referee's report for a paper I co-
authored included the following comment: "my view is that the reproduction of the 
interviewee's verbal tics (such as 'um') may be the convention but it is irrelevant 
and obtrusive". This reader manifestly did not wish to be reminded that the 
interview data we were presenting was not born textual. [25]
The referee went further, however, and suggested that our form of transcription 
"undermines the authority of the interviewee in contrast to the authority of the 
academic text". The issue of authority explored in some detail by NESPOR and 
BARBER (1995), as they explain that they invited interviewees to edit and rewrite 
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portions of the transcripts made from their interviews in order to protect them 
from looking "ignorant", or like "subordinate writers" in contrast to the academic 
prose of the researchers. They further argue that: "researcher-writers say of 
'faithful' transcriptions that 'that's the way people really speak' ... but that is never 
completely true. People do not speak on paper" (NESPOR & BARBER, 1995, 
p.57). [26]
Is it the case that most people are so unfamiliar with the difference between 
speech and writing that they would consider a verbatim transcription to imply 
ignorance? It would seem so, but this does not necessarily suggest that we ought 
to protect their ignorance. And, while the argument that NESPOR and BARBER 
make—that attempting to capture the flow of conversation in transcription is 
misguided, as "people do not speak on paper"—may on the face of it seem 
sensible, foreignising strategies are not necessarily bound to notions of accuracy. 
Indeed, as BAYNE argues of non-linear digital texts (2006, p.1), transcriptions 
may usefully problematise and destabilise domestic norms of academic writing, 
and allow us to recognise them as constructed, not transparent, forms. [27]
WATSON gets at the same idea in a different way—talking of the relocation of 
the researcher in relation to the data that transcription makes necessary: 
"Metaphors of transcription tend to emphasize a process by which a fluid and 
dynamic interaction is made static and thus necessarily reduced. ... The transcript 
needs to be reconstituted through analysis and bears much the same relationship to 
the original data as a prune, when rehydrated, does to a plum. But prunes are not 
necessarily inferior to plums; rather, they do 'being fruit' in different ways. Whereas 
the interview is the immediate immersed research context, the transcription serves to 
relocate the researcher enabling a different relationship to the data to be developed" 
(2006, p.374). [28]
However, while appearing to celebrate this relocation, she immediately goes on to 
point out that "an ironic feature of transcription is that the greater the attempt to 
convey nuance through transcription conventions the less natural the transcription 
appears" (ibid.). If we attempt to include foreignised transcripts in our analyses 
and publications, there will inevitably be a strangeness to the texts we produce. 
The question is, do we do more harm or more good in making our translations 
and transcriptions visible, and perhaps able to be dismissed as impossibly other? 
As VENUTI asks, "to what extent does such an ethics [of difference] risk 
unintelligibility, by decentering domestic ideologies, and cultural marginality, by 
destabilizing the workings of domestic institutions?" (1998, p.84) [29]
Indeed, foreignisation can render strange and essentially "other" not only the text 
but also the source culture, thereby inviting a domestic audience to observe at a 
distance, and to marginalise a foreign culture as hopelessly different and 
unreachable, and possibly, in the presence of a colonial impulse, needing 
intervention. CARBONELL argues that "the processes of cultural difference allow 
desired knowledges that satisfies the needs of the West, rather than the 
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knowledge genuinely deployed by the Other (either the East, the Third World, the 
Primitive or even the Ancient)" (1996, p.92). [30]
The translator's dilemma is clearly ours as well, as "the differences between the 
oral and the written language contexts become critical through the transcription 
from an oral to a written modality (MISHLER, 1991)" (KVALE, 1996, p.44). 
BUCHOLTZ distinguishes between naturalised and denaturalised transcriptions, 
and, following OCHS, calls for proponents of each style of transcription to 
"unsettle" and experiment with the other to see what difference it makes, and 
what they can learn (2000, pp.1461-2). [31]
However, sometimes the component parts of the process of translation—the text, 
or the translator—reveal themselves whether or not we choose them. This brings 
us on to assumptions, accidents and LECERCLE's (1990) notion of the 
"remainder". [32]
6. (In)visibility 2: Assumptions, Accidents and Remainders
6.1 Assumptions and accidents
The effects of the translator and transcriber emerge not only from their conscious 
strategies, but also from the unconscious assumptions (and errors) they make. 
Sometimes in translation these assumptions are brought starkly to light by the 
passage of time or alternative translations; in qualitative research transcription 
this will rarely if ever be the case3. [33]
This may be one reason why translation studies has addressed this issue in such 
depth: it has become clear that reasonable people can disagree about the best 
way to translate any given passage. The entire debate about equivalence rests 
on this premise. BAKER identifies as a key discourse of translation the depiction 
of translators as "honest and detached brokers who operate largely in the 'spaces 
between' cultures ... who can transcend any cultural or political affiliation, at least 
while they're engaged in the highly romanticised task of translating" (2006, p.11). 
She problematises this discourse in the context of cultural meta-narratives, and 
argues that "no one, translators included, can stand outside or between 
narratives" (p.12). This echoes the arguments of many qualitative researchers; 
OLIVER, SEROVICH and MASON, for example, explain that "a transcriber hears 
the interview through his/her own cultural-linguistic filters" (2005, p.1282). [34]
A recent accident provides a fortunate opportunity for an example. A set of 
interview recordings was sent out to a transcription company, who had several 
transcribers working on them. One recording was accidentally transcribed twice, 
by two different transcribers. Each had access to the same audio file, style sheet 
and list of words and phrases which were likely to appear, and the instruction to 
3 In large part this is due to the almost ubiquitous commitment to anonymity that researchers 
make to their interviewees, which make audio or video recordings off limits to anyone outside 
the research team. In an important sense, therefore, the transcript, not the recording, becomes 
the original in a way a translation may not seem to.
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transcribe verbatim, noting pauses, laughter and other non-linguistic happenings 
where possible. [35]
It would be possible to choose literally any part of these two transcripts to 
illustrate the point that no two people hear or represent in the same way—from 
the very first line, the transcripts differ. In fact, one transcript is 25 pages long, 
and the other is 82! However, the extract below illustrates, I think, that the line 
between an error and an assumption may be very fine indeed. 
Extract 1 (transcriber A):
IE: you know, this is—there was a huge long phase right at the beginning of all of this 
when all of us together collectively struggled, because nobody knew what this thing 
was, you know, we were trying to create something and what did it do and what could 
it do, and, um, particularly because we had to make these things and then the 
technology, if you like, came afterwards, um, what's going to be very different now is 
that the technology is there upfront, and you're populating something that exists, um, 
I think one of the things that—I'm sure it's not just me, everybody has struggled with 
all the way through, is how much you might want to say to your user in terms of 
words, this—online things are quite clunky. Well, here's a bit of background 
information that you need to know, for you to—I mean, giving up, also what we've 
been doing on history [resources], you know, launch cold into—to make sensible 
judgments in history you actually have to know something about what you're dealing 
with and how you deal with all of that issue, how you deal with just plunging into the 
middle of something and not being—I mean I set these couple of maths ones for my 
things, I must have been mad, I was a primary school teacher, I have taught lots of 
primary maths in my time, it was rather a long time ago.
Extract 2 (transcriber B):
IE: So, you know, there's a huge, great, long phase right at the beginning of all of it...
IV: Uhuh ...
IE: When all of us, together, collectively struggled because nobody knew what this 
thing was, you know
IV: Mmhm
IE: We were trying to create something and what did it do and what could it do?
IV: Ahuh...
IE: And, um ... particularly because we had to make these things and then... the 
technology, if you like, came afterwards
IV: yeah
IE: Um ... What's going to be very different now, is that the technology is there up 
front and you're populating something that exists
IV: Mmhm ...
IE: um ... I think one of the things that—I'm sure it's not just me—everybody has 
struggled with, all the way through ... is, how much you might want to say to your user
IV: Mmhm
IE: In terms of words ... because ...
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IV: Right, okay, in what way?
IE: online things are quite funky ...
IV: Right
IE: Well ... here's a bit of background information that you need to know before you...
IV: Okay 
IE: You know ... and we've given up also what we've been doing on history 
[resources] ...
IV: Mmhm
IE: You know, launch cold into ... [pause] to make sensible judgements in history, you 
had to actually know something about ...
IV: Right
IE: Something you're dealing with and how you deal with all of that issue
IV: Uhuh ...
IE: How you deal with just plunging into the middle of something
IV: Okay
IE: Um ... and not being ... I mean I've [unclear 14.23] there's a couple of maths ones 
for my sins—I must be mad! [Laughter] You know, I was a primary schoolteacher, I 
have taught lots of binary maths in my time; it was just a rather long time ago ...
IV: [chuckle] [36]
The description of "online things" as either "funky" or "clunky" made quite a 
difference to the point the interviewee is making—she is either celebrating or 
bemoaning the current state of technology, and the need for interventions by 
teachers in online learning contexts, and which is which hinges on that word. In 
transcription as in other contexts, "what people hear depends on what they expect 
to hear" (HUTCHINS & KLAUSEN, 2000, p.5), and these assumptions at the 
transcribing stage can greatly affect the resulting analysis of research data. [37]
There are many other discrepancies between the two extracts. My aim here is not 
to "lament variability" (BUCHOLTZ, 2002, p.785), but to ask (as BUCHOLTZ 
does) what it might imply. For the biggest difference between the extracts—both 
ostensibly "verbatim"—is what the transcriber has chosen to do with the 
interviewer's interjections. In Extract 1, these are excised completely. The 
transcriber believed or decided in this case that the interviewer's turns in this 
stretch of talk were not relevant. Indeed, in themselves they might not carry much 
meaning. Arguably the same information is conveyed in both extracts. However, 
Extract 2 gives a much different impression of what was happening than Extract 
1: it shows the interviewer encouraging, laughing, and asking for clarification and 
expansion, it implies a level of rapport and sympathy between the people in the 
conversation. Extract 1 is far more prose-like, and more expository. It makes it 
sound as if the interviewee is volunteering information without prompting. It 
erases its own context. This could be a result of the transcriber being tired, 
pressed for time, or bored, but it could just as easily reflect his or her implicit 
assumptions about the nature of interviews, conversation or research. [38]
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6.2 Remainders
Sometimes the nature of the text itself makes the translator more visible. Some 
theorists have argued, in fact, that there will always be inadvertent gain 
associated with translation, because words always have meanings and 
associations which differ between languages. LECERCLE (1990) calls this gain 
"the remainder", and VENUTI notes that it "violates ... the 'virtual reality' created 
in the translation ... because the variables it contains can introduce a competing 
truth or break the realist illusion" (1998, p.22). The realist illusion is broken by 
some texts in especially apparent ways—DERRIDA's work is a frequently cited 
example. HERMANS (2002) recounts a story of a passage in which DERRIDA:
"having used the term 'fake-out', carries on for a few sentences and then suddenly 
retraces his steps, wondering 'I cannot imagine how Sam Weber is going to translate 
"fake-out"' (1997b: 213); it is a peculiar statement to make, for in the translation we 
are reading the term has already been translated by Sam Weber, a few sentences 
earlier, without a hitch. ... In anticipating what subsequently turned out to be a non-
problem for the translator, Derrida not only implicated the translator in the translation, 
but allowed us to register Weber's discursive presence in the curious situation where, 
having adequately dealt with 'contre-pied' as 'fake-out', the translator is taken back to 
the corresponding French term which he is now obligated to leave untranslated ..." 
(p.14). [39]
Calling this a "convoluted case", HERMANS goes on to cite a more 
straightforward example of a translator being forced to draw attention to a 
translation, and argues that: "in manifestly declining to be translated ... the 
passage reminds the reader that behind the words as they appear on the page 
there is another discourse in a different language" (p.15). [40]
Such rem(a)inders can appear noticeably in transcripts as well, as with this 
extract from a recent interview between my colleague and a school pupil, talking 
about technology in schools: 
Pupil: "But the annoying thing is, the really annoying thing about the restrictions on 
these computers that gets me so angry, I'm actually putting my hand up and down 
really quickly, you can't obviously see that because it's on a tape recorder ..." [41]
This breaking of the illusion that the transcript can capture everything—a 
reminder of what is lost—is only part of what makes this interesting. In signalling 
his awareness of the digital recorder and its purpose (to provide a recording 
which stands in for the interview itself), the interviewee draws attention to the 
constructedness of both the situation and his account. The "you" he speaks to is 
not the interviewer he is conversing with, but the reader, through the transcriber. 
This playfulness and troubling of the process matters because, even when not 
made explicit in this way, transcriptions and translations are suspect, problematic, 
and utterly imperfect. They are laden with interpretation, mistakes, leftovers and 
strategies, whatever the extent to which the transcriber or researcher chooses to 
domesticate what remains. [42]
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7. Conclusion: Moving Forward with Transcription 
This paper has demonstrated some fertile connections between transcription and 
translation, connections which help us to think about some broader political and 
cultural issues in relation to transcription and academic discourse, the complexity 
of equivalence and the central role of the situated transcriber. I have certainly 
found these to be important ideas in my own development as a researcher. [43]
I started out in my own doctoral research project wanting each of my transcripts 
to be as faithful a representation of the interview as possible. For me this has 
always meant attempting to transcribe everything that is said, including repetition, 
stumbles and the rest, despite the messiness and troublesomeness of producing 
and then citing or working with these transcripts. For one thing, I thought, how 
would I decide what to leave out if I were to deliberately selectively transcribe? I 
told myself that I knew this was still my interpretation, and that I would be highly 
selective when I came to writing up my research, and I told myself I was 
acknowledging that. But I do not think I was. I really wanted my data to sound 
authentic, and I had not deeply examined what I meant by that. [44]
In her beautiful book about language and identity, "Lost in Translation", Eva 
HOFFMAN writes that " ... in my translation therapy, I keep going back and forth 
over the rifts, not to heal them but to see that I—one person, first-person singular 
—have been on both sides" (1998, p.273). I think doing this work around 
translation and transcription has freed me up to live with the contradictions in my 
practice. I still find myself trying to honour the voices in my interviews on their 
own terms, even while I am more aware now that what I make of them must, 
necessarily, be in my own voice. I have not given up on fidelity—"not because it's 
possible, but because one must try". [45]
However, I have a new goal now, too—to use my transcription practice to trouble 
and challenge the dominant discourse of academic writing in ways that leave 
more room for different modes and voices. I want the remainders, the foreignness 
and the accidents to be front and centre, because I believe that there is value in 
mess and uncertainty, and in problematising our reliance on certain forms of 
academic writing as "stable materialisations of the workings of the reasoning 
mind" (BAYNE, 2006, p.1), to the exclusion of all others. [46]
Reasonable people can and will disagree about this, and many research projects 
will not have representing interviewee voices or deconstructing the academy as 
goals. However, in this case a cigar is never just a cigar—all researchers should 
be alert to the negotiations and assumptions transcription involves. Not attending, 
not actively choosing, does not mean that no choice is being made, because 
"researchers make choices about transcription that enact the theories that they 
hold. If these theories and their relationships to research processes are left 
implicit, it is difficult to examine them or to interpret the findings that follow from 
them" (LAPADAT & LINDSAY, 1999, p.66). [47]
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One unavoidable issue here is that transcribing in any but the most cursory of 
ways is extremely time consuming, and one thing researchers usually lack is 
time. We do not generally cost time for transcription in to our research bids, or if 
we do it is to pay external transcribers. It would be good to see more work that 
follows up on TILLEY and POWICK (2002) and McLELLAN, MacQUEEN and 
NEIDIG (2003), but which draws on translation studies literature and on the 
experiences of translators, and suggests strategies for working with external 
transcribers in ways which take account of the conceptual and theoretical issues 
in the transcription process. There is also every reason to believe that voice 
recognition software may someday soon be used for some forms of transcription 
(MATHESON, 2007), which will bring us a whole new set of questions about the 
meanings of accuracy and interpretation, and for which, again, we may be able to 
turn to translation studies for some insights. [48]
Going forward, I would also like qualitative researchers to do more work on 
foreignisation and domestication, understanding better how we shape our 
transcripts to meet or resist certain kinds of expectations and desires within the 
academy. [49]
Translation studies and its engagement with visibility, power, authenticity and 
fidelity has a lot to offer to qualitative researchers working critically with 
transcription theory and practice. We must continue to look for new perspectives 
and strategies which put transcription in its rightful place, as a crucial stage of 
meaning making in research, and an important subject for theoretical discussion 
and debate. [50]
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